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Part I: Introduction 
In 1658 one third of Denmark was ceded to Sweden. The Swedes had invaded the 
western and central parts of the country and were laying siege to Copenhagen. In a 
situation where the country’s very existence was threatened, the government decided 
to give in to the enemy’s demands and surrender the eastern parts of the country that 
bordered on Sweden. The treaty of Roskilde stated that Scania (Skåne), Halland, 
Blekinge and Bornholm, the so-called Scanian provinces, would remain under 
Swedish rule for ever and ever. However, war soon br ke out again. A conspiracy 
against the Swedes led to the Danish take-over of the island of Bornholm but in the 
rest of Scania the conspiracy failed when the brains behind it were betrayed.1 
Technically, Scania (except Bornholm) had become a part of Denmark under Swedish 
rule. The treaty of Roskilde allowed the Scanians to keep their old Scanian Law and 
the inhabitants’ customs and religious ceremonies wre to be kept intact as long as 
they did not clash with Swedish fundamental law. In reality, a number of changes 
were soon enough introduced, although it has long been disputed what impact they 
had on the Scanians. Some of the novelties included the billeting of Swedish troops 
with local families, the introduction of the Swedish mercantilist system and the 
replacement of many native civil servants with Swedes and non-Danish foreigners in 
Swedish service.2 A number of trade routes were cut off or changed, sometimes for 
the better, but sometimes also for the worse. In the same manner the Scanians now 
gained access to the Swedish legal system, which not only meant that the peasantry 
had their own representatives in the Diet but also that the Scanians avoided Absolutist 
rule as it was established in Denmark in 1660.     
 
Then the Danes returned to Scania. In June 1676 the Danish army landed at Råå, just 
south of Helsingborg, and they quickly re-conquered the lost lands with the exception 
of the province capital of Malmö (Malmøe) 3 and a few other enclaves. Half a year 
later the Swedes were back. They beat the Danes in the battle of Lund but most parts 
                                               
1 The most exhaustive description of the conspiracy is to be found in Knud Fabricius’s Skaanes 
overgang fra Danmark til Sverige, (Scania’s Transition from Denmark to Sweden), Copenhagen 1906),  
vol. 1, pp. 98-131.  
2 Alf Erlandsson, Skånska generalguvernementet och dess arkiv. Förvaltnings-och arkivhistoriska 
undersökningar, (The Scanian Government General and its Archives), Lund 1967, esp. pp. 138-152. 
3  In the text I have generally used the modern Swedish place names that are in use today, putting the 
old Danish version in brackets. I have tried to indicate both the Danish and Swedish names or spellings, 
unless where I have not been able to trace one or the other. In the case of Malmö, both versions existd 
during the Scanian War but “Malmøe” was more common in the Danish sources.   
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of Scania remained no man’s land for the following three years. The Danes kept the 
cities of Landskrona (Lands Crone) and Kristianstad (Christianstad), the Swedes 
stayed in Malmö and the rest of the lands were in the hands of whoever had the most 
powerful arms. Normally this third factor was constituted by the so-called snaphaner, 
locals that fought the Swedes with what we today would call guerrilla techniques.4 
During the course of the war these irregular combatants were recognised by the 
Danish king if they would enlist in particular units and adhere to a minimum of 
martial law. These troops were then given the name of The King’s Friskytter and it is 
on them that this thesis will concentrate.  
 
Maybe the snaphaner/friskytter is the dominating sile theme of the sources that 
remain from the Scanian war, on both sides. It is difficult to find a letter, report, 
newssheet or book from the time that does not mention the snaphaner/friskytter, 
especially from the summer of 1677 until the end of the war. In order to be able to see 
whether the snaphaner and friskytter could be classified as guerrillas or irregulars I 
will study their operations during the Scanian War in detail and also analyse the 
reports and letters that they sent to HQ during this war, in order to find out what lines 
mobilisation followed (communal ones?), what sort of men the leaders were, what the 
relationship to the Danish regular army was and how/if they related to other rebel 
movements or irregular troops in Europe. In his disertation Der kleine Krieg 
Johannes Kunisch discerned a close connection between th  rise of the Absolutist 
states and the growing importance of irregular troops.5 Kunisch primarily studied 
Austrian irregular troops from 1740-1790 but most of his theories can be applied to 
late 17th century Scandinavia as well; what interested Kunisch was the nexus 
absolutism-irregular troops and the friskytter/snaphaner fit perfectly into this pattern 
since they were the result of the similar processes in the Danish and Swedish armies.6  
 
                                               
4 The Swedish governor general Jöran Sperling even imagined that the snaphaner would take over the 
whole country. See: Letter from Sperling to the king, 1678, Swedish National Archives (SRA): 
”...snapphanarna ämna Kristianstad blockera, att fästningen snart skall  bliva uppgiven och att sedan 
hela landet utöver skall falla i deras våld.” Quote: Johnsson, p.133. 
5 See: Johannes Kunisch Der kleine Krieg. Studien zum Heerwesen des Absoluti m s, Frankfurter 
Historische Abhandlungen, Band 4, Steiner Verlag GMBH Wiesbaden, 1973, pp.1-4. Quote: p.1. 
6 Although the king of Sweden, Charles XI, had not yet become absolutist at the time of the Scanian 
War, his army already shared some of the characteristics that Johannes Kunisch described as typical of 
absolutist armies. However, it should be pointed out that some traits that were characteristic of the 
Swedish army, such as the “indelningsverk” reform that tied the soldiers to the soil and to agricultural 
life in times of peace, were not shared by other Absolutist armies.   
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In the first part of this thesis I will take into cnsideration the development of the 
snaphane movement from the end of the Scandinavian (K lmar) Union until the last 
snaphane trials at the beginning of the 18th century.7 However, the emphasis will be 
on the Scanian War when the King’s Friskytter Corps wa  established, and more 
specifically on the time from the battle of Lund in December 1676 until 
approximately the execution of baron Krabbe in January 1678, a period that was 
crucial and which saw both the foundation of the official Friskytter Corps and the 
radicalisation of the Swedish measures against all friskytter and snaphaner. The 
snaphaner/friskytter8 were generally perceived of as profoundly anti-Swedish. If one 
asks what it meant to be anti-Swedish one must also ask what it meant to be Swedish, 
Danish or Scanian at the time. It is important to stress that I do not take for granted 
that the snaphaner/friskytter were anti-Swedish but only that they were accused of 
being so by the Swedes.  
 
It is difficult for us today to understand how people in the 17th century experienced 
the coming of new overlords and having to get used to a new culture. It is even more 
difficult to understand the impact that war, torture and general devastation had upon 
these people. Although the main scope of this thesis r mains an attempt at classifying 
the snaphaner/friskytter from a rather technical point f view I will also try to analyse 
the collective cultural identities of the people that left traces of their views and of their 
perception of themselves and the world in the sources, although this remains a minor 
theme. I will do that against a background of theories of the origins of nations and 
nationalism with special emphasis on the ones that have provided me with the 
necessary analytical tools. I hope that my dissertation will help me understand how 
identities were constructed in 17th century Scandinavia. Cultural, ethnic and territorial 
                                               
7 If indeed something like a ”movement” in the sense of an “organisation” existed, which I do not take 
for granted at all. It is, however, a term that hasbeen widely used in both scholarly and less scholarly 
works on the issue and it is common in daily speech. In this dissertation I will use it as a working 
hypothesis and for commodity, but since I sincerely doubt the existence of a movement in any but the 
vaguest sense of the word, I will analyse the whole idea of a movement in the light of the sources that 
constitute the basis for the chapter on the snaphaner. As Clutterbuck (p.27) has pointed out, the 
expression “guerrilla movement” (in this case “snaph ne movement”) does not necessarily imply any 
tighter knit organisation.  
8 These terms are used to describe the same men in Denmark and Sweden. Another synonym is 
gønger/göingar that is often used in Denmark today. However, when it appears in my sources it is 
generally impossible to discern whether it indicates “gønger” in the sense of “snaphaner” or as an 
ethnic group. The distinctions between these terms will be analysed in the section on the image of the 
snaphaner. I have chosen to use “snaphaner” in the cas s were my sources do not make explicit 
distinctions between the groups. I know that “snaphaner” was considered a derogatory term but it is the 
one that is most widely used in Scania today and it does not carry negative connotations today. 
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communities in the early modern world differed from what we call nations and 
nationalism today. Did incorporation and assimilation nto a new culture have any 
importance for the conception of self of ordinary and less ordinary people?.9 
 
Did it matter to them whether they were Danish or Swedish? How soon did they start 
thinking about themselves as different from their one time countrymen on the other 
side of the border ? Did the border have any real significance to people in these new-
born border territories? Fredrik Barth stresses the importance of borders for the 
creation of collective identities but he sees social and cultural borders, not 
geographical ones as most important, in that groups have to relate to and interact 
socially with someone who is conceived of as different in order to be able to exist as a 
group10.  Consequently this thesis has two main themes: resistance (in the form of 
snaphane-activities) and the underpinnings of it.  
 
I have intentionally paid particular attention to the “dark and bloody dimensions” of 
the Scanian War: it is not the main theme of the thesis but a minor theme. To me it is 
obvious that all wars have dark and bloody dimensions and I cannot see why it should 
be wrong to analyse them as long as one is honest ad clear about one’s sources and 
theoretical framework. Whatever has been written on the snaphaner before has yes, 
described executions and torture, but not researched the gradual acceleration of 
violence on both sides, nor what led to it or how it as related to the development of 
the war in general. Nor has there been any sort of analysis of the “demonisation of the 
snaphaner” on the Swedish side as compared to attempts to “normalise the snaphaner” 
on the Danish side. I have tried to interpret the workings of the demonisation process 
and to make clear that it is a process that is characte istic of that kind of situations and 
also to refer to the religious importance it had to be able to classify the snaphaner as 
non members of the Christian community. It should be stressed, however, that the 
Swedish policy on the snaphane issue varied and that there were different currents of 
thought that influenced the decisions of those in power. There were for example, 
continuous amnesty offers that many snaphaner accepted voluntarily and there is also 
                                               
9 Clutterbuck, p.27: “Guerrilla movements grew, and so did support for them. Guerrilla actions 
provoked reprisals, which further increased this support. Within a year the situation was totally 
transformed, and Cornwallis moved northwards, harassed both by regular American forces and by the 
guerrillas, to be besieged and defeated at Yorktown.” 
10 Fredrik Barth, ”Introduction”, in Fredrik Barth (ed.) Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. The Social 
Organisation of Culture Differences, Oslo 1969, pp.14-15.   
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ample evidence of how these ex-snaphaner tried to manoeuvre the authorities with the 
help of their amnesty certificates. 
  
Finally I have also included a section on the histor cal background in order to explain 
the tensions that created the series of wars that led to the cession of eastern Denmark 
to Sweden. Most likely Scandinavians will judge that section superfluous but they 
should try to remember that the history of their own northerly part of the world is not 
very well known outside that area.  In the very last chapter of the thesis I will try to tie 
up all loose ends and come to some conclusions.  
 
The Problem in its Historiographical Dimension 
”The Danes all smiled happily when they heard that e Swedes were gone and that they, without any 
effort or loss of lives, had been able to gain a footing on the beautiful land of Scania that was the 
precious bride that they were to dance for.”  
The landing of the Danish army at Råå, 29th June 1676.11 
 
In 1956 the Scanian historian Alf Åberg divided thescholars that had been working 
with Scania’s passage from Danish to Swedish rule so far, into Swedes on one side 
and Danes and pure Scanians on the other.12 Up until about a decade ago this was still 
very much the case: those who occupied themselves with Scanian history, especially 
that of the transition era, could be divided along national lines with the Scanians 
themselves as a grey zone somewhere in the middle: the odd Scanian historian like 
Åberg himself who managed to make it to the pinnacles of Swedish historiography 
stuck out against a sea of non-professional historians with separatist or reunionist 
sympathies. Today the situation is different although there is still not much of a 
middle ground. The events of the last ten or fifteen y ars have blurred the distinction 
lines between pro-Danish and pro-Swedish history writing slightly. Sweden’s 
entrance into the European Union, the bridge between Denmark and Sweden and last 
but not least, the establishment of the Scanian autonomous region are all important 
elements in this chain of events. Another novelty is that groups of researchers on both 
                                               
11 Sthen Jacobsen, Den nordiske Kriigs Krønicke, 1697. Edited and published by M. Weibull, 
Copenhagen 1897, p.36: ”De danske loe allesammen höijt op i wærett, der de hördte, at de Svenske 
vare borte, och at de uden nogett arbeid och uden noge  mandss forliss kunde faae fodefæste paa dett 
skiönne Skaane, som var den fornemmeste brud her skulde dandzess om.”   
11 Samuel Pufendorf, Innledning Till Swänska Historien, (An Introduction to Swedish History) Stock 
1688, p.911. 
12 Alf Åberg, När Skåne blev svenskt, (When Scania Became Swedish), LTs förlag, Stockholm 1958, 
p.102. 
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sides of the Sound have dedicated serious research to try to promote a new view of the 
Scanian problem throughout the centuries, since no new research had been done in 
many areas during the last fifty or even hundred years. These research projects have 
centred around Lund University and the Centre for Danish Studies, but researchers 
from all over Scandinavia and especially the universiti s of Copenhagen and Malmö 
have participated. The great difference is not that t e two camps should have 
disappeared because they have not, but rather that nationality and point of view tend 
to be less closely connected than before. There are D nish scholars like Anders Linde-
Laursen and Hanne Sanders who both work in Lund and take an all but Danish 
nationalist view on the matter. Traditional nationalism has gone out of fashion and at 
least in academia, it has instead become a question of recognising the existence of 
pre-national identities or some sort of patriotism to a greater or smaller degree, or 
maybe not at all. Researchers are trying to interpret key periods like the one between 
Roskilde and the Scanian War in a light slightly different from traditional views of 
either harsh repression or smooth assimilation. Perhaps a more nuanced image is 
emerging.  
  
There are several issues that practically all works n the Scanian “transition era” have 
had to deal with. Some of these can be traced back to the time when the events took 
place. The main problem is whether the so-called Swedification was a natural process 
or a de-nationalisation project.13 One of the other main issues, and the one that is of 
most importance to this thesis, is whether the snaphaner/friskytter were simple bandits 
or noble freedom-fighters, or maybe something completely different. This is one of 
the oldest themes in the whole debate and it can easily be dated back to the Scanian 
War. Other issues regard the behaviour of the Swedes during the inter-war period 
                                               
13 The  main problem that has troubled many a historian (and maybe some other people) is the how and 
why Scania is so Swedish today. This issue should not be exaggerated in that it is still common that 
other Swedes mistake Scanians for Danes and the cultural closeness is visible to the eye in the 
architectural heritage and cultural landscape that makes central and southern Scania look arch-Danish. 
In fact, many Swedes do not think of Scania as particularly Swedish although many Danes do so, 
especially the ones who have never crossed the bridge. And while many Scanians identify with 
Stockholm and the Arctic as much as anybody else in the kingdom of Sweden, others talk of Sweden as 
“Sweden”, as in “Have you been to Sweden of late?”. As the historian Per Johnsson pointed out, there 
is nothing that is not fragmentary when the “true” story of Scania is to be told: a hundred years ago 
many people thought their ancestors had been Swedish but at the same time there were people who 
were telling the stories of what had happened when “the Swede came down upon this country.” To me 
these two versions are not even contradictory: a fragmented story is not the same as chronological 
history. People often had (and have) a muddled image of a one time Danish past but exactly how and 
when that was could be précised by few.  
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(mainly the nature of the billeting of soldiers and military violence), the language 
question (how important was the change of the languge of the state?), legal issues 
and the relationship between the little man and the s ate, religion, even architecture. 
The answers to these questions have tended to follow national lines for a very long 
time.   
 
In this section I will now go through some of the historiography that has led to the 
research situation of today. It would be desirable to have a proper historiographic text 
on how the Scanian question has been treated by historians of both nations throughout 
the ages, but at this point in time no such is avail ble. I have tried to include the most 
important works, with preference for those that deal with the snaphaner/friskytter. As 
a starting point it is suitable to begin with Sthen Jacobsen (1635-1696), clergyman, 
combatant among the student troops during the siege of Copenhagen 1659, later also 
translator of Cicero and spy for district governor Knud Thott during the Scanian 
War.14 Today Jacobsen is mainly remembered for his brilliant chronicle of the 
Scanian War that he wrote while the war was still in course.15 Jacobsen’s chronicle is 
as close to neutral as can be. It cannot be doubted that the old Latinist’s aim was to 
write history sine ira et studio.16 His account is detailed and includes extracts decrees 
and pamphlets that were issued at the time and the two warring parties are always 
spoken of as “the Danes” and “the Swedes”. Jacobsen criticised unnecessary violence 
and expressed his horror at some of the gruesome scen  he had been eyewitness too 
himself. He also criticised the snaphaner violently but at the same time he provided 
some of the most important “how and why’s “regarding the snaphane/friskytte 
movement and stresses that they in their turn were tr ated atrociously by the Swedes. 
As Paul Erik Engelhardt has wisely pointed out, a slight pro-Danish tendency can 
actually be noted in Jacobsen’s work. I think that perspires from the quote at the 
                                               
14 For the spy business see also: Fabricius III, p.97footnote 12. Fabricius stresses how eager Jacobsen 
was that Kristianstad be liberated. 
15 It should be noted that at the time the war was known as “The Nordic War” and that is the expression 
Jacobsen used. See: Sthen Jacobsen, D  nordiske Kriigs Krønicke, Edited and published by M. 
Weibull, Copenhagen 1897. Original title as it results on Jacobsen’s own title page, with blank gaps for 
the names of the kings: ”Den Store och Blodige Fiire Aarss Nordiske Kriig imellem Den 
Stormæchtigste Höybaarne Förste och Herre Kong … Konge till…paa den eene och Den 
Stormæchtigste Höybaarne Förste och Herre Kong…paa den anden Siide. Upassioneret 
sammenskreffuet.” (The Great and Bloody Four Year Nordic War between the Mighty Noble Lord and 
Master King....King of...on one side and the Mighty Noble Lord and Master King...on the other. 
Written and collected without passion.) 
16 In fact the original title included the addition ”Written and collected without passion”. 
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beginning of this section. Engelhardt mentions another passage in which Jacobsen 
bitterly criticises the Danes for not having taken the chance while they could: “In a 
war, everything depends on watching out for the right moment, because sooner or 
later, occasio (the right occasion) will present itself, but it will also soon go away.”17 
According to Jacobsen the Danes would have won the war if they had attacked the 
Swedish army outside Landskrona in May 1677 and he claimed that the Swedes 
themselves said that if they had been attacked at that moment “then the Danes would 
have given us such a thrashing that we would never have forgotten it again.”18 It 
should be noted that the Danish tendency in Jacobsen is vague and that his attempts to 
be neutral in his writing are obvious. Nevertheless Jacobsen’s intellectual career was 
thwarted by the war and his chronicle had to be stowed away in a church tower. Since 
the chronicle was written in the language of the losers it became a dangerous object 
after the peace of Lund in 1679.19  From 1679 onwards the Danish language could no 
more be used as a tool for intellectual, spiritual or artistic pursuits. Scanian 
intellectuals, clergymen and artists who chose not to leave the country had to adjust 
themselves to the situation in as far as they could. Jacobsen was one of few Scanian 
clergymen who seemed to have survived the war without aving suffered any serious 
consequences, except that he is reported to have died a very bitter man.20     
 
So much said about Danish-writing intellectuals like Jacobsen but one should not that 
native Scanians were not barred and blocked from Swedish cultural life. As long as 
they followed certain lines they were heartily welcome into the Swedish community. 
Those lines included taking a pro-Swedish point of view and writing in any language 
but Danish. One of Jacobsen’s contemporaries was Professor Andreas Stobaeus who 
made a brilliant academic career under the Swedish regime. At an early stage the 
Stobaeus family decided to put their stakes on the Sw des and they were generously 
remunerated for their efforts. Stobaeus wrote his PD in Scanian history in Latin. His 
                                               
17 Jacobsen, p.108: “Alting udi kriig bestaaer mest der udi, at mand achter den rette tiid, thi occasio 
præsenterer sig vell undertiiden, men forsuinder sna ligen.” Quoted by Engelhardt, pp.248-249. 
18 Jacobsen, p.107: “...da haffde de Danske pidskett oss saalediss, at vi aldrig haffde glemt det.” 
19 The peace regulations stated that written materials that thwarted or ridiculed the warring side of 
which country the materials were to be found were strictly and severely forbidden. Nor could Danish 
texts be printed in Scania. 
20 It should be added that Knud Thott bragged that he managed to make all clergymen work for him as 
informers through the very effective method of not letting them buy any food if they refused to provide 
him with Swedish letters or information. Letter from Knud Thott to the king, 22nd May 1679, DRA, 
quoted by Edvardsson, III, p.119. 
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thesis supported the view that Scania was an old Swedish “limb” that had been re-
united with the rest of the “body”. Nor did he forget to mention those “rascals” the 
snaphaner who had ruined the country. Nevertheless Stobaeus was proud of being a 
Scanian and dealt mainly with Scanian history and called himself a “Scano-Gothus”, a 
Scanian Goth. 21  The debate on who could trace his origins to the Goths and who 
could not, had been going on for a long time by the end of the 17th century22  but as a 
discourse it had become more important than ever since it could legitimise the 
annexation of the Scanian provinces. It was therefore important to insert the “Gothic 
discourse” into the intellectual debate that was goin  n at the time. Distance from the 
Danish language and from Danish claims on Scanians and Goths were sine qua non 
for Scanians who wanted to remain inside Swedish academia. The pattern had been 
set by the German history professor Samuel Pufendorff who was commissioned to 
write a History of Sweden in which the conquest of Scania was justified as a 
“reunion”.23 Pufendorff’s theories were violently contested by his Lundian colleague 
Joshua Schwartz already in 1673 in a volume that was burned in public in Lund in 
1675.24 Although Schwartz eventually became the personal ch plain of Christian V 
and was a respected clergyman outside Sweden, he could n t compete with 
Pufendorff. Pufendorff’s version was spread all over Europe and it remained in 
European history books well into the 20th century.25Although book-burning has not 
been practised in Lund for a long time, schoolbooks and university handbooks still 
                                               
21 For the dissertation see: De Scania antiqua dissertatio prima, Londini Gothorum (Lund) 1706. 
Please note the modest Latin translation of the name of the humble town of Lund: London of the Goths. 
It was certainly not a Swedish idea to compare Lund to London: early medieval texts claimed that King 
Canute the Great had wanted to copy London when he founded Lund and called it Lundona Sconiae as 
opposed to British Lundona/London.  Some of Bishop Winstrup’s sermons from the 1660’ies were also 
printed in “Lond.Scan”. See: Weibull & Tegnér 1868, p.22. See also: Knut Stjerna, “Lund och Birka” 
(Lund and Birka), pp.171-225, in Historisk Tidskrift för Skåneland, (Historical Journal for the Scanian 
Provinces), vol 3, Lund 1908, p.204. The author of the poem Regum augustissimo, optimo, maximo, 
serenissimo ac potentissimo principi & domino Carolo XI…is stated as Andreas Stobaeus Scano-
Gothus, the Scanian Goth (Literis Nicolai Wankijf, no date, Swedish Royal Library). 
22 See also the “Historical Background” section of this t esis. 
23 Samuel Pufendorf, Innledning Till Swänska Historien,  (An Introduction to Swedish History), 
Ståkkholm 1688, s.911: ”Sweden’s old borders have been healed again” (de gammle Swerikes Gränsar 
igen heladt). In the same chapter (p.912) Pufendorff claimed that the Norwegian and the Danish 
territories that were ceded to Sweden had been ”won back ” . 
24 Index quarundam novitatum, quas Sam.Puffendorffius in libro suo, de jure naturae et gentium, 
contra orthodoxa fundamenta edidit, Gießen 1673. See: Weibull & Tegnér 1868, p.68. Later, Schwartz 
continued to contest Pufendorff’s views in Index novitatum Puffendorffii, denuo contra stricturas et 
apologiam Sam. Puffendorffii assertus, Copenhagen 1678, and finally he was probably the anonymous 
author of  Discussio calumniarum Sam. Puffendorffii Eride Scandica, indicis errorum suorum causa 
venerabili uni viro indignissime impositarum, Copenhagen 1687.  
25 See: A.H.L Fishers Storia d’Europa II Storia moderna, Universale Laterza, Bari 1971, pp. 311-
316.(A History of Europe,  London 1935). 
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insist on the Swedish origins of the Scanian dialect although there is no scientific 
ground for such a classification.26 Generally these books are based on the works of the 
Scanian linguist Bengt Pamp whose dissertation built on a serious error: on the basis 
of Scanian land registers from 1664 he concluded that the language that was used by 
the Scanians at the time was a hybrid between Danish nd Swedish but definitely 
closer to the latter. Only a few years after the publication of this dissertation a 
historian by the name of Alf Erlandsson discovered that the land registers had been 
written by a Swedish clerk who tried to translate the Danish placenames into good 
Swedish, which in itself invalidates the results of the thesis completely.27 Scanian in 
its older form constitutes the eastern branch of the (older) Danish language.28 
Linguistically this view cannot be confuted but politically it never stood a chance.   
In his dissertation from 1684 Johannes Fabrin told the story of a German man who 
criticised those Scanians who “shared the strong but misdirected conviction that they 
ought to attain conformity with other Sweo-Gothic regions in the areas of language, 
rituals, laws and proceedings, as if these Scanians in their loathsome fawning should 
serve their own interests rather than those of the atherland and as if they had been 
striving to introduce a language, especially during church services, that not even one 
out of a hundred Scanians understood, and through which the Scanian commoners 
                                               
26  Mainly in rural areas and the south-eastern smalltowns. 
27 Erlandsson, Alf. Skånska Generalguvernementet 1658-1693 och dess arkiv, (The Scanian 
Gouvernemenent-general 1658-1693 and its archives, Lund 1967, pp.219-220. Foot-note 37. And 
Bengt Pamp’s Svenska dialekter, (Swedish Dialects), Gleerups, Lund 1990. 
28 Scanian in its older form is spoken by less than 10% of the population today, in the Scanian 
provinces and on the island of Bornholm, and linguistically it constitutes the eastern branch of the 
Danish language.See: Brøndum-Nielsen, Johannes, Dialekter og dialektforskning, (Dialects and Dialect 
Research), København, 1927.pp, 99-104 and 108-112. The most thorough description and analysis of 
Eastern Danish (as spoken in Scania and on Bornholm) is still Johannes Brøndum-Nielsen’s: 
Gammeldansk grammatik i sproghistorisk fremstilling, (A Grammar and History of the Older Danish 
Language) København, J.H Schultz forlag, 1932. The remaining 60 or 70% of the population that 
identify themselves as Scanians have introduced Swedish vocabulary, grammar and syntax to varying 
degrees, depending on the area of origin and place of residence, and on social group. The situation is 
very much the same on the island of Bornholm where “high Danish” has taken the upper hand in most 
linguistic areas. However, even in modern Scanian the pronunciation and prosody, i.e. the sound of it, 
have remained practically identical. In that sense modern Scanian is as far from “up”-Swedish (RP 
Swedish as spoken by educated people in the Stockholm area and on television.) as it is from English, 
but quite close to “high” Danish . In his excellent dissertation in linguistics, Stig Örjan Olsson tried to 
put more attention to the fact that the old Scanian di lect is an eastern branch of the Danish language 
as, in fact, all scholars of old Danish have always su tained. See: Stig Örjan Ohlsson, Skånes språkliga 
försvenskning, (The Linguistic Swedification of Scania) Lundastudier i nordisk språkvetenskap, Serie 
A, No: 31, 1979. See also his ”Den språkliga förändingen” (The Linguistic Change), pp. 87-97, in 
Rosborn (ed.), 1993, in which he also analyses the discussion on the Scanian dialect (s) in Scandinavia 
just before and after the Swedish take-over. The Swdish historian Sten Skansjö has also recently 
pointed out that Scanian is still not to be classified as a “souther Swedish dialect” but as an “eastern 
Danish dialect with southern Swedish influences”. See: Sten Skansjö, Skånes historia, Borgå 2006 
(orginially 1998), p.10. 
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would never be able to acquire the teachings of the religious revelation.”29 The 
Swedes were trying to underpin their uniformity efforts in Scania with the theory of 
the Scanians’ Sweo-Gothic origins and both A. Stobaeus and Samuel Pufendorff 
subscribed to this programme. If they could help convince people that the Scanians 
and their language were a branch of the same tree of origin as the Swedes it would 
become so much easier to gain final acceptance of the annexation, at home and 
abroad.   
 
Around the middle of the 19th century Abraham Cronholm wrote his Political History 
of Scania that boasted the inclusion of not inconsiderable numbers of thitherto 
unpublished documents.30 Cronholm who put great weight on the romantic concept of 
“nationalkänsla” or “feeling for one’s nation” did not treat the snaphaner entirely 
without sympathy:  
“Old affection for Denmark, an inclination towards looting, and a wish to profit from the lawlessness 
of a war, are the circumstances that explain why disor erly groups like that continued to grow in 
numbers until they gained considerable strength, and could count on reinforcements from the wild 
border inhabitants.”31 
 
Cronholm also declared that the snaphaner were presnt in the whole of Scania and 
stresses that governor general Sperling had claimed that in 1678 their “safest nest” 
was Simrishamn on the southeastern coast.32 He also proffered the view that the 
snaphaner were nothing but “peasants run wild” and that at first, they enjoyed massive 
support from the commoners, else the Scanian “little war” would never had been as 
successful as it actually was.33 Quite correctly Cronholm also traced some of the 
snaphaner to troops of young men that had originally been recruited for the Danish 
king.34 The later clichés of snaphaner as a border phenomen and of snaphaner as 
common criminals did not appear in Cronholm. 
                                               
29 Fabrin is quoted in Olsson 1993, pp.89-90. Fabrin’s supervisor was Anders Stobaeus. The German 
man in the text is raising objections to the Swedish uniformity project and Fabrin’s scope was to 
counter this tirade. 
30 Abraham Cronholm, Skånes Historia och Beskrifning. Skånes Politiska Historia, efter till största 
delen otryckta källor, (A History and Description of Scania. The Political History of Scania, according 
to in large part unpublished sources), Stockholm 1851. 
31 Cronholm, p.192. 
32 Cronholm, p.193. 
33 Cronholm, p.195. According to Cronholm the snaphaner originally fought because of their awakened 
“national feeling” but later unrestrained violence and barbarity took the upper hand and the culprits 
were justly punished with barbarian methods.  
34 Cronholm, p.49. In the case of the snaphaner of Färs he had this information from the Swedish 
warlord Taubenfeldt in a letter to the king from 31st March 1659. It is interesting that Taubenfeldt 
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Research on Scania’s Danish history and the transitio  era made a leap forwards 
towards the end of the 19th century when Martin Weibull of Lund University first 
started publishing his collection of original documents with comments, the so-called 
Scanian Collections and then had Sthen Jacobsen’s brilliant Chronicle of the Great 
Nordic War published after two hundred long years.35 According to Weibull the 
snaphaner practically became lords of the land during the later phase of the Scanian 
War and they were not particularly appreciated as overl rds, in fact they were the 
peasant’s natural enemies and the peasants turned against Denmark when the 
“snaphane feud” was recognised as an official war by the Danish king. Weibull also 
reckoned that Bishop Winstrup’s reconciliatory or even, pro-Swedish policy, and his 
influence on the rest of the clergy was what held back the outbreak of a “snaphane 
war” like the one of 1676-1679 already during 1658-1660.  Weibull thought of 
nationalism in a highly traditional way, which was only natural at the time.36 These 
were highly respectable views that were based on a serious scrutiny of the sources but 
at times Weibull’s interpretation becomes flawed since he simply did not have as 
much of the context clear to him (or as many of the sources at hand) as we do today.  
 
 In 1886 S.Wägner explained that the Scanian Commission could only be seen in the 
light of the war and the widespread misery that it had brought down on the land. 
Wägner claimed that the population did not see the Scanian provinces as incorporated 
into Sweden but as ”half foreign” and that this belief was strengthened by the fact that 
                                                                                                                            
suggested that the Swedes set after these men “on the pretext of searching for vagrants” (under 
förewändning at slå efter lösdrifware)...  
35 Martin Weibull, Samlingar till Skånes historia, (Collections regarding the History of Scania), 187 , 
p.73. Idem:, Skånska samlingar, II, Till Skånes historia under öfvergångstiden 1658-1710, 1. Skånska 
kriget och snapphanefejden 1676-79, (Scanian Collections II. Additions to the History of Scania during 
the Transition Era 1658-1710, 1. The Scanian War and the Snaphane Feud 1676-79), Lund 1873. See 
also Åberg 1958, p.98 where he quotes Weibull. 
36 In his and Elof Tegnér’s history of the university of Lund, the reverend Hans Frederik Hjort 
Cervinus, former theology professor, was excused for having gone over to the Danish since he was an 
inborn Danish subject from Ausås in Scania: “at the time of the national clashes his feelings for his old 
fatherland became too strong and in 1677 he resigned his post, went over to Denmark and died there as 
a minister of the church in Zealand.” (Weibull & Tegnér, II, p.68). Up until that time most people had 
thought of Cervinus as Peder Winstrup’s natural successor as bishop of the diocese of Lund. The case 
of another theology professor, namely that of Olof Bagger, is interpreted in a strange way: Weibull and
Tegnér declared (p.67) that Odense-born Bagger had emained true to both his nationality and his 
loyalty oath. He was of “Danish birth and schooling” but had been forced to swear allegiance to the 
Swedish king. I do not quite understand how one could be true to both one’s nationality and loyalty 
oath during the Scanian War, but it is an interesting interpretation. As Weibull and Tegnér stated, Olof 
Bagger died amidst the horrors of war on 11th March 1677. Three months later Olluf Bagger’s brother 
Hans was decapitated on the charge of haven hidden away Danish soldiers after the battle of Lund. 
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Swedish soldiers were billeted in a manner that was only the norm in enemy territory. 
37  The soldiers saw the peasants they lodged with as enemies and not as fellow 
countrymen because this kind of system existed in enemy country only and the 
soldiers were used to see “hosting families” as enemies.     
 
The most important work on the transition era is still the Danish history professor 
Knud Fabricius’s monumental work Skaanes overgang... (the transition of Scania) 
that consists of four volumes, of which the first two were published in 1906 and the 
last two only in the 1950ies. In it he dealt with almost all aspects of the history of the 
years 1645-1709. Fabricius introduced his work with an episode that he had been an 
eye-witness to himself, in which Danish children were teased by Scanian children for 
having had such a cruel king as Kristian the Tyrant.38 The Scanian children thought 
that their own 16th century ancestors had been Swedish! That little episode made 
Fabricius set out on a trek for the clue to the stunning “Swedification” that had taken 
place in Denmark’s lost lands in the east. According to Fabricius the Swedes had 
concrete ”denationalisation plans” when they took over Scania and this was only 
possible because they were quite capable of ”nationl feelings” in the modern sense. 
Unfortunately the national feelings of the Danes were still slumbering when the 
Scanian provinces were ceded to Sweden and so they could not resist the 
Swedification programme properly. The spark that lit the rebellion of 1675-79 was 
primarily (what Fabricius’s saw as) the disastrous financial situation, not nationalism. 
By the time the Scanians stirred from their lethargy and woke up to Danish 
nationalism it was far too late and that was why they ad to carry such a heavy yoke. 
That is the story according to Fabricius who can be seen as the perfect representative 
of the romantic nationalistic school that thrived during the latter part of the 19th and 
the first part of the 20th centuries.39 Fabricius promptly defined the snaphaner as 
peasants and farmers who had had their umbilical cord ut off and were compelled to 
take to the woods and a life of outlawry –later they transformed into friskytter.40 To 
him they were social rebels who turned nationalist. In a radio interview in 1952 Knud 
                                               
37 Wägner’s Skånska kommisssionen af 1669-1670, Lund 1886 
38 In reality Christian II (“Kristian the Tyrant”) was quite popular in Scania where he was called 
Christian den gode (Christian the kind/good). 
39 Fabricius, II, p.48, III pp.13-14 etc. 
40 Knud Fabricius, Skaanes overgang fra Danmark til Sverige, (The Passing of Scania from Denmark 
to Sweden) vols.I-IV, Copenhagen-Lund 1906-58, Ouote:v l.III, pp. 101-102. 
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Fabricius declared that the snaphaner/friskytter were the predecessors of the freedom 
fighters of our days and he prized their love for Denmark.41 
 
Early in the 20th century a collection of documents regarding the snaphaner from the 
Swedish archives was published by Pehr Johnsson.42 In spite of having spent years in 
the Swedish archives, Johnsson preferred to write his book on the snaphaner as a 
fragmentary series of notices and accounts with comments by the author, because “no 
coherence and nothing that was unbroken ever existed during that guirilla war.”43 The 
factual account and the numerous excerpts from the sources are interspersed with 
legends about snaphaner that could only be killed by silver bullets (like all other 
wizards and trolls). However, Johnsson makes quite clear when it is the matter of non-
factual or source-based materials.  It is hard to classify Johnsson because his 
rhetoric’s are clearly and pompously Swedish when h starts praising the Swedish 
warlords but then he takes such obvious delight in telling the stories of the 
mischievous snaphaner and is at such pains to excus his fellow countrymen for their 
deeds that he betrays where his sympathies lie.  He also explained that, according to 
him, at the time of the Scanian War, many people still had not managed to “wear” 
Swedish hearts although they wore Swedish clothes. According to Johnsson, Scania 
was one of the most precious jewels in the Danish crown and its inhabitants were 
fervent loyalists. For centuries they had feared an hated the arch-enemy up in 
Sweden and so it could not have been easy to become one with that enemy. However, 
by 1709, when the Danes returned for the second time, a new generation with 
Swedish hearts had grown up: a generation that felt that it was an honour to be 
Swedish and, Johnsson stressed, this was still the cas .44 As for the snaphaner, 
Johnsson traced their existence to the peasants in arms recruited by Ebbe Ulfeld 
during Horn’s War 1644-45. He defined the snaphaner s “peasants gathered in units 
that, under suitable command, were given the task of causing the enemy as much 
                                               
41 See: Åberg, 1958, p.100.  In Denmark the Scanian guerrilla fighters (the snaphaner) became national 
heroes and stories of them were used to encourage the Resistance movement during the Second World 
War. This was also the interpretative key to understanding why snaphaner films became so popular in 
Denmark during the war. The most popular one starred th  Scanian actor Edvard Persson in the leading 
role. 
42 Pehr Johnsson, Snapphanefejden, Brev och anteckningar, (The Snaphane Feud, Letters and Notes), 
Örebro 1910. 
43 Johnsson’s preface, p.3: ”Att de föreligga i form av brottstycken, utan något sammanhängande helt 
beror därpå, att förf:n velat ge artiklarne en populär form, dels ock därpå, att någonting helt fanns icke i 
detta guirillakrig.” 
44 Johnsson, p.12. 
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damage as possible.”45 According to Johnsson the snaphane “feud” went astray when 
it ceased to be a movement of a “national nature” that fought for the Danish cause and 
turned into a guerrilla war in which “cruel acts of violence and robberies seemed to be 
the main business and the national only of minor consequence.” 46 Johnsson 
hypothesised that this might have depended on the fact that the initially honest 
snaphaner had been joined by considerable numbers of “deserters and scumbags”. 47 
Johnsson praised the virtues of the valorous Swedish commanders who, like Johan 
Gyllenstjerna, fought the snaphaner with “wisdom and courage”.48 Nevertheless he 
was clearly fascinated by the intricate adventures of the snaphaner whom he 
alternately described in terms of “wild hordes”, “rebels” and “highwaymen”.49 
Johnsson sometimes took a rather banal view of the snaphaner, accepting the robber 
cliché without reflecting about what the sources really say. One example of this 
tendency is the passage in which he writes that there was a huge group of 
“highwaymen” on the Halland ridge from where they could “harass” the peasants. 50 
The source that Johnsson interpreted in this way is  report from General Major 
Ulfsparre to the Swedish king in which Ulfsparre claimed that “the roguish snaphaner 
and peasants “ received four ducats each for each prisoner they consigned to the 
Danish camp and that he had just come back after having pursued a company of 
snaphaner on the Halland ridge. Ulfsparre also added that the Swedes were very afraid 
of leaving their camp. Johnsson did not notice thatUlfsparre claimed the peasants 
were working together with the snaphaner. Nor that e Swedes were afraid of the 
snaphaner, not everybody, and consequently it could har ly have been the matter of 
“highwaymen” since robbers do not ask for people’s nationality.  
 
Then, in 1921 Per Sörensson wrote a booklet in which e claimed that the registered 
friskytter were Danish irregular troops that acted on direct orders from the Royal head 
quarters. Sörensson came to his conclusions on the basis of his analysis of the military 
account books from the Scanian War that are kept in the Danish National Archives. It 
is hard to see why his work has been largely ignored since it is undoubtedly the most 
                                               
45 Johnsson, p.6. 
46 Johnsson, p.7. 
47 Johnsson, p.7. 
48 Johnsson, p.241. 
49 Johnsson, p.88 (de vilda skarorna), p.31 (rebellen) and p.80 (stråtrövare). Johnsson mixed notices 
from the archives and news-sheets with legends and stories he had heard.  
50 Johnsson, pp. 79-80 and Handl. rör. Sk.kr. 1676-79, SRA. 
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knowledgeable study of the friskytter that has been do e so far.51 Sörensson stressed 
that no one had ever done serious research on the military organisation of the 
snaphaner and whether they actually co-operated with the regular army. All Swedish 
historians that had dealt with the snaphaner/friskytter up until his day had only used 
Swedish sources when the real nature of the friskytter could only be discerned in the 
Danish sources. This is a view that I share. The predominance of the use of Swedish 
sources and Swedish secondary literature in this whole field of research is a fact that 
one can only hope that the future will change.  
 
In the late 30’ies Yngve Bogren wrote a dissertation on the Swedification of the 
Scanian church, mainly in the region of Bohuslän.52 For unclear reasons the 
dissertation was not approved, though it was published as a book. Some ten years later 
the Swedish historian Jerker Rosén wrote a series of articles that explain the 
Swedification in terms of power politics. He tried to explain why there were such 
vague attempts at a full incorporation of Scania into Sweden during the inter-war 
period and that if this was so then it was because it was also a time of almost 
interregnum when the nobility ruled the realm and more “lax” integration politics in 
all conquered provinces were a general trend, whereas single kings and their inner 
circle tended to tie the foreign provinces closer to Sweden itself.53 Rosén’s article is 
sober and very interesting, especially in that he analyses Scania as one out of many 
Swedish conquests, but it should be added that like many other domestic works on 
Swedish history he is deeply embedded in a ‘Sweden as a Great Power’ discourse that 
is rather hard to fathom from a non-Baltic perspectiv .  
In 1947 Alf Åberg’s dissertation on the the organistion of the cavalry in Scania was 
published.54 From that time onwards Åberg has remained one of Sweden’s leading 
historians and an authority on the snaphaner. Almost all consequent works on the 
snaphaner have relied exclusively or next to exclusively on both Fabricius and Åberg 
                                               
51 Per Sörensson, Friskyttarna (snapphanarna) under skånska kriget (1676-79), Deras organisation 
och militära betydelse, (The Friskytter (Snaphaner) during the Scanian War, Their organisation and 
Military Importance), Karolinska förbundets årsbok 1916. Åberg mentioned Sörensson only in order to 
criticise him for having based his research on Danish sources only. The fact that Åberg himself and 
most other Swedish scholars have limited their work almost exclusively to the Swedish archives was 
not commented upon.  
52 Yngve Bogren, Försvenskningen av kyrkan, (The Swedification of the Church), Lund 1936. 
53 Jerker Rosén, ”Statsledning och provinspolitik under Sveriges stormaktstid (Statesmanship and 
Provincial Politics during Sweden’s Age of Greatness), Scandia 1946, pp.224-270. 
54 Alf Åberg, Indelningen av rytteriet i Skåne, (The Distribuition of the Cavalry in Scania), Lund 1947. 
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although these two gentlemen far from agreed on all points.55 However, Åberg was 
also puzzled by the apparent “amnesia” that seemed to have arisen in the Scanian 
provinces. As an example of how fast that process had worked he proffered the 
example of the magistrates of  Luggude, Rönneberga and Onsjö that in the 1780ies 
declared that the roads in that area had been constructed as a result of the (Swedish)  
Diet at Västerås in 1544, some 120 years before the Swedish conquest.56 Åberg’s 
view of the Swedification is contradictory. On the one hand he states that ”hardly ever 
has a change of nationality after a long war been ex cuted with less bloodshed and 
fewer violations of laws than the one that united the Scanian provinces with the 
kingdom of Sweden.” 57 This view was shared by most Swedish historians up until the 
end of the 20th century. Nevertheless Åberg is enough of a good Scanian to imply that 
thanks to its double heritage, Scania is superior to bo h Denmark and Sweden. The 
assimilation never became complete and the Scanians have always fallen back on 
their Danish traditions whenever they have needed to.58 On the other hand, Åberg 
claims that after the Swedish take-over the Scanians fell victims to the Stockholm 
syndrome: in other terms, they took on the identity of the aggressor. Like so many hi-
jack victims they simply absorbed the history and the memories of their overlords.59  
 
Åberg characterised the snaphaner as a group of “wanted criminals, army deserters, 
Danish royalists and adventurers” 60 that were supposed to fight for the Danes but in 
reality attacked anyone who got in their way. He agreed that they were the peasants’ 
worst enemies and claimed that their actions were characterised by ambushes that hit 
both sides indiscriminately. These actions were limited to the woodlands along the 
border. Åberg practically ignores the presence of snaphaner/friskytter in other areas of 
the Scanian provinces, although he was well aware of the existence of sources that 
proved contrariwise.61  
                                               
55 Whereas Fabricius was a stout Danish patriot, Åberg felt much the same fervour for Sweden. In his 
works he is generally prone to glorifying the indomitable Swedish warriors that followed their kings 
across Europe. 
56 Åberg, 1958 , p.9. 
57 Alf Åberg, 1958, p.9. 
58 See: the Introduction in Åberg, 1958, pp.9-11 and p.127;quote: p.136. 
59 Åberg, 1958, p.9.   
60 Alf Åberg, När Skåne blev svenskt, (When Scania Became Swedish), LTs förlag, Stockholm 1958, 
p.102. 
61 The footnotes of his Snapphanarna (1951) shows that he was acquainted with Sörensson’s 
Friskyttarna and with Pehr Johnsson’s excerpts from the sources that include many episodes from the 
southern parts of Scania. 
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Åberg worked exclusively with Swedish sources, foremost the protocols of the Östra 
Göinge assizes that registered the proceedings of cases against people who were 
accused of being snaphaner. Moreover, Åberg made a very scarce use of foot-notes 
and as often as not he quotes sources that are not stated.62  Even in the simplified 1981 
edition of his Snapphanarna he did not update his research from the 1951 situation, 
nor did he add notes to the quotations, though it might be more excusable since the 
simplified version is more of a children’s book with enlarged letters, simplified 
language and huge, beautiful drawings and photos. Unfortunately even this version 
has been used as an important source book by many historians and writers, probably 
because it is a nice book and because of Åberg’s status. 
Åberg did not question the Swedish sources and he did not consult the Danish ones 
but trusted the Swedish jurors almost without exception. He obviously did not think 
much about the fact that these tribunals set out with the intention of finding murderers 
and assassins where there were none from the point of view of those who felt that 
King Christian was the lawful lord of the land. Tribunals that that helped construct a 
discourse that rendered acts criminal that had not been committed with a criminal 
intention but as acts of war that had been authorised by the Danish authorities. Åberg 
does not seem to realise the problematics of this wole issue, but imitates the 
discourse of the Swedish court registers that declar  that a snaphane (a scoundrel) had 
abducted a decent clergyman, when in fact the scoundrel was registered as a 
lieutenant in the regular forces but was of Scanian b rth and he had worked on strict 
orders from the district governor.63 I am not saying that Åberg should agree with the 
Danish authorisation of the friskytter or with the fact that they considered Scanian 
born regular soldiers on a par with soldiers from other Danish regions, but it somehow 
puzzles me that he seems unaware of the fact that he continues a discourse that his 
sources helped construct the beginnings of. A discourse that constructs the 
                                               
62 Cf. Åberg (1951), pp.154-155 where he tells the story of the Swedish professor Nordeman who was 
caught by the snaphaner under Nicolaus Hermansen during the autumn of 1676 but then released again 
because the pro-Swedish professor Stobaeus managed to convince Hermansen that Nordeman was 
Norwegian. Åberg even quotes Stobaeus as saying that Nordeman “never saw a Danish man without 
anguish and anger and never went close to one without being forced to” but there is no mention of a 
source or an archive or anything. I have seen this report and know it exists but Åberg could not have 
assumed that everyone would have gone through many enough documents to know where his 
quotations came from.  
63 See the case of Sigvard Juul, Pieter Stensen (that Åberg calls Per Stensson), and district governor 
Knud Thott, p.152 in Åberg (1951). 
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snaphaner/friskytter as criminals and not as soldiers and that in part romanticises life 
in the forests.  The forests isolated the peasants on both sides of the border from the 
central authorities and the peaceful border area has been described as a “peasant 
republic” whose citizens had little or no sense of belonging with Sweden or Denmark. 
This line of thought generally supports the view that national identities did not exist in 
any guise at the time. Which might have been the cas . But that sort of rhetoric should 
not be used to create an imaginary republic of woodlanders that was the scene of 
action for the wild snaphaner that had to be tamed by their righteous king – the 
snaphane/friskytte problem regarded the whole of Scania, in one form or another, and 
during the Scanian War it was not an outlawry problem.  
  
In this context I would also like to add that perhaps I have been hard on Alf Åberg’s 
works, possibly even unnecessarily so since his are far from the worst works on the 
“snaphaner”. The reason why I chose to criticise Åbrg more in detail than other 
history writers on the subject is first of all that he is an academic, not a hobby 
historian, and secondly that there is hardly any criticism of him in other works and 
that he is often considered the maximum authority on the snaphaner. Furthermore, 
Åberg is also a fairly recent “authority” on the snaphaner and has an academical 
background. In the case of non-professional scholars I felt that it was enough to state 
clearly that they were not academics and that theirworks have not had much 
importance for academic research although they might have been of political 
importance. With those that have been dead for decades or centuries, and that have 
been criticised in other works I felt that in part their theories were results of the times 
they lived in and in part that it was enough to refe  to the criticisms of others. In the 
latter case I primarily refer to Fabricius.  
 
In the late 1970ies, the Scanian linguist Ohlsson wrote the one extant scholarly work 
on the Swedification of the language in Scania, in which he analysed the language 
that was spoken in the area before and just after it became Swedish and also the 
language that is spoken there today.64 In 1987 the Danish historian Inger Dübeck 
published a short but detailed book on the consequences of the transition from 
                                               
64 Stig Örjan Ohlsson, Skånes språkliga försvenskning, (The Linguistic Swedification of Scania)  
Lundastudier i nordisk språkvetenskap, Serie A, No: 31, 1979. Ohlsson concluded that Scanian was 
and still is a variant of Danish.  
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Danish/Scanian to Swedish law.65 Gitte Kjær’s biography on the famous friskytte 
Svend Poulsen Gønge presents interesting documents and nice pictures but not very 
much else. It should be added that Kjær presents a clearly positive view of the 
“national hero”.66 The Danish ethnographer Anders Linde-Laursen who works in 
Lund has written a study of Danish-Swedish relations which concentrates on “the 
Scanian problem.” Linde-Laursen tries to put the snaphaner into their social context 
and analyses the transition from a strictly modernist point of view. 67   
 
Harald Gustafsson of Lund University has continued in the same vein with a more up-
to-date analysis of integration policies in early modern Europe: if one could link the 
annulment of the edict of Nantes to the Nueva Planta to he union between England 
and Scotland and the Pragmatic Sanction to the Swedification of Scania then maybe 
one could speak of a general European tendency.68 Gustafsson studies not only how 
states but also how identities were constructed in early modern Europe. He stresses 
that ethnic and territorial communities differed quite radically from what we call 
nations and nationalism today and that while analysing early modern (or earlier) 
communities one has to be careful not to fall into the so called “nationalistic trap”: it 
is easy to get blinded if one has one’s mind set on finding the roots of nationalism or 
proof of the modern origins of nationalism. Instead it is important to remember that 
“national” identities were only a minor part of a complex set of loyalties and 
identities. The sources provide sufficient evidence of the fact that it meant something 
to be a “Swede” or “Dane” at the time but the components of these identities were 
probably not the same as today. 69 One way of discerning what “identity components” 
were important in 17th century Scania is suggested by Gustafsson in a recent article in 
which he analyses the motivations proffered by Scanian peasants of both sexes in 
their letters of solicitation to the Swedish governor generals 1661-1699. According to 
                                               
65 Dübeck, Inger. Fra gammel dansk til ny svensk ret, (From Old Danish to New Swedish Law), G-E-C 
GAD 1987. 
66 Gitte Kjær, Svend Poulsen Gønge – i verkligheten, (SVP – in real life), Skippershoved 1992. For an 
account of Poulsen’s life see: Kjær (pp.9 and 66) has attested his military career from 1625-1677. 
67 Anders Linde-Laursen, Det nationales natur. En studie i dansk-svenske relationer. (The Nature of 
Nationalism. A study of the Relations between Denmark and Sweden) Lund 1995. Pp.48-50. 
68 Harald Gustafsson, ”The Conglomerate State: A Perspective on State Formation in Early Modern 
Europe.” In the Scandinavian Journal of History 23, 1998, pp.208-209. 
69 Harald Gustafsson, “The Eighth Argument. Identity, Ethnicity and Political Culture in Sixteenth-
Century Scandinavia”, Scandinavian Journal of History 27, 2002, pp.91-114. Quote p.91;Gustafsson, 
”The Conglomerate State: A Perspective on State Formation in Early Modern Europe.” Scandinavian 
Journal of History 23, 1998, p.210. 
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Gustafsson, the classical “letter of supplication” should be seen as a “ritualised 
encounter between subject and authorities, in which identity concepts and moral 
values are being produced and reproduced.” In this context the Scanian peasants 
primarily stressed their identities as Christians, tax-payers and members of a 
hierarchical society (in which the authorities should remember their responsibilities) 
and sometimes, as women. “Swedish” or “Danish” identiti s were seldom referred 
to.70 
 
In his dissertation on the Scanian commission 1669-70 the Swedish historian Karl 
Bergman expresses his firm view that the Scanian pesantry did not identify 
themselves as either Danes or Swedes. Nor did a strong pan-Scanian identity between 
Scania, Blekinge, Halland and Bornholm exist. Instead Bergman believes that the 
regional identity as Scanians, Blekingar (inhabitants of Blekinge/Bleging) etc. was 
strong among the peasantry. Since no kind of Danish identity existed it was of little 
interest to people who ruled the land. They might even have seen the coming of 
Swedish rule as rather an improvement since it gave the peasants a voice in 
parliament. 71 It was certainly not a negative factor that the fourth estate was given 
more rights. The problem is that it is so hard to say whether these were theoretical or 
practical rights. New research is implying that the judicial system might also have 
become more distant under Swedish rule. Danish local courts (ting) were held in 
every hundred every two weeks but Swedish ones only every six months.  
  
In a dissertation from 2003 Reverend Stig Alenäs pre ents an analysis of church 
documents from the 1680ies both from a linguistical point of view and through the 
way the inner space of the churches were changed (or were supposed to be changed) 
with the introduction of Swedish liturgy. He concludes that there was a great deal of 
passive resistance on the side of the native clergy: “The deans were key figures in the 
Swedification process. They were overtly loyal to the bishop and the authorities, but 
                                               
70 Harald Gustafsson, ”Going to Malmö to Claim One’s Rights. Subjects, Authorities, and Notions of 
Identity in Scanian Solicitations 1661-1699”, pp. 78-115 in Fredrik Nilsson, Hanne Sanders & Ylva 
Stubbergaard (eds), Rörelser, möten och visioner i tid och rum, (Movements, Meetings and Visions in 
Time and Space), Lithuania 2007, quote p, 81. See also the English summary pp.112-113. 
71 Karl Bergman, Makt, möten, gränser. Skånska kommissionen i Bleking  1669-70, (Power, Meetings, 
Borders. The Scanian Commission in Blekinge), Lund 2002, p.368.  
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covertly showed a disloyalty which bordered on obstruction.”72 Alenäs stresses that 
using Swedish or, if one could do no better, pidgin Scandinavian, was a way of 
showing compliance with the authorities and that the clergy made more efforts to 
produce non-Danish epistles as the Swedish uniformity programme gained 
momentum. He also studied the way the communities, contrary to Swedish practice, 
strove to keep their altar candles and Danish bibles. In a more recent article on a 
group of clergymen who were tried in court for having abandoned their posts during 
the Scanian war, Alenäs comes to the conclusion that the most important thing in 
order not to be discharged was to have good connectio s among the Swedes. What is 
more important for this thesis is that Alenäs’s sources contained innumerable 
references to the snaphaner who, in his sources, were described in a very negative 
light.73 
 
Jens Lerbom’s dissertation on pre-national identities on the island of Gotland slightly 
north-east of the Scanian provinces, dates to the same year, 2003. In it, Lerbom 
analyses the war the Gotlanders used or did not use ethnically connected terms like 
“Swede” or “Dane” during the years following the Swedish take-over of the island.74 
In later research, Lerbom has dedicated himself to the analysis of military violence 
during the period between the first and the second Scanian War, to the emigration of 
Scanians to Denmark during the Scanian War and last but not least to an analysis of 
the reaction of the clergy in Halland to the new system.75 In his dissertation on the 
                                               
72 Stig Alenäs, Lojaliteten, prostarna, språket. Studier i den kyrkliga försvenskningen i Lunds stift 
under 1680-talet, (Loyalty, Rural Deans, the Language. Studies of the ecclesiastical Swedification in 
the diocese of Lund during the 1680ies), Bibliotheca historico-ecclesiastica lundensis 46, Lund 2003, 
p.222. 
73 Stig Alenäs, ”Förräderikommissionen 1682”, (The Trason Board of 1682), pp.150-183 in Stig 
Alenäs (ed.), Roskildefreden 350 år. Från danskt till svenskt kyrkoliv, (The 350th Anniversary of the 
Roskilde Peace Treaty. From the Church of Denmark to the Church of Sweden.), Malmö 2008. See 
especially p.183 and p.158 and p.173. Several of the clergymen had been physically abused by the 
snaphaner and even more were threatened with it. It should be added that the letters were addressed to 
the Swedish authorities and that the rhetoric used in them echoed the Swedish “snaphane” discourse in 
that the snaphaner were generally described as barbari ns with no bond to the Danish state. 
74 Jens Lerbom, Mellan två riken, integration, politisk kultur och förnationella identiteter på Gotland 
1500-1700, (Between Two Realms, Integration, Political Culture and Pre-national Identities on Gotland 
1500-1700), Studia Historica Lundensia, Lund 2003 
75 Jens Lerbom, “Våldets regionala realiteter. Soldaters dödliga våld mot civila i Skåne och Blekinge 
1660-1675.” (The Regional Realities of Violence. Deathly Military Violence against Civilians in 
Scania and Blekinge 1660-1675), pp. 272-285, in Våld – representation och verklighet. (Violence-
Representation and Reality), eds. Eva Österberg & Marie Lindstedt Cronberg,  2006. Jens Lerbom, 
“Flyttare, flyktingar, återvändare. Migration i gränsområdet kring Öresund under 1600-talets andra 
hälft”, (Migrants, Refugees, Returnees. Migration in the Borderlands of Öresund in the Late 17th
Century), pp.116-139 in Fredrik Nilsson, Hanne Sanders & Ylva Stubbergaard (eds), Rörelser, möten 
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interaction between the peasants and the crown in early modern Denmark, and more 
specifically in the border area of what is today called Göinge76 1525-1640, Stefan 
Persson pointed out that the creation of a standing army and the militarisation of the 
border region gradually frayed at the once so lively and mutually vital relationship 
between Göinge and Copenhagen.77 At an earlier stage, the local inhabitants had 
enjoyed special privileges in exchange for their protection of the border but eventually 
the state took over the responsibility for the border and placed a permanent garrison at 
the newly founded town of Kristianstad (Christianstad). Another aspect of S. 
Persson’s work is that he analyses the way crown rheto ic and closer ties to the state 
helped shape the beginnings of a Danish “national” identity.78  Only recently Stefan 
Persson has written a massive volume on the wars aginst the Swedes as they were 
experienced and organised along the long “old” border in the Scanian provinces. The 
book also includes an interesting section on the snaphaner/friskytter in which Persson 
stresses that the friskytter were mentioned already during the Nordic Seven-Year-
War, when the term referred to Michel Gynge’s troops (the gränsvärnsfänika). To 
Persson the connection between peasant troops and sn phaner/friskytter is also 
evident. He makes an important point when he points u  that the friskyttar and 
snaphaner were so much more feared by the Swedes than the peasant troops and that 
consequently the employment of them was a deliberate choice that rendered the 
Danish battle techniques more efficient in a situaton when were in desperate need of 
competent combat support.79 
 
                                                                                                                            
och visioner i tid och rum, (Movements, Meetings and Visions in Time and Space), Lithuania 2007, 
2007. Jens Lerbom, Evighetens motsträviga målsmän? Hallands prästerskap på Sveriges riksdagar 
1649-1719, (Eternally unwilling persecutors? The Halland Clergy at the Swedish Diets 1649-1719), 
pp.108-120 in Stig Alenäs (ed.), Roskildefreden 350 år. Från danskt till svenskt kyrkoliv, (The 350th 
Anniversary of the Roskilde peace treaty. From the C urch of Denmark to the Church of Sweden.), 
Malmö 2008. 
76 Then the terms Gynge or Gønge were used. Stefan Persson uses the Latin term “Gothungia”. 
77 Stefan Persson, Kungamakt och bonderätt. Om danska kungar och bönder i riket och i Göinge härad 
ca. 1525-1640, (Royal Power and Peasant Rights. On Danish Kings a d Peasants in the Whole 
Kingdom and in the Hundred of Gothungia app.1525-1640), Riga 2005. See esp. pp. 273-276 but also 
pp. 427-428 of the summary in English.  
78 Stefan Persson 2005, p.426. Persson also claims that there is evidence of a clearly discernable 
Scanian identity that was more important than the micro-regional Gothungian identity: one example of 
this was when the Swedes offered the Gothungians to join Sweden and the Gothungians promptly 
replied they would not divorce their fellow-Scanians.  
79 Stefan Persson, Gränsbygd och svenskkrig. Studier i Blekinges, Skånes och Hallands östdanska 
historia, (The Borderlands and the Wars against the Swedes. Studies in the Eastern Danish History of 
Blekinge, Scania and Halland), Stockholm 2008. See esp. pp.380-392 and for the analysis of the battle 
efficiency of respectively peasant troops and friskytter/snaphaner see p. 383.   
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Some ten years ago the reverend Paul Erik Engelhardt, a etired lecturer from the 
University of Greenland, wrote his PhD on the problems that the encounter between 
Danish and Swedish culture caused among the Scanian clergy and their bishop Peder 
Winstrup. The dissertation has now been updated and published as a book in the 
Museum Tusculanum collection.80 Engelhardt sees the controversial bishop in a new 
light in that he claims that Winstrup was not so much of a traitor or turncoat as has 
been supposed, but that Winstrup should rather be seen in the light of a man who tried 
to mediate between the two cultures so that all too s rident clashes could be divided. 
According to Engelhardt, Winstrup accepted reality for what it was and promptly 
greeted the Swedish king when he arrived, but through t his lifetime he kept 
working for the maintenance of the old Danish churc and its traditions in Scania.81 
Furthermore, Winstrup has gained even some more moral standing through the 
research of Hanne Sanders of Lund University.82 The controversial bishop tried to 
promote the version that the loss of the Scanian provinces and the consequent 
sufferings were God’s way of punishing the Danish people for their sins and that the 
Scanians should accept whatever the Lord sent them. In fact, Winstrup only tried to be 
a good Christian and that was so much more important th  being Danish or Swedish 
at the time. Apart from her research on Bishop Winstrup, Sanders has written 
profusely (and with great competence) on various aspect  of the history and culture of 
southern Scandinavia, both in the present and the past. Her most recent contribution is 
a little volume83 that constitutes the sequel to Harald Gustafsson’s late t work Scania 
in Denmark. A History of Denmark until 1658.84 In it Sanders comes back to her 
                                               
80 Paul Erik Engelhardt, Skåne mellem dansk og svensk. En undersøgelse af de n tionale brydninger i 
Skåne stift årene 1658 til 1679. Holdninger hos biskoppen og i præsteskabet, (Scania between 
Denmark and Sweden. An Inquiry into the Clashes betwe n the Nations in the Scanian Diocese 
between the years 1658 and 1679), Copenhagen 2007. 
81 Engelhardt 2007, pp.269-270. Engelhardt takes a far more traditional view of national identities than 
most of the researchers at Lund University today: he does not believe that the difference between being 
Danish then and now is as radical as has been claimed. 
82Hanne Sanders, ”Religiøst eller nationalt verdensbillede? Skåne efter overgangen til Sverige 1658 
(”A Religious or National Conception of the World? Scania after the transition to Sweden in 1658), 
pp.231-252 in Sanders, Hanne (ed). Mellem Gud og Djævelen. Religiøse verdensbilleder i Norden 
1500-1800, , (Between God and the Devil: Religious and Magicl World-views in the Nordic Countries 
1500-1800), Copenhagen 2001, in particular p. 239: ”To Vinstrup the war consequently remains a tool 
in the hand of God: a tool that the Lord can use for or against the peoples that live on Earth. He brings 
war as a punishment and ends it as a gift.”    
83 Efter Roskildefreden 1658. Skånelandskapen och Sverige i krig och fred. (After the Roskilde Peace 
Treaty of 1658. The Scanian Provinces and Sweden in Times of War and Peace), Munkedal 2008. 
84 Original title: Skåne i Danmark. En dansk historia till 1658, Riga 2008. In it Gustafsson traces the 
outline of how ”Little Denmark” was shaped, from Viking times until the Roskilde Treaty. One 
important point that he makes is that he stresses how t e eastern parts of the kingdom (the one-time 
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interpretation of Winstrup’s sermons and speeches,85 but the main theme of the book 
is to analyse how the transition was experienced by the man (and woman) in the 
street, not primarily as a war-time experience but as an extended process that lasted 
during several decades and that should not be interpret d in terms a conflict between 
“Danish” and “Swedish”.86 Sanders also claims that the long inter-war period between 
the two short wars should be seen as a period of “Scanification” rather than 
“Swedification” since Scania very much remained a pe ce of old Denmark (with its 
own traditional Scanian Law) under Swedish sovereignty while Denmark itself moved 
away from nobility rule to Absolutism. 
 
The Danish historian Jens Christian V. Johansen has occupied himself with Scanian 
history for quite some time. In the year 2000 he analysed the concept of Swedification 
in an interesting article in which he stressed the fact that some historians do not accept 
the existence of a Swedification for the mere reason that they still see the Scanians as 
some sort of Danes.87 Vesterskov Johansen returned to the subject of the 
Swedification in a recent article in which he claims that Swedish authorities tried to 
introduce Swedish laws long before 1683 when Scania officially went over to 
Swedish law. To Vesterskov Johansen an important fact is the degree of coercion that 
was used during the Swedification process. However, th  article also concludes that in 
fact some aspects of the Swedification actually improved the situation for many 
                                                                                                                            
marches) became ever more important during the first stages of the Christian era and that that trend 
continued until the Swedes took over the eastern provinces.(See: pp.27-29.) Later on in the book 
Gustafsson also analyses the difference between how the loss of territories was experienced in an early 
modern conglomerate state and in a mid 19th century national state. Which is why the loss of Slesvig-
Holstein became such an emotional issue in Denmark whereas the loss of the Scanian provinces was 
next to forgotten. 
85 See: pp.102-105. 
86 Sanders 2008, p.8 and pp.60-65, esp. p.62. 
87 Jens Christian Vesterskov. Johansen, ”Hvilken forsven kning?” (Which Swedification?)  in  Mark og 
menneske. Studier i Danmarks historie 1500-1800 (Territory and Human Beings, Studies in Danish 
History 1500-1800), ed. Claus Bjørn og Benedicte Fonnesbech-Wulff, Skippershoved 2000.pp.181-
186. One example mentioned by Vesterskov Johansen is Sven Skovmand, Guds og kongens tjener: om 
søfolk, svenskere og enevælde, (Servants of God and the King: of Seafarers, Swedes and Absolutism, 
Copenhagen 1995. This view can be suitably exemplified by a quote from Ingrid Dora Jarnbjer’s 
(unpublished) MA thesis “Skånelands blodige historie” (The gruesome history of the Scanian 
provinces):”The Swedification continued and after approximately a couple of generations the Swedish 
conquerors claimed that the Swedification was complete, but still today Scania is not “properly 
Swedish”, it is Scanian, and the population still speak their particular dialect and have close ties to 
Denmark”, unpublished MA thesis 2003, quote p.103.    
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people: Swedish law, for example, was not necessarily experienced as a bad thing and 
politically the vast majority of the population enjoyed more rights than in Denmark.88 
 
Other recent works that deal with different aspects of Scania’s passage to Sweden and 
the background of it include Sten Skansjö’s Hi tory of Scania in which the subject of 
a regional Scanian identity throughout history is maybe the main theme.89 There is 
also Jonas Nordin’s A People of Poverty and Liberty, a book on national and political 
self-images in Sweden from 1660-1772. In it the author, who is a Swedish historian, 
describes some of the actions of the Swedish authorities in the Scania business as 
“horse-trading” and seems convinced that the Swedificat on was more of a set 
programme than a process.90 Only a couple of years ago the Cambridge-based Danish 
historian Kim Wagner wrote a revisionist biography of Poulsen in which the latter is 
characterised as something of a social bandit.91 The Swedish archaeologists Bo 
Knarrström and Stefan Larsson only recently published a very interesting volume in 
which they analysed the friskytter and the situation during the Scanian War from an 
archaeological point of view. Moreover, they have tri d to explain “the eruptions of 
violence” without “emotional pathos”.92 In their analysis of the state of the Scanian 
lands (i.e. the soil) they have come to the conclusion that there was indeed a problem 
with desertion of farmlands and poverty during the war.93  Fredrik Persson of Lund 
University has also recently written a dissertation on the construction of a regional 
identity that has come to construct the “Swede” as “the other” and how history has 
                                               
88 ”Den hastige forsvenskning. Skåne efter freden i Roskilde”, pp. 36-48 in Stig Alenäs (ed.). 
Roskildefreden 350 år. Från danskt till svenskt kyrkoliv, (The 350th Anniversary of the Roskilde Peace 
Treaty. From the Church of Denmark to the Church of Sweden.), Malmö 2008. See: p.37  where 
Vesterskov Johansen stresses that one of King Christian the fifth’s most important justifications (as 
declared in a decree of 1st July 1677) for having retrieved Scania was that the Swede’s had rendered the 
peace treaty of Roskilde nul and void in that they ad tried to introduce Swedish law. Se also pp.46-47. 
89 Sten Skansjö, Skånes historia, (A History of Scania), Borgå 2006 (orginally 1997). 
90 Jonas Nordin, Ett fattigt men fritt folk. Nationell och politisk självbild i Sverige från sen stormaktstid 
till slutet av frihetstiden, (A People of Poverty and Liberty. National and political self-image in Sweden 
from the late Age of Greatness to the end of the Agof Liberty 1660-1772), Symposion, Stockholm 
2000, p.65. 
91 Wagner, Kim A., Snaphanelederen Svend Poulsen, en militærhistorisk biografi, (The Leader of the 
Snaphaner Svend Poulsen, a military history biography, Næstved 2003. See also Stig Wørmer’s article 
in “Berlingske Tidende”19 January 2004 in which Wørme  contestates Wagner’s views.   
92 Bo Knarrström & Stefan Larsson. Hans Majestäts friskyttar av Danmark. (His Majesty’s Friskytter 
of Denmark), Riksantikvarieämbetet, Lund 2008. See e.g. p.22. 
93 See: p. 175 and attachments 10 and 11 that include lists of abandoned farms and proprietors of 
inhabited farms in the Örkelljunga area during from the 1650ies to the 1680ies. 
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been used by regionalists to this scope. He has already written several articles on the 
same topic.94 
 
Last but not least I would like to add that maybe th  majority of the extant literature 
on Scanian history, and definitely so in the case of the snaphaner, has been produced 
outside academia. Most books in the “Scanian collections” in the local libraries have 
nothing with the universities to do and those are the history books that are most 
widely read. By far, the majority of the non-professional historians are fervent 
Scanian patriots that resent the actions of the Swedes three hundred years ago but 
also, some are traditional Swedish patriots that con ribute to the nationalist greater 
Sweden discourse in which the passage to Sweden is s en as a blessing. There are also 
Danes that reclaim the lost lands and write history  underpin their case95 and 
genealogists that just want to tell the story of their ancestors.  I have largely ignored 
these works since the vast majority of them are basd on the works of other people on 
not on primary sources. But I have included a number of works by non mainstream 
historians that are based on primary sources that are of importance to my work, 
primarily Vigo Edvardsson and Uno Röndahl. In both cases I have double-checked 
most of the sources they stated and that were of importance to me, except the extracts 
from the Swedish court registers (domböcker) in Edvar sson.  It is difficult not to take 
some of these works into account since some of these obby-historians of both camps 
have found and published documents of importance, as have many genealogists. Vigo 
Edvardsson was a school teacher and a hobby historian with pro-Swedish tendencies 
who compiled a three volume work on the snaphane wars during the 70ies and 
                                               
94 Fredrik Persson, ”Ett historiskt gränsöverskridande? Regionerna Öresund och Skåne som historiska 
konstruktioner”, (A Historical Crossing of Borders? The Öresund and Skåne Regions as Historical 
Constructions), pp.321-351 in Fredrik Nilsson, Hanne Sanders & Ylva Stubbergaard (eds), Rörelser, 
möten och visioner i tid och rum, (Movements, Meetings and Visions in Time and Space), Lithuania 
2007. See especially p.347 (English summary) and p.340 where he comments on the ”explosive 
political power” of the debate about the sad fate of the snaphaner. He also draws parallels to the 
Balkans, the Basque countries and Caucasus.(p.322). I a newspaper article from 26th February 2008 F. 
Persson goes on to claim that the idea of a harsh Swedification is an image that has been constructed in 
order to serve the political scopes of Scanian patriots. As the title of the article, “The Myth about the 
Subjugation of Scania”, (in the Sydsvenska Dagbladet) indicates, F.Persson believes that the concept of 
a “subjugation” has also been invented in modern times, and consequently, that when early modern 
Scanians like Olluf Rosencrantz claimed that their fatherland had been subjugated by the Swedes they 
meant something totally different. Naturally, F. Persson’s line of thought could also be considered a 
tool that is used to undermine criticisms against a Swedification policy that can be traced back three 
hundred odd years in time.   
95 See: Sven Skovmand, Guds og kongens tjener: om søfolk, svenskere og enevæld , (Servants of God 
and the King: of Seafarers, Swedes and Absolutism, Copenhagen 1995. 
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80ies.96 Contrary to most Swedish researchers, Edvardsson made frequent use of 
Danish sources and the traces of his many hours spent in the Danish National 
Archives can still be found in the form of little notes with his name that he stuck 
among the documents wherever he found something of importance.  Uno Röndahl has 
published most of the existing muster rolls with ample comments on the lives of the 
registered friskytter. It should be noted that Röndahl is a retired inspector 
superintendent of the Swedish police force: his tendency to dramatic pro-Scanian 
interpretation of history has gained him a questionable reputation among Swedish 
historians. Another “hobby historian” who came up with important information about 
the snaphaner from mainly Danish sources and that I ve used in this dissertation, in 
spite of his traditionally nationalistic interpretation, was the reverend Anders Hedwall 
of Västerstad (Vestrested) who amongst other things wrote an excellent little 
biography of Simon Andersen, one of the most famous friskytte-officers.97 Thanks to 
Hedwall’s work we have not only a cohesive account of Andersen’s actions during 
the war but also something like an overview of the documents in the Danish archives 
that can be traced to Andersen’s hand. Hedwall It is not always easy to make a 
division between academic historians and non-academic ones. I am not quite sure 
about the background of Per Johnsson and Pehr Sörensson for example, and then there 
are cases were professionals and non co-operate: the peasant republic-and romantic-
woodlander-rhetoric is repeated by the highly accomplished historian Dick Harrison 
in his preface to They Called Them Snaphaner by Kim Hazelius in which he 
(Harrison) speaks of “the outlawed population of the woods”.98 Harrison and Hazelius 
seem to ascribe to the peasant republic-theory. It should be added that the view that 
the snaphaner had questionable backgrounds has also become an “established fact” 
among writers of otherwise clearly pro-Scanian views like Björn Gyllix who calls 
them “criminals, mentally disturbed people, hobos and various other outcasts from 
                                               
96 Vigo Edvardsson, Snapphanekriget 1675-1679 Dokument från en orolig tid I-III , Kristianstad 1974-
1985.  
97 Anders Hedwall, Tullsagra Simon alias Simon Snaphane. En skånsk frihetskämpe. (Simon from 
Tullsager alias Simon the Snaphane. A Scanian Freedom Fighter.), Copenhagen 1966. 
Several of Hedwall’s works were published by the Dansk-skaansk förening (The Danish-Scanian 
society)  in the early 1960ies. They are now also avail ble on the internet of that association.  
98 Dick Harrison, ”Preface”, pp. 7-17 in Kim Hazelius, De kallade dem snapphanar. Friskyttar, rövare 
& bondeuppbåd, (They Called Them Snaphaner. Friskyttar, Robbers and Peasant Insurgents), 
Kristianstad 2006, p.12.  
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society”99 as opposed to the friskytter who were military heroes. Nowhere do any of 
these historians and history writers state exactly on which basis they draw their 
conclusions. Generally they refer to either Fabricius or Åberg or (most frequently) 
both. 
 
On a popular level interest in Scanian history has always been intense and floods of 
books, records, novels, films and even comic magazines have come out during the last 
two centuries from Carit Etlar’s 19th century classic Gøngehøvdingen onwards.100   
 
The Ideological Context – Scandinavian Issues 
  
In modern-day Scandinavia the Scanian problem is a h ghly emotional and political 
issue. It is a matter that keeps popping up in the frequent squabbles between Denmark 
and Sweden. When the new Danish government was elected in 2001 they were 
immediately accused of being racists by the Swedes because of the new immigration 
laws. The Danish politician Pia Kjærsgaard promptly responded that the Swedes 
should think twice before they accused their neighbours of racism. After all, the 
Swedes had practiced “ethnic cleansing” in Scania long before anyone else in Europe 
had thought of such measures.101 In 2007 a Danish rightist party publicly declared that 
Denmark should claim the restitution of Scania and  Scanian and a Danish major 
newspaper (HD and Berlingske Tidende) promptly had t eir readers vote on the issue: 
to the result that 60% on both sides would prefer a reunion and some 10% on the 
Scanian side claimed independence.102  As the opinion poll continued on the Swedish 
newspaper’s website the majority switched to the Swdish side after a while and the 
Scanian and Danish reunionists claimed that it was an up-Swedish conspiracy.  Due to 
squabbles of the kind it can sometimes become difficult to do historical research.103  I 
                                               
99 Björn Gyllix, ”A little town in the midst of a great war”, pp. 231-268, p.246 in Tor Flensmarck and 
Björn Gyllix, Ve de besegrade. Om snapphanetiden och seklet då Skåne blev svenskt, (Vae victi. On 
the Times of the Snaphaner and the Century When Scaia Became Swedish), Gdansk 2006. 
100 Carit Etlar was a pseudonym for Carl Brosbølls. The Gjøngehøvdingen was published in 1853. In 
1899 a Swedish version of the Svend Poulsen saga was published, C A Cederborg’s Göingehövdingen. 
101  See: Berlingske Tidende 13th June 2001. The new immigration laws were the politica  background 
of the Swedish verbal attacks. 
102  
103 At the moment of writing, 7th May 2007 12.30-1 pm, Radio Kristianstad P4, is broadcasting a 
musical programme with songs in the honour of the friskytter. The songs are written and performed by 
Lars Fernebring. The songs are celebrating King Christian and the memory of the happy times before 
the arrival of the Swedes. Another song is dedicated to the sad fate of Captain Severin (“backbound 
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have included this paragraph on contemporary Scanian and Scandinavian politics in 
order to make clear to non-Scandinavians that however distant the things I write about 
in this thesis may seem, they still can be made to serve the purposes of one or the 
other side of a rather inflamed ongoing discussion. And I sincerely hope that this will 
not happen. Whoever feels tempted to insert any of my research results into a modern 
context should think twice before doing it since thworld has changed a lot since 
1658. It is not correct to apply modern concepts and keys of interpretation to issues 
like those that arose after the Roskilde peace. Unfortunately I also have to stress that I 
do not hold anybody responsible for what their fathers or forefathers did.  I do not 
believe in hereditary guilt and I felt sorry for the Swedish television journalist who 
some time ago deposited a bunch of flowers on the steps of a church at Örkened. 
Although the Örkened area was razed to the ground some three hundred odd years ago 
this young man had very little to do with that fact. 
Once and for all I would like to make clear that I have nothing against up-Swedes and 
do not wish this material to be used for any ideological or political scopes. 
 
Legends and Myths  
Alf Åberg has claimed that the original legends depicted the snaphaner in a sinister 
light and that the stories of heroes with almost or actually supernatural gifts that are 
told today are products of the Romanticism. Åberg is convinced that Robin Hood 
themes in combination with Walter Scott’s novels had such an impact on the 
Scandinavians that the originally evil snaphaner were r modelled into national heroes.  
It was easy enough to identify Scott’s highlanders with the snaphaner and already in 
1831 the first Swedish snaphane-novel was published, O.K’s Snaphanerne. Åberg 
claims that the original legends portrayed the snaphaner as unwelcome guests that 
were killed by the locals. The truly romantic vein was then continued by hobby 
historians and authors in Scania and Denmark, whereas the Swedes generally judged 
the snaphaner more soberly. That is the theory presented by Åberg but as usual it is 
not clear where he got his evidence from.104 The the most famous of all snaphane-
novels is Carit Etlar’s Gøngehøvdingen (The leader of the Gønger) from 1854 . After 
                                                                                                                            
and crucified his pain exploded in a wave of agony a d so the snaphane ceased fighting, oh Severin 
why did you leave us?...years of humiliation took our hope away”). This programme is emblematic of 
the modern-day popular vision of the Scanian question that sees the successful Swedification as a 
literal breaking of backbones.  The second part was broadcast on 21st May 2008. 
104 Åberg, p.99.Unfortunately Åberg does not explain how e got to the bottom of the legends. As usual 
he leaves the reader without foot-notes and with no further explanations.   
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him came a Swedish poem called Snapphanens bröllop (The Wedding of the 
Snaphane), then J.O Åberg’s and August Cederborg’s novels about Little Mads. The 
snaphane-novel is still going strong and now it also has a little brother in the form of 
comics. Another variety on the theme of snaphane romanticism are the snaphane-
films and television series, also genres that still very much in vogue.  The last 
Swedish version, the television series “Snapphanar!” from 2006 portrays the very 
Robin Hood-like protagonists in a positive light and there is also a female snaphane 
with some sort of a ninja sword on her back   According to other legends the Swedes 
lined up all the men of suspect villages in front of he churches, made them pray Our 
Father and then shot them. There is no evidence that these executions ever took place. 
The story is reported as a legend in the Ethnological Archives in Lund. It is also an 
element of a play by N.R Munck af Rosenschöld that was published in 1859.105 That 
kind of stories are representative of the tradition hat present the Swedes in a sinister 
light and the snaphaner as resistance fighters, a parallel tradition that exists across the 
entire Scanian territory.  
  
I believe that sometimes the legends contain a grain of truth: sometimes they tell us 
the stories of events, people and places that have been forgotten because they 
belonged to the losers. That kind of stories had no place in official history writing 
since they did not fit into the official Swedish image and the Danes chose not to 
identify with the losers of the Scanian War.106 The foremost example of legends that 
reflect real events is perhaps the Loshult treasure. It mained a local legend that the 
families of those responsible for the coup still had the booty stowed away, but only 
recently a farmer decided to show the part his family had kept in their barn over three 
hundred years.  In the same manner do the Snaphaner stables that have constituted a 
local tourist attraction for centuries and that the archaeologists have finally proved 
were exactly what legend said they had been: a hugesnaphane base with cooking 
                                               
105 According to legend, all grown men in the village of Matteröd were shot outside the church (after 
having prayed Our Father), as reported in the archives. See: Edvardsson, III, p.100. N.R Munck af 
Rosenschöld’s play Lyriskt –romantiskt skådespel i fem avdelningar ur folkefejden i Skåne mot Karl XI 
(Lyrical-romantic play in five parts about the people’s fight in Scania against Charles XI) is published 
in part by Edvardsson, III, pp.168-180. See p.179: “all the peasants were ordered to kneel and to pray 
Our Father…”. Munck af Rosenschöld (p.175.) hoped that he conquest of Scania would eventually 
lead to the unification of the whole of Scandinavia. 
106 Naturally I do not believe that all legends are true: then I would have to accept that some people 
claimed the snaphaner were allied with the trolls and that they were invulnerable to all but silver 
bullets... 
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facilities and stables etc. at the bottom of a ravine. Some hobby historians have even 
claimed that the truth about the snaphaner has never b en documented in any other 
manner than through oral traditions and legends.107 Local tradition has for example 
always known that there were snaphaner all over Scania, which the official version 
has almost forgotten. Vague attempts at documenting the presence of snaphaner in the 
whole region have had to stand back for the peasant republic theory into the frames of 
which snaphaner outside the border region did not fit. Theories apart, I cannot see 
why one tradition should exclude the other. Maybe parallel discourses on the 
snaphaner have existed all along and some people absorbed the tradition that 
presented them through freedom fighter legends and others the tradition that presented 
them as villains.108 Finally, I would like to stress that I absolutely donot think that 
legends should be mistaken for historical facts. Sometimes they can give us a hint 





This section contains a presentation of my sources and my motivations for having 
chosen them. I have also tried to explain the limitations of these and why I chose to 
concentrate on Danish sources.  
 
The snaphaner and friskytter in the archives 
The documents in question all date from 1676-1678 and have been selected on the 
basis of their centrality in time and place: the apx of the friskytte/snaphane 
movement is to be dated exactly to these years. My primary goal was to find sources 
that dealt with the way the friskytter/snaphaner woked and for this reason I 
concentrated on the Danish collections that are today to be found in the National 
Archives in Copenhagen. Early in the 20th century Per Sörensson criticised the 
scholars that had almost exclusively done research on t e snaphaner in the Swedish 
                                               
107 Tor Flensmarck, ”Friskyttar och snapphanar”, pp.186-205, in Tor Flensmarck and Björn Gyllix, Ve 
de besegrade. Om snapphanetiden och seklet då Skåne blev svenskt, (Vae victis. On the Age of the 
Snaphaner and the Century when Scania became Swedish), p.186. 
108 I would also like to add that the legends that I heard as a child did not represent the snaphaner as 
either heroes or villains. I was told they were just people who lived in bad times and sometimes they 
had to fight, sometimes they had to hide in the cellars. 
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archives where the sources speak little or nothing of their military role.109 On the 
contrary, Swedish sources tend to describe what they called “snaphaner” as common 
criminals. Sörensson pointed out that it is in the Danish sources that most information 
about the friskytter/snaphaner is to be found and he hoped that in the future more 
research on them through Danish sources would be don . Unfortunately Sörensson 
and his injunctions have been left in oblivion. The same can be said for the case of 
Baron Jørgen Krabbe who was executed by the Swedes on the charge of high treason 
in the middle of the Scanian War. Two of the main charges against him was that he 
had (perhaps) told a friend that he was Danish (andnot Swedish) and that he 
associated with “snaphaner”. As Knud Fabricius noted, v ry little research has been 
done on the Krabbe case and he called out for otherpeople to take over where he had 
ended. Most 20th century research, including Alf Åberg’s, has relied almost 
exclusively on Swedish sources. I did not principally want to analyse how the Swedes 
constructed the snaphaner, I wanted to analyse the snaphaner and what they did and 
what they did it for. The sources that can be traced to the snaphaner themselves are to 
be found in Denmark and it seemed an obvious first choice of archival research. I 
know that the Swedish sources provide excellent material for a study of how the 
Swedes constructed the image of the snaphaner but to me that was not the main issue, 
although I have included it in my thesis as a sideline theme. In that sense I have tried 
to follow up on Sörensson’s advice and work mainly with Danish sources although I 
have spent short research periods in the National Archives and Royal Library in 
Stockholm, too.   As I have already mentioned I have set out from the points where 
two scholars in the past concluded that new generations of researchers would have to 
continue.  On the basis of the Danish sources, but also using Swedish sources and 
secondary literature I have tried to add new dimension to the way the friskytter should 
be regarded in that I have not only mapped their actions geographically and shown 
that the registered troops tended to follow the movements of the Danish army and in 
what manner they did so and what their tasks were but I also studied the various forms 
that resistance in the form of snaphane activities took during the Scanian War: until 
now nobody has paid any attention to the shape the snaphane “movement” took on the 
noble estates, although some attention has been paid to the fact that estate managers 
and bailiffs tended to be mentioned in association with the snaphaner. Nor has the 
                                               
109  
 37 
south-eastern part of Scania (roughly modern-day Österlen) been dealt with at all as 
an arena for snaphane activities, except in local legends. I felt that the case of Captain 
Bendix was extremely interesting since the sources that refer to it transmit the image 
of a middle phase of irregular warfare, that neither corresponded to the image of the 
peasants-in-arms troops nor to that of the King’s Fri kytter Corps that are registered 
in the National Archives, nor to that of bandits. The sources from that case also allows 
us to study local society from various perspectives: that of pro-Swedes testifying to 
the Danes (in Danish sources) and that of supposedly pro-Danes testifying to Swedes 
(in Swedish sources), regarding the very same events. We certainly only have access 
to a filtered version of what happened at Skräddaröd nd on other, similar occasions. 
The Swedish soldiers might and probably would have, told a different version. Danish 
court officials and registers would have presented everything in a different light, since 
first of all, it would not have been considered a crime to have once been a friskytte. It 
has certainly not been my intention to minimise the importance of the multiplicity of 
voices that the sources transmit to us in cases lik this: on the contrary it has been my 
ambition to make a variety of them heard when possible. Last but not least, 
documents of this kind provide us with information about events that have been lost to 
history: it is interesting to think whether the events that took place at Skräddaröd for 
example would have been forgotten by the historians if the Danes had not lost the 
war. 
 
This kind of inquiry is always subjective in that it cannot possibly cover all letters in 
the archives and the interpretation is left to the person of the researcher. The 
documents we are treating here can be found under the headings of Received letters 
1678 (Indkomne breve 1678), Intercepted Letters (Opsnappede breve) from 1677-
1678 and a collection of war reports called Depositiones 1676-1678, all to be found 
among the papers of the War College in the National Archives in Copenhagen . I have 
also used the archives of the Army Board or “General Commissariat” that include 
account books and pay-rolls.110 The letters that sorted under the papers of the War 
College are mainly reports to the commanders from single officers and soldiers and 
sometimes supplications from soldiers and ordinary people, or whole communities, to 
the king.  The intercepted letters are mainly the”fruit” of the work of the 
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friskytter/snaphaner whose task it was to try and interfere with the Swedish postal 
services. The Swedish letters that the friskytter/snaphaner managed to get hold of 
eventually ended up in the hands of the War College and that is where they still are to 
be found. 111 This collection of letters mainly consists of military reports, many of 
which are coded, but one can also find private lettrs o and from Swedish soldiers 
who were fighting in the Scanian provinces.112  
The Depositiones und Kundschaften collection contains daily reports from the scene 
of war from 1676 until 1679. The reports were written by two or three professional 
scribes. Everyone who came to the Danish Army Camp had to report to the authorities 
and the task of these scribes was to take down their test monies.113 The vast majority 
of the testimonies is constituted by oral reports from friskytter and the deserters that 
they had caught. In some cases a more “direct” report from the front is added in the 
form of a letter to the authorities from anonymous sources. Both kinds of depositiones 
reveal a great deal about the activities of the friskytter.  
 
I have also analysed a series of reports of friskytte prisoners or guests, people who 
had either been caught by friskytter or peasants or wh  had come to them of their own 
free will, in order to try and find out more about the work of the friskytter and what 
tasks were characteristic of them and what tasks might just as well be taken care of by 
peasants. If indeed one could actually separate these two categories at all. But the kind 
of testimonies that the Depositiones registers provide us with can help us understand 
who the friskytter picked up and why.  
  
                                               
111 The Danish national archives will be referred to as DRA (Rigsarkiv) and the University Library of 
Lund as LUB (Lunds universitetsbibliotek). 
112In a letter from 3rd June 1678 King Charles XI of Sweden told colonel Carl Hård that he had to try 
and send his letters the safest way. Some letters wre even sent in triplicate but a large part of them got 
lost anyway: Charles XI declared that Hårdh’s letters of the 26th and 27th ”must have fallen into the 
hands of the enemy” and the triplicate of the letter of the 31st had only just arrived but the two first 
copies remained lost. Opsnappede breve,  1677-79, DRA.  
113 It seems as if this was also the custom in the (Danish) towns, at least periodically. An order that 
General Major Merheim had been charged by the king to issue (from Landscrone, 27th March 1678, 
Indkomne breve, DRA, two orders with the same date, on  in Merheim’s own handwriting, and the one 
for the harbour guards in a scribe’s writing), streses that all persons (men and women, on foot or by
horse),  who came in through the northern gates had to be thoroughly interviewed and state their name 
and address, where they would be staying in town and what their errand was and what they were 
bringing with them and that those who left town should get “passir zetteln” without which they would 
not be allowed in again. Recently there had been several cases of espionage and informers that had 
escaped the notice of the authorities; some spies had travelled to Copenhagen and Elsinore and back 
only just to bring news to the enemy. The same orders w re issued to the harbour guards.. 
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The vast majority of the documents in the Depositiones collection are written in 
Danish but many are in German or Low German, or even a mixture between two or 
three of these languages.114 Contrary to most Swedish sources from the Scanian W r 
there is not much “hybrid” Scandinavian language. Scanians who tried to write 
Swedish (with varying success) to or the Swedish aut orities wrote in Danish to or for 
the Danish authorities. A few cases of “hybrid” language are among my sources, 
though: intercepted letters from ethnic Danes who wr te to Swedes or whilst acting as 
Swedish officials (Uhlfeldt for example), but also Danes who spied on the Swedes 
and copied down Swedish letters (Erlandsson’s letter) and in the case of the 
Depositiones, the scribes often wanted to render what the interviewee said as closely 
as possible and this meant that sometimes a report in German could be interspersed 
with Danish exclamations, but then the Danish was usually rendered correctly. 
However, in the case of Danish or German reports that try to render what the Swedes 
had said often end up in hybridisation: when they wre triumphing in the Swedish 
camp that the food supply lines from Zealand to Landskrona (then Landscrone) were 
cut off the Danish spies reported the Swedes to have s id: ”The Jutlanders are eager 
enough to return home now that they have not any option but to starve to death!”115 In 
the original this phrase is written in what the speaker and/or the scribe perceived to be 
Swedish, which proves that the scribes at least sometimes really tried to reproduce 
what the interviewees said. Another soldier reported that the Swedes were saying: 
“Yes, let the Jutes waste their men away, we will be waiting for them...” 116 Some of 
the intercepted letters are in French, English, Dutch or even Italian. 
 
The letters/reports from the friskytter were not devoid of importance at all, nor were 
their oral reports.  The Secretary of the Army Board117  and War Commissary Jens 
Harboe frequently reported to chief military prosecutor (generaluditøren) Herman 
Meijer of the Army Board in Copenhagen, and sometims almost his whole reports 
consisted of what he had been told by the friskytter, in person or through written 
                                               
114 For example, War Commissary Jens Harboe’s reports are normally but not always, in German with 
Low German influences. The friskytter’s reports arenormally in Danish but Nicolaus Hermansen wrote 
in German.See for example: Nicolaus Hermansen to General Friderich fon Arrenstorp Ÿstenet, 8th 
June 1678 and 2nd July 1678, Indkomne breve, DRA. 
115 ”Og nu wilde Juttan gierne tilbaka, og kunde intet komme mens matte forkomme aff swelten” 
116 Depositiones, Rasmus Persen’s report of 26th June 1677, DRA. “Ja, (lat) lad Juttan spilde folch, saa 
wil wi wel bie ham.” In the original ”lat” is crossed over. 
117 Jensen, p.490. (sekretær i Krigskollegiet). 
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reports, and I have used these reports for both main parts of my thesis. Just as Harboe 
reported on the regular soldiers’ operations he report d about the operations of the 
friskytter.118 Sörensson took some interest in Harboe’s account books from 1678 and 
pointed out the difficulty in separating friskytter (f eeshooters) from “skytter” 
(sharpshooters) in the register books, if indeed thre is any difference to be found.119  
Fabricius refers to Harboe as a Danish commissary and consulted his account books 
for the week 19th-26th April 1677 in which registered expenses for three f iskytte 
units.120 I have concentrated my analysis to the depositiones from 1677-1678.121 In 
some cases I have used reports that fall outside ths time span but then I have 
explained why. My dissertation will concentrate on this period since it was then that 
the friskytte corps developed, but the whole of the Scanian war will be seen as the 
background of these developments.  
 
Finally, I have also used the unpublished booklet “A Promemoria on the 
Snaphaner”122 in which the professional snaphane catcher Sven Erlandsson reported 
his feats during the war. The original has been lost but a handwritten copy is to be 
found in the Danish Royal Library.123 Fabricius pointed out some obvious mistakes in 
Erlandsson’s account. Jeppe Bosøn’s death is describ d to have taken place soon after 
the battle at Lund in December 1676 whereas Knud Thott described the same event as 
recent in a letter to the king from 13th May 1679. In the same manner Tage Bøg’s 
death is described by both Erlandsson in the “Promemoria” and Simon Bengtsson in a 
letter to Sperling from 24th September 1678. Erlandsson claimed he had killed “Böök” 
himself, whereas Bengtsson declared that “a Swedish unit” had done it.124 Fabricius 
hypothesises that the events in the “Promemoria” can generally be dated to the period 
after the fall of Kristianstad (Christianstad) in August 1678. Fabricius also 
hypothesises that Erlandsson might not have been the author of the Promemoria at all 
since it is written in the third person. It might have been written in defence of 
Erlandsson’s actions during his conflict with governor general Rutger von Ascheberg 
                                               
118 See for example Jens Harboe to Herman Meijer, LCrone 18th June 1678, Indkomne breve, DRA. 
119 Sörensson, pp.38-39. As Jensen (pp.453-453), Schwanewedel tended to use ”skytter” as avant-
garde. 
120 Fabricius III, p.106. 
121 June-July 1677 comprise 70 sheets. 
122 “Promemoria”, Ny kgl. Sml. 4o 1076, KB. See also:  Fabricius III, p.174 note 2. 
123 For the story of the “Promemoria” see: Fabricius III, p.174, footnote 2. 
124 See also Sörensson, p.45. 
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who took a considerably more lenient view on the Scanian question and with whose 
post-war war policy Erlandsson disagreed violently. On the other hand, the text is 
obviously influenced by Julius Caesar’s account of his feats in Gaul, De bello gallico, 
which was also written in the third person. In any case, on account of the numerous 
minor inaccuracies in the text, it can only be assumed that the “Promemoria” dates to 
a time when the events it describes were not totally fresh anymore.” 
 
Sources for the Krabbe case 
The original court records from Krabbe’s trial disappeared without a trace at a very 
early stage. What we have today are extracts of documents that made part of the court 
proceedings. These extracts were printed in both pamphlets that constitute our main 
sources. Governor General Sperling, who was also presided as judge at the trial, wrote 
a so-called Deduction of about 30 pages in which he justified his actions a d 
decisions. The Deduction was banned before it reached the shops, but someone had 
managed to get a copy over to the other side. Fabricius hypothesised that the 
embarrassing court records disappeared at the same time as Sperling’s defence 
pamphlet was withdrawn from circulation.125   
 The one most important source is the R plique that countered Sperling’s accusations. 
The author of the Replique is only stated as ”Aletophilus” on the cover. Fabricius 
declared that the pamphlet” was ascribed to Oluv Rosencrantz” but did not go into 
details about why and how that had come about.126 At the university library in Lund 
the pamphlet sorts under Rosencrantz and seems to have done so before Fabricius’s 
day too if one is to judge by the old-fashioned handwriting. I have accepted this 
attribution and speak of Rosencrantz when I mean Aletophilus throughout this 
chapter. The Replique consists of Rosencrantz’s actual defence-pamphlet, a mass of 
documents from the court proceedings, extracts fromKrabbe’s correspondence and 
finally Sperling’s Deduction. A full list of the contents of the Replique is added at the 
end of the thesis. I do not believe that the veracity of Rosencrantz’s version of the 
court documents should be doubted. They agree perfectly with Swedish accounts of 
the court case such as Sperling’s and Olivekrantz’s letters. Some of Sperling’s letters 
to the king contain extracts from the court proceedings and Krabbe’s letters and they 
agree with Rosencrantz almost to the letter. I have found Sperling’s letters and reports 
                                               
125 See Fabricius III: p.122. 
126 Fabricius III: p.123. 
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to Stockholm very useful. They are to be found in the archives of the government 
general of Scania in the Swedish National Archives. A copy of the verdict from 
November 1677 is also to be found amongst these letters. In the Swedish National 
Archives I have also used those of Krabbe’s and his wife Jytte Thott’s papers that can 
be found in the Biographica collection, though I was not allowed to see the originals 
and many pages seemed to be missing. I do not know whether they were only missing 
from the microfilm or from the archives. In Stockholm, most sources from the 
Scanian War are in disorder. Johan Paulin Olivekrantz’s appeal to the king is to be 
found under Krabbe’s name.  
A second pamphlet in defence of Krabbe can be found in the Postcard collection in 
the Danish Royal Library. Fabricius concluded that t e author was unknown but I 
believe that it can be ascribed to Holger Thott on fairly safe grounds.   
I have also used a pamphlet that was written in defence of Krabbe’s brothers-in-law 
Knud, Holger and Tage Thott who were also charged with high treason. This ”short 
and truthful relation” is written in the same style as the Replique. The author is not 
stated at all, instead of having a ”lover of truth” for author this booklet was written 
”for the information of all impartial lovers of truth.” I presume that Rosencrantz wrote 
this pamphlet too.  
I would like to add that there may have existed a third pamphlet in Krabbe’s defence. 
In one of his letters Sperling mentions a support pam hlet that was published in 
Germany. So far I have not been able to trace it – but he might simply have meant 
Aletophilus: the pamphlet that was written in defenc  of the Thotts was printed in 
Lübeck. There is no mention of where the R plique was printed but it is not unlikely 
that it was at the same place: the letters and design of the two pamphlets are almost 
identical. 
Another source from the Danish Royal Library that I will analyse here is the prayer-
book that Krabbe wrote during his imprisonment.   The prayer-book was handed over 
to Krabbe’s widow after his death and he had written i  with her in mind. But Krabbe 
knew that chances were that the Swedish authorities would read it too: he could not 
afford to express anti-Swedish views in it because it would have cost his family in 
Scania too dear.  No one can tell what his prayers would have sounded like if he had 
written them Denmark. It is a neat little book in leather covers and it is all written in 
Krabbe’s own handwriting. He hoped that it would be published or at least widely 
circulated people, because he mentioned “his readers” in several places.  
 43 
Other sources of interest at the Royal Library are a number of papers and documents 
that have belonged to the Thott family. There is an account of Krabbe’s last days as 
told by his confessor Laurenberg, and copies of some f Krabbe’s papers. I have also 
used War Commissary Jens Harboe’s reports from Landskrona (then Landscrone) 
 to the War College in Copenhagen and those are to b f und among the Received 
Letters in the War College Collection in the National Archives. 
Very little has been written on Krabbe- Sthen Jacobsen mentioned Krabbe briefly in 
his History of the Great Nordic war from 1699. Towards the end of the 18th century 
Barfod mentioned the case in his bizarre tales of the Scanian Nobility. At the 
beginning of the 19th century a Danish historian by the name of Odin Wolff wrote a 
lengthy article on Krabbe in the Journal for Politics, Science and Humanities.127  A 
romantic novel about the baron was published in Sweden at about the same time. In it 
Krabbe had become a Swedish patriot and the father of one of King Charles’s XII 
great warriors.  In 1851 Abraham Cronholm reported the most important details of the 
“Krabbe case” in his Political History of Scania. 128 Martin Weibull published some of 
the most important documents in his Scanian Collections from the end of the 19th 
century. Fabricius took up the Krabbe case and ended his short resume by saying that 
more research needed to be done. Several articles hav  appeared in local historical 
journals.  Many guidebooks and guide-sites on the Internet include some paragraphs 
on Krabbe. It’s generally very easy to decide whether e author takes a pro-Swedish 
or pro-Danish/Scanian view. 
 
Conclusions: 
 The Danish sources on and by the snaphaner have been left largely unexplored 
although there is ample first-hand material from snaphaner in Danish archives and as 
regards other documents I actually believe that the Danish sources give a more 
truthful picture of the snaphaner/friskytter. Naturlly it was in the Danish state’s 
interest to defend the friskytter, and sometimes also snaphaner, but it was certainly in 
the Swedish state’s interest to do the very opposite th ng. Consequently the image that 
the sources of both countries left in heritage to us is likely to be twisted, either way 
we look at it. I am to some extent, trying to write th  history of the losers, but once 
                                               
127 Odin Wolff, ”Baron Jørgen Krabbes ulykkelige Skjebn ” ( The sad fate of baron Jørgen Krabbe), 
pp.98-119, in Journal for Politik, Natur- og Menneske-Kunskab,  November 1825. 
128 Skånes politiska historia, efter större delen otryckta källor, Senare delen, Stockholm 1851. For the 
Krabbe case see pp.198-205. 
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again I am not doing that because I believe they were martyrs or because I think 
modern Scanians should take revenge. I do most certainly not think they should. Nor 
do I think that the snaphaner/friskytter was such an extraordinary phenomenon as has 
sometimes been made out: similar situations have aris n in many parts of the world 
during the ages, as I will come back to in the section on the snaphaner and the 
Swedish response was far from unique. On the contrary they responded much the 
same way as states have tended to do throughout history, maybe even today, when 
there is a situation of popular rebellion or guerrilla movements that are hard to get at 
with traditional army means.129 
 
Theoretical Background. National Identities in the 17th 
Century 
 
“The dispute that leads to the war involves a process by which each side calls into question the 
legitimacy and thereby erodes the reality of the other country’s issues, beliefs, ideas, self-
conception.”130 
 
It is difficult for us today to understand how people in the 17th century experienced 
the coming of new overlords and having to get used to a new culture. Not the least so 
if one takes into account that national identities probably did not play the same role as 
today. When I read Danish books from the time of the Swedish conquest of Scania 
like Sthen Jacobsen’s chronicle of the Nordic war  or Leonora Christina Uhlfeld’s 
memories from the Blue Tower 131 or Johan Monrad’s autobiography 132 I find it hard 
to think of these people as substantially different from the Danes and Scanians I know 
around the Sound today. A modern reader might smile a little at the fact that Reverend 
Jacobsen kept interpreting all kinds of meteorological phenomena as omens and that 
Leonora Christina interrupted the fascinating story of her time in prison with psalms 
that she had composed herself. To a Scanian the greatest difference might be that 
Jacobsen actually wrote the way our grandfathers spoke. It was not until I started 
                                               
129 For an analysis of punishments of guerrillas and rebellious subjects in the West, see: Richard 
Clutterbuck, Guerrillas and Terrorists, pp.24-27, Faber & Faber, London 1977. 
130 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain, The Making and the Unmaking of the World, OUP, Oxford, 1985, 
p.128. 
131 Leonora Christina Uhlfeld, Jammers minde og andre selvbiografiske skildringer, (Memories of my 
sufferings and other autobiographical accounts) ed. by Johannes Brøndum-Nielsen and C.O. Bøggild-
Andersen, Copenhagen 1949. There is an Italian translation of this book called Memorie dalla torre 
blu, Adelphi edizioni 1971 .  
132 Selvbiografi (1638-1692), (Autobiography) edited and published by S. Birket Smith, Copenhagen 
1888. 
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studying nationalism and “prenational” identities that it struck me that the writers 
mentioned above took very little interest in the national side of the conflict in the 
Scanian provinces, in spite of their living in the midst of it. Leonora Christina who 
was the daughter of King Christian IV of Denmark sometimes mentioned Denmark 
with nostalgia when she was out travelling in Europe but at least her husband Corfitz 
seemed only to care about his status as a nobleman. Knud Fabricius has pointed out 
that men like Corfitz Uhlfeld took their loyalty oaths very seriously but did not give 
much weight to the nationality of their sovereign. 133 Monrad and Jacobsen both seem 
fairly neutral in their works even if a note of sadness can be noted in Monrad when he 
declares that he still can remember how beautiful Scania was before the beginning of 
the wars. Jacobsen an obvious predilection for the avaged country of Scania that he 
still called a lovely bride to do the dance of war around. Perhaps Jacobsen reasoned 
the same way as the nobleman Niels Krabbe who declared that his one and only 
fatherland was Scania and that was all that mattered in the conflict.134 If Niels Krabbe 
said that he had a fatherland then he obviously meant something by those words and I 
would like to understand what. Both Leonora Christina and Jacobsen had all the 
reasons in the world for avoiding the subject of Denmark-Sweden. Leonora Christina 
was in prison for having sold herself and important sta e secrets to the Swedes. 
Jacobsen was probably hoping that his work would be acc ptable to both sides since it 
was unclear whether his beloved Scania would stay under Danish or Swedish rule. It 
might very well be that they just avoided subjects that were too inflamed at the time. 
But we do not know. In my research I often encounter testimonies of the importance 
that 17th century Scanians gave to their “national” identity and of the importance it 
was attributed by the Swedes, at least in times of armed conflict. In the spring of 1677 
a captain of the friskytter by the name of Jens Keldsøn defined the tasks of his unit as: 
”extinguishing all native Swedes and bereaving them of their privileges.”135 About 
half a year later a nobleman by the name of Olluf Rosencrantz claimed that all 
                                               
133 Fabricius, Knud. Knud Fabricius, Skaanes overgang fra Danmark til Sverige, (The Passing of 
Scania from Denmark to Sweden) vols.I-IV, Copenhagen-Lund 1906-58 vol.III, p.138.  
134 Fabricius (II, p.14.) quotes a letter from Niels Krabbe to Governor General Stenbock, dated 29th 
December 1660, in which Krabbe declares that it was his duty to obey the king and the government that 
Almighty God had decided should subjugate ”his dear fatherland Scania.” As regards Jacobsen, it 
should be added that although his Chronicle is essentially a neutral work, he himself spied actively for
the Danes. See: Engelhardt, p.251. 
135 Uno Röndahl, Skåneland ur det fördolda, (The Scanian Provinces – Out of the Shadows), 
Karlshamn 1996, p.233, quote: ”då ’ville de gå mand ur huse’ för att enligt Christian V:s order, utrota 
alla infördda svenskar ’och deras Formon fra dem tage.’” 
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Swedes were born with innate hatred of Danes and that the Swedes in Scania had their 
minds set on extinguishing the whole Scanian nation because the members of it had 
Danish blood in their veins.136    
Cultural, ethnic and territorial communities in the early modern world differed from 
what we call nationalism today. While analysing these communities one has to be 
careful not to fall into the so called “nationalistic trap”: it is easy to get blinded if one 
has one’s mind set on finding the roots of nationalism or proof of the modern origins 
of nationalism. Instead it is important to remember that “national” identities were only 
a minor part of a complex set of loyalties and identities. The sources prove that it 
meant something to be a “Swede” or “Dane” at the time but the components of these 
identities were probably not the same as today.137 This is the point at which Anthony 
Smith’s theories come in. I believe that the “ethnie” concept is a valid analytical tool 
when one is analysing early modern sources. 138  In his dissertation on the collective 
identities of the early modern Gotlanders, Jens Lerbom has used Smith’s “ethnie” 
concept to analyse how the islanders experienced the passage from Danish to Swedish 
rule in 1645. Lerbom believes that the good old Danish days, the “Danish times”, 
became mythicised as a past that stood for all that was right and good.139 This 
conclusion would probably also be valid for Scania even if the Danish identity had 
deeper roots there. Although most Scanians have vague ides about kings and wars and 
precise dates they tend to be aware of the fact that, once upon a time, “we were 
Danish.”  
In academia today there are on the one hand perennialists who believe that nations 
have existed for a long time but in different forms, on the other hand there are 
modernists who believe that nations are modern constructions. Whereas the idea of 
the relative or even total continuity of nations had been dominant during the first part 
of the 20th century the Second World War came to change this. A new generation of 
historians seemed to think that the horrors of the war proved that the”homogeneous 
                                               
136 Rosencrantz (En sandfärdig REPLIQUE…Copenhagen 1678.) compared governor general Sperling 
to Caligula and maintained that his hatred was unque chable and his cruelty towards the ”remaining 
Scanians of Danish extraction” so great that he would have liked to do away with them all in one blow.   
137 Harald Gustafsson, “The Eighth Argument. Identity, Ethnicity and Political Culture in Sixteenth-
Century Scandinavia”, Scandinavian Journal of History 27, 2002, pp.91-114. Quote p.91;Gustafsson, 
”The Conglomerate State: A Perspective on State Formation in Early Modern Europe.” Scandinavian 
Journal of History 23, 1998, p.210. 
138 Anthony D.Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Oxford 1988, pp.12-13.  
139 Jens Lerbom, Mellan två riken, integration, politisk kultur och förnationella identiteter på Gotland 
1500-1700, (Between Two Realms, Integration, Political Culture and Pre-national Identities on Gotland 
1500-1700), Studia Historica Lundensia, Lund 2003, pp.213-223. 
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territorial nation could now be seen as a programme that could be realised only by 
barbarians, or at least by barbarian means.”140 Perennialism was abandoned by most 
scholars and the modernist school became dominant. One of its major representatives 
was Elie Kedourie whose Nationalism was first published in 1960. Kedourie did not 
deny that the word ”nation” had existed long before his own century but he 
maintained that nationalism had given it a new meaning.141 Exactly what that word 
meant before the end of the 18th century seemed to be of little or no interest to 
Kedourie. The kind of patriotism that existed in early modern Europe could be 
described as:” affection for one’s country, or one’s group, loyalty to its institutions, 
and zeal for defence.” The difference between patriotism and nationalism was that the 
latter had a doctrine of its own whereas the former lacked a particular doctrine of the 
state and did not impinge on the individual’s relation to it. Patriotism and nationalism 
are only confused because the latter has ”annexed” th  universal sentiments that 
constitute the essence of patriotism.   Scholars who speak of an early kind of 
nationalism from the 15th century onwards are only applying categories from their 
own era to a past that did not know anything of the sort:  
”Men who thought they were acting in order to accomplish the will of God, to make the truth prevail, 
or to advance the interests of a dynasty, or perhaps simply to defend their own against aggression, are 
suddenly seen to have been really acting in order that the genius of a particular nationality should be 
manifested and fostered.”142   
Another scholar who emphasised the nexus modernity-nationalism as much as 
Kedourie was Ernest Gellner. According to Gellner it was only towards the end of the 
18th century that something that could be called nationl sm came into being. Any 
sense of belonging between members of the same tribe o  people that might have 
existed earlier could be classified as ”patriotism”. Nationalism could not have 
developed any earlier than it did because the literate élites that existed during the 
middle ages and the early modern era had no desire whatsoever to spread their culture 
to the lower strata of society.143  Gellner’s line of thought has been continued by Eric 
J. Hobsbawm who accepts the idea of a kind of proto-nationalism that in particular 
cases might have constituted the basis for nationalism. A component of proto-
nationalism might have been the cultural identification with a language as was 
                                               
140 Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780, Cambridge University Press 1990, p.134. 
141  Elie Kedourie, Nationalism, Hutchinson & Co LTD, London 1974, p.9. 
142 Kedourie, pp. 72-75. Quotes p.75. 
143 Ernest Gellner, Stat, nation, nationalism (Swedish translation of  Nations and Nationalism), Nya 
Doxa 1997, p.69. Gellner’s Thought and Change was published in 1964. 
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probably the case with the Albanians who had little else in common. This kind of 
ethnicity does not have anything to do with the formation of a nation state. The one 
most important criterion of proto-nationalism in Hobsbawm’s sense is ”the 
consciousness of belonging or having belonged to a lasting political entity.” Another 
kind of proto-nationalism worth mentioning was that of he élites that included the 
three elements of ”nationality, political loyalty and political commonwealth.”144 
Popular movements of defense against foreign invaders in the early modern era were 
spurred by social and religious ideologies, but not national ones: In a somewhat 
ambiguous manner he then declares that such movements could become ”the basis of 
a broader popular national patriotism.”145  Benedict Anderson defines nationality and 
nationalism as ”cultural artefacts of a particular kind” that came into being towards 
the end of the 18th century.146 To him collective identities are ”imagined” in so far as 
the individual feels a sense of belonging with other m mbers of the same community 
in spite of their never having met. Seen in this way national identities become social 
constructions and the nation an imagined political community. Before the invention of 
the printed book it was simply not possible to imagine communities, according to 
Anderson. Books opened a non sacral world in non-sacral languages to the mass of 
the population. Nationalism is best to be understood towards the background of the 
two cultural systems that preceded it. The first sytem was constituted by religious 
communities like Ummah Islam and Christendom with their sacral languages. The 
second system was that of the dynastic realm that up until the middle of the 17th 
century was the only imaginable political system.147 It was only when these old 
cultural conceptions had lost their ”axiomatic grip on men’s minds” that the nation 
could be imagined.148  
The wave of post-modernists was eventually countered by groups of scholars who felt 
that one had to look further back in time than the Fr nch Revolution to explain the 
existence of nations and nationalism. Many of those were ancient and medieval 
historians like Susan Reynolds who maintains that te ”regnal sentiments” of the 
peoples of the Middle Ages were not all that different from the nationalistic 
                                               
144Hobsbawm (1990), pp.53 and 73 (see quote). 
145Hobsbawm (1990), p.75. An example of this would be Bohemia. 
146Benedict Anderson, p.4. 
147 Anderson, pp.12-19 and 46. 
148 Anderson, p.34 and p.36. 
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sentiments of our days.149 A certain tendency to give the primate of national roots to 
their own forefathers can easily be traced among the perennialists. Adrian Hastings is 
convinced that the English ”gave the world the model f a nation-state” and that the 
Normans saw to it that it became an aggressive one. Other nationalisms were 
produced in order to stand up against this aggressiv  model. The English had been a 
nation since the days of Earl Byrhtnoht.150 This Anglo-centric view is interesting but 
less convincing when one discovers that scholars of other nationalities seem to be able 
to trace nationalism quite far back in their own countries.151 To Hastings ethnictiy is 
the basis of nationhood and languages the ultimate origins of every nation. Ethnicities 
would not have become nations if it had not been for the influence of Christendom 
that provided models of nationhood in the Bible andllowed the usage of vernacular 
languages. An ethnicity that had this background and was put under a certain pressure 
of the state eventually became a nation.152 
In his The Ethnic Origins of Nations Anthony D. Smith declares that the roots of 
national identities can be traced back to the beginnings of human civilisation and that 
the ”ethnies” of past times have been remodelled into modern nations.153  One should 
not, however, think of Smith’s view as anything buta constructivist view of 
nationalism. Smith does not believe that collective identities are biological facts – in 
that he agrees with the representatives of the modernist school. He differs the more 
from them by claiming that modern nations were preced d by ”ethnies” that were 
united by a collective name, a common myth of origins, history and culture, a sense of 
unity and a particular territory. An ”ethnie” is a cultural community that has 
constructed its own image and understanding of itsel on the basis of myths, 
memories, language, religion, traditions and institutions. These ethnies could also be 
described as ”historical communities built up on shared memories.”154 Smith 
                                               
149 See Reynolds Susan, Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe 900-1300, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 1984. 
150 Adrian Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood, Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism, Cambridge 
University Press 1997, pp.42-46. 
151 For Scandinavia see: Harald Ilsøe, ”Danskere og deres fædreland. Holdninger og opfattelser ca. 
1550-1700.” (The Danes and their Fatherland. Attitudes and Conceptions 1550-1700).Pp.27-89 in 
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152 Hastings, p.11. The Jews constitute the nation par excellence in the bible. 
153 Anthony D.Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Oxford 1988, pp.12-13.  
154 Smith (1988), pp.25-29.Quote p.25. See also Smith (2000) p.65. 
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emphasises the importance of the longue durée in order to be able to understand what 
nations and nationalism are.155 The main difference between ethnies and nations is 
that the former put more emphasis on ancestry myths and historical memories 
whereas the latter are defined by their homeland, their mass cultures and common 
laws. An ethnie can do without a homeland but a natio  cannot.156 Smith uses the 
term ”nation” in the sense of ”a named human population occupying a historic 
territory or homeland and sharing common myths and memories; a mass, public 
culture; a single economy; and common rights and duties for all members”. 
Nationalism as defined by Smith is ”an ideological movement for the attainment and 
maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by 
some of its members to constitute an actual or potential ’nation.’”157  
I agree with the postmodernists that the kind of natio lism that Fabricius accused to 
Scanians of not waking up to is a modern construction that belongs to the modern 
world. It is totally unfeasible that one should accuse a social group from three 
hundred years ago of not thinking the way one would have wanted to. I also agree 
with Ernest Gellner and other scholars that homogenisation and cultural integration 
are inherent to the industrial state and that modern nationalism has to be seen against 
this background. At the same time it seems obvious t  me that modern nationalism 
has its roots in the societies of past times and that the processes that Gellner described 
as characteristic of the Industrial revolution in certain cases could trace their roots to 
early modern Europe.      
I also feel that their theories come short as soon as they venture outside the field of 
history and that this undermines their general credibility. Both Hobsbawm and 
Benedict Anderson seem obsessed with the importance of languages and the written 
word. That is all very well but it is hard to understand why they have not made an 
effort to deal with languages as objects of serious research. Hobsbawm analyses the 
linguistic situation in Catalonia and the Basque country with very scarce references to 
linguistic and philological works in the field.158 Anderson ascribes the fixity of 
                                               
155 Cfr John Armstrong’s Nations before Nationalism from 1982. Armstrong sees nations in a 
plurimillennial perspective and does not draw clear ines between ethnicities and nations.  
156 Smith (2000), pp.65-71. 
157 Anthony D.Smith, The Nation in History, Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and 
Nationalism, The Menahem Stern Jerusalem Lectures, University Press of New England 2000, p.3. 
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modern languages to print-capitalism without having considered any scholarly works 
on the matter at all.159 Hobsbawm’s claim that Catalan and Basque would be ”equally 
opaque”160 to a Norman sailor is rather absurd and in any case it would be easy to 
prove or disprove scientifically. A test that screen d the percentage of understanding 
would most likely show that the sailor understood sme Catalan, but no Basque. 
History is not the only field in which scholarly methods are required in order to be 
able to make credible statements. Linguistics and philology are two other fields where 
there a certain scholarly standards to be held.     
Further incongruities appear when the modernists hazard theories on phenomena in 
the early modern world that they do not seem to have documented very well at all. 
Anderson claims that there ”was no idea of systematically imposing the language on 
the dynasts’ various subject populations” before the 19th century.161  But in France 
and Sweden the idea existed already in the 17th century and at least in Sweden the 
idea was put into practice to some extent.162 According to Hobsbawm it was only 
towards the middle of the 19th century that linguistic arguments came of use in 
international conflicts. In Scandinavia such arguments were used already in the 16th 
century. In 1523 King Gustav Vasa of Sweden invited the Scanians to join the 
Swedish kingdom since they “had the same language, customs and mores as the 
Swedes.” The king was kind enough to add that if they did share this vision he would 
make them do so by means of fire and murder…163 
I believe that most postmodernist representatives fail to recognise the many faces that 
collective identities show in the modern world and that perhaps that is why they seem 
incapable of perceiving any links whatsoever between th  early modern world and 
                                               
159 Anderson pp.43-44. The Scandinavian languages have changed far more between the 16th and the 
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”L’enseignement élémentaire en Roussillon dépuis ses origines jusqu’au commencement du XIXe 
siècle” in Bulletin de la société agricole, scientifique, et littéraire du département des Pyrénées-
Orientales 50, 1895, pp.145-398, cit.p.109.Cfr Aschenberg’s Swedification programme as presented in 
his account of his time in office.Every child in Scania who did not have at least a superficial knowledge 
of Swedish had to pay a fine and these fines were actually exacted. See: von Ascheberg, Rutger. 
”Rutger von Aschebergs ämbetsberättelse 1693.” (RvA’s Account of his Years in Office) ed. by Jerker 
Rosén in Scandia 17, 1946. See also: Alenäs, pp.99-100. 
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that of today. Anderson sees nationalism as a new religion that has filled a void in the 
souls of a humanity without traditional securities and both Kedourie and Hobsbawm 
agree with him.164 They seem blind to the fact that a large part of the Western world 
still gives great importance to religious identities and would not recognise themselves 
or their world in the description that Anderson, Hobsbawm and their likes give of 
it.165 As I have already stated I do not believe that ”naio l” identities meant the 
same thing to people in the days of the snaphaner as to us today, nor that it necessarily 
had the same significance to people from different strata of society. I tend to agree 
with Harald Gustafsson that it is obvious that those identities existed in the 17th 
century but that we cannot take for granted that they conveyed the same kind of 
associations and emotional response as they do to us today.166 Gustafsson classifies 
the Swedes of the early 16th century as an ”ethnie” and stresses the territoriality of this 
ethnicity: the common Swedish Law defined the kingdom (riket) as a whole that was 
united by the different judiciary districts that were contained by fixed territorial 
borders.167  
In the 1670’ies the consistory at the new university of Lund had to try to put an end to 
”the national odium, sc. inter nationem danicam et suecicam” that was raging among 
the students. Danish students were reported to send out patrols with long sticks to 
look for ”Swedish bastards” that they could thrash. T e consistory decided to 
establish student ”nations” that would keep Danish and Swedish students apart.168 The 
modernists do not give me any kind of answer as to why the students who had been 
born south of the old border identified themselves as Danes and felt that the students 
from north of the old border deserved being beaten up. The perennialists provide 
history students like me with analytical tools and at least the hope of being able to 
make sense of actions and motivations of men and women who lived in a 
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166 Harald Gustafsson, ”The Conglomerate State: A Perspective on State Formation in Early Modern 
Europe.” Scandinavian Journal of History 23, 1998, p.231. P.Torreilles och E.Desplanques, 
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comparatively distant past. I believe that the ethni  concept may serve as a help when 
one tries to analyse identities before nationalism and what it meant to be ”Swedish” or 
”Danish” a century before the ideas of the French revolution. In what order did 
people in the 17th century put their identities as Protestants, Scanians and 
Danes/Swedes? How did these identities relate to their loyalty to the king? And how 
important was it for the new authorities that the Scanians identified themselves with 
the Swedes?  
 
The Integration of Conquered Provinces 
”Integrate”: harmonise, blend, unify, combine, to join together systematically, incorporate.  
German. integrieren, Fr. intégrer, Lat. integrare but ultimately from Lat. integer whole, intact, 
unhurt, immaculate, unsullied, pure.169 
 
The process of integrating conquered provinces is easier to understand if one studies it 
with certain theories at the back of one’s mind. To Charles Tilly capital and war are 
the two most important propelling forces behind the modern state. Those very same 
forces also drove the state towards new conquests and incorporation of border 
territories. Tilly sees the 17th century as the period when the modern state first took
shape and asserts that it was the ”winner takes it all” principle that dominated. The 
normal development was that every state fought its neighbours in order not to be 
engulfed. But rearmament and warfare cost a lot of m ney and in one way or another 
that money had to be squeezed out of the population. The struggle for provisions and 
personnel created the central organisation structures of the state. If one wanted to 
protect the advantages that subjection to the central authorities brought with it 
(personal security for example) one also had to protect the area within which these 
advantages could be enjoyed. Around this safe area it was advisable to construct a 
buffer zone that the army could control and use in order to keep the enemy away. 
Whoever impinged on the safe area constituted a threa  to the rights and advantages of 
its inhabitants. With the passing of time the buffer zone might become integrated into 
the rest of the kingdom and then one had to construct a new buffer zone outside the 
                                               
169 Svenska Akademiens Ordbok, (The Dictionary of the Swedish Academy) www.g3.spraakdata.gu.se; 
Lo Zingarelli 1999, Zanichelli editore; F.Calonghi, Dizionario latino italiano, Rosenberg&Seller 1990; 
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary & Thesaurus, www.m-w.com. 
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old one. More often than not there was a different sta e outside the buffer zone and 
this process inevitably led to conflicts and eventually war. 170  
Tilly’s theories can help us see how war became a me ns of its own right, how the 
need to protect already integrated parts of the stat  led to new wars and new 
annexations. They also enable us to understand how important annexations were from 
a financial point of view...especially to a small country like Sweden that had great 
difficulties in financing its wars. Naturally the integration process of buffer zones did 
not always take the same shape; it depended on the person who sat on the throne, on 
the political situation and on the nature and history of the territory in question. An 
example of this is Jerker Rosén’s hypothesis that provinces that were conquered by 
the Swedes were very much left to themselves when t obility ruled the country. 
When a powerful king sat on the throne the provinces w re tied more closely to 
Sweden. 171 A certain connection between general political trends and integration 
policies can probably be traced in all countries. An interesting explanation of “state-
building” as a chain of events has been given by Tally in The Formation of National 
States in Western Europe.172  The original chain went from 1) Change or expansio  of 
the army. 2) Attempts acquiring more means from the subjects. 3) New or more 
efficient administration. 4) Resistance from the subjects. 5) Renewed coercion. 6) 
Expansion of the “volume” and extortion capacity of the state. 173 Applied to the 
Scanian case this chain might take the following form: The occupation of the Scanian 
provinces necessitated an expansion of the Swedish army (point 1.) that the governor 
general had to try and cover by taxation of the newsubjects (2.), and this could only 
be realised through the construction of a Swedish administration (3.). All this led to 
increased resistance from the Scanians: from conspiracies to upright rebellion (4.) As 
the resistance became fiercer the Swedish authorities became harsher (5.) which is 
especially evident in Scania after the Scanian War. According to Tally ”preparation 
                                               
170 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and the European States, AD 990-1 90. Cambridge, Mass, 1990, 
pp.70-71. 
171 Jerker Rosén, ”Statsledning och provinspolitik under Sveriges stormaktstid (Statesmanship and 
Provinicial Politics when Sweden was a Great Power), Scandia 1946, pp.224-270. 
172 I am using this term but perhaps that of ”state-formation” would be more correct, as Harald 
Gustafsson has proposed. Both Tilly and Gustafsson believe that the early modern state was not created 
”on purpose” by absolutist rulers but rather  ”came into being as unforeseen consequences of a ruler’s 
desperate attempts at solving urgent problems. ” See Gustafsson, ”Statsbildning och territoriell 
integration.”(State-building and territorial integration) in Scandia 57, 1991.  
173 Tilly, Ch. (ed.), The Formation of National States in Western Europe, Princeton University Press 
1975, p.74. 
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for war has been the great state-building activity”.174 The construction of an 
efficacious army was a heavy burden on the shoulders of the population: taxes, 
conscriptions, requisitions etc.175 In order to be able to obtain all this from the 
population the state needed power, sheer force and a passable administrative system. 
In the long run all this would mean ”territorial consolidation, centralisation, 
differentiation of the instruments of government and monopolization of the means of 
coercion, all the fundamental state-making processes.” Tally has also claimed that a 
homogeneous population made all this easier.176  
In conglomerate states the ”normal” way of ruling conquered province was normally 
that of leaving everything much as it had always been and pleasing the nobility – one 
could say that it lay in the nature of conglomerate states to take this line.177 But as 
we will see in this paper the Swedish central authorities seem to have deviated from 
the “natural” course of conglomerate states in several r spects. I will also pay some 
attention to the concept of “territorial integration” that does not necessarily only have 
to mean the incorporation of foreign territories that ave been taken by force. To 
Harald Gustafsson ”territorial integration” does not only mean the incorporation 
and/or integration of conquered territories but he giv s this concept three meanings. 
The first is the one we have just mentioned: traditional integration of conquered 
(border-) territories and in this category eastern De mark fits perfectly well. The 
second category would be that of integration that is directed ”inwards” and ”points at 
crushing the privileges of older units within the realm.” An example of this would be 
the way King Gustaf Vasa of Sweden abolished the regional laws in the 16th century.  
The third kind of territorial incorporation is constituted by the construction of new 
administrative systems: the Danish amts (administrat ve units that centred around the 
towns)of the late 17th century were for example imposed by the absolute king in order 
                                               
174 Tilly (1975), p.76. 
175 Nevertheless these burdens were strictly necessary and already Tacitus in his day had pointed this 
out. However, Machiavelli insisted that “virtu’” was more important to sustain warfare than money! 
See: Anthony Molho’s article “Lo stato e la finanza pubblica, Un’ipotesi basata sulla storia 
tardomedioevale di Firenze”, pp.225-280, in Giorgio Chittolini, Anthony Molho, Pierangelo Schiera 
(eds.), Origini dello Stato. Processi di formazione statale in Italia fra medioevo ed tarda eta’ moderna, 
il Mulino, Bologna 1994. In particular pp.225-226 and p.280. Tacitus is quoted on the first page. 
176 Tilly (1975), p.42. 
177 Gustafsson  (1998, p.195) defines a conglomerate st as : ”a state area consisting of several 
territories, usually brought together by a ruling house but kept together by a few other factors. Each 
territory –or rather the social elite of each territo y- had its distinctive relation to the ruler, its
privileges, its own law code, its administrative system staffed by that same local elite, and often its own 
estate assembly.” 
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to in order to create greater cohesion within the realm.178  Gustafsson’s point is that 
one should not see the integration of conquered provinces as something abnormal but 
as a variation on the theme of what happened within the states at the time.  
In my MA thesis I compared Scania and Alsace according to these criteria and came 
to the conclusion that Alsace could be classified as typical case of integration of 
border territories. Only very vague attempts at integrating the province ”inwards” can 
be traced (for example the Conseil Souverain and the introduction of French 
currency). Louis XIV did work on a centralisation programme and tried to break 
down the regional parlements but at least in Alsace this “inner” integration remained 
superficial. The third kind of integration (the construction of new administrative units) 
only concerned Alsace in so far as that the provincial governor was put “on top of” all 
traditional leaders and that it was the first time that the province got a unified 
administrative system. The guvernement became a unity o  paper but in practice the 
old administrative system was kept under the surveillance of the intendants. The real 
change would only come with the parlements of the revolution. In Scania the process 
of transition from the first to the second kind of integration was much faster; the 
intensified internal integration became Swedification at a certain point. The process 
was the very same as when the Swedish provincial laws (landskapslagar) were 
substituted by a unified set of Rikslagar (national laws). Nevertheless the gap between 
old and new becomes more difficult to abridge the more different one’s original 
culture and language are. In Scania new administrative units (Swedish län) were soon 
constructed. Uniformity was an official ideology both in France and in Sweden but as 
René Pillorget has pointed out it was very important o proceed with care and patience 
in France.179  The king hoped that the Alsatians would come round through “la 
douceur de notre domination.”180 In line with this policy was also the fact that Alsace 
was allowed to remain outside the mercantilist fortress of France...whereas Scania 
was included in the Swedish mercantilist system and had all its traditional trade routes 
cut off. It seems as if the Swedish authorities were more interested in integrating their 
                                               
178 Harald Gustafsson,”Statsbildning och territoriell ntegration.”(State building and territorial 
integration) in Scandia 57, 199, pp.192-228. Quote: p.200. For the development of Danish institutions 
see also: Ertman, pp.306-311. 
179 René Pillorget, ”L’âge classique” i Histoire de la France, ed.Georges Duby, Larousse 1970, p.292. 
180 Instruction from Louis XIV to Colbert de Croissy in Georges Livet, L’intendance d’Alsace sous 
Louis XIV 1648-1715. Thèse principale pour le Doctorat dès Lettres préentée à la Faculté des Lettres 
de l’Université de Paris le 2 mai 1953, Publications de la Faculté des lettres de l’université de 
Strasbourg 1956, p.935: ”vous donnerez lieu à nos sujets de se remettre des pertes passées et aux 
autres de se louer de la douceur de notre dominatio…”. 
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conquered territories actively than the French authorities.181 In the case of Scania 
they were probably pushed to this through the violent war of 1675-79 in which the 
population took the Danish side. 
A Brief Historical Background 
When the Nordic states first took shape towards the end of the Viking era Scania was 
already part of Denmark. According to legend there had been independent kings of 
Scania before that but those were pagan times when the art of writing was restricted to 
the odd Runic inscription. When the three Scandinavian kingdoms were constituted 
along European lines they also became Christian and literate. One of first collection of 
laws that was put into writing was that of Scania (Den Skonske Logh) and it was 
written in runes. The Scanians showed a certain tendency to support or even elect 
their own candidates for the kingship. This story would repeat itself many times 
during the following centuries, but unfortunately not always with such a peaceful 
outcome. The Middle Ages were dominated by the struggle between the archbishops 
in Lund and the kings in Copenhagen. This was also the era when immigrant German 
knights introduced the Danish nobility to “the fighting techniques and lifestyle 
associated with European knighthood.”182  
In 1329 Denmark was divided between king Christoffer II and the two counts that had 
helped him regain the throne after a period of insurrections. Scania, Blekinge and part 
of Zealand fell to the share of Count Johan of Holstein. This situation led to an 
insurrection in Scania.  Archbishop Karl Eriksen pleaded with the Swedish king that 
he should deliver them from the foreign yoke. King Magnus willingly agreed and 
expelled the Germans with force. As a premium he could call himself “rex Sveciae, 
Norvegiae et terrae Scaniae” in 1332.183 He remained king of Scania until the Danish 
King Valdemar Atterdag won it back in 1360. As a result of the consequent wars part 
of Scania was ceded to the Hanseatic League from 1370- 85. 
King Valdemar’s daughter Margerethe became queen of a united Scandinavia in 
1389. The so called “Kalmar Union” came to last until 1523 when the Swedish 
                                               
181 For the history of the incorporation of Alsace seealso: G. Livet, Le duc Mazarin gouverneur 
d’Alsace (1661-1713). Lettres et documents inédits. Èditions F.-X. Le Roux, Strasbourg-Paris 1954. 
Bernhard Vogler, Histoire culturelle de l’Alsace, La Nuée Bleue, Strasbourg 1994, especially pp.75-89.  
182 Thomas Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan, Building States and Regimes in Medieval and early Modern 
Europe, Cambridge University Press 1997, p.307. Ertman clims that the German knights were one of 
the main forces behind the gradual descent into “vornedskab” (being bound to the soil) and “hoveri” 
(labour dues). 
183 Ingvar Andersson, Skånes historia. Senmedeltiden, (A History of Scania. The Late Middle Ages), 
Stockholm 1974, pp.131-156.   
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nobleman Gustav Eriksson (Vasa) rebelled and managed to get himself elected to king 
of an independent Sweden. It is rather doubtful whether one could speak of a 
“national revolution” the way Thomas Ertman does.184 Sweden was divided between 
the supporters of Gustav Eriksson and the king of the Scandinavian union Christian II 
and for a long time it seemed as if the unionists would win. Christian II was 
eventually manoeuvred out from Denmark too and the Danish throne was taken over 
by his uncle the Duke of Slesvig-Holstein who became Frederik II.185 Nevertheless 
King Christian maintained numerous supporters in all of Denmark-Norway. This 
conflict would become known as  the “Grevefejd” (The Count’s Feud). 
In Scania the nobility had recognised Frederik but burghers and peasants tended 
towards the other camp. The island of Gotland had remained in the hands of one of 
King Christian’s men: Søren Norby who was raiding the whole of the Baltic Sea with 
his fleet. In 1525 Norby’s fleet landed in Blekinge and his mercenaries invaded the 
whole of Scania. It seems to have been quite a welcome invasion to large parts of the 
population. It is not clear whether the Scanian rebellion of 1525 was an agrarian 
rebellion against the nobility or whether Norby mobilised the peasantry against his 
and King Christian’s enemies.186 King Christian was still in the hands of his uncle and 
Søren Norby and his mercenaries and Scanian peasants had he both Scandinavian 
kingdoms and Lübeck against them. Scania was transformed into a gigantic battlefield 
but in the end Norby had to surrender.187 
On the intellectual level there was an intense feud going on between Denmark and 
Sweden at this time. Both countries were striving to become the leading power of the 
north in more than one sense and historical writing was becoming a useful tool. The 
Danes had had Saxo’s Gesta Danorum for more than three centuries but all of a 
sudden the Swedes felt that they had to prove that they were an older nation with a 
                                               
184 Ertman, p.313. Cf. Harald Gustafsson who stresses that Eriksson might just as well have become 
king of Norway and consequently a “national liberato ” here. King Christian II had been King of 
Sweden too…only that he was also king of other kingdoms (Gamla riken, nya stater. Statsbildning, 
politisk kultur och identitet under Kalmarunionens upplösningsskede 1512-1541, (Old Kingdoms, New 
States. State formation, political culture and identity during the last years of the Kalmar Union 1512-
1541), Atlantis 2000, pp.76 and 86-88). 
185 In his pamphlets Frederik maintained that this had become necessary since his nephew had 
disregarded native Danes to the advantage of  “Scotsmen, Hollanders, Germans, Rogues, Tyrants and 
Witches.” See Gustafsson (2000), p.77. 
186 See: Mikael Venge, ”Tiden fra 1523-1559”(The era from 1523-1559) in Kai Hørby & Mikael 
Venge, Danmarks historie II:a. Tiden 1240-1559  (A History of Denmark 1240-1559) , Copenhagen 
1980, pp.291-311 and Gustafsson (2000) p.107. 
187 Søren Norby himself managed to escape to Livonia from where he went to Russia. He then served 
the Emperor for some years and was killed during the siege of Florence in 1530. 
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longer history than their cousins in the so. The result was Johannes Magnus’s Historia 
de omnibus Gothorum Sueonumque regibus (1554) that presented the Danes as 
descendants of a band of criminals and Scania as anorigi al part of Sweden. The 
Danes countered with a Refutatio (1561) by Hans Svaning and the R s Danicae 
(1574) by Erasmus Laetus. Both historians tried to prove that the Danes were 
descendants of the Goths too and that Scania had alw ys been “the heart of old 
Denmark.”188 
The Nordic Seven Years’ War lasted from 1563 to 1570 and was something of a 
catastrophe for the inhabitants of the war zones that yet another time included Scania 
as a prime scene. The bone of contention this time was the Baltic provinces: the island 
of Ösel and modern day Estonia. It was only with the peace of Stettin in 1570 that the 
Nordic Union was formally dissolved. It was also during this war that the snaphaner 
were first mentioned and Mikkel Pederssön Gyding alias Mikkel Gønge became a 
legend.189 
A cold war was going on between Denmark and Sweden for the whole of the end of 
the 16th century and during the beginning of the 17th. On direct orders from the king 
troops of peasants were created and exercised in the Scanian provinces. These troops 
sorted under the responsibilities of the king’s lensmand.190 War was finally declared 
again in April 1611. The direct cause of the war was the Finnmark: areas in Lapland 
that both Denmark-Norway and Sweden claimed the rights to. The war operations 
included the so called “Incendiary Expedition” of 1612 when King Gustavus II 
Adolphus of Sweden and his men laid waste large parts of north-eastern Scania. The 
peace treaty stipulated that Sweden should abstain from all claims on the Finnmark 
and that only Denmark had the right of including the Three Crowns in its coat-of-
arms.  
King Christian IV was not only king of Denmark but also duke of Holstein. It was as 
duke that he declared his entrance into the Thirty Years’ War in 1625. The Council of 
the Realm had not supported his policy on the issue but had to stand back when it was 
                                               
188 ”The Literary Feud between Denmark and Sweden in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries and 
the Development of Danish historical scholarship”, in Renaissance Culture in Context. Theory and 
Practice. Eds. Jean R.Brink and William F. Gentrup, Scholar Press, England 1993, pp.4-120. Quote 
p.115.   
189 For details on this war and more especially Daniel Rantzau’s campaign in Sweden and how the 
snaphaner under Mikkel Gyding were employed in thatwar see: Stefan Persson, Vinterfälttåget, (The 
Winter Campaign), Lund 2008, p. 27 but also pp.167-72. 
190 The lensmand corresponded roughly to the French intendants and were not responsible to the local 
administration. See: Ertman, p.308. 
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as a German duke and not as Danish regent that he entered the war. Nevertheless the 
whole of continental Denmark (Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland) was occupied by 
Imperial troops after the defeat at Lutter am Barenberg in 1626. Harald Gustafsson, 
for one, has declared the Danish intervention in the T irty Years’ War as a “bitter 
fiasco” that weakened Denmark considerably, both financially and politically, at a 
time when Sweden was a rising star on the northern Eu opean firmament.191  
The war of 1643-1645 goes under different names. In Scania it has gone to history as 
“Horn’s War”. Jutland was invaded by the Swedes in Ja uary, Scania by the troops of 
field marshal Gustav Horn in February that same year. A royal order from Christmas 
Eve 1643 urged the lensmænd of Scania to prepare their peasant troops. The lensmand 
of Kristianstad (then Christianstad) Ebbe Ulfeld, who was also the king’s son-in-law, 
became commander-in-chief of both the regular troops and the peasant troops. The 
most famous of all snaphaner, Svend Poulsen Gønge, was first mentioned during this 
war when he led a company of dragoons on the ridge between Halland and Scania.192 
In 1645 the peace treaty of Brömsebro stipulated that Denmark should cede the 
province of Halland to Sweden for 30 years. Queen Christina obtained ”all rights, 
percentages and custom duties ordinary and extraordinary, the lordship, the glory and 
the jurisdiction” that had earlier been the privilege of King Christian IV of Denmark. 
The inhabitants of Halland had to swear a loyalty oath to the Swedish queen – with 
the exception of members of the gentry and aristocracy who had properties in Halland 
without being resident there. In spite of the fact that the peace treaty stated expressly 
that Danish Law and religion should be kept intact he Swedes immediately put their 
own taxation system into effect and added Halland to the diocese of Gothenburg.193 
Thirteen years later, on the 26th February 1658 to be precise, the peace treaty of 
Roskilde was signed and all the Scanian provinces (Scania, Bornholm, Blekinge and 
Halland) were handed over to the Swedes permanently. The treaty stated that the 
provinces that had been ceded to Sweden should be allowed to keep their own laws 
”for ever and ever” as long as they were not contrary to the ”leges fundamentales” of 
Sweden. Loccenius provides us with a contemporary juridical definition of the 
concept of ”leges fundamentales” and he explains them as the laws that were the basis 
of royal power and the state. These laws were the following: 1) Unity in religion and 
                                               
191 Gustafsson 2008, p.108. 
192 For an account of Poulsen’s life see: Gitte Kjær, Svend Poulsen Gønge – i verkligheten, (SVP – in 
real life), Skippershoved 1992. Kjær (p.9 and p.66) has attested his military career from 1625-1677. 
193 Fabricius I, p.30. 
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ceremony 2) Certain inheritance laws. 3) The oaths of loyalty that were sworn by both 
the ruler and the estates at the accession to the throne of a new monarch. 4) The 
King’s oath 5) The form of government of 1634. 6) The decisions of the estates, the 
so called ”recesser” or agreements.194 
The Swedish overlordship brought approximately the same consequences to the rest 
of the Scanian provinces as it had to Halland in 1645: all the inhabitants (including 
non-resident noblemen this time) had to swear the loyalty oath, the Swedish taxation- 
and customs system was brought in and commerce was to follow the laws of the 
Swedish mercantilist laws. The Danish church was left as it was but there was a hope 
that the clergy eventually would become ”incorporated” with the Swedish clergy.195 
In a resolution from May 1659 King Karl X Gustaf of Sweden declared that Scania 
was ”an old member of the state that has been retriev d”196 that is to say Swedish 
territory that had been lost to Denmark and then reconquered. Nevertheless Bornholm 
was lost already in 1660 when the population of the island rebelled and the Swedish 
authorities declared that they would refrain from putting the rebellion down if the 
Danish king and the Scanian nobility would agree to sell him enough of their lands in 
Scania to correspond to the entire surface of Bornholm. They said yes.197  
The Scanian War of 1675-79 came to change the attitude of the Swedes towards the 
Scanian provinces, which becomes evident when one reads sources from this era. The 
Danes had tried to win their lost provinces back and the Scanians had joined them in 
the attack. After a devastating war that razed the town of Kristianopel (then 
Christianopel) to the ground forever and made a large part of the population leave the 
country the Swedes were still there and the earlier t eaties were confirmed. In 
December 1679 King Louis XIV decreed that Sweden was to keep the lands it had 
conquered in 1658, apart from Bornholm. From then on the Scanian provinces except 
Bornholm have been under Swedish rule.198 
 
If the Swedish integration policy had been fairly lenient up until the beginning of the 
war, it was no longer so from the point in time where the Swedes realised they would 
                                               
194 Fabricius I, pp.49-50. 
195 Fabricius I, p.57 ( from an instruction of the commission of 3rd March 1658). 
196 Fabricius I, p.60.   
197 For the Bornholm rebellion see: Ebbe Gert Rasmussen, “Begivenhederne på Bornholm under 
Sveriges besiddelse af øen 1658” in Bornholmske samlinger, (“The Events on Bornholm during the 
Swedish Occupation of the Island 1658” in Collections from Bornholm), Rønne 1967. 
198 The town of Helsingborg was under Danish rule for a few months in 1709. 
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win again. The king and his government started working on a way of incorporating 
the new provinces totally; the best way to keep them would be ”if such uniformity and 
likeness between our Swedish lands and the aforemention d ones was brought about  
that the inhabitants and subjects with the passing of time would be won over from 
Danish to Swedish modes and manners and eventually lost their love for 
Denmark;”199 Uniformity was a term that was used to describe the centralisation- and 
unification process that took place during the latter part of the 17th century; in Scania 
uniformity became synonymous with ”Swedification.”200  
Governor General von Aschenberg has reported about the programme that was drawn 
up in order to ”cure the Danish minds of the Scanians”. The goals of this programme 
were: 1) To adopt Swedish religious practices and the Swedish language. 2) To adopt 
the Swedish juridical system. 3) To mix Scanians and Swedes through marriages. 4) 
The castigation and final subjugation of the inhabitants so that they would be ”forced 
to learn the Swedish language and to become virtuous, honest and blithe.” This 
proposal was favoured in place of a preceding one that had outlined a way of 
”extinguishing” the Scanians so that Swedes and people from less treacherous 
provinces could substitute them.201 
In order to get past the clauses of the Treaty of Roskilde the different Scanian estates 
were ”encouraged” to appeal for the right of being included in the uniformity of the 
realm and to gain access to the Riksdag. The fact th t the bourgeoisie and the nobility 
in Halland promptly refused did not prevent the Swedish Riksdag from declaring the 
validity of the uniformity in the whole of the Scani  provinces. In his dissertation 
The Swedish Commonwealth (Det svenska väldet), Torbjörn Eng claims that jus
because the Swedish authorities were so perfectly well aware of the considerable 
cultural differences between Swedes and Scanians they had to try to hammer in their 
message into the heads of both old and new subjects (i.e. Both Swedes and ex-Danes). 
Getting the Scanians to apply for uniformity was an important step on the way to 
success for the Swedish policy.  
                                               
199 King Karl X Gustaf from his camp on the moors of Ljungby, 10th February 1678. Quote in: 
Fabricius IV, p.22. 
200 ”Swedification” is the term that is normally used in Scandinavia, first and foremost in the case of 
the Scanian provinces and the other foreign territories that became Swedish but sometimes also to 
underline the comparatively intense centralisation process in the whole of Sweden and the territories of 
the Samer (Lapps). 
201 Rutger von Ascheberg, ”Rutger von Aschebergs ämbetsberättelse 1693.” (RvA’s account of his 
years in office) ed. by Jerker Rosén in Scandia 17, 1946, p.24. 
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The Scanian provinces became an integral part of Sweden in 1719 when their special 
status as conquered provinces was repealed.   
Scania and the Baltic provinces 
In 1630 Johan Skytte, the Governor General of Estonia a d Livonia, wrote to King 
Gustavus  II Adolphus that the principle according to which these provinces were to 
be ruled  was:”unus rex, una lex et grex unus”.202 All since Estonia placed itself under 
Swedish protection in 1561 that had been the rule of thumb for the governors.203 This 
policy was directed against the Baltic provinces’ most powerful group: the German-
Estonian nobility. King Erik XIV of Sweden had ordeed his men to “hate the 
Estonian nobility a little so that they would understand how advantageous it would be 
for them to sell their estates to Swedish noblemen.204 Perhaps King Erik’s policy 
should be considered as the background of the government discussions a century later 
when Charles X Gustaf discussed the possible extinction of the Scanian nobility. The 
government tried to weaken the position of the Baltic nobility by freeing the clergy 
from their dependence upon the nobles and by weakening the bonds of serfdom. An 
oath of loyalty was demanded from the whole of the population and the nobility and 
representatives for Reval (Tallinn) were called to participate in the Swedish Diet. 
Swedish ecclesiastical ceremonies were introduced in these provinces and Swedish 
law was introduced in the province of Ingria that hd been incorporated in 1617. This 
trend came to a halt under Gustavus II Adolphus and his chancellor Axel Oxenstierna. 
Instead of opposing the élite the king started to co- perate with them. By that time the 
Swedish élite had acquired a considerable number of Baltic estates and had come to 
the conclusion that they had rather keep the privileges of the Baltic nobility. This 
situation would repeat itself in the Scanian provinces. If the old privileges were kept 
there was less of a chance that the noblemen from the conquered provinces would join 
in the competition for seats in the Privy Council. Gustavus Adolphus did not want the 
noblemen from the Baltic provinces in the Privy Council because he was so afraid that 
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they would oppose his foreign policy.205 From around this time the conquered 
provinces were governed locally through county diets (lantdagar) and a Swedish 
governor-general. Only Sweden (-Finland) was represented in the Swedish Diet. It 
was only in 1680 that a will to tie the Baltic provinces closer to Sweden could be 
traced in government policies.  
There are remarkable similarities between the “Swedification” policies that were used 
in the Scanian and the Baltic provinces. In many cases it was the same families or 
even the same men who ruled and administered these provinces. When Johan Skytte 
was Governor General of Livonia, Ingria and Carelia (1629-1634) he carried through 
the same political line as his grandson Johan Gyllensti rna did in Scania forty years 
later: ”With Dorpat as the centre of everything, Skytte tried to centralise everything, 
justice, ecclesiastical matters, education etc, so that he would be able to bring the 
Baltic conditions in line with Sweden. It cannot be doubted that incorporation and 
uniformity was the ultimate goal.”206 Johan Gyllenstjerna followed his grandfather 
and uncle’s line and is held to be the man behind the Swedification programme. The 
integration policy that the Skytte-Gyllenstierna cln promoted in the conquered 
provinces was not all their own work; it should been s en as a link in a political line 
that had been supported by the opponents of the Swedish aristocracy since the days of 
Erik XIV. This policy promoted a total incorporation of conquered territories. The 
Estonian historian Jaak Naber makes a difference between the “svenskhetspolitik” 
(literally “Swedishness-politics) in Ingria and the Swedification of the Scanian 
provinces and the Norwegian provinces that had also been conquered in 1660.207 The 
policy that was carried through in Ingria was characterised by the royal desire to 
centralise and unify and by a demand for a general r cognition of the Swedish king 
and his power. Jaak Naber believes that Swedification is very close to 
denationalisation and apart from among some governmnt officials there were no 
such tendencies in Ingria. No attempts were made to intr duce the Swedish language 
in church ceremonies. The difference between Naber’s two concepts is not quite clear. 
Many scholars would not agree at all that the Scanian (and Norwegian) provinces 
were denationalised (renationalised). Naber notes that Jöran Sperling acquired a 
”certain amount of practical Swedification experienc ” during his years as Governor 
                                               
205 Rosén, s.245. 
206 Rosén, s.240. 
207 Jaak Naber, Motsättningarnas Narva, (Narva –A Town of Controversies), Opuscula Historica 
Upsaliensia 15, 1995, p.8. 
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General of Scania.208  He then put this knowledge into use at Narva (Saint Petersburg) 
where he tried to started a ”campaign in favour of Swedishness”. This campaign 
included trying to get as many Swedes as possible into the city council and to give 
Germans and Swedes equal rights in ecclesiastical and educational matters.   i kyrko- 
och skolfrågor för ”en kampanj för svenskhetspolitiken”. Sperling was Governor 
General of Scania from 1677 to 1679 and Governor of Ingria from 1682. 209 In both 
provinces he represented what Jerker Rosén has called the ”incorporation line” and in 
both provinces he was well-known for being even more radical than his sovereign. It 
was only with the introduction of uniformity after the Scanian War that the integration 
policy in the Scanian provinces became harsher than in the Baltic provinces. It was 
only then that commoners were forced to learn Swedish. But a tendency in the same 
direction was noted in Livonia when Charles XI confiscated a number of noble estates 
and the nobility rebelled. The similarities between the Baltic- and the Scanian 
provinces were obvious to the contemporaries. The leader of the Baltic rebels Johann 
Reinhold Patkul and the most important Scanian in ex le, Knud Thott had secret 
meetings in Copenhagen.210 Patkul lost his life but the Baltic provinces were never 
incorporated into Sweden. Knud Fabricius thought it rather odd that the language 
question did not seem to constitute much of a problem when the position of the Baltic 
provinces was discussed in Swedish government circles: in Fabricius day it seemed 
strange to consider letting people who spoke German, Sl vonic and God knows what 
other languages become members of the Swedish Diet. In arly modern Sweden that 
did not seem to have been a major problem.211 The upper strata of society in the 
conquered provinces were expected to learn Swedish: a decree from Gustavus 
Adolphus to the city council at Narva declares that: “And for this reason you shall 
take down, register and write all court cases, verdicts and letters that are treated in 
court, in Swedish. Do the same when you write to His Royal Majesty, and not in 
German, so that the Swedish tongue will come of use among them and they will 
                                               
208 Naber, p.124. 
209 For Sperling’s politics in the Baltic provinces see: Naber pp.124-136. Fabricius analysed his policy 
in Scania thoroughly and saw a clear connection betwe n his discharge from the position as Governor 
General and the way the execution of Krabbe was handled. See: Fabricius III, pp.128-140 and the 
chapter on Krabbe in this dissertation.  
210 Fabricius III pp.222-223. Rosén pp.269-70. Alvin Isberg’s Karl XI och den livländska adeln 
(Charles XI and the Livonian Nobility), (Lund 1953) gives an excellent description of the situation in 
Livonia at the time. For Patkul see pp. 112-121. 
211 Fabricius IV, p.18. 
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understand Swedish matters, law and order better.”212 A “main” language was 
considered useful, especially when it came to administration and judiciary matters, 
but it did not regard people outside the higher strata of society. 
The Manorial System 
Northern Scania and Blekinge could be described as ch racteristic of the early modern 
Nordic area. For the eighteenth century Harald Gustafs on has distinguished four 
traits that most parts of Scandinavia shared: the soil was so poor that one could not 
live off it only, the vast majority were freeholders, there was hardly any nobility and 
the export was dominated by raw materials.213  This analysis would be valid for the 
17th century as well. The rest of the Scanian provinces w re different from the 
northern forests. The landscape could be described as classically Danish: wide plains 
with fields that were interrupted by the odd patch of beech wood, smalltowns and 
villages with stone churches and half-timbered cottages with thatched roofs. As 
Gustafsson has also pointed out these parts of the Scanian provinces fitted better into 
the continental pattern: there was a ”dense network of towns” and the countryside was 
dominated by large estates. Most peasants were ”subject tenant peasants” of the 
owners of these estates.214 At the middle of the seventeenth century the greatest estate 
owner of all was the crown with its 45% of Denmark’s peasant farms (including the 
Scanian provinces).215 By 1675 this percentage had shrunk to half in Denmark. In the 
Scanian provinces a considerable part of the crown lands had gone over to private 
hands by that time too. The Swedish crown had taken ov r the Danish crown lands 
and later these had been parcelled out to officials in recompense for their war-efforts. 
It was much the same process as in Denmark where th crown lands had been 
parcelled out to those who had supported the king in his strivings to become absolute. 
Many of these supporters were civil servants whose salaries could not be paid. 
However, one should note that the Danish peasants hd rather fewer rights compared 
to their continental counterparts. Palle Ove Christiansen has maintained that estate 
farming in Denmark was similar to that of the German Western Rhineland and 
                                               
212 Naber, p.36. Quote from letter from 21/11 1615. SRA Livonica II, 662, p.105. 
213 ”freehold farmers, who were not subject to any loca  lord but had in principle a direct relationship to 
the central government.” See: Harald Gustafsson, P litical Interaction in the Old Regime, Central 
Power and Local Society in the Eighteenth –Century Nordic States , Studentlitteratur, Lund 1994, p.29. 
214 Gustafsson (1994), p.30. 
215 Palle Ove Christiansen, A Manorial World; Lord, peasants and cultural distinctions on a Danish 
estate 1750-1980, Scandinavian University Press, 1996, p.100.  
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Carolingian France but the difference was that, in the latter areas, corvée labour had 
been substituted by money rents and paid farm labourers there during the latter part of 
the Middle Ages. On the central Danish island of Zealand and the southern islands the 
peasants were bound in villeinage from the end of the fifteenth century until 1702.216 
Nevertheless certain areas of the Danish realm weredominated by freeholders: among 
these were the province of Ditmarsken217 and some areas of northern Jutland. 
Christiansen concludes that ”Zealand and Lolland-Falster, and until 1660 Skaane, had 
in agrarian administrative terms more in common with Holstein and Further 
Pomerania than with North Jutland, which preserved more of the features from west 
of the Elbe, and which after 1600 was closer to the trading centre of Europe in terms 
of communications.”218 The Grundherrschaft system that dominated west of the Elbe 
was characterised by the substitution of corvées for kind rents or money after the 
crisis of the Middle Ages.219   
 Although Denmark was ideologically and politically part of Western Europe it was 
closer to Eastern Europe under other aspects. One of th se aspects was the demesne 
farm system that was necessary in order maintain the trading balance. Just like 
Pomerania, Poland, Prussia and Livonia, the whole of Scandinavia depended on 
import of finished goods from continental and Meditrranean Europe. In return for 
salt, herring, groceries, textiles, wine and silver, the Scandinavians exported grain, 
hemp, tar, flax, lumber, copper, iron and furs. In Denmark the export of cattle was 
also of great weight. Nevertheless the Danes had difficulties competing with the grain 
that was pumped out of the estates of the eastern Baltic and that is the background 
towards which the tightening of the manorial forms should be seen. It was necessary 
in order to produce trading goods. This tendency was characteristic of the so-called 
Gutsherrschaft system that dominated east of the Elbe.220 Those were areas where 
urbanisation had only taken place to a limited extent and where money circulation 
was even more limited. In Western Europe the population growth and trading boom of 
the sixteenth century resulted in intensified demesne farming; the landowners tried to 
re-establish corvées but had to settle for a little less. In the end most estates in the 
west had their demesne lands worked by cottagers who were paid for their services. In 
                                               
216 In 1733-88 villeinage was substituted by adscription (stavnsbånd) for the whole of Denmark. 
217 For Ditmarsken see Gustafsson (2000), pp.15-20. 
218 Christiansen, p.111. Skaane=Scania. 
219 Christiansen, p.107. 
220 Christiansen, p.108. 
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the east the basic situation was similar but the result was that the upper classes 
succeeded in tying the peasants to the land. The Gutsherrschaft system was 
characterised by a kind of refeudalisation that included ”striking reductions of the 
peasants’ customary rights and ... very heavy corvée.”221 According to Christiansen 
Denmark could be included in this refeudalisation process and the same could be said 
of some areas of Sweden (-Finland). This was the sort of environment that Krageholm 
(then Krogholm) belonged to. 
Absolutism 
Before the cession of the Scanian provinces Denmark w s ruled by a king who was 
something of a primus inter pares. Together with the aristocrats of the Council of the
Realm (rigsråd) he ruled a country that kept its ancient feudal system. The aristocracy 
enjoyed extensive privileges. Not only were they exempt from taxes but they were 
also the only ones who were entitled to own estates. They had their own harbours and 
export-rights and did not have to compete with the merchants of the towns. In return 
for all this the noblemen pledged everlasting faith nd loyal (military) service to the 
king. With the introduction of absolutism in 1660 all this was changed. The burghers 
allied themselves with the king against the aristocracy and won the day. Christiansen 
explains this in part with the fact that the siege of Copenhagen had proved the 
impotence of the nobility as a warrior class. They ad simply not been able to protect 
the country. As for Copenhagen it was only the efforts f the burghers that saved it. In 
effect, the role of the aristocracy as protectors had already been played out with the 
development of modern firearms and more advanced military technology and 
strategies. The disastrous wars of 1657-1660 had made this all too obvious. That was 
also the way people at the time conceived of it and hostilities between burghers and 
noblemen were all too evident when the different estat  met in parliament in 
September 1660.222 The parliamentary proceedings that continued until December that 
year led to the introduction of hereditary kingship and increased royal powers. The 
lower estates hoped that they would be able to win privileges over the nobility if they 
                                               
221 Christiansen, p.108. 
222 See: J.A. Fridericia, Adelsvældens sidste dage, Danmarks historie fra Christian IV’s død til 
enevældens indførelse (1648-1660), Kjøbenhavn, P.G. Philipsens forlag 1894, genudgivet af Selskabet 
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Friis if he had carried his rapier as proudly on the island of Funen as himself and the other brave 
burghers during the siege of Copenhagen. Friis had already been accused of cowardice during the battle 
of Nyborg by an emissary of the emperor (Colonel v.d.Naht). 
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allied themselves to the king. The nobility, represented by Iffuer Krabbe, tried to hold 
their own but found themselves in a situation that might even have led to civil war.223 
Nevertheless it does not seem as if absolutism as such was consciously supported 
even by the burgher estate. In his analysis of the downfall of the Danish aristocracy 
J.A Fridericia claimed that when the estates-general (stændermøde) of 1660 closed, 
even the burghers believed that the estates would be assembled regularly in the future. 
Only a month later the king issued a ”pragmatic sanctio ” that not only declared his 
dynasty’s hereditary rights to the throne but also stated that his were the ”jura 
majestatis, absolute rule and all regalia.”224 That was the end of all estates-generals 
for another two hundred years. The old aristocracy was overstepped by a new class of 
civil servants who supported the whole ideology of the king as the Lord’s anointed. A 
permanent army financed by a new taxation system liberated the king from the armed 
power of the old aristocracy. The right to own land became free. Important 
administrative reforms were also effectuated. The new class had its origins in the 
urban trades, administration and politics and by the time of the Scanian War in 1675 
they owned approximately a third of the arable land in Denmark. Through this process 
”manorial rights were turned into a commodity that could circulate.”225 The Swedish 
Wars had depleted the funds of the exchequer. The king owed money that he could 
not pay back to many prominent burghers. Intensifying demesne farming was a way 
of bringing the country back on its (financial) feet again. Donating lands to burghers 
was a way of paying back one’s debts at the same tie as a new upper class was 
created; an upper class that was both more loyal and more efficient in its work. 
It was probably not clear to anyone just how far the king wanted to go in his 
absorption of powers. Up until the day when the throne became hereditary the king 
had not been sovereign. The kingship was held by different dynasties and different 
individuals. Sovereignty rested with the Danish Crown that was represented by the 
Council of the Realm (rigsrådet). The Danish historan Sebastian Olden-Jørgensen 
claims that, until 1660, the crown was seen as a “transcendental conception” that was 
represented by the council of the realm, at least during periods of interregnum. After 
                                               
223 Fridericia, p.523 and p.527. See also Sebastian Olden-Jørgensen’s article 
“Enevoldsarveregeringsakten og Kongeloven, Forfatningsspørgsmålet i Danmark fra Oktober 1660 til 
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1660 the “crown” became one with the royal dynasty (the house of Oldenburg).226 As 
early as 1658 the king became sovereign in the duchy of Slesvig that had been 
bestowed upon him as a fief (len) by the Crown. As sovereign the king was freed 
from this feudal relationship. In 1660-61 Frederik III and his dynasty became one 
with the crown of Denmark. 
Thus we can see that seventeenth-century Denmark was a land that was literally stuck 
in the middle between the northern-Atlantic and the Baltic worlds. In 1677 absolutism 
had been the form of state for seventeen years. Sweden was still ruled by more 
traditional means. After the long regency young Charles XI had taken the reins of the 
realm into his own hands but he was not an absolute monarch as yet. At this time 
Scania did not quite make part of either country. Perhaps one could describe it as a 
part of old Denmark under Swedish rule. The treaties of Roskilde and Copenhagen 
had allowed the Scanian provinces to keep their old laws and privileges as long as 
they were not contrary to Swedish fundamental law. That meant that the Scanian 
provinces remained under the Scanian Law.  
 
On the other hand, Denmark differed from many other parts of Europe under some 
aspects. The way Norbert Elias saw things the modernisation and centralisation of 
Europe had a background of statal control of firearms and of taxation. He claimed that 
in the early modern era ordinary people were not all wed to carry guns and that the 
central authorities had a monopoly on taxation: ”The financial means thus flowing 
into this central authority maintain its monopoly of military force, while this in turn 
maintains the monopoly of taxation.”227  Neither of Elias’s two criteria were valid in 
Scania. There was no monopoly on firearms in Scandinavia during the latter part of 
the 17th century. A ban on firearms in the Gønge area was actually decreed by the 
Swedes in 1677, but when the local population appealed to colonel Gyllenstierna and 
explained that they would not be able to stand up against the snaphaner without 
(snaphane-) guns the Swedish authorities gave in. Likewise, in Scania taxation was 
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227 I am quoting Elias as quoted by Molho. See: Anthony Molho, The State and Public Finance: A 
Hypothesis Based on the History of Late Medieval Florence”, The Journal of Modern History 67, 
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not quite yet a business between emissaries of the central state and individuals as the 
Krabbe case will show us.228 
 
Border- or frontier wars (Grenzkriege) changed shape s wars about religious issues 
were substituted by dynastic conflicts and a general European “Gleichgewicht” 
became ever more important. The new kind of border war was characterised by the 
conquest of neighbouring provinces and a prerequisite for it was a complex war 
machinery that depended on supplies from stores in the own country (like Charles’s 
XI army in Scania). In Europe in general, but also in Denmark that had become 
absolutist with the introduction of the “Enevælde” in 1660, unconventional warfare 
took on a new shape with the coming of Absolutism. The absolutist states were 
characterised by what Kunisch called a “Disziplinierungsbesessenheit”, the immediate 
consequence of which was that the soldiers came undr stricter control than ever and 
the maneuvers demanded a thitherto unthinkable precision. In this way the flexibility 
of the regular army became limited. The growing dimensions of the absolutist armies 
meant that regular units could not venture into enemy territory or even too close to it. 
The sheer bulk of the absolutist army also meant that efficient communication and 
supply lines became vital and that the opposite sidin the war needed to target those 
lines almost as badly as they needed to face the enemy in open combat. Whereas the 
regular soldiers still executed the latter task best it was the easily manoeuvrable 
irregulars that were charged with the task of attacking communications and supply 
lines.As conventional armies became bigger and more sl w-moving the military 
theoreticians realised that guerrilla tactics might become a powerful weapon in the 
right hands. In this manner irregular troops were attached to the official armies of 
many European countries. These irregulars or “partisans” were supposed to operate on 
the flanks and in the rear of an opposing army. Famous irregular units included the 
Croats229 and the Panduren around 1750, the Hungarians during the Schlesian war, the 
Freikorps of Frederic the Great, the Prussian Free battalions (Freibattalione) during 
the Seven Years’ War of 1757-1758.230 In the Seven Years’ War irregulars were not 
                                               
228 But then, if the Danish system really was all that old-fashioned in the early modern era that was 
maybe one of the reasons why the Danish state was almost engulfed during the war of 1658-1660. 
Swedish tax collection was much more effective. 
229 The Croats or Grenzer (border fighters) had lighter arms and were often compared to Cossacks. 
230 Kunisch, p.5. 
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only used by the Prussians, but also by the French a d especially by the Russians.231 
These troops all had surprisingly much in common with the Danish King’s Friskytter 
Corps from the 1670ies. But then, by the end of the 17th century the work of 
unconventional units had started to get its recognition n Europe and manuals of how 
best to conduct it were already becoming all the vogue.232 The petite guerre was 
largely ignored by the military theoreticians of earlier ages because they thought it an 
embarrassing remnant of more primitive war techniques, but nevertheless it existed. 
At best it was considered a support technique that was not worth the attention of the 
great military commanders and military theoreticians. By the 18th century strategics 
had become a science in its own right. The movements of the huge armies were 
thoroughly calculated by military experts. Every single move depended on the 
workings of the gigantic wheel that the absolutist state had become: taxes had to be 
collected, soldiers conscripted, storages filled with supplies that could then be 
transported across the border…Irregular troops did not have to follow the rules of the 
absolutist game. Official warfare had stiffened in its form so that it had become 
almost impossible to improvise. It was here that the irregular troops had an important 
role to play.  
                                               
231 Kunisch, p.27. 
232 Hahlweg mentions Antoine de Ville’s manual on guerrilla warfare (petite guerre) from 1670 as an 
example of this trend. 
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 Part II: Friskytter, Snaphaner and Gønger 
                   
The Snaphane Movement 
”Our peasants here pluck up their courage and becom Snaphaner, just as they do in Holsten. To which 
I wish them Luck. They gather here and there in the for sts and cause the Enemy great damage but are 
of great advantage to us in that they very often take 60- 80 well, even more heads of cattle from the 
Enemy...Whomsoever of the Enemy that they kill, they bury in the woods. Recently the Enemy found 
an enormous Grave full of Dead Bodies, that an old Hag had shown them. For this Reason they soon 
put Fire to some farmhouses and sent a very strong party against the same Snaphaner but in vain: for 
they know how to retreat into the bushes so that they are not easily to be found” 
 Report on the Snaphaner in Scania and Holsten, 5th August 1644 233 
 
In the wake of the continuous wars between Denmark and Sweden during the early 
modern era a movement called that of the snaphaner arose. 234 The anonymous writer I 
just quoted saw the snaphaner as groups of courageous peasants who had taken up 
arms against the enemy and fought what in everyday language would be called a 
guerrilla war in a terrain where regular enemy soldiers could not track them down. In 
Scandinavia, the designation "snaphane" is first testifi d in documents dating to the 
early 1500s.235 At that time, the definition of the word was vague, or at least it seems 
so to us today.236 During the Nordic 7-year-war in the 1560ies a snaphane was often 
synonymous with Mikkel Gønge’s corps of men from the Gønge region237 that 
followed the regular Danish army.238 Not only Danes enrolled in Mikkel's corps but 
also some Swedes from the border regions and Alf Åberg called them "the voluntary 
                                               
233 Relation om snaphanerne i Skaane og Holsten, Det Konglige Bibliotek (The Royal Library) in 
Copenhagen that will be referred to as KB.   
234 In this paper I have chosen to spell Scandinavian words such as ”snaphane” in Danish except in 
Swedish quotations. The reason for this is that I hve tried to keep as closely to the language of my 
sources as possible when words, names and place names have to be rendered in the text and the 
majority of my sources are in Danish. 
235 See: O. Källström, “Snapphane på 1520-talet” (“’Snapphane’ in the 1520’s”), pp. 322-326 in 
Fornvännen 1944, with a summary in English. This article can be found on the following website: 
http://fornvannen.se/pdf/1940talet/1944_322.pdf 
236 The Swedish king used the term to designate a ship, but also to indicate a gun. See: Källström, 
p.324. As for the origins of the word “snaphane” I refer to the section “The Word Snaphane” in the 
Snaphane Chapter. I make quite clear there (see p.9 in articular) that the word entered the 
Scandinavian languages during the Middle Ages and that i s definitions varied.   
237 I have also mentioned the original place names when possible. The area that is called 
Gynge/Gønge/Giønge in my sources is called Göinge today, but the local pronunciation would be much 
the same in all four cases, something like “yuhynhghe” with the stress on the first syllable. The 
Latin/English form Gothungia is sometimes used and when I refer directly to sources/literature where 
that variant is included I do so too. 
238 Alf Åberg, Snapphanarna, Lund 1981, p.30. According to Sörensson (p.1.) the snaphaner were first 
mentioned during Horn’s war 1643-45 but that is obvi usly wrong. The official name of Mikkel’s 
corps was the of “the hakeskytte company” that they had taken after their rifles (hakebössor).   
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guerrilla troops of the border forests." 239 As far as is known, that is the first time we 
come across snaphaner in something like the shape we meet them during the Scanian 
War well over a century later. 
 
The snaphane movement came to an apex during the Scanian war of 1675-79 when 
Denmark tried to reconquer the eastern part of the realm (excluding the island of 
Bornholm) that had been lost to Sweden in 1658. The local name for that war is the 
“Snaphane War”240, and during it a special corps of Scanian volunteers was created on 
the basis of the snaphane movement: the King’s Friskytter. From this time onwards 
even non-registered combatants preferred this designation. The Swedes, on the other 
hand, insisted promptly on calling them all snaphaner. It even became punishable by 
Swedish law to use the term “friskytte”. 241   
 
To the Danes the snaphaner were ordinary people who defended their homes and 
lands against the Enemy; later this designation acquired a slightly stale flavour and 
they all seemed to transform into friskytter. To the Swedes they were common 
criminals. In modern times these divisions have remained much the same: on the one 
hand the snaphaner have come to symbolise the Danish fight against the evil Swedish 
invaders, both in Denmark itself and Scania, on the ot r hand they have been defined 
as a bunch of “wanted criminals, army deserters, Danish royalists and adventurers” 242 
that have been used as an efficient tool in the hands of fanatic Danish and Scanian 
nationalists, but who really had very little to do with modern-day Denmark and 
Sweden. Today it is difficult to define what a snaph ne/friskytt really was, and 
anyway, whose definition are we to accept? 
 
                                               
239 Åberg, 1981, p.30.   
240 Or “the Snaphane Feud”. In Norway and the ex-Norwegian areas that Sweden had conquered from 
Denmark(-Norway) some thirty years earlier the same war was called “Gyldenløve’s war” after the 
governor of Norway Ulrik Frederik Gyldenløve. 
241 For this reason Chaplain Jens Pedersen Cloeger/Clö from Ystad was denounced to the Swedish 
authorities by his (Swedish) boss Reverend Lacander. See: Acta clericia, LA, Lund, quoted by 
Johnsson, pp.167-170. Cloeger was charged with several other offences apart from using the term 
“friskytte”. He was also suspected of having sold wheat to “snaphaner” and of having bought horses off 
the “snaphane leader (Knud) Böök” and it was claimed that Cloeger still owed “Böök” money for the 
transaction. Doing business with snaphaner was highly ncriminating. “Böök” is a Swedification of the 
Danish surname Bøg. 
242 Alf Åberg, När Skåne blev svenskt, (When Scania Became Swedish), LTs förlag, Stockholm 1958, 
p.102.  
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In this part of the thesis I will try to analyse the snaphane movement on the basis of 
sources that testify of their work. Primarily I have consulted the Depositiones and the 
Intercepted Letters collections in the Danish National Archives, but I have also used 
pamphlets and news sheets from the late 1670ies and naturally I have taken advantage 
of the few sources that have already been published by different scholars. Is there a 
way we can find out what the snaphaner really were up to? I think a meticulous study 
of their actual work could bring us to an understanding of how they should be 
categorised and what they fought for. The documents in the Danish National Archives 
contain numerous descriptions of the working methods f the snaphaner: of how they 
described their daily life themselves and of what teir employers the Danish 
authorities required them to do. The Intercepted Letters collection is in itself the fruit 
of the snaphaner’s work since one of their main tasks was to interrupt the Swedish 
communication lines and snatch the Swedes’ letters from them. The muster rolls and 
account books also provide important details about the snaphaner, their background, 
work and the nature of their relationship to the Danish state. If we know what the 
tasks of a snaphane or friskytte were then we should also be able to classify their work 
according to some sort of standard. In this case I thought it fit to compare the nature 
of the tasks of a snaphane/friskytte to those of guerrilla fighters and irregular troops 
throughout history. The pro-Danish side have always insisted that the Gønger, 
friskytter and snaphaner were guerrilla fighters. Is that view sustainable from the 
point of view of military history and strategics? Another hypothesis is the one that 
was first presented by the ethnologist Anders Linde-Laursen and then by the historian 
Kim Wagner who both interpret the snaphane phenomenn as social banditry. But 
Linde-Laursen only dealt with the snaphaner very briefly in his work on the relations 
between Denmark and Sweden in general and Kim Wagner’s study concentrates on a 
small group of so-called Gønger on the island of Zealand during the preceding war 
(1658-60). Do the snaphaner/friskytter during the Scanian War qualify as social 
bandits? These are the main issues that I will dealwith in this chapter. 
 
Traditionally Swedish historiography classifies thesnaphaner as outlaws that attacked 
anyone who got in their way. In the 19th century the distinguished Scanian historian 
Martin Weibull called the snaphaner the ”natural enemies” of the peasants.243 Later, 
                                               
243 Åberg, p.98. 
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Alf Åberg continued this line of thought, describing them as villains whose actions 
were characterised by ambushes that hit both sides in iscriminately.244  These actions 
were allegedly limited to the woodlands along the border. The forests isolated the 
peasants on both sides of the border from the central authorities and the peaceful 
border area has been described as a “peasant republic” whose citizens had little or no 
sense of belonging with either Sweden or Denmark. This line of thought generally 
supports the view that national identities did not exist in any guise at the time.   
The Danes countered with a far more lenient view of the snaphaner. To Fabricius the 
snaphane movement was “an economic phenomenon that surf ced in the borderlands 
every time war broke out and disturbed the natural occupations. But it was not only an 
economical phenomenon. The snaphaner/friskytter did not only look for booty but 
they also asked who the booty belonged to. Fabricius emphasised that in the sources, 
you never come across snaphaner/friskytter that turn against the troops of their own 
country. The snaphane movement had what Fabricius called a “political tendency”, 
and it therefore –or in any case- could be taken into the service of the state. To 
Fabricius the acquisition of a political cause explains how the snaphaner turned into 
friskytter.245 I think that is a very important point and one of very few parameters that 
we have to measure up the snaphaner/friskytter against. However, I doubt seriously 
that a neat line of development from destitute peasants to politically conscious 
friskytter can be drawn. The snaphaner of Mikkel Gønge in the 16th century fought for 
Denmark too, and followed the Danish, not the Swedish army, which indicates that 
there was some sort of political consciousness then too. I think that political 
consciousness served the scopes of frustration, whether that frustration be caused by 
perceived threats to one’s safety (war-situation) or changed conditions that one 
ascribed to the new rulers of the land (financial hardship), and that these factors 
should be taken into account during the whole era of the snaphane wars, from the 16th 
century onwards. 
 
The early 20th century historian Per Sörensson felt that it was important to stress the 
fact that the peasants on both sides had been actively participating in warfare against 
each other for generations. Wars that had imprinted a sense of “Danish-ness” on them. 
A Danishness that might simply have consisted in the feeling of diversity that 
                                               
244 Åberg, (1958), p.102. 
245 Fabricius III, p. 98 and p. 102. 
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developed over the years when they were called uponto help the authorities kill the 
peasants on the Swedish side of the border.246 The Gønger were those among the 
Scanians that grumbled the most over the new overlords and did not show any signs 
of being pleased with the forced union with their dear neighbours. Young men from 
Gønge were wont to go to Copenhagen to fight for their king and they knew that 
likely enough, the enemy was going to be their northern neighbours. After the end of 
the Scandinavian union around 1521 the Gønger had had to fight back invasions from 
the north innumerable times. They were used to drawing guns on their next-door-
neighbours. It is important to stress here that the Blekinge and Gønge areas were the 
poorest parts of Denmark long before they came under Sw dish rule. The inhabitants 
depended on their connection to Zealand and the capital to where they could export 
men, cattle and goods. Knud Fabricius claimed that the passage to Swedish rule had 
severed the umbilical cord of these northerly regions. The extent of the financial crisis 
caused by the annexation has been questioned in rece t times. 
 
Uno Röndahl even goes so far as to claim that a “local peasant war” broke out during 
the autumn of 1677 when there was  a wave of raids an  killings across the border: a 
group of snaphaner called the Uggle-boys (Uggleherarn ) concentrated their raids on 
the Swedish villages right across the border from their own area. Their Swedish 
neighbours from the county of Småland answered in the same manner: during a raid 
on Örkened (Ørkende) they captured five men and shot one, who might have been 
Trued, the leader and eldest of the brothers from Uggle.247 At least periodically local 
hostilities seem to have taken surprising dimensions. Edvardsson tells the legend of a 
Swedish “snaphane” who had the king Carl’s initials t ttooed onto his hand and 
fought his Danish neighbours with great fierceness.  In this case it is the matter of a 
legend but it tells of a time when the border became more important than ever and 
when the crossing of it meant that you had a right to kill the first man you met. And 
                                               
246 Sörensson, p.7.      
247 Röndahl, 1996, p.366. The Uggle boys were seven brothe s. According to tradition their father was 
executed outside the Glimåkra (Glimager) church by the Swedes. Five of the brothers are mentioned as 
“snaphaner” in the archives. According to legend the other two were killed in battle, but there is no 
trace of them  in the records. A network of names is connected to the Uggle brothers.At least one of 
them (Pehr) had fought among Captain Caspar Due’s friskytter. Pehr had been conscripted to the 
Swedish army in 1674 but took to the woods instead. Their  home, Ugleboe, was burnt down by 
Gyllenstierna in the spring of 1677. The last three of the brothers were executed in 1684, as can be read 
in the court registers of Östra Göinge 16th April 1684. See: John Tomenius, Den stora ofärden (The 
Great Disaster), Uddevalla 1984, p. 147. See also: Röndahl 1996, p.365.   
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that was what quite a few men did. Ethnic distinctions existed before the wars, but 
probably they were accentuated by the hostilities.  
     
As I mentioned in the introduction practically all works on the Scanian “transition 
era” have concentrated on either the Swedification or the Snaphaner. Somehow the 
snaphaner have become emblematic of the whole Scanian question, today and 
yesterday. Since these issues have remained in the focus of attention for so long it 
might simply be that people perceive them as unresolv d and somehow hard to deal 
with still today, especially in Scania. At one point or another most Scanians find 
themselves being called half-Danes (or worse) and start wondering why. Maybe it is a 
good thing that these things are being aired in the open, and that today, it is infinitely 
much easier to do so than only fifteen years ago.248  
   
However, it is definitely not a good thing that until quite recently these issues have 
almost always been analysed according to strictly binary parameters: good or bad, 
black or white. In the end it all came down to pinpointing the bad guys. Those who 
identified with Sweden and its proud history needed to blacken the snaphaner’s 
reputation; else Sweden’s own reputation would become tarnished. What is generally 
recognised is that the snaphaner fought the Swedes like madmen and that the Swedes 
tortured them grossly. But it is not easy to make sense of that if you subscribe to a 
traditional Swedish view of history. Nor is it all that easy to come to terms with if you 
are Danish or Scanian and want your ancestors to have d a glorious past and not to 
appear as pathetic losers. Those who felt embarrassed by Denmark’s many defeats at 
the hands of their northerly neighbours needed heroes t  boost their national pride. 
Either the Swedes were the monsters or the Snaphaner. Generally the Danes as a 
people have not been nominated real bad guys, maybe because it would not be good 
                                               
248 As Anne Llewellyn Barstow declared in her Witchcraze (p.xiv), some things need to be “named and 
brought to light” if the trauma the event itself has caused is to be healed at last. She wrote that book in 
order to “remember the names of those who died, to understand why it happened –and happens still” 
and that is very much the kind of work I would like to start doing in the field of snaphane research 
(with this thesis). In a way this is also an analysis of violence as a power language or conveyor of 
messages that are inscribed on the bodies of human beings or through the transformation of the 
environment. For that analysis I have very much relied upon Llewellyn Barstow, Françoise Sironi’s 
research on the significance of torture and the workings of it upon the sufferer’s mind, Joanna Bourke’s 
works on the killing trade throughout history, and last but not least Elaine Scarry and her brilliant work 
on the transforming power of pain: The Body in Pain, The Making and the Unmaking of the World. 
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for the Scandinavian community or “gemenskap”, as some people call it. 249 But the 
snaphaner were convenient scapegoats since they did not necessarily have to be 
identified with Danes in general. “ The true nature” of the snaphaner has been the 
subject of innumerable analyses all since their owntimes. In the end it always comes 
down to judging whether the snaphaner/Gønger/friskytter were simple thugs or noble 
freedom-fighters, essentially, whether they were good r bad? In recent times exactly 
this question was put by the Scanian historian Dick Harrison in a Scandinavian 
history magazine (Populärhistoria) and towards the end of the article he promptly 
replied that they were both, or rather that the snaphaner/friskytter included different 
kinds of people that could be put into very different categories.  
 
Today’s “freedom-fighters or thugs”-debate can be traced back to a radio interview 
with the Danish history professor Knud Fabricius in 1952, in which he declared that 
the “friskytter” were the predecessors of the freedom-fighters of our days and he 
prized their love for Denmark. 250 During the war the snaphaner actually served as a 
model for the Danish resistance and the so-called “snaphane-films” encouraged the 
Danish freedom-fighters in their battle against the Germans.251 In Sweden the Scanian 
historian Alf Åberg fiercely opposed Fabricius romantic view of the “snaphaner” and 
claimed that they had only been a mixture of ”wanted criminals, army deserters, 
Danish royalists and adventurers”. 252 Naturally he claimed that these villains stood 
outside the peasant communities.  
 
In this chapter I will analyse a number of letters, reports, newssheets and notebooks 
that deal with the so-called snaphaner. The criteria of selection have not been whether 
the persons in question would have called themselve snaphaner but if the Swedes 
would have done so. In some cases it is only the matter of persons who ere accused 
of collaborating with snaphaner or of occupying thems lves with anti-Swedish 
activities and sometimes the final verdict remains u known. The nature of these anti-
Swedish and snaphane activities will be in the centre of attention. Since the fight of 
                                               
249 “Gemenskap” could also be translated as “sense of togetherness”. Some of my colleagues have 
kindly put to my attention that my dissertation in itself constitutes a threat to the cohesion of the 
Scandinavian community (gemenskap). I stressed then, as I stress now, that it has never been my 
attention cause unnecessary trouble but that I feel that it is wrong to abstain from historical research in 
areas that are considered not politically correct. 
250 Åberg, p.100. 
251 For example “Snapphanen” with the legendary Scanian actor Edvard Persson from 1941. 
252 Åberg 1958, pp.101-107 and p.111. Quote p.102. 
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the snaphaner/Gønger/friskytter253 was intrinsically connected with being Danish, 
Swedish and/or Scanian I also hope that the analysis of the will lead to some clues as 
to how identities were constructed in 17th century Scandinavia and what components 
they included. The principal questions that I will keep in mind while analysing the 
sources that constitute the basis of this chapter are the following: Who became a 
snaphane/friskytte and why? What was the nature of their work, as seen by 
themselves, by their employers and by the enemy? What was their relationship to 
local society? Did it matter to them whether they were Danish or Swedish? Why did 
the Swedes crack down on them the way they did? 
                                               
253 These terms are used to describe the same men in Denmark and Sweden. The distinctions between 
these terms will be analysed in the section on the image of the snaphaner. I have chosen to use 
“snaphaner” in the cases were my sources do not make explicit distinctions between the groups.  
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The Word “Snaphane” 
 
Introduction 
This chapter contains a brief analysis of the terminology that was used to indicate 
those who fought on the Danish side without making part of the regular army and how 
these groups could be classified technically today. There is a tendency in Sweden 
today to use the term “snapphane” (Da. snaphane) to indicate what were really a 
number of different categories of people and in this chapter I will analyse the 
linguistic history of that term. However, it will take a good part of the rest of the 
thesis to try to delve into the background of the cange of terminology that actually 
took place on the Danish side and of the change of meaning of the old term that took 
place on the Swedish side and how these two occurrences were interconnected. 
 
Snaphaner, Gønger, Friskytter, guerrillas... 
There is a certain controversy about the very word "snaphane" and its connotations 
and origins. According to some historians it was the famous "snaphane"- guns that 
were made in the Göinge area that gave their name to the men who used them most. A 
more likely origin of the word ”snaphane” would be that it came from Old Low 
German to the Scandinavian languages during the middle ages. According to KA 
Blom the word originally designated a tiny but very quick bird in Low German and 
then in the 14th century it came to designate fast and agile men and from that it came 
to describe armed peasants, rebels and finally, outlaws.254 Maybe one should not 
forget that “Schnapphahn” still means “highwayman” in German and that the first part 
of the word is the same “snap” as the English verb “to snap” and the noun “snapshot”. 
The somewhat quaint expression “snaphance” or “snaphaunce” for “freebooter” is 
linguistically identical with the word “snaphane”, not the least in that it also means “a 
flintlock or a weapon with one.” Chambers Dictionary states that “snap” probably 
comes from Dutch “snappen” that means exactly “to snap” and that “hance/haunce” 
traces its origin to Dutch “haan” i.e. a cock.255 In Ordbog til det aldre danske sprog 
(A Dictionary of the Older Danish Language) "snaphane" is explained as 
"highwayman, partisan" and from the 16th and 17th centuries the combinations 
"snaphaner and robbers” and "snaphaner and pirates” are reportd.  However, the 
                                               
254 KA Blom, Jan Moen, Snapphaneboken, (The Book of the Snaphaner), p.22. Trelleborg, 1987. 
255 See: “snapha(u)nce” in Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary 1986. 
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most common usage of the word in early modern Danish was as a designation of 
"armed independent combatants in the wars of 1675-19: the brave and courageous 
Gønger and snaphaner." 256 The Danish national encyclopaedia reports that the word 
derives from North German "snaphan", highwayman and that it in Danish means 
"armed independent combatants in the northern wars of the 17th century. It is stressed 
that the "snaphaner" were commanded by regular officers and worked as paramilitary 
troops Scania, Holsten and some other regions. 257 In the Swedish language the word 
first appeared during the first part of the 16th century as a loanword from Middle Low 
German, and it was then applied to as various objects as ships, guns and people. In the 
1520ies it was the surname of a Danish smith who lived n Stockholm.258 Swedish 
encyclopaedia explain the word “snapphane” as irregular troops consisting of peasants 
and warriors" 259 and "Swedish designation for guerrillas, resistance members and 
common looters on the Danish side in the Danish-Swedish wars." 260  
The German sociologist Norbert Elias claimed that ”the more or less sudden 
emergence of words within languages nearly always points to changes in the lives of 
people themselves...”261 and I believe that the new term for snaphane signified on the 
one hand that the friskytter had ’gone official’ and had the King’s protection, on the 
other hand that they wanted to distinguish themselves from the signification the 
Swedes had given to the word ’snaphane.’  
In his book on rebels in Wales from 1400-1600, Arfon Rees draws the conclusion that 
the image of the outlaghs became less positive over the centuries.262 During the 
Glyndwr uprising at the beginning of the 15th century those who rebelled against the 
English and had to take refuge in the mountains were s en as great heroes and the 
bards wrote long poems about them. As times grew harder and the English gained a 
steadier footing in Wales it became more difficult to survive in the mountains and the 
utlaghs became a problem for the locals. In this way their heroic image was 
                                               
256 Otto Kalkar, Ordbog til det ældre danske sprog 1300-1700, (A Dictionary of the older Danish 
Language 1300-1700), Copenhagen 1902-1907. Quotes: ”" snaphaner oc røffuere" and "snaphaner og 
sørøvere."   
257 Den Store Danske Encyklopædi, Danmarks Nationalleksikon 17, (The Great Danish 
Encyclopaedia)1997. 
258 O. Källström (p.326) hypothesised that this Hans Saphane ”originally came from just the border 
districts which were famed for their good guns, andwhich, about one hundred years later, were to 
provide the bitter Danish-Swedish border wars with the renowned partisans –the ”Snaphaner””. The 
border district that Källström meant was of course Gønge. 
259 Bonniers konversationslexikon XII, Stockholm 1952. 
260 Bra Böckers Lexikon 21, Bokförlaget Bra Böcker, Höganäs, 1989. 
261 Norbert Elias, The Civilising Process, Blackwell 1997 (English translation), p.43. 
262 E.A. Rees, Welsh Outlaws and Bandits, Caterwen Press, Birmingham 2001, p. 33 and p.37. 
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blackened. Glyndwr’s image changed from that of heroic status to that of a feared 
outlagh. Nevertheless he was never bereaved of that halo of romanticism that 
surrounded him in the popular songs and poems. Something very similar happened in 
the case of the snaphaner. By 1677 nobody wanted to be called by that name, because 
things had happened that rendered it offensive. In this chapter we will analyse the 
events that led to that situation. In a letter from November 1677 Lieutenant (cornet)  
Hendrik Ovesen Pflug who was sent out from the regular army to command the 
Bornholm based friskytter asked Copenhagen “das die, so Freyschützen jemahls 
gewest, mihr folgen sollen undt alsdan vor keine Schnaphanen erkennet werden.”263  
In 1916 Per Sörensson pointed out that with this phrase Pflug made quite clear that in 
1677 the two words had very different connotations a d that “only lawless vagrants 
should be branded with the latter name (Schnaphanen).”264 It was no longer the case 
to use the word “snaphane” as a positive headline, the way the author of the “Account 
of the snaphaner in Scania and Holsten” had done, si ce nobody would voluntarily 
identify himself as a snaphane and even less be encouraged to take action through that 
kind of identification. During the intervening thirty years, the situation had changed 
and a snaphane during the latter part of the Scanian W r was not the same as a 
snaphane during the Torstensson’s War. 
 
And yet, according to Alf Åberg the term “snaphane” was not derogatory during most 
of the early modern era but it became so during the 1690'ies when the Swedish 
authorities came to use it to designate all kinds of criminals and political opponents.265 
I believe that the Account of the snaphaner in Scania and Holsten266 proves that at 
least the Danes did not feel that "snaphane" was a derogatory term in 1644. However, 
thirty-five years later, when the Scanian war was drawing towards its close, the Danes 
avoided using it. One reason for this is probably that he connotations of the word 
“snaphane” actually changed earlier than Åberg assumed, both in Denmark and 
Sweden. Pflug made that quite clear in his neat distinction between the two 
categories. We can also see that the “friskytter” are mentioned on almost every page 
of a little notebook in Jørgen Krabbe’s defense that is to be found in the Danish Royal 
                                               
263 Quote from a letter from Pflug to HQ in Copenhagen, Copenhagen 19th November 1677, I.S., No: 
684: Suppliker (Petitions), DRA. The letter, including the quotation, has in part been published by 
Sörensson, p.50. 
264 Sörensson, p.50. 
265 Åberg, p.108. 
266 See the Introduction. 
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Library. The notebook can be dated to the beginning of 1678 or thereabouts. At least 
in one case the author (Holger Thott?) first started writing "snap" but corrected 
himself and wrote "friskytte" instead.267 He also explained that it only was Swedes 
that said "snaphane" whereas the Danes said "friskytt".268 During the latter part of the 
1670’ies the Swedes were terrified of the snaphaner, of their reputed unpredictability 
and cruelty. The Swedish sources that I have analysed all speak of them in the same 
wary, often enough almost terrorised tone, and always as “snapphanar” not 
“friskyttar”, except a few times in reported Danish speech, but then using the term 
“friskytte” was enough to get one denounced.    
In the Danish reports from the Scanian war the “snaphaner” are normally called 
"friskytter", at least from 1677 onwards. The Scanian clergyman Sthen Jacobsen 
called them "snaphaner" all through his Chronicle of the Nordic War but explained 
that from 1677 onwards they insisted on being called "friskytter."269 In my sources the 
word "snaphane" is sometimes used by Danes but almost only when it is the reported 
speech of a Swede.270 In many Danish contemporary sources the friskytter w re 
mentioned with reverence; if the darker sides of their deeds were mentioned they were 
often (but not always) excused.271 The term “friskytte” was used much in the same 
contexts as “snaphaner” in Danish sources even in earlier eras: Mikkel Pederssøn 
Gyding’s troops were sometimes mentioned as “Michel Juding mit seiner 
                                               
267 ”...and no one has either said or accused Krabbe of having paid his servants to go to the snap 
friskytter or of making deals with them or even saying the least word to them...”, MS Rostgaard 4to, 
93, KB. 
268  ”...that Krabbe should let the Swedes know that ose whom they call snaphaner were there....” 
(”...att Krabben skulle lade svensken vide, att disse om de kalder snaphanerne var der at finde.”) MS 
Rostgaard 4to, 93, KB, p.43. Fabricius called this manuscript Det hefnraabende blod (Blood Calling 
for Revenge).   
269 Jacobsen also knew that if he had written friskytter his history of the Scanian War would have 
remained not publishable in Sweden. The book could not be published in any case, since it was in 
Danish, but probably Jakobsen had hoped up until a cert in point that it would be publishable even if 
the Swedes won.  
270 On his arrival at the Danish camp on 18th June 1677 (Depositiones, DRA) Cristen Jensen report d 
that a group of soldiers had brought 3 snaphaner with them to the Swedish camp. This is one of the 
very few passages from the Scanian war where a Danish scribe uses the expression snaphane. It was 
definitely the expression Jensen would have heard in the Swedish camp. In the same manner Danes 
always referred to themselves as “Danes” but when ty reported Swedish speech they used the 
derogatory term “Jutes” that they Swedes tended to use. 
271  The author of MS Rostgaard 4to, 93 (KB) admitted he ferocity of the friskytter but explained it as a 
retribution for what the Swedes had done during the past wars in Denmark and as a normal but horrible 
thing that happens in times of war.  
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freischutzen” etc.272 In the same manner Christer Bagge who was condemned to death 
for being a leader of the snaphaner in 1658 called himself a captain of the friskytter. 
Now, it is often maintained that terms that were not i  use during the historical era 
that one is studying should be avoided, although that was obviously not the case in 
Mommsen’s days. For that reason I have chosen not to call the snaphaner/friskytter 
“guerrillas” in this dissertation although they used battle techniques that today go 
under the name of guerrilla warfare.273 As far as we know today, the terms “guerrilla” 
and “petite guerre” only started to be used during the Napoleonic Wars. However, the 
corresponding Italian form,  “guerriglia”, can be dated back to the 16th century. 
“Guerriglia” is the diminutive of “guerra” and like “petite guerre” and “guerrilla”, it 
simply means “little war”.274 Today, the terms “partisan” and “guerrilla” warfare are 
generally held to be synonymous, although partisan fighting is sometimes attributed 
more of an ideological colouring.275 The term “partigænger/partigängare” that was 
frequently used at the time is closely connected to the word “partisan”.276 During the 
Scanian War “to go on a party” meant to practise irregular/detachment warfare or to 
execute irregular operations. For the Danes, a “party” (Scand. “parti”) could be 
constituted by regular soldiers, friskytter or a mixture of both. The Swedes often used 
the term to describe minor detachments that were sent out to fight 
snaphaner/friskytter. A similar terminology was used during the Spanish campaign 
against Napoleon (1808-1814) in which both  “partid” and “guerrilla” designed: 
                                               
272 Holger Rørdam(ed.). Historiske samlinger og studier vedrørende danske forhold i det 17. 
aarhundrede, (Historical Collections and Studies regarding the State of Things in 18th Century 
Denmark ), Copenhagen 1884, pp. 49-50: “Weil es aber eine sehr geferliche reise, dazu sich niemandt 
gern gebrauchen wolt lassen, wardt entlich Michel Juding, welchem die Schwedische Sprache und die 
gelegenheit des gantzen Reichs bewust, mit grossen zusagungen bewogen die reise mit 30 seiner 
freischutzen anzunemen.” See also p.78: “...Ago Brun, welcher in abwesen Michel Juding die Denische 
freischutzen furete.” The passages have kindly been put to my notice by Dr. Stefan Persson. 
273 The military historian Lars Ericson Wolke of the Swedish Defence University characterises the 
Swedes’ encounter with friskytter and snaphaner during the Scanian War as an encounter with 
“guerrilla war, a kind of war that was not described in the scientific war manuals of those days.” See: 
Lars Ericson Wolke, Krigets idéer. Svenska tankar om krigföring. ( Ideas of War. Swedish Reflections 
on the Conduction of War), Värnamo 2007, p.109. 
274 The Zingarelli 1999 derives “guerriglia” from the Spanish “guerrilla” and dates its first appearance 
in Italian to 1573. The meaning is stated as: “Forma di lotta condotta da formazioni irregolari di armti 
che combattono un esercito regolare. Maybe its most common usage in Italian today is to describe 
fights between hooligans and police at football matches. 
275 Leonid D. Grenkevich, The Soviet Partisan Movement 1941-1944, A Critical Historiographical 
Analysis, Frank Cass, London, Portland, Or, 1999, p.1. In 1863 Karol Borkowski (Pamiętnik 
historyczny o wyprawie partyzanckiej do Polski, Leipzig 1863, p.242, quoted by Emanuel Halicz, 
Partisan Warfare in 19th Century Poland, Odense University Press 1975, p.28.) distinguished between 
partisan fighting and partisan warfare. The former was a national war of liberation, the latter a 
revolutionary war.  
276  Hahlweg (p, 27) defines early modern guerrilla warfare as a war for “independent (free) troops, 
Parteigänger, and detachments”. 
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 “a guerrilla band or irregular operations, but it can also mean a picket of regular troops or be usedto 
describe the use of skirmishers on the battlefield; by the same token, the word partida can stand not just 
for a guerrilla band but also for a detachment of soldiers.”277 
 
In a way it is disrespectful to use the term “snaphane”, even in a historical context. On 
the other hand it is the word that is used in Scania today where a whole area has taken 
its name after them and schools and companies are nam d after them. And people are 
proud to be the descendants of the snaphaner. For this reason I have chosen to use the 
term, with certain reservations. Hopefully the bad connotations have been exorcised 
by the frequent and positive usage of the word, in the face of those who wanted it to 
mean something else, or whose fear made them believe so. 
 
Conclusions: 
In this chapter, I have  stressed that my sources indicate that the term “snaphane” 
could even be used in a positive sense in Danish before the Scanian War and that 
some Danish pamphlets spoke of the snaphaner as heroes, but that during the Scanian 
the word had become (as Fabricius put it) “an offence that cried for a bloody 
vengeance.” 278 From early 1677 onwards, nobody called themselves “snaphaner”.279 
This gradual change in connotations is lacking in Fabricius and I wanted to point it 
out. As we will see later, early 1677 was also the tim  when the Swedes came down 
heavily on the “snaphaner” and took to increasingly brutal punishments, at the same 
time as the King’s Friskytter first turn up on the scene of war. 
 
The Historical Origins of the Snaphane Movement 
Introduction 
Scania had a long history of rebellions and peasant uprisings behind herself already 
by the time of the Scanian War. Was that the most plausible background of the so-
called “snaphane movement”? In this chapter the actual battle techniques of the 
snaphaner/friskytter will be traced back in time and compared to similar movements 
throughout history, on an international basis. However, the local Scandinavian context 
                                               
277 Charles J. Esdaile, Fighting Napoleon. Guerrillas, Bandits and Adventurers in Spain 1808-1814, 
Yale University Press, New Haven and London 2004, p.25. See also pp.198-199. 
278 Fabricius, III p.102. The Scandinavian expression that corresponds to “a bloody vengeance” is “en 
dyr hævnd/hämnd” which literally means “an expensive vengeance”, which is also what Fabricius 
wrote. In Scandinavian it is obvious that the expense is not assumed to be monetary. 
279 Fabricius, III p.102. 
 87 
and how its specificity formed the basis of the snaphane movement will not be 
forgotten. 
 
From the Hittites to the Renaissance 
In his Guerrillas and Terrorists Richard Clutterbuck traces two original branches of 
guerrilla warfare: the “development of organized revolt against established 
government” of which the Spartacus revolt was typical and secondly, “resistance to 
foreign occupation or domination by a tribe or community subdued by another” of 
which Scythian resistance to Persian occupation in 512 BC was an example.280 In pre-
Roman Gaul, the popular leader Vercingetorix addressed his men when they were 
about to set out on their fight against Julius Caesar and the Romans. What he said (or 
so it is claimed that he did) was this:  
“We have to conduct the war quite differently, to cut off the Romans from their food and supply, to 
destroy isolated detachments. All the open villages and farms from which the Romans can get their 
provisions will be cut off and the Romans will starve”.281  
 
Seventeen centuries later or so, on 26th July 1678, the Danish War Council discussed 
what should be done now that open battle against the enemy (the Swedes) seemed out 
of the question. In the face of an undeniably superior nemy the members of the War 
Council advised King Christian V to concentrate on a strategy that was similar to the 
one Vercingetorix had employed against the Romans: War Councillor Herman Meijer 
declared that according to him the best way to weaken the enemy was through attacks 
on minor targets such as the Swedish redoubts on the Skepparslöv (then Skiberslev) 
heights, and by using “small parties”, friskytter and ships in order to cut off enemy 
food provisioning lines, and furthermore, to send out reconnaissance parties, and by 
“alarming and harassing bread and forage provisioning they would try to divert the 
enemy until the times changed.”282  The situation of the Danish army and the 
commanders choice of strategy becomes more comprehensibl  in the light of 
Johannes Kunisch’s analysis of the Absolutist state as a gigantic wheel, the workings 
of which depended on the functioning of the innumerable sub-units: taxes had to be 
collected, soldiers conscripted, storages filled with supplies that could then be 
transported across the border...Irregular troops did not have to follow the rules of the 
absolutist game. Official warfare had stiffened in its form so that it had become 
                                               
280 Clutterbuck, p.24. 
281 Gaius Julius Caesar, De bello gallico, VII, quoted by Lacqueur, p.6. 
282 Jensen, p.381. 
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almost impossible to improvise. It was here that the irregular troops had an important 
role to play.283  
  
The basic structure of this kind of combat methods can be traced as far back as the 
beginnings of civilisation and maybe further. In military manuals this manner of 
fighting is called guerrilla- or partisan warfare, and in its more technically and 
strategically advanced versions, it becomes detachment- and irregular warfare. Hit-
and-run-tactics, the evasion of open battle and the a tempt to wear down the enemy 
has been practised in all times. So-called “primitive” cultures know no other way of 
fighting. Most likely, it is mankind’s oldest way of waging war.284 The first time we 
know of that a classical trait of guerrilla warfare was mentioned is in the Anastas 
Papyrus in which the Hittite king Mursilis complained that “the irregulars did not dare 
to attack me in the daylight and preferred to fall on me by night.”285 The 
characteristics of this kind of war was that the troops practiced hit-and-run tactics 
which they were good at because they were more mobile than their enemies and had a 
knowledge of the often difficult terrain that was denied their opponents. Sometimes 
they ended up as brigands. Normally they were supported by the local inhabitants and 
not few of them acquired the status of legends. To return to the days of the Roman 
Empire the troops of the Empire were often countered by native uprisings that were 
violent and sometimes effective. Hardly ever were the rebels on a par with the 
military technology or the numbers of the Roman soldiers but had to try to outwit 
them in other ways than sheer brawn. The climax of the war of the Iberians against 
the Romans was Viriathus’s rebellion. From 147-139 BC Viriathus and his men tried 
to expel the Romans with battle techniques that could be characterised as typical of 
guerrilla warfare. In fact Theodor Mommsen called Viriathus “chief of the 
guerrillas”.286  Although guerrillas have always existed, irregular troops like the 
                                               
283 Kunisch, p.4 and p.21: ”Den kleinen Krieg kennzeichnet auf der einen Seite eine größere 
Unabhängigkeit, auf der anderen eine größere Gebundnheit. Was die Unabhängigkeit betrifft, so ist 
daran zu erinnern, wie stark der Aktionsradius große  Armeen von Magazinen und zuverlässigen 
Nachschubverbindungen eingeschränkt wurde.” 
284 Lacqueur, p.3. 
285 Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla Warfare. A Historical & Critical Study. Transaction Publishers, New 
Brunswick and London, 1998 (originally 1976), p. 3. See also: Werner Hahlweg, Gerillakrig utan 
fronter, Halmstad 1970, p.25. Original version: Guerilla. Krieg ohne Fronten, Stuttgart 1968. 
Laqueur, p.29, traces the origins of the term “guerrilla” to the Spanish war against the French (1808-
1813) though as a diminutive of “guerra” it can be traced  back to at least the early 16th century.  See: 
Lo Zingarelli, Vocabolario della lingua italiana, Zanichelli 1999, “guerriglia”. 
286 Lacqueur, p.8. 
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Danish Friskytter only came into existence in Europe during particular conditions and 
at a stage in history (post Thirty Years’ War) when g eral warfare was becoming 
heavier in bulk, more efficient and violent in arms techniques, and at the same time, 
more dependent on connection lines to areas that the mass of the army could not reach 
but that were vital to it.287 
 
I will now trace an outline of the events and the social situation that eventually led to 
the development of the complicated network of resistance fighters and irregular troops 
that existed in Scania during the war of 1676-79. The Scandinavian countries had a 
long tradition of calling the ordinary inhabitants to arms in times of war. This 
habitude in itself constituted the basis, if not for the existence, then for the dimensions 
and efficiency of the “snaphane movement” during the Scanian War.  If there is a set 
of skills and military techniques that are characteris ic of guerrilla- and irregular 
warfare then the Scandinavian peasants were well practised in many of these skills 
and techniques centuries before the Scanian War. 
In most European countries the d fensio patriae theories had little practical outcome 
but in Scandinavia it already felt quite natural for peasants to go to war for their 
country. This was especially the case in Sweden. In De mark it was first and foremost 
the inhabitants of the border region whose services were called upon. The Gønger of 
the Gønge region were considered the most valorous warriors in the kingdom of 
Denmark. Contrary to what for example Alf Åberg seems to think in his books, the 
snaphaner/friskytter were far from an exclusively Scandinavian phenomenon. 
Continental European influences were crucial for the development of the snaphane 
movement, albeit in combination with the already existent readiness and ability to go 
to war of the peasantry in a corner of Europe where the lower classes had never been 
disarmed. In the early modern era peasant detachments w re employed in practically 
every battle between Swedes and Danes. Although local peace treaties were common 
in the border area it was also a plain fact that every generation that grew up there had 
to get used to participating actively in wars against their neighbours across the border. 
When the ”European” idea of local militia was introduced in Denmark the concept of 
”fatherland” was much used in order increase the loyalty of the local soldiers. I 
believe that the snaphane movement, and later, the friskytter, developed out of the 
                                               
287 Der kleine Kri.e.g. Studien zum Heerwesen des Absoluti mus, Frankfurter Historische 
Abhandlungen, Band 4, Steiner Verlag GMBH Wiesbaden, 1973. Pp.1-4. Quote: p.1. 
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troops that were raised in every parish, a least to ome part as a result of the defensio 
patriae movement.  
In an article on the origins of patriotism Gunner Lind analyses the way the concept of 
“fatherland” was used in Denmark up until the introduction of absolutism in 1660. 
According to Lind this concept gained a broader value when the idea of defensio 
patriae was broached in Denmark at the very beginning of that century.  By mid-
century patriotism based on the duty to defend the fatherland had become a force in 
its own right and not only in the upper strata of society.288 Now, if Lind is right  
Krabbe and the Thotts and their contemporaries all grew up reading Encomion Regni 
Daniæ, Nør-Nissom’s A Short Danish Chronicle and other popular history books that 
were directed to readers that “wish their dear fatherland well, and wants its best from 
the bottom of their hearts and victory against its enemies.” 289 
During the century and a half that preceded the Snaphane War the Scanian peasantry 
had several occasions to practice their wartime skills. The Norby rebellion of 1525 
transformed Scania into a gigantic battlefield. It is not clear whether it was the matter 
of a purely agrarian rebellion against the powerful nobility or whether its leader Søren 
Norby had simply mobilised the peasantry against his and King Christian’s 
enemies.290  
King Christian was still in the hands of his uncle and Norby and the Scanian peasants 
had both Scandinavian kingdoms and Lübeck against them and in the end Norby had 
to surrender.291 It is highly unclear whether a category of men called the snaphaner 
existed already at this point. No mention of the word “snaphane” has (so far) been 
found in the scarce sources that remain from Søren Norby’s days. Nevertheless it is 
hard not to agree with the Danish ethnologist Anders Linde-Laursen who sees a clear 
connection between what he calls “earlier peasant uprisings” like the one headed by 
                                               
288 Lind, p.102. 
289 Gunner Lind, ”Gamle patrioter”, (Old patriots), pp.91-115, in Søfart, Politik, Identitet, tilegnet Ole 
Feldbæk, Handels- & Søfartsmuseet på Kronborg, SøhistoriskeSkrifter XIX, Falcon 1996, p.95.and p.  
103 where he  quotes Jens Søffrensøn Nør-Nissum, En kort Dansk Krønicke, Copenhagen 1649, 
introduction:”som vel mener deres käre fädreland, og af et oprigtigt hjerte söger dets bedste og gavn 
mod dets fjender.”For the introduction of franc-archers in France and militia (under Machiavelli) in 
Tuscany that led to the institution of Danish militia towards the middle of the 16th century see: John R. 
Hale, Guerra e società nell’Europa del Rinascimento, Laterza 1987, pp.218-222. (War and Society in 
Renaissance Europe, 1450-1620, Fontana books 1985).   
290 See: Mikael Venge, ”Tiden fra 1523-1559”(The years 1523-1559) in Kai Hørby & Mikael Venge, 
Danmarks historie II:a. Tiden 1240-1559  (A History of Denmark 1240-1559) , Copenhagen 1980, 
pp.291-311 and Gustafsson (2000) p.107. 
291 Søren Norby himself managed to escape to Livonia from where he went to Russia. He then served 
the Emperor for some years and was killed during the siege of Florence in 1530. 
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Søren Norby, and the snaphaner.292  It was only with the Nordic Seven Years’ War 
(1563-1570) that the snaphaner and their legendary le der Mikkel Pederssön Gyding 
alias Mickel Göing were first mentioned.293 A characteristic piece of “irregular” war 
tactics that Mikkel Gyding practised was that he and his men fought in the rear of the 
regular troops: the very first time the “snaphaner” are mentioned in the sources it is in 
association with what is considered a classical trait of guerrilla warfare. At a later 
stage in European history irregular troops followed closely in the footsteps of the 
regular army in order to attack the enemy in the back in order to make them feel 
cornered and nervous. They were also kept in the rear in order to catch deserters and 
stragglers and sometimes to finish them off.294  These were all tasks that the fearsome 
Mikkel and his men managed brilliantly and that were continued by later generations 
of snaphaner. A cold war was going on between Denmark and Sweden duri g the 
latter part of the 16th century and the beginning of the 17th. Yet again the peasants 
played a crucial role: on direct orders from the king peasant troops were created and 
exercised in the Scanian provinces. These troops sorted under the responsibilities of 
the king’s lensmand.295 War was finally declared again in April 1611. The direct 
cause of the war was the northerly Finnmark: areas in Lapland that both Denmark-
Norway and Sweden claimed the rights to. The war ope ations included the so called 
“Incendiary Expedition” of 1612 when King Gustavus II Adolphus of Sweden and his 
men laid waste large parts of northeastern Scania. It should be added in this context 
that it is not my intention that potential readers of the text should interpret it as if the 
Danes were innocent victims. I am trying to write a brief background of Scanian early 
modern history before the Scanian War, and to study what precedents the 
friskytter/snaphaner might have had during that era.  For that reason I have not paid 
much attention to other war zones, but the Danes certainly committed atrocities too. 
During this war the areas of Småland and Öland were pa ticularly exposed to Danish 
violence. 
                                               
292 Linde-Laursen, p.44. 
293 The Seven Years’ War was something of a catastrophe for the inhabitants of the war zones that yet 
another time included Scania as a prime scene. The bon of contention this time was the Baltic 
provinces: the island of Ösel and modern day Estonia. It was only with the peace of Stettin in 1570 that 
the Nordic Union was formally dissolved. For information on Mikkel Gyding see: Stefan Persson, 
pp.372-373. 
294 See: Kunisch, p.19. 
295 The lensmand corresponded roughly to the French intendants and were not responsible to the local 
administration. See: Ertman, p.308, but also Appel, . 673. Appel also explains the significance of the 
different Danish administrative units len and amt, and the difference between a lensmand and an 
amtsmand. See Appel, pp. 366-378. 
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Mercenary troops had never been a great success Scandinavia. As with many other 
things this “European” trend did not have much success in a part of the world where 
there weren’t any cities (according to European stadards) until the 19th century and 
the climate is either arctic or almost so. Consequently, irregular warfare in 
Scandinavia can hardly be seen as a substitute for mercenary troops that were never a 
big hit there, although on a European scale the irregulars that were so characteristic of 
the Absolutist armies have often been explained in that light.296 In Scandinavia the 
mercenaries were not substituted by massive, sluggish armies in combination with 
swift irregular detachments. Instead the peasant armies in Denmark became ever more 
professional, first under the German knights and a ever-ending stream of foreign 
officers, then under the leadership of lensmænd and other officials that were sent out 
by the state to make warriors of them. In Sweden thre were never any German 
knights, but a certain number of foreign officers. Some made part of the limited 
number of mercenary troops that after all existed in Scandinavia where it was 
comparatively easy for them to rise in rank and even b come noblemen. 
The peasant troops were organised under stricter military forms during Horn’s War 
(1643-1645), which in itself was yet another “ramification” of the Thirty-Years’ 
War.297  Jutland was invaded by the Swedes in January 1643, Scania by the troops of 
field marshal Gustav Horn in February that same year. A royal order from Christmas 
Eve 1643 urged the lensmænd of Scania to prepare their peasant troops. The lensmand 
of Christianstad Ebbe Ulfeld, who was also the king’s son-in-law, became 
commander-in-chief of both the regular troops and the peasant troops.298  
 
It is from that war that the report on the snaphaner i  Scania and Holsten that I quoted 
at the beginning of the chapter dates. In it the snaphaner were described as quite 
ordinary peasants who fought the enemy with all their might. Another report from the 
same year regards the snaphaner in Jutland: a French envoy by the name of de la 
                                               
296 Kunisch, p.2. Kunisch studied the Austrian irregular troops from 1740-1790 but most of his theories 
can be applied to late 17th century Scandinavia as well; what interested Kunisch was the nexus 
absolutism-irregular troops and I feel that the friskytter/snaphaner fit perfectly into this pattern in its 
own, Scandinavian way. 
297 Sörensson, p.5. Skansjö pp.168-171 on Scandinavia and the Thirty-Years’-War. 
298 Skansjö, p. 170. Ulfeld later went over to the Swedes and was employed as a “snaphane-catcher”. 
Due to his experience of Danish peasant troops he was also considered an expert in the field of 
snaphaner: which implies that those two categories were, perhaps, closely associated in the Swedish 
imagination. 
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Thuillerie had ended up in the hands of the snaphaner o  his way from Hamburg to 
the Swedish quarters general in Denmark. de la Thuillerie later wrote to secretary of 
state Count de Brienne and to Mazarin to tell of his little adventure:  
 
“On my way from Hamborg...I ended up in the hands of the snaphaner (les chapans). They are 
rebellious and armed peasants, of whom everyone has tried to frighten me. But far from hurting me, 
they escorted me through all dangerous places, with so many blessings and prayers for the success of 
my peace negotiations, so that it is obvious that tese poor people are driven by desperation rather than 
evil, and that they have been forced to lead the life they are leading because they cannot manage to pay 
all the “contributions” they are burdened with. Although there is only seven- or eight hundred of them, 
they nevertheless cause the Swedish army great damage; because since this country is full of woods, 
they always manage to surprise one or other (Swede) and then they kill him, even if he is an officer or 
of even higher rank. But the worst problem is that ey interrupt connections between this town and 
Hamburg, unless there is a considerable escort troop, but that is very tiring for the troops.”299 
  
This letter and the Report on the Snaphaner in Scania and Holsten agree on almost all 
points as to the way the snaphaner are described. At this point in time many of the 
characteristics of the snaphaner/friskytter of the Scanian War were already there: 
ordinary, and even religious, peasants that ambushed the enemy who was not just 
anybody who happened to have some money, as brigands would have done, but rather 
enemy soldiers from the invading army. They hustled cattle (from the enemy) and 
interrupted communications so that the “big” war was f cilitated. All these 
characteristics were present thirty-odd years later, too. 
 
Around this time, the Swedish authorities created so-called “border brigades”.300 The 
peasants appreciated this idea and in a short time 400 men were enlisted within the 
confines of one hundred301; more than four times the result of an ordinary 
conscription muster. The commander of the Swedish dragoons was a professional 
soldier but the other officers were locals. The vast majority of them were not 
professional soldiers. The state provided these dragoons with equipment. 302   
 
The Danes followed suit. Dragoon companies were enlist d in the border areas: many 
of these men came from the province of Halland that was officially under Swedish 
                                               
299 Historiske samlinger og studier vedrørende danske forhold i det 17. aarhundrede, (Historical 
Collections and Studies Regarding the State of Things  18th Century Denmark ), ed. Holger Rørdam, 
Copenhagen 1896, pp. 477-478. The letter is dated Haderslev 24th June 1644. This letter has kindly 
been put to my notice by Dr. Stefan Persson. 
300 Sörensson, p.5. 
301 The “hundred” is an old Germanic territorial unit. In Christian times it normally comprised several 
parishes.   
302 Sörensson, p.5. 
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rule. Whether this was a choice influenced by the Sw des, as Sörensson declared303, 
or whether it was the result of general European tendencies in this direction, or both, 
is difficult to say. A company of 100 was enlisted by a man called Svend Poulsen who 
would go to history as “Gøngehøvdingen”, the leader of the warriors from the Gønge 
area. His life would become the subject of endless academical squabbles, even more 
endless soap operas and the occasional acceptable novel. Not to mention exhibitions, 
comics, musicals and records. As a young man Poulsen had participated in the Thirty 
Years’ War and he had considerable experience as a mercenary on the continent. Now 
that war was drawing close to his native Halland again he appears for the first time in 
the Danish military records as the captain of the 100 dragoons that patrolled the ridge 
between Halland and Scania, dragoons that have gone to history as snaphaner or 
simply, “the Gønger”.304 Exactly the same formation pattern would become the norm 
during the Snaphane War when the vast majority of the men were locals, some with 
military experience from the regular army, but most not, and then an addition of a few 
professional officers that had been sent out from Copenhagen. As we will see later, 
the difference between peasants, snaphaner, Gønger, dragoons and later, friskytter 
remained vague, even in the military records.305 Many of these dragoons, like Poulsen 
himself, came from the province of Halland that hadbeen under Swedish rule for 
twelve years in 1657 and now that a new inter-Scandin vian war seemed to be 
drawing closer they all wanted revenge. 
 
Apart from the dragoon companies that at least in part, have gone to history as 
“snaphaner”, the so-called “landstorm” was kept intact: the landstorm was constituted 
by ordinary peasants in arms. They were divided into companies and every 
detachment had its own captain and a lieutenant. Every detachment represented a 
parish or hundred. In 1657 the Danes followed suit.The authorities wanted to 
organise a company of peasant troops in every hundred.306 The younger and stronger 
                                               
303 Sörensson, p.6. 
304 He had recruited these men himself as stated in the licence. For an account of Poulsen’s life see: 
Gitte Kjær, Svend Poulsen Gønge – i verkligheten, (SVP – in real life), Skippershoved 1992. Kjær 
(pp.9 and 66) has attested his military career from 1625-1677. Poulsen died missing in action at a 
considerable age.  
305 Most of the snaphaner that survived the Scanian war wanted to be transferred to regular dragoon 
units in the Danish army. 
306 This was not only the case in Scania but in the rest of Denmark too. More than a thousand peasants 
were killed by the Swedes in the forest of Iversnæs on the island of Fyen. Only some days after the 
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of these peasants were not only supposed to defend th ir own area but also participate 
in raids on the other side of the border. The Swedish border-dragoons, Poulsen’s 
dragoons and the Danish peasant troops all participa ed in the main offensive apart 
from playing an important role in the so-called “little war”, what today would be 
called guerrilla activities. A Danish attempt to extend Poulsen’s dragoon organisation 
to the Gønge area itself was prevented by the intervention of the Swedish border-
dragoons that ambushed the actual mustering place.307  
In 1658 the Swedes had won again and this time a temporary lease on Halland was 
not enough. Denmark had to cede the whole of the Scanian provinces, eastern 
Denmark, for ever and after.  
 
When the Swedes arrived they promptly started conscripting young men. Since 
Scanians were not allowed to do military service in their own region they were sent 
off to the Swedish provinces on the other side of the Baltic where they might be more 
inclined to turn their guns the right way in battle. Tax exactions we sometimes violent 
under the Swedes. Erlandsson has found that it was not unusual to bring the military 
in.308 In May 1658 several hundred peasants gathered in the village of Glimåkra 
(Glimager) and shot seven Swedish dragoons. In Gønge several hundred peasants 
were conscripted during that summer, but the conscript  escaped almost to a man and 
took to the woods.  At about this time count Ebbe Ulf ld declared that:  
”A people that is not used to such harsh treatment, tha  has only recently come under the crown of 
Sweden, that are tough by nature will join forces with the dragoons that have escaped, now that the 
great woods are green...”309  
 
Ulfeld, who was a native Scanian himself, knew thata “little war” was only to be 
expected. Malcontent, armed peasants, dragoons and green woods spelled snaphaner. 
 
In 1659 there were continuous Swedish reports of rebellious peasants and attacks on 
Swedish military patrols, especially in the woods along the border. In the summer of 
                                                                                                                            
fortress of Hindsgavl at Middelfart surrendered to Rutger von Ascheberg and his men. The 450 Danish 
soldiers were enrolled in the Swedish army. This seems to have been the norm.  
307 Sörensson, p.6. On the same page Sörensson also clims that this kind of troops were “branded as 
snaphaner” by the enemy. See also Johnsson who has publi hed important documents on the 
snaphaner/rebels of 1658-1660! 
308 Erlandsson, p.146 and p.166. Jørgen Krabbe in his day claimed the same thing both before and 
during the Scanian War, but we will come to that in the chapter on Krabbe. 
309 Åberg 1958, p.47: ”Ett folk ovant vid sådant hårt traktamente, nyligen kommet under Sveriges 
krona, käcka av naturen, och nu då den gröna stora k gen är för handen, skall de rota sig tillhopa med 
de bortrymda ryttarna.” 
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that year a rich farmer from Holje called Oluv Perssön called the men of four whole 
parishes together and organised an attack on a Swedish dragoon company. In the 
autumn colonel Lybecker and his men were sent out to try and ”pacify” Glimåkra 
(Glimager) and Jämshög (Gemsø). Oluv Perssön told him ”You will not always be 
that strong. Sooner or later our divorce will come through!”310 Some time later 
Lybecker came back and burnt down part of the worst villages, killed some peasants 
and sent Oluv Perssön to prison.  
One of the most convincing points in Åberg’s works is his analysis of the Swedish 
donation policy during the first years after the conquest. He sees this policy as the 
origin of the widespread abuse and maltreatments of the local population on the side 
of the army. At the outset the army was supposed to live off the lands of the Swedish 
Crown in Scania: lands that had been taken over from the Danish Crown and the 
nobility. But by and by these lands were donated to Swedish noblemen, officials and 
administrators who wanted something in return for their efforts in Scania. 
Consequently the army had to squeeze out the means for their upkeep from the local 
population.311 I believe that Åberg is right in seeing this as one f the main propellants 
of the ”rebellion” of the Danes and the consequent Snaphane War. 
There were new conscriptions, although it has been disputed how many people 
actually were conscripted in Scania and how much influe ce that had on the people 
around them. In the summer of 1674 about 500 men from Göinge were sent to 
Pomerania. Two years later they were transferred to Liv nia ”so that the occasion to 
escape would not offer itself so easily to them.” At about this time another 500 men 
were conscripted from Gønge but 300 of them escaped before reaching the Swedish 
fortress.312 Scanians were not allowed to do normal military servic  during the reign 
of Charles XI313 but nevertheless Scania had to keep as many soldiers as other parts of 
                                               
310 Åberg 1958, p.55. See also Fabricius’ account of the snaphaner 1658-1660 in Fabricius I 
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311 Åberg 1958, pp.75-77. 
312 Åberg 1958, pp.81-82. 
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constrained to keep a Swedish “ryttare” and that when t e soldier died he was expected to take his 
place, which he refused to do. Captain Eskeld was Sc nian, so there were probably exclusions to the 
rule. In Scania there were about two cavalry regiments of “ryttare”, the northern and southern Scanian 
Cavalry Regiments, that comprised approximately 2000 men. See: Göran Larsson, “Aldrig mera – 
Skånska krigets förljder för svensk militär organistion och taktik” (Never Again – The Consequences 
of the Scanian War for Swedish Military Organisation and Tactics), pp.352-362 in Göran Rydstad 
(ed.), Kampen om Skåne, (The Battle for Scania), Falun 2005, p.357. 
 97 
the Swedish reigns: only that in Scania these soldiers were not locals but Swedish 
soldiers that were billeted with farmers. The nationality of the soldiers could naturally 
vary, as the Swedish army contained many foreign mercenaries too. Eventually these 
lodgers even obtained right of inheritance to the farmsteads they were billeted in.314 
 
In order to evaluate the situation in the Scanian provinces the Swedish king instituted 
a commission that was to inquire into their situation.315 The so-called Scanian 
Commission has been interpreted in many different ways. Already in 1886 S.Wägner 
explained that the Scanian Commission could only be seen in the light of the war and 
the widespread misery that it had brought down on the land. Wägner claimed that the 
population did not see the Scanian provinces as incorporated into Sweden but as ”half 
foreign” and that this belief was strengthened by the fact that Swedish soldiers were 
billeted in a manner that was only the norm in enemy territory. The soldiers saw the 
peasants they lodged with as enemies and not as fellow countrymen because this kind 
of system existed in enemy country only.316 This view was supported by Per Johnsson 
in his The Snaphane Feud in which he claims that during the inter-war period of 
1660-1675 the situation was calm on the surface but malcontent was breeding 
underneath. On the basis of his scrutiny of the acts of he Scanian commission 
Johnsson claimed the inter war-period and the consequent billeting was oppressive 
and that both the billeted soldiers and other visiting soldiers behaved outrageously.317 
He was aware that some of the supplicants might have exaggerated the misery their 
Swedish “guests” brought upon them but he believed th re was ample evidence to 
prove that the peasants had suffered unnecessarily from the unprecedented billeting of 
                                               
314 In the same manner as with the conscriptions it is hard to say what the real consequences of this 
norm were. We do not know today how many soldiers actually inherited their host’s home and wife. 
315 Wägner, Weibull, Fabricius, Karl Bergman, Jens Lerbom but also Vigo Edvardsson. which was only 
the custom in occupied territories and so the inhabitants found themselves in the constant presence of 
soldiers that reminded them of their status as “conquered” subjects. Occasional outbreaks of protest 
were quickly calmed down by the military. For fifteen years the Scanian provinces remained in a state 
of semi-occupation. 
316 Wägner’s Skånska kommisssionen af 1669-1670, Lund 1886 
317 Johnsson lists a number of complaints in the commission documents, and a few single court cases 
like the one from Ronneby 23rd May 1658 when a group of Swedish soldiers had, as they thought, 
come down upon a den of snaphaner at Ramdala but actually only managed to shoot down a couple of 
civilians. The Swedes also tortured the vicar of Jemsjö and Ramdala Måns Ågesen. Eventually the 
Swedish soldiers were convicted: three of them to the death penalty, the one who had abused of the 
vicar to run the gauntlet six times through one hundred men and the last two to be imprisoned in chains 
for fourteen days. See: Johnsson, p.25. The original documents are to be found in the “Rebellernas 
Acta”, LA. See also: Johnsson pp.25-26 for a long list of violence against civilians in the border area 
just after the Swedish take-over.  
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soldiers in their homes.318 According to Johnsson “the internal situation in northern 
Scania after the transition to Sweden was deplorable, and for this reason one must not 
be surprised by the fact that the snaphane movement fou d such fertile soil in that 
area.”319 Almost a century later Karl Bergman hypothesised that although the 
commission was a normal measure and not a measure the state took to in times of 
crises, the failure of the Scanian commission might have led to the revolt of the 
snaphaner.320 Röndahl in his turn indicates the court case against a Swede called 
Liljenberg who had settled in Ingelsta (Ingelsted) in the south-east of Scania where he 
abused atrociously of the locals. If those were normal conditions during the inter-war 
period the situation must indeed have been intolerab  for the indigenous population. 
To Röndahl the connection between the insistent complaints of the peasants and the 
rebellion of 1675-79 is obvious.321 In a recent article Jens Lerbom stresses that the 
Swedish authorities did not approve of violence against civilians at all: in fact military 
offenders were generally punished more severely than civilian criminals.322 The 
violent episodes that actually occurred were neither authorised nor encouraged by the 
Swedish state. Nor were they the direct result of the Swedish take-over of the former 
Danish lands, but, as Lerbom sees it, should be seen in a larger cultural framework of  
early modern concepts of honour and masculinity, inclusion and exclusion into 
particular groups (such as soldierly camaraderie) and pub brawls in any culture that 
                                               
318 Johnsson, pp. 13-27. 
319 Johnsson, p.19. 
320 See Bergman, pp.377-378: “On the basis of my analysis it is difficult to extrapolate to what extent 
the complaints (to the Scanian Commission) led to ac ual changes. But it does not seem as if rapid or 
direct measures were the scope or strength of the commission. On that basis it is possible to draw the 
conclusion that the commission was a failure. The snaphane movement during the Scanian War might 
be an indicator in that direction, the faith of thepopulation had not been won over. But one could also
turn the question around and ask what would have happened if the Scanian commission had not carried 
through their journeys and if they had not dialogued with the population. What shape would the 
conflict then have taken on?”. Bergman’s thesis is excellent in that it delves deep into questions such as 
the one mentioned here, without pretending to give definite answers. I believe that Bergman has 
overseen one fact. Namely that the commission acted in the wake of a war. There is no mention of this 
as any kind of non-normal situation in Bergman but has war and conquest ever constituted normal 
situations?     
321 Röndahl, 1996, pp.190-191. Now, the Liljenberg case was not the norm since Liljenberg was 
actually recalled to Stockholm and his “fief” Ingelsted given to someone else as a punishment for his 
evil deeds. Röndahl refers to the county assizes of Ingelstad, March 1670 and to S. Wägner’s book 
(from 1886), on the Scanian Commission to which the peasants presented their case. A special 
investigation into this case was done by Jørgen Krabbe and Lejonsköld.  
322 Jens Lerbom, “Våldets regionala realiteter. Soldaters dödliga våld mot civila i Skåne och Blekinge 
1660-1675.” (The Regional Realities of Violence. Deathly Military Violence against Civilians in 
Scania and Blekinge 1660-1675), pp. 272-285, in Våld – representation och verklighet. (Violence-
Representation and Reality), Eva Österberg and Marie Lindstedt Cronberg, Lund 2006,  quote p. 275. 
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values drunkenness. Ethnicity played a very limited role in the episodes studied by 
Lerbom.323 
Conclusions 
Age old familiarity with firearms, the habitude of defending oneself and one’s king 
and country in person, incipient nationalism that ws fuelled by the defensio patriae 
movement, surrender to the archenemy and consequent h miliations, financial 
changes and deterioration which were attributed to the arrival of the new overlords, 
the partial failure of the Swedish state to create a sustainable situation with its 
Commission...  All these factors were important for the development of the snaphane 
movement and eventually led to the creation of the King’s Friskytter units in the midst 
of the so-called Snaphane War.   
  
The Snaphane War 
Introduction 
In this long chapter I will analyse the role of the friskytter/snaphaner during the 
Scanian War and on how the “snaphane threat” was met by the Swedes. I chose to call 
this section “The Snaphane War” because to the snaphaner that was certainly what it 
was, and this thesis centres upon their work and their motivations. Please note that by 
a “snaphane war” I do not intend to say that there was ever a war waged by 
“snaphaner” on their own or for their own scopes, in the sense that Martin Weibull 
and various other scholars have believed there was.324 The snaphaner/friskytter could 
and would not have existed without the support of the Danish king and the Danish 
army. It is important to stress that neither this tesis, nor this particular section of it, 
are intended to take a general overview of the so-called Scanian War. It is the part that 
the snaphaner/friskytter played in it that I am trying to analyse here, as outlined 
against the bigger conflict, the Scanian War. In my general outline of that war I have 
by and large followed Jacobsen, Jensen and Fabricius, though I have included more 
recent analyses of events like those of Lars Ericson (Wolke), Sten Skansjö and Göran 
Rystad. As Rystad correctly stresses in his The Battle for Scania, the Scanian War 
                                               
323 Lerbom 2007, p.279. Lerbom (p.274) has managed to track down thirteen cases of deathly military 




was determined not by the battle of Lund, not by the snaphaner, actually not by 
anything that happened in Scania at all but by the war on the plains in Flanders.325  
But then Rystad is only repeating, or pointing out, what Sthen Jacobsen tried to say 
with his Chronicle of the Nordic War, more than three hundred years earlier: first of 
all he called it a “Nordic” war, that included various northern European territories and 
started and ended outside the Scanian provinces, secondly it was a war between kings 
for the lordship of these various strips of land, and thirdly, the end of the war and the 
destiny of the contested land strips were decided from outside, by the then super 
powers of world politics according to what they saw s the convenience of the general 
European situation. But Jacobsen ascribed a role to “the snaphaner who wanted to be 
called friskytter” and in his chronicle as in most ther accounts of the Scanian War, 
and sources from it, these persons occupy space on almost every page that deal with 
the war scene and politics in the Scanian provinces. In this thesis I have certainly not 
tried to write or re-write the history of the Scani War.326 I have only tried to shed 
some light on an aspect of it that has been left large y unexplored, although the 
“memory” of it draws busloads of tourists across south-eastern Scandinavia to see the 
places where it all took place and the houses where t  snaphaner lived. An enormous 
amount of attention has been paid to the snaphaner and the Snaphane War, and a lot 
of people have a lot of different opinions on the issue. Other important works on the 
Scanian War and/or the Transition Era that I have also consulted include Colonel N.P. 
Jensen’s The Scanian War from 1900 and Oscar Bjurling’s contribution to hisown 
and Salomon Kraft’s History of Ystad.327 
 
As I have already mentioned, what little serious research has been done can almost 
entirely be traced back to Knud Fabricius, in the sense that no academics seem to have 
worked in at least the Danish archives since his day . Pehr Sörensson’s early 20th 
century attempt to draw some serious conclusions about the nature of the friskytte 
force on the basis of the Army Board account books in Copenhagen have been largely 
                                               
325 Göran Rystad, ”Snapphanarna och ’det lilla kriget’” (The snaphaner and ’the little war), pp.283-298,  
in Göran Rydstad (ed.), Kampen om Skåne, (The Battle for Scania), Falun 2005, p.297. 
326 N.P. Jensen, Den skaanske Krig 1675-1679, Kjøbenhavn 1900. 
327 Oscar Bjurling, “1658-1792”, pp.175-507 in Salomon Kraft and Oscar Bjurling, Ystads Historia, 
Del I, Från äldsta tid till 1792, (A History of Ystad. Part I, From the oldest times until 1792), Ystad 
1956. 
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ignored.328 So much theorising and mythicising has been done but we still do not 
really know what the snaphaner/friskytter did during the Scanian War. What was their 
role in the operations? Göran Rystad may be perfectly correct in guessing that 
whatever the friskytter/snaphaner did was in vain but what did they do? Until today 
the picture of the friskytter/snaphaner’s actions ha been dominated by myths. The 
sources tell us there were quite many of them and a quick scrutiny is enough to realise 
that the friskytter/snaphaner were involved in all sorts of different contexts during the 
war. So, even if we know today that their fight was in vain, it still seems interesting 
enough to me to try to obtain a general picture of what they did, what an ordinary 
workday in the life of a friskytte looked like, and if possible, why they did it. We 
should try to remember that neither they nor the Danish authorities knew that it would 
all be in vain. It has often even been denied that the snaphaner fought at all. In spite of 
the fact that for example Sthen Jacobsen clearly stated that the snaphaner participated 
in battles jointly with the regular army and undertook major actions on their own, 
later historians have often discarded the snaphaner as robbers who probably hid in 
their dens with their gold and their women when they w re not prowling on decent 
people. That view is a myth, as is the view that natio listic Danes and Scanians have 
traditionally taken of Svend Poulsen and his Gønger. In this context I feel that it is 
suitable to quote Kim A. Wagner who has written an excellent biography on “the 
real” Svend Poulsen during the war of 1657-1660. Wagner claims that Poulsen “was 
reduced to a myth and a symbol, which rendered the entire topic irrelevant to 17th 
century history. There is nothing wrong with all tha , historical myths also have a 
function and a justification – as long as you do not mix them up with truth.”   In his 
book Wagner tried to point out that maybe the real Svend Poulsen was not quite as 
blond and noble of heart and passions as in the television series but he was a very 
professional soldier who fought four long wars from the Thirty Years’ War onwards 
and he was the brain behind very effective guerrilla attacks against Swedish convoys 
in southern Zealand during the Karl Gustav Wars. I would like to take the occasion to 
stress that I think that it is the same thing whether one makes the snaphaner out to be 
                                               
328 The exception to the rule is Kim Wagner’s excellent book on Svend Poulsen during the war of 
1657-1660. I would like to thank archivist Nils Bartholdy of the National Archives in Copenhagen for 
having informed me of Wagner’s work at an early stage.  
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super blond superheroes or mentally disturbed villains329, both versions make 
excellent soap opera subjects but we will not find them in the sources. 
 
The Return of the Danish King 
Introduction 
In this section I will analyse the events of the first few months after the Danes took 
control of Scania again in June 1676. Nothing like th  King’s Friskytter was then 
existent but the corps would soon enough crystallise from the various attempts at 
using popular resistance and guerrilla methods to fight the enemy.  Throughout my 
account of the events of the Scanian War I will try to put emphasis on the nexus 
peasants-snaphaner-friskytter-regular army-authorities. In particular during the first 
phases of the fighting there was a lot of confusion regarding who was what and what 
role they were to play during combat and during military operations (including 
looting). 
 
Peasant Troops and Border Guards 
When King Christian V of Denmark returned to what he considered his lost lands in 
1676 he did not come as a conqueror but as a rightful sovereign.330 To the Swedes he 
was an invader but King Christian offered the Scanians an alternative view of the 
matter. He claimed that he had been suffering great distress and despondency during 
the years that he had been constrained to watch the umiliations the Scanians had 
endured under the Swedish yoke. 331 According to that point of view the Swedes could 
be equalled to the Babylonians who held the poor Jews captive in a foreign land.332 
King Christian reminded the Scanians that the Swedes had broken every single 
paragraph of the Roskilde peace treaty and consequently the Swedes themselves had 
                                               
329 Please see “Introduction” p.25 where I refer to Gyllix’s and Flensmarck’s conclusions on the 
snaphaner.  
330 The Danes claimed that the Swedes had forsaken their right to the Scanian provinces by breaking 
important paragraphs of the Roskilde Treaty. The Swdes were convinced that they still had a 
conqueror’s right to the lands they had been ceded in 1658 and 1660 and that King Christian was the 
invader. I am not trying to decide once and for all who was right there. I am only trying to present the
Danish case as King Christian was justifying it to he people in his propaganda. In this thesis as a 
whole I have tried to study the underpinnings of the motivations of the snaphaner and the Danish 
authorities provided them with justifications in decr es like the one I refer to here. The official Danish 
discourse did not at all consider the Danish presence i  Scania as an invasion but as a liberation 
operation that had freed them from the Babylonian yoke.   
331 That this was the official Danish view can be discerned from the pamphlets that were sent out to the 
Scanians at about this time. See: Weibull, Samlingar till Skånes historia, VI , p.19. 
332 Cf. Tue Tuesen who claimed that the Swedes who condem ed him to decapitation were indeed a 
“foreign land” to him. Cf. Also the Psalter book  137:1: “By the rivers of Babylon, when we sat down 
and when we cried...when we remembered Sion...how can we sing the Lord’s song in a foreign land?”. 
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freed the Scanians from every obligation to their nw masters. Scania was 
immediately re-organised in accordance with the new, absolutist-invented 
administration system that divided the kingdom of Denmark into “amt” units.333The 
Scanians did not have to swear new loyalty oaths and just like all other Danes they 
were urged to enrol in the Danish army. Those who chose not to do so were 
encouraged to rise against the Swedes anyway.334 In this manner the Scanians were 
provided both with an official excuse for rebellion a d with hope of victory. During 
the whole war the Danish cause depended largely on popular support and active 
participation in combat by non-regular troops and the people who provided the 
support and armed assistance to the Danish state were in their turn provided with a 
justification for their actions by the Danish state. And with hope, of course. 
Hazardous actions like participation in resistance movements or guerrilla war, or 
perhaps any war at all, would hardly be undertaken if it was not for the hope of a 
better future.  
 
Right from the beginning of the war we see snaphaner, peasants and regular troops 
acting together: on 25th July 1676 a united force of Danish cavalry, snaphaner and 
peasants ambushed King Charles’s XI luggage train and the Swedish Crown treasure 
at the village of Loshult.335 In fact, some Swedish peasants also dragged part of the 
booty across the border. As soon as news of the “coup” reached King Christian a 
cavalry troop of 100 were sent to help the Gønger at Loshult.336 But at the very same 
time the Danish authorities were getting wary of the unruly freelancers. On 27th July 
the king annulled the licences that he had already issued to various snaphane-captains. 
All those who wanted to serve King Christian should join the regular army instead, 
preferably Colonel Sten Brahe’s regiment of Scanian dragoons. Unauthorised looting 
and destruction of Swedish property in Scania was to be severely punished. Sörensson 
stressed that this decree is only to be found as a v gue outline in the Danish archives: 
                                               
333 Sörensson pp.14-15. 
334 Every man who went into Danish service was promised 5 rigsdaler and all others who supported the 
Danish cause would be rewarded for their service. Those who did not support the Danish cause would 
be severely punished. See: Åberg 1958, p.84. 
335 Åberg, p.90. Johnsson, pp.52-54. Two days after the Danish king prohibited all kinds of private 
guerilla warfare and asked that those who supported him should report to the regular army. 
336 In 2002 a Scanian farmer revealed that he had one part of the Loshult treasure in his barn where his 
family had always kept it hidden. The rest of the treasure has not been found, though people in the area 
claim they know where it is. 
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therefore we cannot be sure whether it was ever issued.337 The point here is, however, 
that the snaphaner were generally not accused of attacking Danish/Scanian property 
too, which they would have been if they had been thugs. Nevertheless the peasants 
were still encouraged to rise against the Swedes and so they did.338 This indicates that 
there was (in the minds of the Danish commanders at leas ) a difference between 
snaphaner/friskytter and peasants in arms, at this point of the war. Meanwhile, the 
authorities were hoping that the whole of the province of Blekinge (Bleging)would be 
reconquered in the same manner as the Swedish Crown t easury had been obtained: 
that is, through the rebellion of the peasants withthe help of limited regular troops.339     
In response to the pleas for assistance from the inhabitants of the border area on 
September 3rd 1676 King Christian ordered that Colonel Sten Brahe nd Hans Ditlev 
Steensen should set out with their (regular) regiments to help the people of Blekinge 
(Bleging) and Göinge (Gønge).340 Their main task would be to help the locals fight 
back the assaults of the neighbouring Swedish peasants and to protect the King’s 
subjects in general.  These peasant troops were also encouraged to cause the enemy 
rear as much damage as possible, just as Mikkel Gynge with his snaphaner had been 
ordered to do more than a hundred years earlier.341 Colonel Stensen was ordered to 
the Gønge area with his men in order to meet the Swdish onslaught there and to 
organise border guard troops and an efficient resistance strategy. This kind of peasant 
troops that were organised by Colonel Stensen were und r the command either of the 
sheriff (ridefoged) or an official Danish officer.342 According to Jensen the “small 
corps” that that Brahe was sent out to create were call d Snaphaner and they were 
supposed to operate in the enemy rear and cut off all kinds of communications and 
provisioning: “Naturally the importance of the snaph ner increased the further the 
Swedish army penetrated into Scania for in doing that its communication lines 
lengthened.” 343  In that sense, Jensen and the snaphane and future minister of the 
church Jacob Visseltoft agreed that ““Where there is no Durchmarch there are no 
                                               
337 Sörensson p.10. The document he refers to is: Krigskollegiets udgaaede Sager (U.S.), Outgoing 
mail,  1676-77, no 1209, DRA.  
338 Sthen Jacobsen  claimed that the snaphaner would just as well go for a Dane as a Swede. 
339 U.S., 29th July 1676, No: 1212, DRA. Quoted by Sörensson, p.10.  
340 Jensen, p. 172  and Sörensson, p. 13. Referring to orders to Colonels Sten Brahe and Hans Dietrich 
Stensen, 3rd September 1676, U.S, No 1396, 1397, DRA.   
341  Fabricius III, pp. 35-36 and p. 61.   
342 Sörensson, p.15. Presumably, Pieter Stensen alias Peter Sten alias Per Stensson was one of them. 
See also the section on Pieter Stensen in this thesis.  
343 Jensen, p.172.  
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snaphaner”.344 Jensen further claims that snaphaner of that kind co-operated with the 
“parties” that were sent out from the Danish main army, often enough on the orders of 
General Major Meerheim and Colonel (oberstlöjtnant)) Schwanewedel. As is clear 
from Sthen Jacobsen’s accounts, Herman Franz Schwanewedel often enough 
commanded these operations in person.345 The line between this kind of troops and 
“snaphaner” was thin or non-existent.  
 
Many of the characteristics described here as typical tasks for the snaphaner, friskytter 
or peasant troops would have suited perfectly in Russian partisan commander General 
Denis Davidoff’s  Essay on Partisan Warfare from the 19th century, in which he 
concluded that partisan forces should always operate in support of regular forces and 
not as a force on its own. Tasks that Davidoff considered suitable for partisans to deal 
with included the following active missions: “attacking the enemy where he least 
expected it, burning magazines, hospitals and other establishments in the enemy rear, 
and destroying units moving to join their parent army”. Passive missions included 
“alerting forces about the approach of enemy reinforcements, locating enemy supply 
depots and regrouping areas, and employing obstacle to slow the enemy’s retreat”346 
Generally irregulars travelled lighter than regular soldiers. 
 
By August 1676 the fortress of Karlshamn (then Carlshamn) was the only place in 
Blekinge that was still in the hands of the Swedes: then it was besieged by a troop of 
approximately 200 peasants under the command of the sheriff (ridefoged) of the 
hundreds of Lister and Bregne Johan Johansen Hollænder. But the Danish king was 
preparing Admiral Tromp for a conquest from the sea of Kristianopel (Christianopel) 
and Karlshamn and on 30th August he sent over drawings of both strongholds to the 
admiral.347 The Danish troops348 kept the Karlshamn fortress under siege on the 
landside until the beginning of October when the Danish fleet under Admiral Rodsten 
managed to ship over some regular troops that quickly conquered the fortress with the 
                                               
344 See p. 314 of this thesis. 
345 Jacobsen, p. 68 and p.79 etc. 
346 Grenkevich, p.2. 
347 See: Jensen, p.152.  
348 Sörensson ( p.12) claimed they were peasant troops under Sheriff Hollænder, Jensen (p.153) that 
that the Danish troops that blockaded the landside wer  Colonel Brahe’s troops. However, one does not 
exclude the other. 
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help of the landside troops.349After that the fortress was manned with 100 regular foot 
soldiers and 100 peasants from Blekinge.350 Sheriff Hollænder also organised border 
guards along the Blekinge (Bleging) border to Sweden. These guards were supposed 
to prevent the reading out of Swedish decrees. They were also charged with the task 
of collecting taxes for the Danish crown. Exactly the same tasks as the often enough 
sheriff-led friskytter would later be charged with.  Co-operation between non-regular 
and regular forces was the rule during the Scanian W r, as it had been for generations.  
Sheriff Hollænder had a colleague in the neighbouring hundred of Østre (the eastern 
hundred) who was called Michel Mørch. Mørch reported to Copenhagen that he had 
mustered all the men in the hundred and that he had divided them all into a 
detachment and a captain for every parish. Unfortunately there was a dearth of guns. 
All in all he had managed to muster four companies of peasant troops and a company 
of dragoons that he would bring to the regular army. Some of the dragoons were 
Danes that had served in the Swedish army and some were “snaphaner” whom he had 
persuaded to go regular. Mørch was aiming at a total incorporation of the snaphaner 
into the regular troops or perhaps a merger with the peasant troops. The second option 
was obviously less attractive since the snaphaner considered themselves dragoons and 
not foot soldiers. Mørch was against the snaphane-system because it ruined the 
peasants. From Mørch’s reports to the War Ministry in Copenhagen we can actually 
deduce that there was a debate going on at the time, as to whether the widespread 
employment of irregular troops was more efficient than reliance on troops that were 
tighter knit to the central authorities. Mørch felt that the snaphaner (whom he defined 
as “cavalry that fought almost independently from the army”) were dangerous and 
that just like Hollænder claimed, the peasant troops were hard to keep at rein too, 
because they were too eager to shoot or kill any male of the Swedish nation with their 
long knives and that they all wanted “all Swedes out of the country.”351 To Mørch 
they all needed to be closer tied to the authorities. He also pleaded to Copenhagen that 
                                               
349 See: Jensen, p.153. 
350 Lützow to Arensdorff, 17th October 1676, I.S., no: 593, DRA, this letter is mentioned by Sörensson, 
p.12. Fabricius has also based part of  his account of the events in eastern Blekinge during October-
November 1677 on both Colonel Aegidius Lützow’s andhis brother Lieutenant Colonel 
(oberstløjtnant) B. Valentin’s  reports to the authorities that are to be found in the War College 
collections in Copenhagen, although Fabricius does not mention this particular one. Aegidius was 
commander of Kristianstad (Christianstad) and Valentin of Kristianopel (Christianopel). 
351 Fabricius, p.39.) 
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he might receive assistance in the form of more regular troops.352 Men like Mørch and 
Hollænder perceived of the snaphaner as a potential threat and an asset at the same 
time. The Scanian peasants had wreaked havoc in Denmark before (cf. Søren Norby’s 
war) but they had also gained themselves the reputation of being among the most 
valorous warriors of the kingdom.353 Towards the end of September the sheriffs 
(ridefogder) along the entire border, from southern Halland to eastern Blekinge were 
ordered to intensify the work of the border guards and to see to it that every single 
man in the land was prepared to fight the Swedes in case of an attack from the 
north.354 And the attack came: on 19th October King Charles XI of Sweden mustered 
his troops at Ljungby in the very south of “old” Sweden. Four days later the Swedish 
army crossed the old border to Scania, as the scouts were quick enough to report to 
the Danish headquarters.355 At the same time the Swedish king sent out two “peasant-
armies”. One to Kristianopel (Christianopel) under the command of the Scanian count 
Ebbe Ulfeld356 and the other to Gønge under the command of the Swedish nobleman 
Pontus De la Gardie.357 The return of the Swedes meant that the Scanians were 
expected to obey two overlords. Naturally they were supposed to choose between the 
two and each side punished treason with death. The Danish army gathered at Östra 
Lung (Østre Lyngby) in order to prevent the Swedes from reaching Malmö (Malmøe) 
which was believed to be their main aim.  
 
The Continuation of the War 
At this point, the events take different turns depending on the historical traditions and 
interpretations. According to the Swedish sources, on 6th November 1676 count 
Pontus De La Gardie’s troops were attacked by “snaphaner” at the Gallrya bridge near 
                                               
352 Michel Mørch to the Army Board (General Commissariat), Christianopel, 30th August and 3rd 
October 1676, I.B, Blekinge, DRA. See: Sörensen, p.12 and Fabricius III, p.38ff. My account of the  
sheriffs Johan Johansen Hollender’s and Michel Mørch’s organised resistance is based on the accounts 
of Fabricius and Sörensen.  I think the letters that Fabricius and Sörensen refer to are the same, since
dates, names and place names in their foot-notes corresp nd, although they used different collocation 
systems.  
353 The Danish king always had Gønger among the Royal Lifeguard. 
354 Order to the sheriffs (ridefogder), 30th September 1676, U.S., No: 1539, DRA. See: Sörensson, 
p.13.The order also stresses that all peasants were divid d into troops with an officer for each company. 
355 See: Jacobsen, pp.60-61 and Jensen, pp.162-163. The connection between “fogder” and 
snaphaner/friskytter is thoroughly explored in the section on Captain Bendix. 
356 Ulfeld had gathered 2-3000 peasant troops. See: Jensen (p.153) who describes how, on the orders of 
the king, Ulfeld and his peasants tried to storm the stronghold at Christianopel and when they failed to 
do so they blockaded the landside so that the Danes could only get in by sea.  
357 Jensen, p.163, but also Jacobsen, p.61, though he claimed that “Count Pontus” was sent down to 
Blekinge (here: Bleging). 
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Mörrum. On 8th November 1676 Ebbe Uhlfeld met the snaphaner who had been 
waiting for him at modern-day Olsäng and by the bridge of Aspenåsa, but he and his 
men managed to beat them back. The Danish response (according to the Swedish 
sources) was to try to assist the snaphaner. B.V. Lützow, the commander of the 
battalion at Kristianopel (Christianopel), sent outwhat the Swedish sources report as 
“snaphane” troops to assist the others. The leaders on the 8th November were “John 
Månsson, a major from Olsängen” and also a peasant called Per and a man called “tall 
Håkan”.358 The Danish historian Jensen describes this episode n ifferent terms: 
according to his sources in the Danish National Archives, the encounter between 
Ulfeld and the snaphaner on 8th November 1676 was a strategic move from the 
Danish side and not a haphazard ambush.359 On 25th September Admiral Rodsten had 
shipped Valentin von Lützow’s batallion into Christianopel that had been abandoned 
and in part destroyed by Swedish troops. The Swedish re ponse was to send out 
Count Ulfeld with his peasant troops to try to take th  fortress by storm, but by the 
time Ulfeld got there, the fortress and the battlements had been sufficiently repaired to 
withstand attack and Ulfeld would have had to lay siege to it, which did not have 
enough funding for.360 Instead he and his troops blockaded the landside so that from 
1st November 1676 Kristianopel (Christianopel) could only be reached by sea. 
According to Jensen, a “snaphane troop” under Major Jens Monsen, Pehr the Peasant 
and Tall Hakon were sent in succour of Lützow and it came to a battle on 8th 
November 1676 but the Ulfeld managed to hold the snaphaner back.   
Although this is an excellent example of how Swedish and Danish sources may vary 
in their description and/or interpretation of events, it also remains another obvious 
example of how the snaphaner were assisted or even under the command of the 
regular military authorities. In that sense Swedish and Danish sources agree. It also 
gives us further clues as to what sort of targets the snaphaner were set on (by the 
Danish regular commanders) or chose to attack: Ulfeld, De La Gardie, possibly a 
succour mission. Last but not least, these “encounters” give us yet another chance to 
study in what military contexts Swedish warlords like De La Gardie and Ebbe Ulfeld 
worked.   
                                               
358 Information based on Professor Winslow’s diaries from the war, UB, but also Skånska samlingar 
1874, pp.80-81. See also: Johnsson, pp.60-61. The names re Swedicised. See also Fabricius III, pp.65-
67 for Ulfeld’s and De La Gardie’s movements and encounters with the snaphaner and the peasant 
troops in this area during the first days of Septemb r 1676. 
359 Jensen, p.153. 
360 Jensen, p.153. 
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The provincial capital of Malmö (Malmøe) was under siege during large part of the 
war. The people in the surrounding areas were encouraged to take part in the 
“landstorm” that was organised in order to support Colonel Holch’s army that was 
blockading the walled in city.361 There is no way of knowing how many locals 
actually participated in the “landstorm” on this occasion, but to the Swedes they 
would have been snaphaner. A notary called Axel Wilumsen who had been in 
command of the local troops on this occasion later reported to the authorities in 
Copenhagen that he had had 4000 peasants under him.362  
 
Up until the Danish conquest of Kristianstad (Christianstad) on 12th or 15th August 
1676363 the Danish “reconquest” was as successful as anybody c uld have hoped for. 
Sthen Jacobsen concluded that “”Until now the king of Denmark’s weapons had been 
fortunate, in that His Majesty had, including these three fortresses, won three quarters 
of Scania.”364 The land was gradually emptied of regular troops. The king and the 
main part of the army went towards Kristianstad (Christianstad). According to Jensen 
they were hoping to meet the Swedes there for a conclusive battle, but by the time the 
Danes got there the Swedes had withdrawn across the bord r to Sweden.365  While the 
Danish king still thought he was on the hunt for the Swedish main army, he decided to 
send General major Duncan out with his troops in the direction of Halmstad 
(Halmsted in these sources) in Halland. The aim of this mission was for him to try and 
establish a connection between the Scanian provinces and Norway from where 
                                               
361 For the origins of the “landstorm” see p.109.  According to Jacobsen, (p.45) Holch and his 600 
cavalry were stationed outside the city walls in order to see to it that nobody got out from there. Jensen 
(p. 133) claimed that Count Christian Christoffer Holch was sent there on 5th August in order to 
“observe the fortress”.  On 1st October (Jensen, p.150) Holch and his regiment were replaced by 
General Hans Wilhelm Meerheim and the “livregiment” and Colonel Gotfried Rauch with his cavalry 
regiment. 
362 Sörensen, p. 11. His source is: Willumsen, Incoming Letters (IB) which is probably the same source 
as Fabricius (III, p. 41 foot-note 18) mentions: Aksel Willumsen to the king, 28th December 1679, War 
College (Krigskoll. i S.), DRA. Willumsen is the only authority we have for the number 4000, and he 
might have exaggerated, which Fabricius points out. 
363 Sthen Jacobsen (p.49) claims that it started in the early hours of Tuesday 12th. Jensen (p.134) claims 
the it was the night between 14th and 15th.  
364 Jacobsen, p.49. He also quoted Livy, book 21: ”adeo varia belli fortuna ancepsque Mars fuit, ut 
propius periculo fuerint, qvi vicêre.” 
365 Jensen, p.133. 
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Gyldenløve was attacking the Swedes.366 The first step would be to lay siege to the 
fortress at Halmstad (Halmsted) that was still in Swedish hands. Duncan had not got 
any further than to start digging trenches around the fortress when he was brought 
news that enemy troops were approaching.367 Quite unexpectedly (to the Danes) the 
main body of the Swedish army, under King Charles, were attacking Duncan.368 
Duncan immediately set his troops on the retreat and se t to the king for help, but on 
17th August at dawn he had to face the Swedes in battle at he Fylle bridge. At first, 
Duncan thought it was only Rutger von Ascheberg’s 300 advance troops that were 
arriving, but soon enough the main body of the Swedish army was on the spot. 
Eventually Duncan chose to surrender. King Christian who only had just conquered 
the town of Kristianstad (Christianstad) in north-eastern Scania left Colonel Aegidius 
Lützow in charge and set out for Halland himself. Eventually the whole of Scania was 
left with very few regular troops and the snaphaner and the peasant forces became 
ever more important.369 On 4th December 1676 the Swedes triumphed at Lund in the 
bloodiest battle ever in Scandinavia.370 It was also the most important battle of the 
Scanian War. It has often been argued that it was more of a psychological than an 
actual victory: the Swedes suddenly realised that they stood a good chance and the 
Danes that the return to Danish rule might not be permanent. The Danish army was 
evacuated to Zealand and only the towns of Landskrona (Landscrone) and 
                                               
366 Jensen, pp.132-133 where he quotes a letter from the Danish king to Gyldenløve of  4th August 
1676,  in which the king reported: “We are breaking camp in order to seek out the Enemy, so that for 
the time being You will not have anything to fear.” See also: Sörensson, p.11. 
367 Presumably this piece of news was brought to him by the later so famous friskytte Eskeld Nielsen. 
See: Fabricius III, p.100. 
368 Although the Swedish king’s main aim was to join hs troops on the Norwegian front. At the time 
the Swedish army that was with the king counted 5300 men. Duncan’s troops counted approximately 
3000 men. These numbers are Jensen’s (p.136 and p.139.) Jacobsen (pp.49-50) claimed that Duncan 
had 3000 men that the Swedes counted Ascheberg’s six squadrons plus then king’s 10 000 men. He 
also commented that the Danes fought desperately but in a desperate situation even the most brave and 
strong have to surrender in the end. The sources agr e that only 500-600 Danes managed to return to 
the main army. Between 1000 and 1500 died and the rest became POWs. The Swedes reported their 
numbers of dead to twenty, but that number is doubtful too. 
369 Sörensson, p,11. 
370 6000 Danes and 3000 Swedes remained on the battlefield. See: Karl-Erik Frandsen, “Da 
Østdanmark blev til Sydsverige 1645-1720. En oversigt over den politiske baggrund og historikernes 
vurdering af den.” (When Eastern Denmark became Southern Sweden 1645-1710. An Overview of the 
Political Background and the Historians’ Evaluation of it.), pp. 11-21, in Da Østdanmark blev 
Sydsverige. Otte studier i dansk-svenske relationer i 1600-tallet (When Eastern Denmark became 
Southern Sweden. Eight Studies in Danish-Swedish Relations in the 17th Century), Skippershoved 
2003, p.18. See also: Jacobsen, pp. 71-76; Jensen, pp. 178-218; Claes Wahlöö & Göran Larsson, 
Sextonhundrasjuttiosex, Minnet av historien. Historien av minnet. (1676 The Memory of the Historical 
Events The History of Memory of Them), Lund 1996. For casualty number see: pp. 153-155. Wahlöö 
and Larsson emphasise that at least 46% of the Danish combatants died. Their volume includes 
Dahlberg’s excellent drawings from the vast battlefie d e.g. pp.140-141.  
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Kristianstad (Christianstad) were still officially under Danish rule. Malmö (Malmøe) 
remained in the hands of the Swedes. The rest of the land was no man’s land.  
Conclusions:  
When the Danes returned to Scania in 1676 they provided the locals not only with a 
legitimation but with an excuse for rebellion against their Swedish overlords. Oaths 
were taken seriously at the time and it cannot be tak n for granted at all that the 
Danish ethnicity of the Scanians should have counted more than fealty to their sworn 
lord and master the king of Sweden. But King Christian V of Denmark now declared 
that whatever the Scanians had once owed the Swedes was no more valid: the Swedes 
had broken the paragraphs of the peace treaty of 1660 themselves and consequently 
the Scanians were free from obligations towards them. This discourse was offered to 
the Scanians as a motivational force and it was readily bsorbed by many of them. It 
can only be assumed that those who had already been thinking that maybe the coming 
of the Swedes was the cause of the misery of their liv s jumped eagerly at the chance 
to expel the Swedes from the country or to cut all those of the Swedish nation up with 
their long knives.371 The Danish official discourse offered them to do so within the 
limits of the law.  
 
The line between peasant troops and snaphaner was thin and drifting already at this 
point. To the Swedes, armed Danish peasants were snapha er, but then so were they 
to the Danes too if they did not make part of the border guards or other troops that had 
been trained by emissaries of the state. And if peasant soldiers undertook actions that 
were not strictly part of their duty as outlined by the state, well then they were 
snaphaner anyway, and very often it was impossible to draw the line. Various forms 
of popular “landstorms” and border guards, led by emissaries of the state were 
difficult to separate from troops consisting of peasants in arms. Officers working 
under Brahe and Steensen were not classified as snapha er by the Danes. Two of the 
most frequently mentioned men in the documents from the war; Nicolaus Hermansen 
and Pieter Stensen were among these officers. They were both classified as snaphaner 
in the Swedish sources. An alternative to using regular officers as heads of peasant 
troops was that of putting sheriffs in charge and as we will see, Danish sheriffs, 
                                               
371 In this context it is of little importance whether the Swedish take-over really had caused a lot of 
misery or not, what matters here is that some people blamed them for the bad times and other things. 
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estate-managers, foresters and gamekeepers would continue to play a prominent role 
among the snaphaner/friskytter.  
  
A War of Inclinations 
Introduction 
In this section I have tried to analyse the importance that perceived or real support 
from the people played for the authorities: almost all reports from the 
snaphaner/friskytter included a report on what people thought, on whose side they 
were and exactly how ardent those sympathies were. It was well-known then, as it is 
today, that insurgencies were battles for “the hearts nd minds of the people who were 
providing the sea of support in which the insurgents swam.”372 The words I just 
quoted come from an account of the situation in Fallujah, Iraq 2003 and served to 
illustrate how the Americans tried to apply the classic doctrine of how to fight 
insurgents there. The authorities were just as aware of this principle in Scandinavia in 
the 1670’ies, and both sides strove hard for the affections of the people. 
 
After the Battle of Lund 
In several decrees from the period immediately following the battle of Lund King 
Charles of Sweden announced that the entire Scanian population were abandoning 
their homes to join the Danes.373 A decree from 14th December 1676 declared that 
“all the inhabitants of the provinces of Scania andBlekinge have broken faith, even 
some of the clergy”. They were all responsible for the havoc that the snaphaner had 
wreaked and for that reason they all deserved theirjust punishment: wherever a 
snaphane was found all the peasants of his parish would be considered traitors. Not 
only would they all have to pay a fine of 1000 riksdaler each, but every tenth of them 
would be hung.374 On 19th January 1677, the Swedish governor general in Malmö 
(Malmøe) Fabian von Fersen communicated to the king that the situation in Scania 
                                               
372 Bing West, No True Glory, A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah, Bantam Dell, New York 
2005, p. 1. 
373 Decree from the Swedish king, Markaryd (here: Marche öd)  24th October 1676, printed in 
Jacobsen, p.65 (“...the commoners...in stead of coming to us, their lawful master by oath, with utter 
humility and obeisance, and offer help in our operations for their own protection and help...on the 
contrary run away from their houses and homes and actually keep to the enemy, and do him all sorts of 
services...”). According to Jacobsen the Swedish king felt that all the inhabitants of Scania and 
Blekinge had betrayed their lawful king. 
374 Decree from the Swedish king (Vä) 14th January 1676, Riksregistraturet 1677, SRA. Quoted by 
Johnsson, p.77. This decree was supposed to integrate a decree from 14th December 1676. 
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was extremely worrying.375 The inhabitants of the province were unreliable and they 
all supported the Danes. Fersen could feel how their evil and loathing grew day by 
day. According to Fersen the clergy were no different from the rest of the inhabitants: 
they were “up to their necks in evil, agitated and excited” and this whole pernicious 
situation constituted a safety risk to the Swedes.376 On 21st January 1677 it was 
decreed that:  
“...all peasants that dwell in that parish will not be regarded kindly, and not only will they be fined 
1000 Rix Daler for each man they attack, but by the decision of the dice every third of them will be 
condemned to lose his life, these orders should be obeyed by all those that they regard. 
Carolus 
Ebbe Ulfeldh vidi377 
 
On 27th January 1677 Governor General von Fersen declared that the whole of 
Blekinge was unsafe due to the activities of the snaphaner that gathered mainly in the 
forests. Fersen reported that District Governor Lilliecron had written that many people 
were forced to side with the snaphaner else they would be attacked by them. The way 
Fersen saw it the snaphaner were inciting the commoners to revolt and the only way 
to reinstate calm and awe of the Swedish authorities would be to “cleanse” the land.378 
 
In the same manner the Swedish nobleman Pontus De la Gardie declared that not a 
single faithful man was left in northern Scania and Blekinge, neither among the clergy 
nor among the peasants.379  Some Swedes suspected that all he Danes that had 
become Swedish subjects in 1658 had rebelled against them as soon as they felt 
assured of the back up of the Danish army. Because the Swedes were convinced that 
the “allmoge”, the commoners that constituted the vast majority of the population, 
were against them they decided to clamp down heavily on them. The Danish regular 
army had been vanquished (at least temporarily) but the peasant soldiers, the border 
guards and the landstorm, the local dragoons and the freelancers that some called 
                                               
375 Fersen to the king, 19th January 1677, Generalguvernörsarkivet, SRA. Most of Fersen’s letters were 
in German (his mother tongue) and in his own writing. Fersen was born in the Baltic provinces and 
hardly ever used the Swedish language. He always spoke German to the Scanian nobles for example. 
This letter takes the form of an official report and is written in Swedish with another person’s 
handwriting.    
376 ”i ondskan nedsänkte, exciteradhe och opwäckte...” och detta prästernas ”enorme och skadelige 
förhållande” utgjorde en säkerhetsrisk för svenskarna. 
377 Opsnappede breve, DRA. ”Ebbe” is Ebbe Uhlfeld.  
378 Fersen to the king, 27 January 1677, SRA, quoted by Johnsson, pp.80-82. Cf. Scanian peasants who 
told county sheriff Hollænder who complained of their cruelty that the only way out was to cleanse the 
land from Swedes. See: Fabricius III, pp. 138-139. 
379 Martin Weibull, 1871, p.62. 
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snaphaner, were still there. At some point after th victory at Lund the Swedes opted 
for a harsher policy against the Scanians. The comparatively peaceful and humane 
way in which they had treated the Danish population until then had obviously not paid 
off. It had left those Scanians who were inclined to rebellion time, space and liberty to 
conspire against their overlords and to let their hat ed flourish. During the year 1676 
the Swedish king had issued several decrees that declared parole to those snaphaner 
who surrendered their arms to the Swedes but the atemp s had been of very limited 
efficiency. Now it was time to change policy.  
 
At the same time as the Swedes were beginning to despair about ever being able to 
convert the Scanians to loyalty and good behaviour, the Danes were not quite as 
convinced that the Scanians would stay true to Denmark at any cost. The defeat at 
Lund had made many of them lose faith. The Danish aut orities responded by trying 
to provide the locals with some encouragement: on 5th December 1676 General Major 
Meerheim was sent to Kristianstad (Christianstad) with a cavalry force of 1000.380 
Meerheim and the “lifeguard” regiment had replaced Holch’s troops outside the city 
walls of Malmö (Malmøe) at the beginning of October. During the battle of Lund he 
served under Friedrich von Arensdorff on the right flank.381 Now Meerheim would 
become commander of the garrison at Kristianstad (Christianstad). He was instructed 
to make great efforts to make the peasants keep faith, especially in Gønge and 
Blekinge because it was so important for the Danish cause that the Gønger  should 
help Meerheim’s men interrupt the Swedish communication lines between Scania and 
Sweden.382 Meerheim also brought a letter to the Gønger that encouraged them to take 
service in the regular army. In it the king swore that he would come over and save his 
faithful subjects from the foreign yoke the following year.383 In a decree that was 
issued a few days later the Danish king urged his faithful subjects in northern Scania 
and Blekinge to arrest all Swedish civil servants and ll those who sympathised with 
                                               
380 Two cavalry regiments and one of dragoons. See: Jensen, p.211. Jacobsen, (p.76) saw this 
principally as a move that prevented an expected Swedish attack on Christianstad. Besides, Jacobsen 
claimed that Meerheim set out on 7th December. Elowsson interpreted this measure in a dfferent way:  
“A change in sympathies that at least occasionally made itself noted even among the snaphaner, an 
unease that caused the Danish commanders to send colo el Meerheim with a cavalry force of 1000 as 
reinforcements to Christianstad.”  
381 Jensen, pp.176-177 and p.180.  
382 Sörensson, p.18. He refers to the Instructions to Meerheim, Copenhagen, 9 December 1676, U.S. 
No:1646. Interrupting communication lines was a task  characteristic of irregular troops as can be. 
See: Kunisch, p.19; Grenkevich, p.5 and p, 14. 
383 Copenhagen, 9 December 1676, U.S. No:1648. Quoted by Sörensson, p. 18. 
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the Swedes.384 But nevertheless, the news from the northeast was not encouraging. 
Meerheim did not stay put in Kristianstad (Christianstad). Just like during most of the 
war he spent much time and effort on the “little” war that he was so expert at. 
Meerheim excelled at partisan warfare or “party” warfare as it was called at the time, 
and had long experience of this from the Thirty-Years’-War when he served in the 
Imperial Army.385 But then, it should be noted that detachment warfare only differs 
from partisan warfare in a quantitative sense, not in a qualitative one.386 Meerheim 
and his men went out on brief missions, often but not always, in limited groups and 
they constituted as much of a nuisance to the enemy as they ever could. On 20th 
November that year Meerheim’s and Colonel Reventlow’s men burnt down Skarhult 
manor and three villages, where supposedly the Swedes stored their ammunition.387 
The same sort of tasks were executed by Colonel Schwanewedel’s troops. On 12th 
November they had effectively stopped a grain convoy that the burghers of Malmö 
(Malmøe) tried to get inside the city walls.388 According to Jacobsen, the previous 
commander of the troops outside the walls, Holch, had been transferred because he 
was too weak and took pity on the people inside the besieged town so that he let them 
come out and look for food, but among them was at le st one spy who brought letters 
for the Swedish king.389 Consequently, Meerheim and Schwanewedel took over the 
task of keeping the inhabitants of Malmö (Malmø) blockaded and furthermore, 
dedicated themselves actively to detachment warfare, and when Meerheim was 
stationed at Kristianstad (Christianstad) he continued the same sort of operations as 
long as he was not totally blockaded by the Swedes, just as Schwanewedel did at 
Landskrona (Landscrone) where he even brought in Croats390. It was practically 
impossible to distinguish Meerheim’s and Schwanewedel’s troops from “snaphaner”.  
                                               
384 Sörensson, p.18. Copenhagen 16 December 1676, US No:1690, DRA. The Danish authorities often 
threatened those who sided with the Swedes but not with the flames of hell like the Swedes in the case 
of Scanians that sided with the Danes. The Danes were more lenient both in their threats and in the 
execution of them, but they obviously also felt that they could be fairly assured of the sympathy of the 
Scanians whereas the Swedes felt more insecure about it. Cf. The decree of the Swedish king of 19th 
December 1676, quoted by Jacobsen on pp.79-80. 
385 Jacobsen, p.278. (Notes added by Weibull, I suppose, but it is not stated in the text.) 
386 Kunisch (p.19) quotes Carl von Decker’s Der Kleine Krieg, Berlin 1844. This manual made clear 
that sometimes the traditional petite guerre took the shape of detachment warfare instead. 
387 Jensen, p.172.  
388 Jensen, p.172.  
389 Jacobsen, pp.45-46. 
390 Sörensson, pp.38-39. For the Croats, see Jensen, p. 335 and p.422. The Croat “Parteygänger” that 
participated in the Scanian War were recruited by the Danish ambassador (afsending) to Vienna, 




On the Danish side, the authorities took care to colle t as much information as 
possible about the “affections” of the people, both through interviews with all those 
who wanted to enter the cities and the Danish army camps and through reports from 
friskytter and spies. Those people whom the friskytter brought to the Danish camp or 
to the Danish enclaves always had to report how they perceived the feelings of the 
people ran and information about this was normally included in the friskytter’s own 
reports too.391  Another report that betrayed that some people simply tried to place 
their markers on the winning party was the one that tells of Frans Rasmussen, first 
estate manager and then sheriff, native of Flensburg in southern Jutland but long since 
resident in Scania. Rasmussen’s career would have rende ed him a perfect applicant 
for a position in the friskytte corps, but he chose a different path in life. First of all he 
had served the Ulfeld family for twelve years and the Ulfeld’s were Danes who had 
gone into Swedish service at an early stage. Then he had got himself mixed up in the 
Captain Bendix affair that will be described at a later stage of this thesis: Rasmussen 
was arrested by the Danes on the charge of having informed against Bendix Clawssen, 
the local sheriff, in exchange for his job. When faced with these charges, Rasmussen 
replied that he was innocent of any criminal offenc but that he had applied for 
Clawssen’s job because he had 12 children to feed and ”the Swedes had made the 
whole country believe that the Danes would never come back to Scania again.”392  It 
is quite possible that Rasmussen identified himself more strongly with the family he 
had been serving for twelve years (the Ulfelds) than with his being part of a Danish 
“nation” and that he felt that he owed loyalty to his patron Ebbe Ulfeld rather than to 
either one of the two kings that staked a claim on his loyalty. In any case, this was 
exactly the kind of information the authorities wanted the snaphaner/friskytter and 
                                               
391 Report from Landscrone, 5th January 1678, (among Harboe’s reports, DRA, one Danish, one 
German identical copy.) states that Knud Larsen the mill r of the parsonage mill at Fulletofte had 
reported that the king of Sweden and his closest men (Aschenberg, Uhlfelt and Gyldenstierne) had 
visited the nearby Magle manor in the company of 4000 cavalry. Larsen then reported: “die rede ging 
unter die bauren, alß mann Gen: Maj: Meerheim und noch ein ander Gen: so hir gekommen 
....weßwegen sie aufgebrochen den unsrigen entgegen zu kommen, so bald sie aber vernommen, daß 
sie in ihre meinung betrogen, haben sie sich reterieret.” In this kind of reports it was taken for granted 
by the Danish authorities, as represented by the scribes, that the commoners en masse sympathised with 
the Danes, although there were traitors and rascals th t preferred the other side. When Jens Harboe 
(letter to Herman Meijer, 2nd January 1678, Indkomne breve, DRA) spoke of a peasant who was 
arrested on the charge of espionage, he called him a “”lesster Schelm”, exactly the same title that the
Swedes bestowed on the friskytter and snaphaner. 
392 Depositiones, 15th June 1677: ”Hand siger at wære gifft og hawer 12 börn, derudower søgte hand 
bestilling att de kunde nære sig, der til med hafde de swenske indbildet det heele land att de danske 
aldrig komb i Scaane igien.” 
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others who did the same kind of job (soldiers and spies) to come up with. The 
authorities did take heed of reports like this and instructed their emissaries to try to 
boost people’s spirits and faith in the Danish cause. They knew that people’s loyalty 
could be swayed easily enough by persuasion and doubts as to the viability of their 
options. The Danish king and his emissaries tried to ingratiate themselves with the 
Gønger by telling them how good and faithful they were and soon they would be 
saved from the foreign yoke once and for all. But the Gønger would have to keep their 
faith and keep ambushing and harassing Swedes, or possibly they could join the 
(Danish) army, else they would never be saved. The Danish authorities were aware of 
the practical connection between “humeur” and combat efficiency. They were also 
prone to using biblical images like the foreign yoke because they assumed that people 
knew about the Babylonian yoke and the Egyptian thraldom and that it was obvious 
who was on the right side in the biblical battle between god guys and bad guys.   
 
Traditionally most Swedish historians have claimed that the Scanians lost their 
sympathies for the Danish cause after the battle of Lund when the Danish army 
retreated to Zealand and the snaphaner/friskytter became ever more powerful. First of 
all it should be stressed that the King’s Friskytter did not wield any power in their 
own right, as their name makes clear. They acted upon the orders of their superiors 
and their aim was that the King of Denmark should take over the land on a permanent 
basis. For that reason, it can hardly be said that the land was in the hands of the 
“snaphaner”: if it had been so, victory would have been Danish once and for all. That 
was not the case, though. There was detachment warfare and skirmishes going on all 
over the place, with groups of combatants that participated on one or the other side, 
but the “snaphaner” were no more in power than the Sw dish detachments that were 
sent out to fight them. The “snaphaner” did no more st ive after power in their own 
right than did the Swedish “snaphane-catchers”. Secondly, I believe it rather unlikely 
that the friskytter should have constituted enough of a problem to turn the Scanians 
against the Danes as early as 1676, and neither the Swedish nor the Danish sources 
indicate any change in the “inclination” or “humeur” of the people, although the 
Danes feared that it might change if things did not take a better turn. In fact, both 
Fabricius and more recently, Stig Alenäs have come to the conclusion that the 
Scanians continued their passive resistance long after 1679 when active resistance had 
ceased. Nevertheless, the whole concept of passive resistance has been questioned by 
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Stefan Persson in his dissertation on the situation in Gønge during the century before 
the Swedish conquest. Although Persson does not deny th  existence of passive 
resistance he claims that often enough it is not the matter of resistance at all but of 
pure and (relatively) simple passivity.393 Passivity, however, should not be mistaken 
for indifference. In fact, the line between passive resistance and passivity is very fine. 
The actual difference between one and the other is only the state of mind of the person 
who has the chance to offer resistance but does not. In most cases it is impossible to 
judge whether an action was omitted because the agent was embittered and wanted to 
cause trouble or because he/she did not care what happened anymore. In either case 
the specific state of mind (passivity or passive resistance) tends to be the result of 
overwhelming events that have exhausted the physical and mental resources of the 
agents. As Sörensson wisely suggested, it was probably the whole situation, a 
combination of many different factors, but especially the destruction of the land and 
towns (that was caused by regular and irregular troops from both sides) that made the 
Scanians lose their will to oppose themselves.394    
  
It seemed obvious already at this point that it wasa war about sympathies and 
inclinations in which all too much depended on the “ umeur” of the people. 
Preferably one would want the “inclination” of the p ople for one’s own side. The 
Swedes had worked hard to win it during the inter-wa  period, or at least to make 
themselves accepted by the people who after all, had a  regional identity that did not 
need to be interfered with from above only because the province had new overlords, it 
would have been absolutely normal not to in those days. Furthermore this regional 
identity provided the Swedes with the possibility to claim that the Scanians were not 
Danes, because they were Scanians and both geographically, culturally and from the 
Goths just like the Swedes but the Danes did not.395 At least that was what the Swedes 
                                               
393 Persson, p.20. 
394 Sörensson, p.55. 
395 See: Flores Antiquitatis Scaniae, M Jonaz Floraei, Göteborg (Johann Georg Lange) 1743, Cap.IV § 
4: “...it can inerrably be said that Scania, as rega ds name and location, as also blood and descent, since
olden age has under all these respects a strong and secure connection with the other Gothic (Göthiska) 
Countries.” Actually, the Danes sometimes also claimed that they descended from the Goths. In his 
Cronica  Guthilandorum (Den Guthilandiske Cronica, Kiøbinghhaffn MDCXXXIII; facsimile Visby 
1978, see: Introduction) Hans Nielsen Strelow claimed that the “Goths” on the island of Gotland 
(northeast of Sweden) could trace their origins to the peninsula of Jutland. Strelow wrote his Cronica in 
part to contest the view of those Swedes who refused to think of Danes as descendants of the glorious 
Goths. Both currents of thoughts consequently existd a  the same time and were often called upon to 
serve the scopes of those who needed backing for their arguments such as claims on Scania or indeed, 
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liked to think. Now it was far too obvious that gentl  persuasion had not worked, and 
to the Swedes it seemed more and more obvious that the inclination of the people 
would not change by itself.   
 
Swedish irritation with the Scanians transpires clearly from some sources that can be 
dated to this period. Governor General Fabian von Fersen was well aware of the 
connection between snaphaner and the general populati n. In January 1677 he wrote 
to the “Praepositus”, the rector of the hundreds of “N rre and Biähre” (Nørre and 
Bjerge) in order to complain that both “here and there” in the area, Swedish civil 
servants and military were being “attacked, abducted and often killed” by 
snaphaner.396  This would not have happened had all inhabitants of he area remained 
true to their loyalty oaths, and Fersen stressed that regarded both “commoners and 
others.” Now Fersen communicated that in those parishes and villages that any soldier 
or civilian was attacked, robbed or murdered, the country folk would be held 
responsible. There would be no more snaphane attacks if the country folk stopped 
providing for and supporting the snaphaner. The Prapositus was now asked to read 
out this decree from his pulpit and to tell the rest of the clergy in his area to do the 
same. They should tell their parishioners to capture all snaphaner and to bring them to 
Malmö (Malmøe). There were tax reductions to be had for those who managed to 
capture a snaphane. To Fersen the nexus snaphaner-peasants was clear at an early 
stage and he also realised that without local support the snaphaner would have to give 
in.  
 
The governor general was not the only one to feel that the snaphaner were becoming 
too much of a nuisance. Svend Erlandsson was also aware of the connection between 
countryside population and snaphaner. In a letter from mid-February 1677 he betrays 
an increasing annoyance with the peasants and snapha er that he gave vent to during 
                                                                                                                            
claims on the island of Gotland itself, or on the contrary, in order to denigrate the Danes and their 
origins. See: Joanna Vadenbring, “La legge e la sag dei Goti”, unpublished tesi di laurea, Università 
degli Studi di Roma ‘La Sapienza’, 1999. A wave of history books, dissertations and poems were 
published in order to re-write the history of Scania. One of these was Jonas P. Gielberg’s De Scania 
antiqua that was published under the auspices of the war “hero” Anders Stobaeus in “Londini 
Gothorum”, in 1706. The Swedes took care always to stress the connection between the Goths and 
Scania.       
396 Fabian von Fersen to the Praepositus of Norre and Biähre, 26th January 1677, Intercepted Letters, 
DRA. 
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his career as a snaphane catcher.397  At this time Erlandsson was at the Swedish army 
camp at Vä (Wæ) and had left his duties at the Herrevads kloster (Herrewadh Closter 
in this source) Priory estate in the hands of others. He had been estate manager there 
and it seems that he still occupied that position or at least had some responsibility for 
the estate, although by this time he had taken service as a commissary for the 
Swedes.398 Now he had ordered Knud Peders who worked for him on the estate, to 
send rye and malt over to the Swedish army camp and he also asked about some of his 
clothes but Peders had replied that the enemy had taken away everything, including 
Erlandsson’s clothes. Erlandsson’s reply was furious: “those rascals and traitors the 
Priory peasants” had done it because the enemy would never have found his clothes 
on their own. All since the “rupture” the peasants had treated their masters in such a 
manner that more than one of them would have to “jump over the sword’s edge” once 
it was time for payback. Erlandsson had seen with his very own eyes how much rye 
there was in the barn and now Peders was lying blatantly about it. Erlandsson frankly 
told him:  
“In summa the liar is as good as the thief...you be assured that all Rascals and Thiefs will be extirpa ed 
from this land, things will never be good, until the sour roots at the Priory estate (Clostergodset) will 
have been pulled out....The good Priory peasants and rascals insist they are neither snaphaner nor 
supporters of them, but they are lying in the second case, which can be proven by the 200 dragoons that 
were standing at Færingtoffte while 80 snaphaner ...were warned by those rascals at Færingtoffte, a 
Wasteland is better than a land full of Rascals and Traitors.”399  
 
In this letter Sven “The Thrasher” Erlandsson also claimed that county sheriff Mons 
Haksen was a snaphane, which (according to Erlandsso ) was proved by the fact that 
at the time of writing, Mons Haksen was in Kristianstad (then Christianstad). 
Conclusions: 
Throughout all this it remains evident that the ethnic or pre-national identity was of 
some weight at the time. It was of considerable military importance that people in 
Scania opted for a Danish identity, although that Dnish identity did not contain the 
same components as a 21st century Danish identity. But it remained important that 
                                               
397 Svend Erlandsson to Knud Peders at Ruggerödh, Wää ( æ) 13th February 1677. In the margin a 
note says that this letter was written by Inspector Svend Erlandhs at the Swedish army camp at Wæ and 
copied word by word, on the spot. This copy is now t  be found among the Intercepted Letters in the 
Danish National Archives. A few lines from this letter have been quoted by Fabricius III, p.73. 
398 Fabricius III, p.73. 
399 In Summa, Talleren er så goed som Stielaren, forsækra i Eder på, at wederbørande skall …., och 
Skielmer och Thiufuar skole rødes aff landet, tÿ før blifue aldrig godt, førend den falska roten blir på 
Clostergodtset utrögt…Di gode folck Clostersbønder och skelmar, sæga de er Inte Snaphanar, heller 
hålla med dem, I det sidsta de liuget, wist hålla de med dem, dhet wetta det parthi af 200 hästar beretta, 
som stod i F. då dhe 80 snaphaner ….då de skelmar i F. gafue dem…wärsell, det er bettre et Öde Land, 
end fuld aff Skielmar och forrædare.” 
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they, as a constituent of that identity, considered th  king of Denmark their rightful 
sovereign and that the Swedes could be identified as Babylonians, ie. as foreign and 
unlawful conquerors. By the winter of 1676-77 the Danes had lost much ground in 
Scania and the Danish authorities were doubting whether the inhabitants were 
prepared to keep faith to Denmark at any cost. They w re encouraging guerrilla 
warfare and tried to convince the locals that the road to victory went that way. At the 
same time Swedes of some importance like Fabian von Fersen and Sven Erlandsson 
expressed their worry over increasingly frequent “saphane-attacks” and they both 
connected these attacks not to groups of outlaws outside society, but to the peasant 
commonalty. In this context the Swedish king expressed his fear that the Scanians as a 
whole were Danish traitors. Erlandsson expressed with his frequently quoted phrase 
“a Wasteland is better than a land full of Knaves and Traitors.”   
  
The Establishment of the King’s Friskytter Corps 
Introduction   
With this chapter I am trying to trace the development of the friskytte/snaphane 
movement during the Scanian War and to underpin my claim that during the early part 
of 1677, just after the battle of Lund, there were distinct changes in attitude to the 
“snaphaner” on both sides  
The King’s Friskytter  
From January 1677 onwards the Danish account books show that grain was often 
distributed to groups of “friskytter”.400 During the first months of that year many of 
the most famous friskytter turn up in the Army Board records in Copenhagen where 
they had been assigned winter quarters. Not only Nicolaus Hermanssøn alias Nikolaj 
Hermansen appears frequently as a recipient of wages nd provisions for his 
friskytter401 but also captain (ryttmästare) Hendrik Frederik Dreyer402, captain 
(ryttmästare) Eskeld Nielsen, Jens Jenssön, Simon Andersen and Knud Espersen 
(Espensen) Böge or Bøg. It should be stressed that Nicolaus Hermansen had been in 
action from the beginning of the war on the Scanian fro t, as had Lieutenant Pieter 
Stensen and several others. In fact it is significant that so many friskytter were in 
                                               
400 Sörensson, p.21. The information is to be found in a report from: Copenhagen, 20 February 1677, 
U.S. No:207,  DRA. The grain was destined for the horses of these friskytter. 
401 Sörensson, p.23: on 2nd March seven friskytter receiv d 21 daler, on 22nd March five friskytter 
from Blekinge received 10 daler, on 28th March Knud Espersen (Böge) received 46 aler for his 
company of 22 friskytter. 
402 Sörensson, p.24. In May 1677 Dreyer received 100 daler “in advance” for his company. 
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Copenhagen that winter because those who had not compromised themselves too 
severely with the Swedes would presumably have stayed t home. Only those who 
were too much at risk to spend the winter at home would have betaken themselves to 
winter quarters. On 20th February 1677 the king issued friskytte licences for Jens 
Jenssön and Simon “The Snaphane” Andersen: 
 “With this we concede to Jens Jenssön of Stoheby in the county of Landscrone and to Simon Andersen 
of Wester Wram in the county of Christianstad who are both present here, the authority and order, that 
they with their followers and the assistance of true Danish subjects would and will persecute all 
Swedish natives and officials and subjects that sympathise with the Swedes in Scania, that are trying to 
betray and destroy their brothers and our faithful peasants and inhabitants, which they should kill and 
treat as adherents of the enemy.”403  
 
As soon as the harsh Scandinavian climate would let them the friskytter left their 
winter quarters (in Zealand, Scania or on Bornholm) and returned to the scene of war.  
In Scania most of them had their official quarters in Landskrona (Landscrone) where 
they were enrolled and had to swear their loyalty oaths to the king. Then Christian V 
issued the following order that put them on a par with other dragoons, at least 
nominally: 
 
 “Christian der Fünfte…etc… 
Wohlgeborner und Wolledle Rähte, Liebe, Getreue. Demnach etzliche Freyschützen auss Schonen, 
Halland und Bleckingen sich in Landscron angegeben, g gen den Feind fersner sich gebrauchen zu 
lassen præsentiret und umb Unterhalt allerunterthänigst gebethen, so ist Unser Allergnädigster Wille 
und Begehr, dass ihr durch Commissarius Harbo alda dieselbe in Unsseren Eid nehmen, enrollieren 
und hernach ihnen ihr Unterhalt gleich andern Dragonern monatlich geben lasset. Und Wir 
verbleiben euch mit Königl. Gnaden gewogen. Geben auf unserer Residentze zu Copenhagen d. 20 
Martij Anno 1677. 
                                                       Christian 
                                                        Ad mdtm S.R.Maj 
                                                        H. Mejer”404   
 
 
Fabricius estimated the number of registered friskytter to in between 1500 and 
2000.405 It is impossible even to hypothesise about the numbers of the non- registered 
                                               
403 This licence (Copenhagen, 20th February 1677, U.S.No:207,  DRA.) is quoted by Sörensson on 
p.21 and by Röndahl on p.224. 
404 Kongl. Ord. 1677, Quoted from Sörensson, pp.21-22. I would like to add here that my point here 
was not to claim that I had discovered that JJ and SA etc. had obtained licences from the king, nor that 
the king ordered that the friskytter be recognised as ragoons, these are well-known facts in both 
professional and hobby-historian literature.  
405 Jacobsen (p.202.) states that in 1678 there were 12 companies of snaphaner that had joined forces 
and he concluded that “anyone can imagine what oppression Scania suffered from this vast number of 
vagrants that only did what pleased them.” Others have claimed that they counted as many as 5-10% of 
the entire male population between 15 and 65. See Carl-Gustav Liljenberg, ”Krig och ofredsår vid 
gränsen” in Osby Hembygdsförening, Årsbok 1963, (War and Discord along the Border” in The 
Yearbook of the Local History Association of Osby) pp.131-197 and Linde-Laursen p.53. The 
population of the Scanian provinces amounted to about 250.000. Maybe, if one counted all the men of 
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snaphaner. The muster- and pay rolls in the National Archives in Copenhagen are 
extremely interesting to study but they only allow us stealthy glances at the situation 
in certain moments of time; they do not cover but a limited part of the Scanian war 
and we know that important documents are missing.406 Approximately 20 companies 
of friskytter are registered in the muster-rolls in Copenhagen. A company could 
include anywhere between 20 and 160 men, but the normal number was that of a 
dragoon company: 60. The numbers of each company vary greatly in the records: one 
reason is that some of them simply returned home during the winter months and only 
those who considered themselves too compromised went to the main winter-quarters 
in Landskrona (Landscrone), Helsingborg, Copenhagen nd Elsinore. The pay-rolls 
from the winter months show that the friskytte-companies tended to become 
considerably smaller during the cold season: among Dreyer’s at least forty friskytter 
(excluding officers) only twelve registered for payment during the winter 1677-78. 
Out of Aage “the Hare” Monsen’s fifty-odd friskytter only twenty-three  remained 
with him during that winter. Perhaps Niels Andersen’  friskytter were included in this 
number.407 Many friskytter were killed. From one muster to another sometimes one 
third of a company had been killed, in battle or at the stake. Some accepted the 
occasional general parole offers of the Swedish king or even went over to the other 
side. During the winter 1678-79 it looks as if  there were only ten official companies: 
Captains Niels Andersen, Aage Monsen Harlof, Peder Lau sen, Eskild Nielsen and all 
their men were assigned winter quarters in the Helsingborg area,  as close to the 
enemy lines as possible. At the same time the govern r of the Landskrona 
(Landscrone) district, Knud Thott, received the same orders regarding Hendrik 
Dreyer, Peder Christophersen, Anders Pedersen, Simon Andersen, Matz Oelsen and 
Hans Severin with their men in the Landskrona (Landscrone) area.408 These ten 
companies might have constituted the registered friskytte troops in Scania at the time. 
In that case it was the matter of maximum 3-400 menduring the two or three winter 
                                                                                                                            
all ages who had ever participated in some sort of armed action against or looting of Swedes, one might 
accept the higher estimate.   
406 Tage Bøg’s licence for example. It is mentioned by several  Swedish and Danish sources but has 
unfortunately been lost to the archives. Another example is Captain Bendix who is missing from both 
muster-and pay rolls but frequently mentioned in other sources from both sides. 
407 Sörensson, p.4. 
408 Lit.D, quoted by Sörensson, p.53. 
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months when most of them did not operate actively, but probably two or three times 
as many during the campaigns.409    
A year later the major of the friskytter Aage Monse Harlof stated the number of 
companies under him as eight.410 But by then Dreyer and Severin had both suffered 
gruesome deaths during the last Swedish round-ups of the friskytter, and many other 
friskytter with them. It can only be assumed that all hose who could acted like 
Captain Eskild’s quarter-master Svend from Boarp who only just made it in time to 
obtain a parole certificate and returned to his farm.411 In February 1680 the number of 
friskytter on Zealand was listed as 400. But then again, in March that year 500 
friskytter in the Kronborg district received passports.412  
Liljenberg’s calculation of the numbers of registered friskytter was probably 
exaggerated, considering that an average of 60 men multiplied with 20 would only 
make 1, 200. However, he might not be all that far from the truth when it comes to the 
total number of friskytter/snaphaner, registered or not, since the non-registered ones 
might have constituted the majority during many operations. 
Not only Gønger volunteered for service in the friskytte corps but young men from all 
over Scania and Blekinge/Bleging.413 Most companies took their names from the area 
from which most of the men originated: with a few exc ptions the friskytter organised 
their companies in their own parish (or hundred) even if they later operated all over 
Scania. In the muster-rolls we find companies from eastern and western Gønge, Bjäre, 
Northern Åsbo, Villand, Börringekloster, Malmö (Malmøe), Landskrona 
(Landscrone) and Helsingborg, Kristianstad (Christianstad), Blekinge (Bleging), one 
company from ”Scania and Blekinge”, four more from Blekinge , of which one from 
the parish of Sturkö. Other companies took their names after their commander. At 
                                               
409 I.B. Levetzow. 9 January 1679. The friskytter that found winter-quarters in the districts of 
Landskrona (Landscrone) and Helsingborg were assigned a monthly pay of 5 slettedaler from the 
peasants but they seem to have tried to squeeze out more than that. See:Sörensson, p.53 
410 Aage Harlof to the King, 18th November 1679, I.S., No:413. See: Sörensson, p.60. 
411 Like many others he ended up in serious trouble with the law because of his past anyway. See: 
Edvardsson III, p.130, Johnsson, p.129.   
412 Hans Rostgaard to the Army Board, (General Commissariat), 7 February 1680, I.S., June, No:221; 
and 1 March 1680, I.S., August, No:269, DRA. Quoted by Sörensson, p.61.The list included 2 majors, 
11 captains, 14 lieutenants, 13 cornets, 19 quarter masters, 25 corporals, 4 scribes, 2 drummer boys, 
410 friskytter. 
413 As results from those muster rolls on which place of origin is reported. As we have seen earlier in 
this thesis, there were also snaphaner in Holsten and Jutland. There were also “snaphaner” in Halland 
and in the old Norwegian territories around modern-day Gothenburg and the border province of 
Jämtland. 
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least one company came from the deep south (Luggude). Each company was an 
independent unit but it was not infrequent that they co-operated. 
The most common procedure was that a local man of some influence and means 
gathered a troop of at least fifty men who were willing to fight and then he offered 
their services to the king in the hope of receiving a  authorisation to become a 
lieutenant or captain of the friskytter with licenc to “attack the enemy.”414 Evidence 
from the 1658 trial against the rebels in north-east rn Scania show that a man of some 
status in the area was entitled if not expected to sending out a message calling to arms 
those of his neighbours that he thought apt. 415 This was standard procedure but 
personnel from the regular army were often sent out o train peasant troops and during 
the Scanian War this became more and more frequent.416 Sometimes HQ nominated 
captains without followers who were then sent out t recruit volunteers. It is rather 
unlikely that men from the lowest strata of society would be able to enrol in the 
friskytte corps since a horse and a good gun were the basic requirements. The 
friskytter were armed with “long guns”, very often manufactured in Gønge. They 
carried knives and sometimes rapiers and pistols.417 The companies normally chose 
their own “lieutenants”, “cornets”, sometimes a “fänrik”“quartermasters”, “scribes” 
and “corporals”. The friskytter were recognised the same military grades as regular 
soldiers by the Danish authorities. The non-commissioned men (menige) were 
normally called dragoons. At the time dragoons were soldiers who travelled by horse 
but normally fought on foot with long guns and that was also the characteristic 
manner of fighting of the friskytter. In fact, the Danish authorities considered the 
friskytter as a kind of dragoons.418 Their fighting tactics were based on the existence 
                                               
414 The classical expression was “tage paa Fienden.” See: Fabricius III, p.102. At the beginning most 
companies were led by a lieutenant who later became a captain or major (ryttmästare). Regular dragoon 
companies were normally headed by a captain. 
415 Christer Bagge’s case in Johnsson, p.32 where he rfers to the court registers from Ronneby 11th 
December 1658, Rebellernas acta, (The Rebel Files), LA. Christer Bagge himself claimed that he had 
never been keen on acting as a snaphane leader but he had been persuaded to do it by, amongst other, 
the two local ministers of the church. Christer Bagge is also mentioned by Alf Åberg in his 
Snapphanarna from 1952 (pp.41-42.) Åberg stresses that Bagge was chosen by the peasants in his area 
because of his experience as a corporal in the Swedish army and because of his status. Åberg also 
makes the point that Bagge recruited his snaphaner by sending messages to those farmsteads where a 
farmer he thought apt resided. Åberg did not add that Bagge himself claimed that he had been talked 
into the enterprise not by  two local clergymen andthat the snaphane company was sworn in during a 
meeting outside a church, in the company of one of these prelates. 
416 Pflug and Hermansen for example. 
417 Sörensson claimed the contrary but I have rapiers and pistols are mentioned in many places in my 
sources, p.31. 
418 Cf. King Christian’s ordinance of 20th March 1677 (Sörensson, pp.21-22): “ Demnach etzliche 
Freyschützen auss Schonen, Halland und Bleckingen sich in Landscron angegeben, gegen den Feind 
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of at least some degree of military discipline and  functioning rank system. It is also 
quite clear in the Danish sources that the Danish army not only worked together with 
snaphaner/friskytter, but that the commanders of the regular army considered them 
their “servants” and expected orders to be obeyed b them.419 Since the Swedes did 
not recognise the friskytter as anything but common criminals they consequently did 
not recognise their military ranks either.420 Nevertheless, many Swedish officials 
accepted these ranks de facto. A military man probably felt more proud of himself if 
he defeated majors and captains than if he just caught and executed thugs.421 
 
The friskytter/snaphaner often fought in considerable numbers. Troops of as many as 
200 snaphaner were quite frequently mentioned, sometimes up to 700422: the Swedish 
king was reported to have been ambushed by 200 snapha er towards the end of 1677, 
and so were the councillor of the realm Ebbe Ulfeld, Sir Carl Gustaf Skytte and 
Lieutenant Colonel Sparrfelt with several others while they were hunting at Fjälkinge 
in September 1678. In the latter case the friskytter/snaphaner were led by Major 
Henrik Aagesen (Ageson) Pflug who had been sent out fr m the regular army.423 
                                                                                                                            
fersner sich gebrauchen zu lassen præsentiret und umb Unterhalt allerunterthänigst gebethen, so ist 
Unser Allergnädigster Wille und Begehl, dass ihr duch Commissarius Harbo alda dieselbe in 
Unsseren Eid nehmen, enrollieren und hernach ihnen ihr Unterhalt gleich andern Dragonern 
monatlich geben lasset.”   
419 See for example Johnsson, pp.60-61: “General Kristian Lützow sent out the snaphaner. The leader 
of the snaphaner on 8 November was John Månsson from Olsängen, major…”. See also Dalhoff’s 
letters to Rommel (February 1677, DRA) in which he reported that when General Brock set out to 
attack the Swedes in Bleging he not only brought 60 regular soldiers but also all friskytter and farmes 
he could get hold of.  
420 In the legal records the accusations against the friskytter often include phrases like: “he called 
himself a major of he snaphaner…”The trial against bailiff (länsman) John Månsson, 1677, Letter from 
district governor (landshövd. skriv till k.m:t) to he king, SRA, quoted by Johnsson, p.73. The court 
preferred to call Månsson “leader of the rebels.” 
421 On 24 September 1678 the snaphane catcher Simon Bengtsson seemed overjoyed to be able  to 
report to the governor general that a Swedish unit only had just managed to kill “major Tage Böök.” 
(Letter and report to the governor general, 24 September 1678, LA, Lund, quoted by Johnsson, pp.172-
273.)   In September 1678 a Swedish captain by the name of Lindeman reported that the area around 
Sövdeborg castle was swamped with snaphaner. He had caught a snaphane who had confessed that 
there was a “Danish party” in the village. The day after Lindeman fought with the “major and 
lieutenant of these bastards and killed them”.( LA,und, quoted by Johnsson, p.171.) Lindeman calls 
what appears to be the same men “snaphaner”, “Danish party” and “bastards” in the same letter. 
422 The renegade Hans Karup claimed they were fighting in 700. See: Depositio, 12th May 1677, DRA, 
Interrogation of Hans Karup: “Det er bunde i Gyngeherret, som hand hawer handlet med om 
Snaphanernis wesen og deres revocation thi effter at pardon engang war gifwen, exequerede Ulfeld paa 
ny igien, hworfore bönderne igien gick til skofs.” 
423 While the noblemen were hunting they caught sight of some snaphaner who they set after and 
followed to Håstad were a party of 200 snaphaner under Major Henrik Ageson Pflug were waiting for 
them so that the noblemen had to run towards Nosabr bridge. They managed to escape but four 
servants were caught by the snaphaner. The servants were later ransomed. The information about the 
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Harlof had 400 men under his command during the latt r part of the war. 424  It is not 
uncommon to find reports of two- or three hundred snaphaner/friskytter that engaged 
in battle with as many Swedes. Nor did the Swedes always seem know whether they 
were fighting regulars or irregulars. On 6th November 1676 the Swedish newssheet 
Mercurius reported that “300 Finnish dragoons were gone out on a party but they 
ended up in battle with 200 snaphaner. Some people think they were the enemy’s 
avant-garde, which is all the more likely since the Finns surrounded them and killed 
them all so that nobody escaped.”425     
 
An Escalation of Violence 
As Sthen Jacobsen pointed out, there was a notable escalation of violence on both 
sides just around this period. I will now try to analyse why and how this was the case. 
At the beginning of 1677 the Swedes caught some snaphaner, who were treated in the 
following manner:  
“First they were placed in the guilds of the nightmen, so that those who were prisoners at (the camp at) 
Wæ first had to draw out and then flay dead mares, and those who were prisoners in Malmöe had to 
clean outhouses and toilets, which greatly annoyed th  master of the nightmen…When they had learned 
this craft they were handed over to the executioner who crushed their arms and legs and put each of 
them on 4 wheels (steijler).”
 426 427  
 
 This was an unprecedented step that outraged the Dan s. For the first time the 
“snaphaner” were singled out and executed like thugs, although at least one of the 
victims of the first batch of torturees (Captain Bendix) was a man of considerable 
influence and social standing. But the Swedes would cling to this policy throughout 
the war and soon enough they would even take to the un ard of measures of 
impalement and skewering.428 According to Sthen Jacobsen the harsh Swedish 
                                                                                                                            
ambush comes from Professor Winslow’s diary from 1678, UB, Lund, Sk.saml.1874, p.26, quoted by 
Johnsson, pp.166-167. 
424 The Mercurius, 31st July 1679, Swedish Royal Library. 
425 Quoted by Johnsson, III, p.192. Finland was then part of Sweden. 
426 Jacobsen, p.89. The Danish “natmænd” were a group of men who took care of dead animals, 
emptied latrines and did other unpleasant chores, while their wives often worked as fortune-tellers. 
Sometimes they are identified with “tartars” or “gypsies” but we do not know if that is indeed the case. 
Many towns in Denmark and Scania still have their Nightman’s street (Nattmansgata). 
427 Edvardsson, p.192. (hava först måst utdraga alla död  hästar, som I lägret funnits och som därefter 
skola steglas). “...a captain of the snaphaner called Bendix was brought to our camp with 12 of his 
subordinates, they were all to be sent to the stake and wheel but first they had to draw out all dead 
horses that could be found in the camp…They confessed the names of both clergymen and noblemen 
who have conspired with them.”A“Captain of the snaph ner” called Bendix Classon was executed 
near Lyngsiö and “broken on five wheels” on 9th January 1677, 
428 Fabricius III, p.91 footnote 3: “The first example of radbrækning seems to have been that of 
Captain Bendiks Klausen with four other snaphaner i January 1677”.Impalation and “skewering” 
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reprisals had the opposite effect of what the Swedes had hoped. Instead of paralysing 
the insurgents with fear the snaphane movement multiplied from this moment 
onwards.  
Jacobsen further reports that the surviving snaphaner were terrified and angry when 
the first executions of this kind took place.429 Many of them retreated to Landskrona 
(here: Landtzcrone), some went over to Copenhagen where the authorities tried to 
calm them down and ensured them that the army would be back in the spring. The 
snaphaner then went to the woods to hide away during the winter (or so Jacobsen 
claimed). According to Jacobsen they became like “Daniel’s goat” from that point 
onwards: if one horn was broken off soon four others grew out so that “when a 
snaphane was killed, ten others turned up in his stead.” 430 It was also from about this 
point in time that the snaphaner started calling themselves friskytter, as 
contemporaries pointed out and the sources prove.431  
 
At the very beginning of February 1677432 the snaphaner captured Colonel Abraham 
Cronhjort, Major Oldengreen, Lieutenant Creutz and seven dragoons on the ice that 
was covering the Finje Lake. The Swedes took refuge at a farmstead on the shore of 
the lake and defended themselves from there. In the end they had to surrender and at 
least four of the dragoons were shot.433 The officers were brought to Landskrona 
(Landscrone) where the commander paid the snaphaner 20 daler for them.434 Apart 
                                                                                                                            
(impalement on a red-hot iron skewer) were new to Swedish punishment history. Impalement had a 
long tradition in Eastern Europe, where it had not only been one of Vlad Tepeş’s  favourite methods 
but was also frequently practiced by Peter the Great. See: Ambrius (1996), pp. 61-62.  
429 As did Arensdorff in his reports to Copenhagen, only that he wrote that the peasantry as a whole 
were absolutely terrified because of the executions. See: Fabricius III, p. 107. 
430 Jacobsen, p.89. 
431 Jacobsen, p.89. The Thott brother who wrote Det hefnraabende blod (Blood Calling for Revenge) 
asserted that only Swedes used the term “snaphaner”.     
432 Jacobsen (p.89.) claims this event took place on 2nd February. and so does Johnsson (pp.65-66 
where he quotes Winslow’s diaries for this date) claim that it was on 2nd February. Fabricius claims it 
took place on 1st (Kyndelsmäss) and his source is a report from Bibow in the War College collection in 
the Danish National Archives from 1st February 1677. Fabricius (p.91, foot-note 2) also consulted a 
letter from Cronhjort to the Danish king from around 13th March 1677(War College collection, DRA).  
Jensen (p.229) also dates this event to 1st February. Unfortunately Jensen only seldom refers to precise 
sources, but has a general list of sources at the beginning of his volume. His first-hand sources were the 
Danish National Archives. 
433 In his letter to the Danish king Cronhjort claimed that there had been an agreement with the 
friskytter but they had got drunk around midnight that day and had murdered four of his dragoons. See: 
Fabricius, p.91, foot-note 2. 
434 1 RD:  6 mark: 16 skilling = 96 skilling. 1 RD = 48 lybske (Lübeck) skilling. From the 1650ies there 
was also the krone/skettedaler = 4 mark. See: Poul Thestrup, Mark og skilling, kroner og øre. 
Pengeenheder, priser og løninger i Danmark i 360 år (1640-1999), (Mark and skilling, kroner and øre. 
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from the monetary reward the snaphaner also received oats for their horses and were 
allowed to sell their booty and so they were “extremely pleased” when they rode away 
again.435  
Towards the end of January 1677 the friskytter delivered a Swedish captain as POW 
to Kristianstad (Christianstad). At about the same ti  three lieutenants and a non-
commissioned officer (fændrik) were delivered to the Danish authorities in 
Landskrona (Landscrone). The “fændrik” had tried to escape twice but “the peasants 
and the women finally managed to catch him.” 436 
 
However, the Swedish response to these actions was a series of deaths on the racks in 
the hundreds of Göinge and Färs (Gønge/Gynge and Fers). According to the reports in 
the War College collections the Scanians were totally outraged by the executions.437  
It should be noted that this kind of executions were unheard of in a military and 
paramilitary context in Scandinavia. 
 
Only shortly afterwards it was reported that county sheriff Jöns Bengtssen had 
exposed four snaphaner to the following treatment: 
“One of them had a cross stuck down his throat and another one up his backside and then his bowels 
were drawn up through his throat; then they poked a hole in the side of another one and forced him to 
draw his bowels out and wind them around his waist”. 
 
 The other two were tortured in a similar manner. After this treatment they were all 
put on the stake and wheel.438 From that time onwards notices like that often appeared 
in the Swedish newssheets. More often than not they ended with a note in the 
following vein: “Nevertheless the others persist in heir wicked ways and have no fear 
of punishment”.439 
                                                                                                                            
Monetary Units, Prices and Wages in Denmark during 360 Years), Arkivernes Informationsserie, 
Statens arkiver 1999. 
435 Fabricius III, p.91.   
436 Fabricius III, p.91. 
437 Fabricius III, p.91. forbitrelsen herover voksede m re og mere: svenskerne svarede med 
radbraekning 
438 Fabricius, III, p.107. These executions were reported to the Danish authorities by local inhabitants.  
See also: Röndahl, p.232. In medieval and early modern Europe disembowelling was a common 
punishment for serious crimes such as high treason. William Wallace (Braveheart) was punished in this 
way in 1305. See also:Geoffrey Abbott, Rack, Rope and Red-Hot Pincers. A History of Torture and its 
Instruments, Eric Dobby Publishing, Ltd, 2002 (originally 1993), p.209 and Ambrius (1996, pp.66-67), 
who points out that disembowelling and winding the victim’s intestines around him was an old 
Germanic tradition that can be traced at least back to the Vikings. 
439 The Mercurius 10th April 1678, quoted by Röndahl, p.267. This source ends with a piece of rhetoric 
that had become a cliché in Swedish official snaphane discourse. The same sort of rhetoric was 
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On 6th June 1677 three executions were reported from Lund: ”Last Monday a burgher 
from Lund called Hans Bagger was decapitated. He was accused of having shot some 
Swedes who had sought refuge in his house after the battle of Lund. It was his 
neighbours who had reported this to the Swedes. When he was about to die he said 
’May God punish whoever is unfaithful to the King of Denmark and has told lies 
about me!’   He then walked to his death with great courage (according to the Danish 
source). The following Friday two friskytter were quartered in that same town.440 As 
in so many other wars it had become impossible to trust one’s neighbours but one 
should remember that the dividing lines were not necessarily ethnic.  
 
Bagger obviously did not like the Swedes and felt tha it was his duty to stay true to 
the Danish monarch. It is very interesting that he actually said that he thought that 
those Scanians who broke faith with the Danish kinghad deserved themselves 
damnation. Men like Bagger probably saw the loyalty oath to the Swedish king as 
something he had been forced to against his own will and consequently devoid of 
value, but that their old Danish oath should be respected. In a similar situation, 
Christer Bagge clearly stated his reasoning in court when he was facing charges of 
rebellion against the Swedish king and of pretending to be a chief among the 
snaphaner in December 1658: he proudly declared that yes, he had gone down to 
Malmö (Malmøe) to swear the loyalty oath to the king on behalf of the hundred of 
Østre, but he had never cared much for that oath and yes, he was indeed a most 
faithful friskytte officer.441  An oath that Bagge on the contrary, contributed the 
utmost importance was the one he had fallen on his knees to take in the midst of a ring 
of men and in the presence of the vicar, on the Rödeby churchyard some time later. 
That was the oath he had taken to become a captain of the friskytter and which meant 
that he had sworn to kill every Swede he came across.442 However sacred oaths might 
                                                                                                                            
common when “normal” criminals were executed too, in Sweden and in Denmark, unless they had 
repented their sins in public. In this case it is the rhetoric that is of interest: not the claim that the 
remaining snaphaner persisted in their wicked ways and had no fear of punishment. I have no idea of 
what the percentage of people who had no fear of punishment was. 
440 ”Nu Gud i himmelen straffe den som er Kongen aff Danmarck utroe og hawer falskelig wundet paa 
mig!”, Depositiones, 6th June 1677, DRA. 
441 Johnsson, pp.28-30 where he refers to the court registers from Ronneby 11th December 1658, 
Rebellernas acta, (The Rebel Files), LA. 
442 Johnsson, p.32. Christer Bagge is also mentioned by Alf Åberg in his Snapphanarna from 1952 
(pp.41-42.) Åberg stresses that Bagge was chosen by the peasants in his area because of his experience 
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have been during the early modern era, it is obvious that early modern men like Hans 
Bagger and Christer Bagge did not consider forced oaths as oaths at all. According to 
their line of reasoning an oath had to be taken of one’s own will in order to be valid 
and they were bound by no other loyalty oath than te one that enjoined them to 
oppose Swedes, to kill them or to have them killed. In the same manner, although 
lying was not accepted in general it was sometimes con idered permissible to lie like 
the jurors who promised Christer Bagge pardon if heconfessed everything but then 
had him decapitated anyway.        
Conclusions: 
The Danish insistence on officialising/civilising the snaphaner and their work was in 
part a response to a Swedish criminalising process. By early 1677 nobody wanted to 
be called a “snaphane” anymore, since the word had become tantamount to being 
called a “thug”. Those who wanted to express their sympathies with the Danes started 
using the term “friskytte” instead and all those who identified themselves as some 
kind of resistance fighters naturally adopted this erm immediately.  As I see it the 
authorisations and payment lists reflect the Danish tendency to adapt the “snaphaner” 
to a more modern military situation at the same time as they were, perhaps, trying to 
protect them from Swedish punishments that were growing increasingly cruel. 
Whereas a rebel and ex-Swedish soldier like Christer Bagge was granted decapitation 
in 1658, it was now becoming more and more frequent that rebels were tortured to 
death. In the case of Hans Bagger, who was a respected burgher, it seems that he too 
was granted decapitation. Being executed as a criminal also remained a class question. 
Both Bagge and Bagger proudly declared that they owed no loyalty to the Swedes and 
that their only true loyalty bond was the one to the king of Denmark. Like so many 
others they adhered to a discourse that was very different from the official Swedish 
one but that went hand in glove with what the views xpressed by the Danish 
authorities.  
 
                                                                                                                            
as a corporal in the Swedish army and because of his status. Åberg also makes the point that Bagge 
recruited his snaphaner by sending messages to those farmsteads where a farmer he thought apt 
resided. Åberg did not add that Bagge himself claimed that he had been talked into the enterprise not 
by one but by two local clergymen and that the snaphane company was sworn in during a meeting 
outside a church that was attended by one of these prelates. 
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The Fall of Kristianopel (Christianopel) and Karlsh amn 
“Between the 8th and 9th of this month, the enemy arrived at Night at one o’clock, and stormed Fort 
Bokul but with the assistance of our Lord they were deluded. Their commanders were Colonel Skytte 
and Colonel Swinhofwet. According to some Accounts 400 drowned in the ice or were shot and when 
they retreated 60 carts were needed to carry their wounded to Rönneby.”  443 
 
Introduction 
In this section I will try to show that, in the light of new evidence and through a 
detailed exam of the different versions of the events surrounding the capitulation of 
Kristianopel (Christianopel) and Bodekuld/Karlshamn it is obvious that things went a 
bit different from what has been thought. Contamination of sources, misinformation 
and pure mistakes have led to considerable confusion as to what really took place.  
 
The Two Strongholds 
That winter the province of Blekinge (Bleging) was brought to its knees. According to 
Jensen the Swedish decision to lay siege to Kristianopel (Christianopel) and then 
Karlshamn was principally meant to bereave the ”snaphaner” of their safe havens in 
the area.444  As Jensen saw it, the main Swedish aim was  to conquer Kristianstad 
(Christianstad) but the king’s councillors did not feel confident enough of their 
numerical strength, so from his camp at Wæ where he had arrived on 12th January that 
year, the Swedish king decided to let his commanders s t out for the snaphaner first. 
Copenhagen knew that Kristianopel (Christianopel) and Karlshamn were exposed and 
a rescue expedition was sent out by sea, with the intention of evacuating the garrison 
at Kristianopel (Christianopel). Commander Lützow was ordered to keep his stand as 
long as possible but then to save his men when he could no more. Unfortunately the 
ships could not get through the thick ice that was covering the sea and so the rescue 
mission had had to be postponed until too late.445  
 
Meanwhile, the Swedes had sent out Colonel Axel Wachtmeister, Colonel 
Swinhufvud, Colonel Lieutenant Carl Gustav Skytte and Colonel Lieutenant Gustaf 
                                               
443 Falch Lauridtzön Dalhoff’s report to the Army Board on the first Swedish assault on 
Bodekuld/Carlshamn in February 1677, Falch Lauridtzön Dalhoff to the Army Board, 22nd February 
1677, Indkomne Breve, DRA. 
444  Jensen, p.229. 
445 Jensen, p.228. 
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Hård and 800 troops (at least in part peasants) against Karlshamn446, the “Swedish” 
town that had replaced the small seaport of Bodekull (Bodekuld) that was there in 
Danish times.447 The garrison was very small: only two companies under Captain 
Krumsee.448 At the beginning of this section I quoted Mayor Falch Lauridtzön 
Dalhoff’s account of these events. The Swedes triedo attack Bodekuld/Karlshamn 
from the seaside: the sea was frozen and they were planning a surprise across the ice 
and then from the back. But, according to Jensen’s account, the “snaphaner” had 
warned the garrison under Captain Hans Ernst Krumsee who promptly ordered the ice 
to be broken around the two ships that were stuck there and along the side of the 
fortress.449 When the Swedes arrived the Danes opened fire both from the ships and 
from the fortress and as we have seen from Dalhoff’s acccount, many of those who 
were not shot perished in the icy water instead. According to Dalhoff the Swedish 
troops consisted of 200 regular soldiers from Ronneby (Rönneby) and 600 
conscripted peasants.450 Furthermore, Dalhoff adds the interesting detail that a 
burgher from Karlshamn led the Swedes across the ice but he was shot outside the 
fortress and Dalhoff himself had ordered the burghe to be hung in the gallows in the 
central square, “as an example for his comrades.”451 Dalhoff also reported that some 
of the Karlshamn burghers had “run away” with the Swedes and that he had expelled 
                                               
446 The usage of the name varied, though. Falch Lauridsön Dalhoff used the terms “Bodekuld fortress” 
and “Carlshafn” in his reports to Copenhagen, so that i  seems that to him (and he took for granted that 
the recipients of his missiles understood it the same way) the old name designed the fortress whereas 
the new name indicated the actual town. Dalhoff wasm yor of Kristianstad  (Christianstad) according 
to Fabricius (III, p.66), although it seems obvious that he occupied the same position at 
Carlshamn/Bodekuld at the time of writing the reports that I mention below and he was also its customs 
officer. In the treaty that stipulated the surrender of Kristianstad (Christianstad) Dalhoff is mentioed 
“former mayor, the Danish customs officer, Falch Larsön” See: Jacobsen, p.177. See also: Falch 
Lauridtzön Dalhoff’s reports to the Army Board and to Offue Rommell of 22nd February 1677 and 19th 
October 1677 respectively, Indkomne breve, DRA. Another contemporary, the Reverend Sthen 
Jacobsen (p.90.) preferred to use the terms “Carlshaffn” and “Carlshaffn fortress.” 
447 As Fabricius (III, p.91 foot-note 4) points out, Jacobsen (p.90) wrongly dates this event to 8th 
January instead of February. Fabricius mainly relied on Falch Lauridtzön Dalhoff’s report of 22nd 
February 1677 for the account of these events. 
448 Jensen, p.228. At the capitulation there were 150 men inside the fortress. 
449 Jensen, p.230. 
450 “…bemelte Partie af de Svendske vare ey udskrefne bö der som stöte till de –200 som laa i 
Rönneby, och vare de saa –800 mand som Hand (Col. Skytte) attaqverede skandtzen med.” Jacobsen 
(p.90) agreed with this estimate. As for the losses, however, Jacobsen estimated them to 200 instead of 
400 like Dalhoff. 
451 “Een Borger af Carlshafn anförte samme swendske parti.e....ofwer Isön, blef skudt uden for 
skandtzen, saa hafwer Jeg udgifwet order at lade opreyse een gallie paa Carlshafns torfwe och hannem 
der udi ophenge, andre hans Cammerater til Exempel...” This episode is only mentioned by Dalhoff 
and has not been mentioned by any scholars or hobby historians either. However, it is interesting in its 
way, not the least because, as far as I know it is the one and only time any burgher at all is mentioned 
as taking part actively on the Swedish side. With Carlshamn having been built in Swedish times it can 
perhaps be assumed that its population identified more easily with the kingdom of Sweden. 
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their families from the town. The belongings of these persons had, according to 
Dalhoff, already been sent to Sweden.452 This incident is another case in which non-
optional ethnic distinctions might have carried some i portance. Was it only by 
chance that the one town in the Scanian provinces that did not welcome King 
Christian’s troops with open arms was a “Swedish” town that had largely been 
populated with ethnic Swedes and non-Danes?  I think, though it remains a 
hypothesis, that it was because they were largely of Swedish or at least, non-Danish 
origins. Rebuilding or founding from zero towns/villages that had decayed or been 
destroyed by war, especially in this important border region was a political statement 
in itself: to let Charles’s Crown and Port Charles (Karlskrona and Karlshamn) guard 
the new territiories made quite clear what the Swedish intentions were.453 
 
Yet another version of the events is presented by Jensen who claims that it was 
Colonel A. Wachtmeister who led the attack and thathe had 1700 peasant troops with 
him and that half of them perished. Unfortunately, what happened at 
Bodekuld/Karlshamn that time is highly unsure since the sources give us various 
versions of the events and do not even agree as for the dates. Whereas Dalhoff was 
closest to the events, and definitely most reliable s for the dates (since he sent in an 
almost day to day report from January until 22nd February and had no reason to mix 
up January and February like Jacobsen), he was also an enthusiastic pro-Dane who 
did not try to be impartial. It does seem unlikely, however, that a fervent Danish 
patriot like Dalhoff would have omitted mentioning the considerably higher casualty 
numbers reported by Jensen. Jacobsen was also a contemporary, but he was further 
away from the events that he might even have learned about from newssheets and 
letters etc. but he tried to  be as impartial as possible and was therefore, perhaps, less 
prone to exaggerating numbers. Jensen and Fabricius wrote more than two hundred 
years later, but they had access to documents that contemporaries like Jacobsen and 
Dalhoff had no possibility of reading. Unfortunately Jensen in particular, is very 
                                               
452 ”Nogle Borger löb med det swendske partie bort, deres Hustruer och börn lader Jeg forwise byen, 
derres godtz er intet thi det er fört til Swerrig.” 
453 That does not mean that the Danes in their turn did not build and rebuild when they thought 
necessary or politically opportune.  The names “Christianopel” and “Christianstad” in themselves were 
also political statements. As for the Swedish tendency to replace Danish border towns with new 
Swedish towns, see: Linde-Laursen, p.47. Bodekuld and Christianopel were substituted by Karlshamn 
and Kristianopel and the burghers of the remaining old “Danish” town in the area, Sölvesborg, 
complained that they were being reduced to ”a speck of dust on the map.” For pre-Swedish Bodekuld 
and how Carlshamn was constructed see also the excellent maps on the website of the local museum: 
http://www.karlshamnsmuseum.se/ezweb/?Page=14&ID=1 
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vague about his sources. What can be said for sure i  that the Danes managed to ward 
off the attack and that after having suffered sever losses the Swedes retreated and set 
out for Kristianopel (Christianopel) instead.  Colonels Gyllenstjerna and Tungell were 
sent out to expugn Kristianopel (Christianopel).454 Gyllenstjerna’s troops arrived on 
11th February and then Tungell brought his heavy mortars (mörser) down from 
Sweden and laid siege to Kristianopel (Christianopel).455 Five days later a battery of 
cannons was posted at the distance of a gunshot from the city walls.456 Heavy 
bombardment was then started and destruction and fire spread over the town:  
important buildings like the bakery and the brewery were soon in ruins and although 
the inhabitants fought desperately on the walls the commander, Colonel Valentin 
Lützow, who was running out of ammunition, decided to capitulate on 22nd February 
1677.457 The agreement that was signed by both sides stated that the garrison should 
be escorted safely “an die nächste Grenze nach Selandt” (to the border that is closest 
to Zealand), with the exception of “rechte gebohrne Schweden” and “gefangene 
schwedische Bediente”.458 However, this never came to be. What really happened 
after the surrender of Kristianopel (Christianopel) has long been disputed.  
 
According to Sthen Jacobsen “all officers and privates became prisoners of war” and 
he then added that “among these Danes there were 70 men from Bleging and Gynge 
that were singled out from the others and hung that very same hour.”459 Jacobsen does 
not mention a word about “snaphaner” in this context. As he saw it the blame for this 
disaster could be attributed to Lützow’s incompetence. This view was obviously 
shared by some important people in Denmark because som  time later, Commander 
Valentin von Lützow was court-marshalled. According to a letter to “Kriegs Rath” 
Herman Meijer from Valentin’s brother Aegidius, peole were saying that Valentin 
had refused to listen to his officers’ advice and oly acted according to his own will, 
                                               
454 There were eight companies at Kristianopel (Christianopel), two of Colonel Lange’s, four of Col. 
Warnstedt’s and two of Col. Schack’s. See: Jensen, p.228. Röndahl (p.222) states that the garrison at 
Kristianopel) Christianopel) comprised 750 soldiers, approximately 150 armed burghers and 50 men 
from different partisan units that could be called “snaphaner”. 
455 Jensen, p.229.  
456 Jacobsen, p.91 claims it was on 15th January that Colonels Tungell and Gyllenstjerna started 
bombarding the town. Jensen (p.230) claims the heavy bombardment started on the 18th and continued 
for two days. 
457 Jensen, pp.230-131; Fabricius III, p.92. 
458 Fabricius III, p.92. 
459 Jacobsen, (p.91.), was critical of  Lützow’s attempts to keep the enemy at bay: “Lytzou probably did 
offer some resistance...” (Lytzou giorde vel nogen modstand). 
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but Aegidius von Lützow insisted that it was slander: his brother had written to him 
about what had happened and now the whole family would be immensely grateful if 
the “Kriegsrath” would help collect testimonies from the officers that had been 
present.460 Nevertheless, Valentin von Lützow was condemned to death by the sword, 
although in the end he obtained grace and only lost his job.461 Jacobsen’s account 
offer us no clues as for the fate of the prisoners of war, neither of those who were 
considered regular soldiers by the Swedes, nor of those who were singled out as 
snaphaner.462 
 
Although they vary on several other points Jensen and Fabricius agree that original 
agreement was that the entire Kristianopel (Christianopel) garrison be guaranteed safe 
passage to Sealand and that eventually they were not:  the Swedes declared that the 
Danes had broken the agreement since the two ships that had been stuck in the ice off 
the coast managed to break through the ice and escap .463 With this excuse the Danes 
(including Lützow himself) were sent on a trek to Tr ndheim in Norway that took 
them well over four months. No numbers of casualties are reported by Jensen but he 
claims that “the majority perished on the way.” Jenson’s version agrees with Jacobsen 
in that he reports that 70 “snaphaner” were singled out and executed before the 
garrison was sent on a forced march to Norway. 464 
 
According to Knud Fabricius the agreement that was signed by both sides stated that 
the garrison should be escorted safely “an die nächste Grenze nach Selandt” (to the 
border that is closest to Zealand), with the exception of “rechte gebohrne Schweden” 
and “gefangene schwedische Bediente”. The Swedes then used this paragraph as an 
                                               
460 Aegidius von Lützow to “Herr Kriegsrath” (Herman Meijer), I.B., 1678, DRA. No date. 
461 Jensen, p.231. Fabricius (III, p.92) only stated that Lützow had been condemned to decapitation. 
462 Although, according to the Swedes the latter category would not have been seen as POWs but as 
criminals. It is important to note that, from a Danish point of view there should not have been either 
POWs nor captured criminals among those who had fought for Kristianopel (Christianopel) on the 
Danish side, since the treaty stated that they would all be allowed safe passage to Danish territory if 
they surrendered. Seen in that light, the lawbreakers w re the Swedes.  
463 Jacobsen, (p.91), mentions no ships outside Kristianopel (Christianopel), only the two off the 
Karlshamn coast. Jensen, (p.231) and Fabricius (III, p.94) claim there were two ships off the coast of 
both Karlshamn/Bodekuld and Kristianopel (Christianopel) and that all four had been stuck in the ice. 
Only Fabricius expressly claims that on both occasions the ships sailed away from the victors and 
provided the Swedes with an excuse to break the safe passage agreements for the garrisons. However, 
Fabricius states Jacobsen as one of his sources for the passage in which the ships are mentioned!  
464 Jensen, p.231. 
 137 
excuse to single out 141 men from the garrison465; amely those of the soldiers who 
could trace their origins to the Scanian provinces and who, according to Gyllenstjerna, 
belonged to the category of “rechte gebohrne Schweden.” These men were then 
examined and those that could be considered as “snapha er” were executed.466 The 
German mercenaries in Kristianopel (Christianopel) were also singled out but their 
destiny was not quite as horrifying: they were all enlisted in the Swedish army. In this 
case the difference between life and death depended on where one had been born. In 
this sense “national” identities were not optional at all.  
 
According to Jacobsen the Karlshamn/Bodekuld garrison under Captain Krumsee 
capitulated before Kristianopel (Christianopel), and it was those men who were sent 
on “a walk across Sweden up to Jempteland to Trundheim in Norway”.  Only fifty-six 
men survived the trek through what was still a wintry landscape.467 Still according to 
Jacobsen, the two ships that had escaped the Swedes ha  been anchored outside 
Karlshamn/Bodekuld and the Swedes had broken the agreement for this reason. 
Jensen claims the Swedes had no excuses at Bodekuld/Karlshamn and that Krumsee’s 
behaviour had been impeccable, which the Danish inquiry into the case later that year 
also concluded.468 Although Jensen mentions two ships that were stuck in the ice 
during the Swedish attack on Bodekuld/Karlshamn of 8th February 1677, he seems to 
have forgotten to mention their fate at the capitulation. He does mention, however, 
that there were two ships off the Kristianopel (Christianopel) coast at the time of the 
capitulation of that town. According to Jensen the 150 man strong 
Bodekuld/Karlshamn garrison were sent on a forced march to Rørås in Norway and 
that 57 of them survived.469  
 
News did not always travel quickly during those Arctic winters. On 4th March 1677 a 
Mr J.470 wrote to his friend “Monsieur Barkman Inspecteur Premier des Gabelles pour 
Sa Maytt de Suède à Malmö” but his letter was intercepted by the Danes and ended up 
                                               
465 According to Fabricius. Röndahl (1996, p.222) believes that the numbers might be slightly 
exaggerated. 
466 ”de, der blev overbeviste om snaphaneri, henretteds”, Fabricius III, p.92. 
467 Jacobsen, p.91. 
468 Jensen, pp. 231-232, based on Document 637 among the Indkomne Sager October 1677, DRA. 
469 Jensen, p.231. 
470 I have not been able to decipher this man’s surname: it reads something like Haghis. See: 
Opsnappede breve, 4th March 1677, DRA. 
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in the National Archives. Mr J. was eager to tell his friend some news: “Yesterday we 
received news from Markarid that Christianopel had gone over to us (by storm) and is 
consequently once more obedient to His Majesty. There was a whole bunch of 
snaphaner in there.” 471 The same news were given an important place in Johan 
Krook’s letter from Vä (Wæ) of 5th March 1677 to his friend “Monsier Gustaff 
Lährman Medicin du Roy de Sued a Mallmoe ou il sera.”: His Majesty has news from 
Bleking that Christianopel...has been conquered...they found a bunch of snaphaner 
there.” 472    
 
If one is to trust the sources in the archives, the Kristianopel (Christianopel) garrison 
were not sent to Norway. Almost three months after the capitulation of Kristianopel 
(Christianopel), on 19th May 1677, County Governor Augustin Leijonskiöldh wrote to 
the Swedish king from the town Jönköping just north f the border to Scania, in order 
to report that he had received His Majesty’s instructions regarding the Kristianopel 
(Christianopel) garrison, i.e. that the officers should live on their own money, and the 
privates would sooner or later be constrained to find masters (hußbonde) for 
themselves when they realised they would receive nothi g.473 Obviously the 
Kristianopel (Christianopel) garrison had not been sent to Norway but were held 
captive in the province of Småland, just across the border. The letter specifies that the 
privates were placed in the parishes of Säby and Lieröd (Linderähs) and that they 
“have now been reduced to fairly small numbers compared to what they were at first, 
and they now consist exclusively of national Danes to a number of 120 or 130 
men...”.474 Leijonskiöldh then went on to report that the privates had no higher wish 
than to be accepted into Swedish service, no matter wh e they would be sent. 
However, if possible they would rather not join themarines. According to 
Leijonskiöldh the Danish soldiers were miserable and frightened and they felt sorry 
for themselves that they were “Jutes” , else they would have been recruited into the 
                                               
471 I have not been able to decipher this man’s surname: it reads something like Haghis. See: 
Opsnappede breve, 4th March 1677, DRA. 
472 Modern-day “Vä” was then spelled “Wæ” or as in this letter “Wä”. I have not been able to decipher 
this man’s surname: it reads something like Haghis. See: Opsnappede breve, 4th March 1677, DRA. 
473 Leijonskiöld to His Majesty, Jönköpingh, 19th May 1677, Intercipierte breve, DRA. 
474 “Dhe Christianobelska gemehna, som mehrendels ligga i Säby och Linderöhs socknar befinnas nu 
reducerade till ett tämmeliget litet antahl emoth dhet dhe i förstone wahr, och bestå alleenest af national 
danska till 120 ell 130 man...” I here understand the term ”national danska” as belonging to the 
regiments that were supposed to comprise only men from particular Danish regions, such as the 
National Scanians etc. Very often these regiments also included Danes from other regions and even 
foreigners.   
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army but as it were they were at the mercy of the farmers.475 The farmers had the 
power to decide whether the POWs would have “a little bit or nothing” and 
Leijonskiöldh feared the farmers were rather inclined towards the latter option, for the 
“Jutes” were suffering great misery and were imploring in the name of God that they 
be allowed to serve as soldiers.476 The exception were three “constables” (constabler), 
residents of Copenhagen with had their wives in that town, who would not hear the 
word “service” (tjänst), and so Leiyonskiöldh had brought these three to Jönköping in 
order to starve them into obedience. Now, Leijonskiöldh was asking the king if there 
was any possibility that the other soldiers could be taken into Swedish service and he 
also asked the king to take into consideration that the majority of these soldiers had 
served “His Majesty’s forefathers”.477 It seems quite obvious that the Christianopel 
garrison had not been sent to Norway after all. Whether they would not have preferred 
that option is perhaps worth asking oneself, if oneis to believe Leijonskiöldh’s 
description of how they fared at the Swedish farmers’ hands. It seems far more likely 
that it was the Bodekuld/Karlshamn garrison under Krumsee that were sent on a trek. 
Not the least because the garrison at Kristianopel (Christianopel) was far bigger, it 
comprised six companies instead of two and the number of men that were sent on the 
forced march to Trondhejm was 150. 
 
After the siege and the capitulation the town of Christianopel was in a miserable state. 
Gyllenstierna had ordered the burghers to pay 1500 daler in ransom but there was no 
money to be found in the devastated town.478 The remaining inhabitants of 
Kristianopel (Christianopel), Ronneby (Rønneby) andthe hundreds of Medelstad 
(Medelsted) and Bräkne (Bregne) had to sign a written statement in which they 
promised never to help the snaphaner. Contrariwise the parish or the town would have 
to pay a fine of 1000 daler and every tenth man would be executed. By May further 
167 inhabitants (both men and women, as Bauman emphasised) had died at 
Kristianopel (Christianopel): the Swedish emissary of the state, Petter Bauman 
declared that it was impossible to get anything done in the area. The town was 
                                               
475 “dhet är nu ingen ringa olycka, at dhe ähr Juthar” 
476 “...lijda deße Juthar stoor nödh och bedia för Gudz skull, at man wille taga dhem i tienst...” 
477 “såsom största dehlen af dhem för detta Eders Kongl: Mayß: förfäder tiänt hafwa.” 
478 ”…when Councillor of State, the Most Noble Sir Johan Gyllenstjärna, through God’s might, 
received the town back, he ordered the burghers to pay 1500 Rix Daler…” Letter from Petter Bauman 
to His Majesty’s ....true man and General Customs Officer in Scania and Blekinge the noble and well-
born Johan Barckman in Mallmö, Intercipierte breve, DRA. 
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damaged by fire, people were ill (Bauman too had had a bout of the illness that so 
many people suffered from) and there were no horses and no cattle, which meant that 
the pot ash trade that was so important had died totally.479 Gyllenstierna had to 
renounce on his money. The city walls were pulled down and the inhabitants were 
ordered to move to other places; their abodes were left prey to the nearest Swedish 
peasants who were allowed to pull down the houses and take the materials.480   
 
After Kristianopel (Christianopel) the Swedes went for Karlshamn. At the beginning 
of March Gyllenstierna started the attack on the Bodekuld/Karlshamn fortress with his 
cannons. The commander of Kristianstad (Christianstad), General Major Meerheim, 
sent reinforcements in the shape of 200 dragoons and Nicolaus Hermansen’s 
friskytter.481 On 15th February Hermansen set out in the direction of Blekinge with 60 
men plus the officers. They were supposed to go out and recruit more “friskytter and 
peasants”. The representative of the Danish Army Board (General Commissariat), 
Christoffer Lindenow had divided these men into companies so that the king would 
have a Blekinge (Bleging) regiment once it pleased him to send them regular officers. 
Lindenow had also obtained a request for Danish flags from the parish of Jämshög 
(Gemsø) so that he was having one tailored for them. A week later the men were back 
without having been able to do anything, which Falck Lauridtzön Dalhoff482 reported 
with great compunction: 
 ”Captain Nicolauss Hermandssön came back to Christianstad today without having gone about his 
business up in Bleging. When he arrived at Rönneby with the peasants and wanted to attack the enemy 
they refused to follow him. For it is with the peasant as I have always said and still say, that is that t e 
Peasant is of no use except when the woods are green and he will be out hiding behind the bushes 
where he can shoot at whoever he likes, as soon one of our own as one of the enemy.”483 
 
                                               
479 Petter Bauman to Nilß Arfueson, 11th May 1677, Intercipierte breve, DRA. This letter was 
mentioned by Fabricius III, p. 92. See also: Bauman to Arfueson, 12th May 1677, Intercipierte breve, 
DRA. 
480 Fabricius III , pp.91-92.   
481 Jacobsen, ( p.90), mentions this rescue mission, th ugh his dating of this letter to January is wrong. 
According to Jacobsen Meerheim set out with some troops from Kristianstad (Christianstad) that were 
to be joined by “Blegingssfarer”, people from the province of Blekinge (Bleging), at the Asserum 
bridge. Unfortunately the Swedes were waiting for them there and the Danes had to retreat, according 
to Jacobsen because of their useless German officers. In this case the “Blegingssfarer” that were to 
fight for Meerheim were not called snaphaner by Jacobsen. Hermansen is called “Nikolaj Hermansen” 
in that source. 
482 In the Danish National Archives he is registered as a “customs officer”. In the accord between 
Danes and Swedes after the Danes had surrendered Chistianstad (Jacobsen, p.177), Dalhoff is 
mentioned as “ former mayor, the Danish customs officer Falch Larsön...”. 
483  
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Dalhoff spoke of Hermandssön with great admiration, as did many others.484 
Hermandssön was one of many fighters in the Snaphane War whose position was far 
from clear. Sometimes he was called a captain of the dragoons, sometimes of the 
friskytter. It seems as if he changed between being a regular and an irregular soldier 
several times. Which probably was not all that strange at the time. The difference 
between regular detachment warfare and irregular warfare was only nominal485 and 
Hermansen was often employed on that kind of mission , as were his colleagues 
Svend Poulsen Gønge who we have mentioned before486 and Pieter Stensen whom we 
will come to later, and who were also both  mentioned as regular soldiers and 
friskytter, and both had backgrounds as professional soldiers.  
 
Commander-in-chief Meerheim’s troops were reinforced with in between six- and 
seven hundred peasants. On 7th March the Danes attacked the Swedes that were 
laying siege to Karlshamn. When the peasant troops found themselves face to face 
with the regular Swedish infantry they soon escaped, or so the Danish reports 
claimed. A Swedish report of the incident states that 500 “snaphaner” assisted a troop 
of 200 Danish cavalry in an attack on Karlshamn at the beginning of March. The 
Danish party had set out from Kristianstad (Christianstad) with the intent of a surprise 
attack. Fortunately for the Swedes they were beaten, some were shot and many were 
taken prisoner. A number of “snaphaner” were hung o the spot but some others were 
reprieved.487 Fabricius pointed out that it was rather singular to let peasant and 
irregulars attack regular troops on open ground. It id not at all correspond to their 
image as treacherous peasants who ambushed decent pople in the woods. Nor did the 
fact that the snaphaner often acted in troops of asmany as several hundred together, 
alone or in co-operation with regular troops. As in many other cases it is not very 
clear what kind of troops that really participated on the Danish side in this battle. The 
Swedes claimed that 500 were “snaphaner”, the Danes that everal hundred peasant 
troops had participated, but there might also have been more professional irregular 
troops, by now even authorised friskytter. On 9th March 1677 the fortress at 
                                               
484 For an account of his life see: Röndahl, pp.442-444. Hermansen is sometimes known as Nicolai 
Hermanssön.   
485 Kunisch, (p.19), quotes Carl von Decker’s Der Kleine Krieg, Berlin 1844. 
486 See: p, 19. 
487 Anonymous report to the king, 14th March 1677, Handlingar rörande danska kriget 1676-79, SRA. 
Quoted by Johnsson, pp.82-83. 
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Karlshamn capitulated to the Swedes. From then on Blekinge (Bleging) was in 
Charles XI’s hands.  
 
Per Sörensson considered Karlshamn/Bodekuld the last time that the Danes used 
peasant forces in the war: the way he saw it the 700 men could only be seen as 
peasant troops, if nothing else then because of their numbers.488 But then, even at the 
time nobody seemed to know quite what to call the diff rent categories of combatants 
that participated in the battles on the side of the Danes. To the Danish authorities it 
was the matter of different categories of people but clear distinctions were not easy to 
make, at least not at this point of the war. Meerheim called the 700 men that Colonel 
Brahe had recruited “peasants” although he had written about “friskytter” earlier (and 
consequently the concept of a “friskytte” clearly existed to him). At the same time the 
governor of Kristianstad (Christianstad), Lindenow, called those men “snaphaner” 
that had joined Hermanssøn under Brahe’s dragoons. Nevertheless he would later 
write that he himself had managed to raise forces con isting of “peasants, snaphaner 
and friskytter.”  To the Swedes all these categories were normally classified as 
“snaphaner”. The distinguishing factor was that the persons in question were Scanians 
and thus subjects of the Swedish king. It is seems obvious that Meerheim, 
Lindenow489  and Falch Dalhoff490 were speaking about the same 700 men but they 
were not sure what to call them. During the whole campaign most Danish operations 
were characterised by the employment of a combinatio  of regulars and some sort of 
irregulars, be they snaphaner, friskytter or peasant troops. Just as Meerheim chose to 
send mixed troops to Karlshamn he also sent Captain (ritmester) Zepelin with 60 
dragoons to help the friskytter in north-western Scania at the same time.491 Co-
operation between regulars and irregulars of various kinds was the rule rather than the 
exception. The line between a peasant, a snaphane and a friskytte and often between 
friskytter and regular troops too, sometimes existed only in the eye of the viewer: the 
Swedes classified most of these categories as snapha er...I do not know how Scanians 
who were enrolled in traditional regular companies were categorised, but even 
Brahe’s Scanian dragoons that constituted regular if not newly created troops were 
                                               
488 Sörensson, p.20. 
489 Sörensson, p. 20 bases his conclusions on: Lindenow to the King 21 February 1677, 8th March 1677, 
Meerheim to the King, 21st February 1677, I.S. No:254, DRA. 
490 Falch Lauridtzön Dalhoff to the Army Board, 22 February 1677, Indkomne Breve, DRA. Falch 
Lauridsön Dalhoff to Offue Rammell, 19th October 1677, Indkomne breve, DRA. 
491 Fabricius, p.95.  
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sometimes called “snaphaner” or “friskytter”. Colonels Brahe and Hans Ditlev 
Stensen were both very regular Danish soldiers of considerable social standing. They 
were charged with the responsibility for the defence of the north-eastern regions and 
had some very well-known men under them: Nicolaus Hermansen was one of Brahe’s 
officers, and Pieter Stensen one of Hans Ditlev Stensen’s. Both Hermansen and Pieter 
Stensen were considered “snaphaner” by the Swedes.  
  
Towards the end of the month, the Swedish War Commissary Gabriel Månsson 
Hilleton commented upon the events in a letter to Baron Hans Ulfsparre:  
 
“Now that Christianopel and Carlshambn have been conquered, His Excellency Councillor of the 
Realm Johan Gÿllenstierna has also forced the unfaithful inhabitants of Blekinge and Göinge to submit 
to His Majesty’s most gracious Devotion.”492 
 
Hilleton felt that the conquest of the two main Danish enclaves in the east had been 
necessary in order to make the locals disposed to neg tiate on Swedish terms. 
Whether it was the matter of getting at the snaphaner through the conquest of the 
towns or vice versa is hard to tell. Jensen claimed that the Swedish king’s main aim 
was to take Kristianstad (Christianstad) by storm but that in early 1677 his councillors 
dissuaded him from that for the time being. Instead they decided to go for the 
snaphaner and the smaller strongholds, and it proved to be an excellent strategy. 
Hilleton also reported that he had reliable information that the situation in Kristianstad 
(Christianstad) was frightful, only about 1000 of the soldiers were well enough to do 
service and there had been problems between the Danish “national soldiers” and the 
Germans. However, there were also many snaphaner, “but,” he concluded, “they will 
soon have other things to do.”493 
 
Conclusions:  
It now seems obvious that the Kristianopel (Christianopel) garrison were not sent on a 
forced march to Norway but were kept in Swedish captivity for at least three months 
after the capitulation. It was the Bodekuld/Karlshamn garrison that were sent on foot 
                                               
492 G. Hilleton to Le Baron Hans Ulfsparre, 28th March 1677, Opsnappede Breve, DRA: “Sedan 
Christianopel och Carlshambn eröfrande hafuer hans Excellentz H Riiks Rådet Johan Gyllenstierna 
twingat dee otrogna Bleking och Göinge borna at submittera sig Kongl: May: aldra nådigaste 
Devotion.” 
493 “Snaphanner ähr också här många, Men de skola snart få nnat at giöra.” 
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to the north of Norway, as had the Helsingborg garrison before them.494 It is also clear 
that a number of persons at Kristianopel (Christianopel) were singled out and declared 
to be “snaphaner” by the Swedes, assumably on account of their ethnic identity as 
natives of the Scanian provinces. Obviously there were people who were defined as 
“snaphaner” by the Swedes at Kristianopel (Christianopel). Nothing indicates that 
these people thought of themselves as “snaphaner”, or that other Danes did so. In 
fact, Sthen Jacobsen calls them “men from the Bleging and Gynge areas” that were 
singled out from the other Danes.495 Nevertheless there were people there who 
corresponded to the Swedish criteria for a “snaphane” d that was something that 
was noteworthy enough to be mentioned in private let rs. 
 
Other details that I have tried to point out as incorrect in the traditional version, is that 
a meticulous exam of the different versions presented allows us to draw the 
conclusion that there were probably only two ships, i.e. those off the 
Bodekuld/Karlshamn coast, and that the events of the capitulations have been mixed 
up by the different historians, from the contemporary Sthen Jacobsen onwards. 
The Devastation of the Borderlands 
“Instead of respecting the oath and the loyalty that you all have committed yourselves to but have 
abused of and ignored in a disgraceful manner, you have given no thought to the salvation of your soul 
but have condemned yourselves to eternal damnation. What do you mean you treacherous and damned 
people, would the righteous wrath and fire that is afflicting you be appeased, would the bloody fires of 
war that are ravaging this country be calmed or extinguished? No! Not as long as you persist in your 
evil intents and doings and insist on committing abominable and treacherous sins against your lawful 
king, lord and all authorities. Eternal damnation is hanging over your heads day and night, and over 
your wives and children and your possessions too.”  




From the attempt to liberate Kristianopel (Christianopel) and Karlshamn/Bodekuld 
onwards the Danish authorities avoided using peasant troops, in the sense that they 
did not send in massive locally recruited troops but preferred the smaller but more 
skilled and swifter King’s friskytter that operated across wide stretches of land. 
According to the Swedish point of view, they preferred one kind of snaphane strategy 
over another. But it should be noted that Swedish peasant soldiers were generally not 
                                               
494 Jacobsen, p.90. 
495 Jacobsen, p.91. 
496 Quoted by Jonny Ambrius in his Scanian History, http://home1.swipnet.se. The year 1679. 
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called “snaphaner”: locally recruited peasant troops were quite common in Sweden 
but they were not referred to as snaphaner.497  
 
Early Spring 1677 
According to Fabricius the fall of the strongholds up east was also the point when 
support for the Danish cause in eastern and central Blekinge started to fail, exactly 
because things had gone so bad and people up there did no longer think that the Danes 
would prevail. In fact, after the fall of Kristianopel (Christianopel) the Danes did not 
venture east of Karlshamn/Bodekuld for the rest of the war. Fabricius also claimed 
that the clergy in these areas no longer obeyed Danish orders as willingly as before 
and that the indefatigable turncoat Blasius König soon started to “incite the 
commoners to rebellion against his royal majesty of Denmark”.498   
 
There were continuous clashes between Swedish troops and friskytter, with or without 
regular troops. The Swedish ex mayor or Helsingborg and commissioner of the tithes, 
Gabriel Månsson Hilleton had to withdraw his troops to the churchyard at Markaryd 
(just across the old border to Sweden) at the beginning of 1677 in order to avoid 
continuous assailments by groups of snaphaner that had crossed the border.499 In those 
days most churchyards were surrounded by walls and the churches were as stout 
edifices as could be found in Scandinavia in those days, maybe with the exception of 
some of the castles. Hilleton had stored all his troop’s ammunition inside the church 
and was prepared to take a stand against the snaphaner from the churchyard. On 26th 
March Månsson Hilleton reported that two of his men who had ventured outside the 
“fortifications” two days earlier had disappeared and nobody knew whether they were 
dead or prisoners and two of their horses and two heads of cattle had mysteriously 
                                               
497 Vigo Edvardsson refers to Swedish snaphaner but they were peasants that went on independent raids 
across the border. 
498 Fabricius, p.93: “instigeret almuen til trodsighed og rebelleri”. An example of a clergyman who 
started acting as a ”good Swede” was the Reverend Rasmus Larsen of Lykkeby in Østre Herred who 
started sending on Danish orders to the Swedish authorities. König had once been a Swedish tax 
collector (kronefoged), then he had pledged fealty to Christian V. Now he too wanted to become a 
good Swede again. The quotation comes from a letter in which Valentin Lützow warns the Army 
Board against him. Since König belonged to the administration, and moreover was a “kronefoged”, I 
think his case is of importance to my analysis: after all I do come back to the role different kinds of 
“fogder” played during the war and Blasius König was one of the few that managed quite well in the 
long run. 
499 Johsson (p.69) calls Hilleton a “captain”, but maybe it was meant in the sense of a “leader”. 
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disappeared.500 However, the expected assault never came and Hilleton was replaced 
by his half-brother Brodde Jacobsson.501 Jacobsson reported that there were snaphaner 
everywhere in Scania and that they came as close as a quarter of a mile’s distance 
from Markaryd, in troops of fifty or sixty. However, a few snaphaner had also been 
caught and brought into the camp. 502 
 
King Charles XI had first tried to pacify the Scanis, and in particular, the Gønge 
area, through peaceful persuasion. In January 1677 he had decreed general amnesty 
for those snaphaner who turned themselves (and their arms) in, as he had already on 
earlier occasions, but the decrees had not been particul ly successful. The king now 
thought he would have to think of other means to quench the rebellion. One first 
attempt was to enjoin the Scanians to attend certain rall es that were organised in 
order to try to find out who the snaphaner really were. All those who were not 
snaphaner were supposed to hand in “obligation letters” (förpliktelsebrev) in which 
they promised always to stay at home in peace and quiet and that they would consign 
their arms and never support the snaphaner. Those who did not pay heed to this 
ordinance would cause every tenth man in their parish to be hung and the whole 
parish would have to pay a fine of 1000 Swedish aler. On 29th April 1677 all the 
inhabitants of the hundred of Gärds (Giers) were supposed to turn up in Ystad (Ysted) 
in order to consign their “assurance letters”. The decree was issued at Malmö 
(Malmøe) on 14th April 1677.503 Another attempt in the same direction was when 
Charles XI sent out two academics (Stobaeus and Karup) from Lund to try and 
convince the Scanians that they had better recognise their righteous lord and 
master.504 When their attempts at pacifying the Gønge region proved a complete 
failure King Charles decided to leave the task to the feared military commander 
                                               
500 Letter from Gabriel Hillethon to Major Knebel, Markaryd 26th March 1677, Handl.rör . Dansk. Kr. 
1676-79, SRA. Quoted by Johnsson, pp.69-70. 
501 Hilleton’s mother married the mayor of Halmstad, Jakob Broddesson in second marriage and 
consequently the brothers had different patronymics although they called each other “brother”. I would 
like to thank Jens Lerbom for this information.  
502 Letter from Brodde Jacobsson, Markaryd 26th April 1677, Handl.rör . Dansk. Kr. 1676-79, SRA. 
Quoted by Johnsson, p.71.. 
503 Letter to the Rector (Probst) of the hundred of Gärds (Giers), the Right Honourable and Learned 
Herr Clas i Träne from Hack Larß Stiern, 14th April 1677, Intercepted Letters, DRA. See also: Letter 
that speaks of this to Herr Hans and Herr Peder of Hurryd, date: Høiredh 14th May 1677, Intercepted 
Letters, DRA. 
504 Karup and Stobaeus, as they were called, were both native Scanians who had put their stakes on the 
Swedes, or at least Stobaeus had done so. Karup seemed more disposed to side with whoever won the 
conflict and he worked actively both as a Danish and Swedish spy. 
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Johannes  “the brute”Gyllenstierna. During the months of March and April 1677 
Gyllenstierna and 230 of his warriors went from village to village in western Blekinge 
and northern Scania in order to persuade the inhabitants to consign their arms and to 
promise not to give shelter to any snaphaner. The punishment was constituted by a 
fine of 1000 daler and the hanging of every tenth man. Eventually the peasants were 
allowed to keep their guns so that they would be abl to fight the snaphaner with 
them. They had to swear an oath that declared that they were brothers with the 
Swedes and that they were obliged to defend Swedish lives:   
”Since Our most gracious King has communicated that we may keep our rifles, then we pledge to 
use them against the Snaphaner and never to the injury, ruin or destruction of a Swedish person; 
but we will help all our Swedish brethren, both inborn and incorporated, against violence and abuse 
with Our very same Rifle in order to maintain and defend them (our Swedish brethren).”505  
 
It was a demonstration of Swedish muscle that did not fail to produce its results. The 
king was so pleased with the results of this campaign that he sent Fabian von Fersen 
on a similar campaign in the southern parts of Scania.  
 
Reports from the Front 
Reports of Swedish ravages in the region of Gønge wer  constantly coming in during 
the summer of 1677.506 The future commander-in-chief of the friskytter, Aage 
Monsen Harlof, declared reported the following on 9th June: ”Ebbe Ulfeld  has now 
gone to Sweden, and Johan Gyldenstiern is in the hundred of Gynge where he is 
burning down everything, the last place he burnt down was Agerup.” 507 Cristen 
Jensen from Viborg managed to escape from the Swedes and reported that they had 
”500 men in Gynge who were dragoons and footsoldiers and were there to catch 
snaphaner and devastate the land.”508 Nels Persen from western Gønge (Westre 
Gyngeherred) had left his home in order to make his way down to the camp outside 
                                               
505 Christianstad 11th Junii 1677, Depositiones, DRA. Gyllenstjärna’s edkrävartåg 1677, oath from 
northern Scania:”Efftersom Wor aller nåhdigste Koningh oβ  låther tilseja, at wi skuhlla få beholla 
wort ghewähr och Byser, da forpligta wii os hermed, de samme at bruka emot Snaphanerne och til 
ingen suensk manniskis skahde, forderf eller undergangh, uthan alla suenske, som vare Indfödde, och 
incorporerede medbrøder, emoth alt ghiewähr och øffuerlast, med samma Wort ghiewähr hielpa at 
maintinera och forsuahra.” 
506 Please note once more that these are Danish source and things are generally presented the way 
people thought they would sound reasonable or welcome t  the Danish authorities. Swedish sources do 
not present what happened in Göinge (Gynge) in the same manner at all. 
507 Ebbe Ulfeld had been lensmand and commander-in-chief of the Scanian forces during Horn’s War 
in the 1640’ies but he willingly went over to the Swedish side after the annexation. See: Aage Monsen 
Harlof’s report from 9th June 1677, Depositiones, 1677.  
508 The camp outside Malmöe 18th June 1677, Depositiones, DRA: ”Og sagde att der war 500 Mand i 
Gyngeherrit som war draguner og fodfolck at opsøge Snaphanerne og ruinere landet.” 
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Malmö (Malmøe), (a distance of about 100 kilometres.509 He came to ask for help 
since commander Johan Gyllenstierna was behaving with great cruelty and committed 
outrages and burnt villages down and drove their cattle to Sweden.510   The day of 
Nels Persen’s departure Gyllenstierna had burnt down Krogeberg and Töffte and had 
taken all the cattle from those villages to Sweden. Now he was not only threatening 
the inhabitants of Farstrupe with fire and the sword if they did not meet up with him 
at Weirum three miles from the Swedish border on 24th June, but he was also saying 
he would burn down Osby (Ousby) and Loshult (Losalte). Nels Persen was wondering 
if he and his neighbours might get a party of soldiers to help them chase the foe 
away.511  
Yet another refugee from the Swedish camp, Søren Jensen from Roskilde, reported 
that the Swedes had been given permission “to plunder and devastate Gynge and the 
lands around it as far as they could reach” and that the soldiers had been warned of 
the snaphaner. Jensen also declared that before leaving Mölleryd (Möllerid) the 
Swedes had taken two peasants ”of which one had to hang the other.”512 Almost three 
weeks later Christen Jochum from Viborg made his way back to the Danish camp and 
declared that the Swedes said that  
” they would send a party of 4000 horsemen to Gynge ad destroy and burn everything down. They 
wanted to leave the southern parts of this country until they found out how the siege of Malmöe would 
go: in case the town falls into the hands of the Danes they will head for Sweden and devastate the land 
with murder and fire on their way.”513  
 
On 22nd June 1677 Jens Michelsen, the owner of Hovdala (then Howdal) castle, 
arrived at the Danish army camp outside Malmö (Malmøe) in the company of 
“Lieutenant Per Steen”. Jens Michelsen has gone to his ry as a Danish traitor who 
sided with the Swedes and was later knighted Ehrenborg, (Castle of Honour) by the 
Swedes.514 However, the Danish archives reveal that he actually turned up at the 
Danish army camp of his own free will and in the company of what the Swedes 
considered an “arch-snaphane” like Pieter (Per) Stensen in order to let the Danes 
                                               
509 Depositiones, Nels Persen’s report, 26th June 1677, DRA. Nels Persen’s place of origin is stated as 
”Boborb” or something like it, and then ”Gyngeherret”. 
510 (Nels Persen)…beklager sig ower den store haardhed som Johan Gyldenstiern foröfwer imod denem 
med skenden og brænden…” 
511 ”Nu begærer de att maa faa et partie hwor til de kunde samble sig om det war mueligt at bortjage 
samme fiendtlige partier:” 
512 The camp at Lund 8th June 1677, Depositiones,DRA. ”førend de reyste fra Möllerid tog de 2 bönder 
hwor den ene maatte ophenge den anden.” 
513 The camp outside Malmö, 21st June 1677, Depositiones, DRA. 
514 See e.g. Johnsson, p.88 who claims that ‘Jöns Mickelsson’ was one of very few Scanian gentlemen 
who stayed true to the Swedish king. 
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know all he knew about the movements of the Swedes515...Maybe history’s been 
wrong about Michelsen. On this occasion,  Michelsen reported some interesting news 
from the north-eastern border region:516 first of all that Gyllenstierna had called all 
civil servants and clergymen in the area to a meeting where he had reminded them of 
their duties to the king of Sweden. As usual Gyllenstierna was swearing and 
threatening everyone with the hounds of hell. The best way to prove one’s loyalty was 
to send provisions to the army and all of them were expected to contribute with 1 ox, 
bread, butter, two barrels of beer, white bread, hens and eggs, and the peasants their 
part, if they could.517 He then reminded them that they were not allowed to visit or 
communicate with the enemy in any manner. The civilservants and clergymen replied 
that they had nothing to contribute with because the army had already plundered the 
whole area. Eventually Gyllenstierna agreed that special consideration would be taken 
in the case of those places that had already been totally plundered: “Brynnested, 
Howdale, Matved, Maglegaard, Finnie, half of the parishes of Melby, Winslef, 
Enneberg and Stoby and part of Torup”.518 He then communicated that he would sell 
both his body and soul to the devil if Copenhagen and Landskrona (Landscrone) had 
not been blockaded within two weeks.519 The most curious detail about this report is 
finding Michelsen and Stensen together. Only ten days earlier an informer (Petersen 
of Magløgaard) had reported to the Danish military command that Jens Michelsen 
kept the Swedes informed of the movements of the Danish army and that he had had 
to pay himself free from the snaphaner’s harassments, no  once but four or five times, 
when they were angry with him because he was a “skælm” i.e. a rascal or knave.520 
Possibly Stensen had been sent out to fetch Michelsen to clear up the 
                                               
515 Then I would like to stress that Fabricius did not mention that Pieter Stensen and Michelsen knew 
each other. I do not think it has been known until now that they did. 
516   It seems as if Michelsen sympathised with the Danes to some degree, or at some stage of the fight, 
although eventually he put his bets on the Swedes. In August 1678 Howdale was besieged by a troop of 
snaphaner but after a fight that lasted for thirty hours Michelsen managed to escape across the lake 
behind the castle. Michelsen’s family kept the Hovdala estate until the last male descendant died in 
1981 and it is now a museum. 
517 At least in the case of Käglinge at the beginning of the month, Gyllenstjerna had Hilleton write the 
officials of the area to meet up at “Hoffdahla” (Howdale) mansion after mass on 2nd June with their 
“contributions” and so that they could meet Gyllenstjerna. See: Letter from Hilleton to the Sheriff and 
all Commoners of the parish of Käglinge, 2nd June 1677, Intercipierte breve 1677. Gyllenstjerna was 
consequently Michelsen’s lodger at the time. A repot fr m 25th June (Elias Davidsen, Depositiones, 
DRA) states that on 21st June 400 Swedes had been stationed at Howdale but that “Gyldenstiern” 
himself was lodging at Möllerid. 
518 Modern names where known: Brönnestad, Hovdala, (?), Maglehult (?), Finja, Mellby, Vinslöv, 
Ignaberga (?), Stoby, Torup. 
519 Depositiones, DRA. 
520 Fabricius III, p.116.  
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“misunderstanding”. The day after his arrival, Michelsen wrote a most humble 
application for a “salva guardie” letter for his estate, and as Fabricius noted with a 
vein of sarcasm, Michelsen whose door still today bears the marks of the snaphaner’s 
bullets, signed his letter to the Danish king “Your most subservient, dutiful and true 
subject and servant.” However, the snaphaner/friskytter did not launch a major attack 
on Hovdala (Howdale) until much later and Michelsen was certainly not the only 
gentleman who had problems with the snaphaner. Evencou ty sheriff Mons Hacksen 
complained that they were a danger to him, although Mons Hacksen was considered a 
snaphane himself by the Swedes. Furthermore, Michelsen was not the only person of 
Danish origins who was rumoured to have said too much to the Swedes. Jørgen 
Krabbe of Krageholm (Krogholm) was subject to the same kind of suspicions. 
Whatever Michelsen’s reasons for coming to the Danish camp in June 1677, they 
should not be judged in the light of later events. 
 
A Danish soldier who had been a Swedish prisoner of war managed to make his way 
back to the Danish camp on 23rd June 1677 and observed that ”wherever their Army 
goes there are new executions.”521 Elias Davidsen of Vramhuset by the Ringsjö 
(Ringsøe) lake reported to the camp outside Malmøe on 25th June 1677. With him he 
had Boel Broersdatter from Klinta (Klinte) who had interesting news from 
Erichsholm mansion. Furthermore, Davidsen also reported that the Swedes had moved 
their camp from Herridhwahds Closter some way east to a place called Risselberg 
(Risberga) where they were bivouacking on the meadows by the vicarage. The 
peasants in the area had been ordered to meet up in the army camp on the Friday 
evening with their wagons and those who failed to turn up would be fined 40 march 
and lose their lives. Davidsen also reported that on 21st June a troop of 400 soldiers 
had arrived at Howdale mansion and were still there and that Johan Gyldenstiern was 
staying at Mölleryd (Möllerid). According to Davidsen, rumour had it that “they” 
were 9000 men strong and that they were heading for Kristianstad (Christianstad). On 
27th June Karen Bentsdatter turned up at the camp outside Malmö (Malmøe), all on 
her own it seems, in order to report about the ravages in the border region. She had 
left her home at Broeslef the day before and then Gyllenstierna and 600 of his men 
had first been to Hovdala (Howdale) and Mölleryd (Möllerid) and then they had gone 
                                               
521 Fridric Liwertz’s testimony, 23rd June 1677, Depositiones, DRA. 
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to Weirum (modern-day Verum?). Bentsdatter declared that Gyllenstierna laid waste 
and looted every place he came to, took all cattle he could find and he had burnt 
Gammelstorp, Torpe and Togerup (modern-day Tågarp?) to the ground.522 
 
A letter from a peasant in Blekinge (Bleging) tells us of the precarious situation of the 
autumn of 1677. The anonymous peasant wrote to his wife (?) who was inside the 
Karlshamn fortress. He assured his “dear heart” tha he had managed to hide most of 
their belongings in the hay (loft); thanks to this they still had their things while “all 
other people had lost theirs.”523 According to the peasant the “grand seigneurs” Count 
Pontus (De la Gardie), Ulfeld, Håkan Skytte and Colone  Gyllenstierna all visited 
people every day and demanded “royal treatment”: one day they visited one farm, the 
next day another. The peasant claimed that “those who were of that nation did not 
save their efforts, only the best was offered…there are no words for the happiness of 
those people.” By “those of that nation” and “those people” the peasant intended the 
Swedes and their sympathisers. He then went on to declare that on the contrary “the 
others are very sad and are moping about as if their last day had come, but someday 
God Almighty will surely make them happy again.”524 The peasant had had 
innumerable visits from the Swedish army, fortunately the last time it was only four 
or five “peasant officers” (gemen bønner officerer). Then on 11th November Carl G. 
Skytte arrived from the Swedish camp at Hoby with 50 or 60 men and the peasant had 
to accept an officer and his squire as lodgers. During this time he had also had a visit 
from a soldier with seven horses that had to be fed. On 18th November the peasant 
received a visit from Ulfelds people, though they lodged with the village tailor. On 
24th November they went in the direction of Karlshamn and from there they were 
going down south to Ystad (Ysted)where they said they ad “the Jutes” in a mouse-
trap. According to the letter-writer many of the peasants deserted as soon as they 
could. Most of them came from the neighbouring region of Småland and claimed that 
                                               
522 Depositiones, DRA. She added that even an old wido had lost everything she had because 
Gyllenstierna’s men had found a dead body on her grounds. 
523 Interciperede breve, DRA. This letter is to be found among the intercepted letters from the Scanian 
War in the Danish National Archives. I suppose it was intercepted by someone somehow or else it 
ended up there by chance. I could find no mention of the writer’s name in it. I dated it according to the 
events described in it, which also corresponded to the other letters it was amongst. 
524 Quote from the letter of the preceding foot-note: “…dhe som war uthaff den Natio, sparrhde ingen 
tinge dhet öpperste var hos C.P.V:S* for Carl Gustaff Skutt og jeg kand icke uth sige hor glad dhe 
folcker er dher imod er dhe andre disto bedröffuer gar och henger dheres huffuet som dhe var førtapet. 
Gud dhen allerhøgste glader dhem dog en gang igen.” *det er cort pehrsen, palm och spholinger. ”The 
italics are mine. 
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they would never agree to join the armed forces again. Finally the peasant begged his 
“dear heart” not to worry about him. They were doing fairly well in the village 
because “the Swedes treat us as their own and so dothe Danes so I hardly believe 
they will plunder us”. Unfortunately, later on in the war both sides would come to 
treat the Scanians as their enemies. 
On 7th December 1677 Lieutenant Hans (Bentsen) Gammelstrup came to Landskrona 
(Landscrone) with his remaining 33 friskytter.525 He and his men had set out from 
Blekinge (Bleging) (from where Gammelstrup and most of his men originated) six 
weeks earlier and then spent a long time in the Göinge (Gønge/Gynge) area where the 
situation had become unbearable.  Some of Gammelstrup’  men had gone over to the 
Swedes and so he did not dare stay in the area anymore. The Swedes had arranged 
blocks along all roads where peasants had to look out for friskytter and deserters. 
Bentsen reported that there were about one hundred peasants at each check-point but 
they were all unarmed and there were “no other Swedes with them”.526 And the 
Swedes were moving all peasants within a radius of 1 mile from Kristianstad 
(Christianstad) area away from their farmsteads, nobody knew why. Then, on 14th 
December 1677 the friskytter Anders Pedersen527 and Michel Troelsen of the 
Brønnested (modern-day Brönnestad) friskytter  arrived in Landskrona (Landscrone) 
with more news from the north-eastern areas of Blekinge and Göinge (Bleging and 
Gynge): the situation was critical. The peasants were doing duty at the Swedish road-
blocks. Somehow the Swedes already knew that the Dan s were about to send 
assistance to the besieged town of Kristianstad (Christianstad). Some friskytter had 
accepted amnesty from the Swedes and were refusing to move. These friskytter tried 
to make the authorities realise that the Scanians would not stay true if there was no 
hope of victory. 528 The day after a peasant called Niels Bendsen from Andrarum 
                                               
525 Depositiones, DRA. Hans Bentsen Gammelstrup is one of the most well-known friskytter and he 
had one of the most difficult tasks: to defend the easternmost province of Bleging/Blekinge. 
Gammelstrup himself survived the war and went to live in Denmark, but his company suffered 
terrifying losses. See egg. the muster roll from 15th March 1680 (Fabricius III, p.242) where he states 
that thirty-four of his soldiers had ended on the stake and wheels. 
526 “...hafr ingen gewehr eller andere suänshe hos dem…” 
527 Anders Pedersen was captain of a company of friskytter as results from other sources, amongst other 
Knud Thott’s reports. Fabricius (III, p.206) mentions his as one of four companies that made up the 
Scanian National Friskytter  under “Major Aage Monse  Herlev” in 1680. Obviously, he was not the 
Anders Persson from Öja/Øje who had been with Colonel Holch’s regiment in Zealand and then a 
friskytte with Peder Christophersen (Per Kristoffersson) and who was condemned to death by a tribunal 
in Helsingborg in October 1677. See: Johnsson, p.102. 
528 “…landmanden ofver alt begynder nu at blifue good schwensk, eftersom fienden dennem indbilder 
at for dennem ingen viidere undsatning af de danske er vorwente...”, Depositiones,  DRA. Fabricius 
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(Anderom) reported that eight days earlier, Gyllenstjerna had arrived, immediately 
beginning to conscript men from all the hundreds in the area according to the rote 
system (mantallet), and without caring whether the men were old or young.529 
 
The Different Stages of the “Revolt” 
Traditionally most scholars have explained the creation of the King’s Friskytter and 
the Danes’ increased reliance on irregular warfare with the fact that the peasant forces 
in the border region could no longer be counted upon and that the creation of new 
regular dragoon regiments seemed too expensive. Alf Åberg distinguished two 
different stages of the snaphane movement. The first phase was an agrarian revolt, 
”the rebellion of a primitive peasant republic against the multiple abuses of the 
Swedish authorities.” This phase ended in the spring of 1677 when the Swedish 
commander Johan “the brute” Gyllenstierna “pacified” the whole border area from 
Blekinge (Bleging) to Kullen.That was when the second phase started. The Danes 
were no longer able to call whole parishes to their lp and so instead they 
concentrated on the snaphaner that Åberg reluctantly calls an ”organised friskytte 
movement” without explaining in what sense it was an organised movement. Alf 
Åberg’s interpretation of the snaphaner was noticeably influenced by Marx’ and 
Engels’ interpretation of the Spanish guerrilla war.530 In the 19th and 20th centuries the 
petite guerre was often considered to be the war of revolutionary rebellions. In that 
sense, no, petite guerre, guerrillas and partisans did not exist before the French 
revolution, unless Robin Hood and his mates could be counted as pre-Marxist 
revolutionaries.531 This ideologically coloured view can be traced to Marx and Engels 
who did a lot of theorising on guerrilla/partisan warfare. Engels concluded that “the 
tactics of guerrilla warfare on the part of poor peo l  against their rich antagonists 
was an integral part of the British proletariat’s struggle for human rights.”532 Marx 
correctly pointed out that the distinguishing mark of guerrilla warfare was the hit-and-
                                                                                                                            
(III, p.148) quotes a Danish report that says that e ’country folk’ around “Børringe” were becoming 
’quite shy’ (ganske forsagt). According to Fabricius there was a general feeling among the Danes and 
the Scanians at the time that they were losing ground and maybe would not be able to throw the 
Swedes out after all. 
529 Report from Landscrone, 15th December 1677, Depositiones, DRA. 
530 For example the division into corresponding phases. 
531 Grenkevich, p.41. characterised the Spanish guerrilla war as “the earliest of partisan experiences.” 
Hobsbawm’s theories can also be traced back at least to Marx and Engels. 
532 Grenkevich, p.39 quotes K. Marx and F. Engels, Sochineniia, (Collected works), tom 2, Moscow 
1955, p.517. 
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run tactics that enabled partisans to maintain their centre of resistance “everywhere 
and nowhere” at the same time.533 Marx and Engels saw Spanish resistance to 
Napoleon’s troops as the first true guerrilla war, and to them guerrilla warfare was 
intrinsically connected with political ideology. The war of the Spanish guerrillas 
could be divided into three phases: first the one during which the French army was 
winning the day and the locals took up arms to do the job that the army had not been 
able to do. They did this using unconventional partis n tactics. The second and most 
important phase was when guerrilla bands were formed on the basis of the remnants 
of the Spanish Army’s and (Spanish) deserters from the French armies. They were 
organised in small but manoeuvrable bands. The third phase was characterised by an 
increase in numbers. The guerrillas now tried to take on the trappings of regular army 
forces, their ranks swelled from 3.000 to 6.000 men. They were now less able to 
conceal themselves or suddenly disappear: “the incrase in the numerical strength of 
partisan formations and their strict chain of command did not always improve their 
combat capabilities or quality.”534 Another way of seeing guerrilla warfare is to 
classify it as a combat method, a set of strategics that is resorted to in certain 
situations, and not as the offspring of a particular political ideology. In his Short 
History of Guerrilla Warfare, J.A. Ellis stresses that identical strategies were 
employed against the English in North America, the Napoleonic French in Spain, the 
Austrians in Italy and Hungary, and the German Nazis in Yugoslavia and Russia and 
that the same methods had been practised very long before the Napoleonic Wars. 
These were all instances in which “guerrilla warfare compelled would-be conquerors 
to treat popular resistance as a form of warfare that could and did frustrate the 
achievement of their final goals.” 535  
 
According to Fabricius too, it was the events around this time, mainly in the border 
area that transformed the snaphaner into the more efficient and more dangerous 
friskytter,536 although they appeared in the registers well before the oath taking 
campaigns. The snaphaner did not turn into friskytter of themselves but it was 
obviously a decision from above. Possibly the word “friskytte” had already been in 
use in order to indicate irregular troops for some ti e by 1677, but it totally 
                                               
533 Grenkevich, p.41. Quotes: Marx and Engels, Sochineniia, tom 10, Moscow 1958, p.458. 
534 Grenkevich, p.40. 
535 J.A Ellis, A Short History of Guerrilla Warfare, New York: St Martin’s Press, 1976, p.112. 
536 Fabricius III, p.97. 
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substituted the term “snaphane” in the Danish languge from that time onwards.537 
The Swedish attempts to create a category of criminals that could be denominated 
“snaphaner” had made those who had once possibly used that term to indicate 
themselves or their war-time occupations, shrink from it. However, Fabricius was 
right insofar as the more strictly organised friskytte movement was very likely spurred 
on by Gyllenstierna’s and the other grand seigneurs’ harsh reprisals in the northeast.   
Perhaps it had become a personal issue for Gyllenstier a, as perhaps it had for the 
Swedish king.538 In June 1677 an informant explained to the writers of the 
Depositiones records that Gyllenstierna was not in a very good mood during this 
period because the snaphaner had stolen all his luggage that was coming down from 
Sweden. He felt “very angry with the peasants and promised he would destroy them 
all completely.”539 There is some evidence that popular support for Denmark and the 
friskytter/snaphaner diminished after this point in ime.540 But I would like to add that 
first of all, these are all theories based on very limited sources. At the most we can try 
to say today that there were trends in that direction or the other when we are 
discussing vague and vast concepts like “popular support in general among the 
250.000 inhabitants of the Scanian provinces.” There were no mood barometers in the 
news bulletins way back then, no opinion polls. Furthermore, some of the scholars 
that have had their say on the matter only consulted a limited number of documents 
during their research. It is not unlikely that the border inhabitants actually were 
paralysed with fear: almost every statement in the Depositiones collection speaks of 
terror, desperation and cruelty. It might not have had anything to do with Denmark or 
Sweden to most people. Maybe people were simply war we ry. Perhaps those who 
were not prepared to become full-time friskytter and risk whatever they had left 
                                               
537 Although today “gønger” is the most common word to indicate paramilitary- and resistance fighters 
in early modern Denmark. “Snaphane” is sometimes perceived as an offensive word in modern Danish 
too. When in January 2009,  I asked the archivist at the main desk of the Danish National Archives for 
the boxes with information on the “snaphaner” that I had ordered he sneered and said “In this country 
we do not call them snaphaner, we call them great natio al heroes or sometimes gønger .” (Her hjemme 
kalder vi dem store national helter...). He also explained that great men like Svend Poffuelsön/Svend 
Poulsen the “Gøngehøvding” and Nicolaus Hermansen were far too busy saving the country to have 
time to sneak around and cut innocent people’s throa s. 
538 The Swedish king was attacked by snaphaner on several occasions. A letter from 15 November 
1677 states that the  Swedish king had been ambushed by 200 snaphaner while he was having dinner at 
a parsonage near Kristianstad (Christianstad) but that the he and his officers had managed to fight them 
off.  This letter has no signature but it was written to Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie, Handl.rör.Sk. 
kr.1676-79, SRA, quoted by Johnsson, p.117. 
539 Depositiones, 22nd June 1677, DRA. Yet again we see that very often ”snaphaner” was tantamount 
to “snaphaner” and vice versa. 
540 Johnsson, p.82. But also Fabricius, Sörensson and Edvardsson. 
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decided that more loosely organised part-time “guerrilla” activities were not worth the 
risk. In that sense one kind of resistance activities might have become more frequent 
while the other decreased. Also the snaphaner and friskytter acted in almost the whole 
of Scania, not only in the border area that had been laid almost totally in ashes by the 
warlords. In fact, the King’s Friskytter had their headquarters behind the safe city 
walls of Landskrona (Landscrone) and they operated from there, not from the border 
area.  
 
The Situation South of the Border 
The war was going on in more than one part of the land:  there is evidence that the 
population at large did not fare particularly well during those times, and that 
“ordinary” life had been brusquely interrupted by the war, far outside the immediate 
border area. One example of this is a letter from a young man called Hanß Wæbo to 
his girlfriend Sissele Hansdatter, from 11th March 1677. Wæbo wrote to his “dearest 
Sissele” whose address was care of her uncle who was a cobbler at Skommesleu 
(modern-day Skummeslöv?).Wæbo himself lived at Lund.541 In his letter, he excused 
himself for not having been in touch for so long, but he had been unwell and both his 
aunt and “Little Anderß” had died from the same illness. Nor had he received his 
dearest’s last letter but one, which she had asked him about. Obviously Sissele had 
also asked when he was coming up to see her because he excused himself with the 
general situation:  
“...as soon as God wants this situation to calm down a little, so that one can travel then I will at once go 
up there, I beg my dearest not to have doubts about me...I implore you my dearest to stay where you 
are and let God decide when we shall be able to meet, different times must surely come, with the help 
of God.”542 
 
Meanwhile there were continuous skirmishes in the northwestern corner of Scania: 
the commander of Helsingborg, on 7th April 1677 Carl Hård reported the following 
after a victory over Danish troops that had tried a surprise attack on Helsingborg:  
“ich glaube fast daz der feindt 100 man dieser weiße verloren, daz fält liegt aller wegen mit todten, kan 
man also straxt so just nicht wißen, die straßen sindt auch allerwegen mitt todten geziert, undt wird der
feindt so bald kein apetit haben.”543  
 
                                               
541 Wæbo’s letter is written in Danish as are all other letters between Scanians and Danes that I have 
come across during the Scanian War. Mixed language letters appertained to mixed spheres: like Baron 
Krabbe many Scanians tried to write Swedish, or at least to put a Swedish touch, to letters to Swedes. 
542 Letter from Hanß Wæbo to Sissele Hansdatter, 11th March 1677, Intercepted Letters, DRA. 
543 Opsnappede breve, Carl Hård to unknown recipient (GM?), Helsingborg 7th April 1677, DRA. 
Sthen Jacobsen, (p.102) dates this assault to 6th April, whereas Jensen (p. 244) dates it to 5th April. 
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He then continued his description of the latest events in the area in a report to 
Governor General Fersen from the same day. In this report he complained that the 
worst threat was not attacks like the one he had just fought back, but the “snaphaner” 
that were “spreading their contagion” around the hundred of Bjäre (Bierre) and 
Ängelholm (Engelholm). According to Hård they had alre dy called meetings for the 
inhabitants of both areas, at which they had forced people to consign their firearms to 
the authorities. In Ängelholm (Engelholm) they had pulled up the bridges after them 
so that they could practise their “maliciousness” in peace and quiet.544 Hård’s aversion 
to snaphaner is obvious, but so was maybe his aversion to Danes in general. 
Regarding the snaphaner, Hård adheres to a Swedish discourse that again and again 
returns to their “maliciousness” and evil nature and that describes “snaphaner” as 
beyond the pale of humanity. 
 
A Swede who was obviously worrying about the state of things in Helsingborg was 
the town’s former mayor Gabriel Månsson Hilleton who wrote to General Major 
Ulfsparre from “Marchary” (Markaryd) on 21st February 1677:  
 
”Herr General Major would be very gracious if he would be as careful of the town Helsingborg as 
possible and especially not let town councillor Anders Jöran’s house and garden get all too ruined, 
since if possible, a good Swedish man might later become owner of it.”545 
 
It seems from this letter that Hilleton was well aware that buildings in his old place of 
residence might be coming down, and that consequently, the situation was far from 
normal although Helsingborg was not exactly in the border area. 
Conclusions: 
In this section I have tried to analyse how and why the Swedes came down so 
effectively on the border area exactly at the same ti as the King’s Friskytter Corps 
started to crystallise and how this fact has been interpreted by different scholars. One 
                                               
544 Carl Hård to Baron Fabian von Fersen, Marschal du Camp & General gouverneur en Schone, 
Halland & Blekingh a M. 7th April 1677, Opsnappede br ve, DRA. “sonst stehe Gott Lob in solcher 
Posteur das vor den feindes anfall mich nich betrügte, allein die snaphanen grassieren hier ziemblich 
her umb und in sonderheit in Bierrshärad und Engellholm, wo selbsten sie das ganstze härad zu 
sammen berufen und von ihr Schutwappen abgetwungen, ein gleiches procedere haben sie auch mit 
Engelhollms einwohner gehabt, in dhem sie etzliche.....von der Brücke abgewarfen. Damit sie desto 
sicher sein könten Ihr malitiositet auf gleicherweiße mit Ihren aus aus zu üben....Ich habe zwar alle 
brücken ..... laßen ab...., so den Snaphanen .... ....zu gehen...könten, weillen aber das waßer wieder 
feldt, ........nicht kan gehemmet werden, weder si.... wogen .... .... den contribution sehr hinderlich 
sein....” 
545 ”H General Majoren will gunstigst låta sig wara stden Helsingborg i bästa måttan recommenderat i 
synnerheet och at rådmanden Anders Jörans huus och hägård icke alt för mycket måtta ruineras, effter 
mögeligen ehn redelig suänsk kar här effter blifua äg re der till.” Opsnappede breve, DRA. 
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fact that is often forgotten is that the King’s Friskytter had their headquarters behind 
the safe city walls of Landskrona (Landscrone) and they operated from there, not from 
the border area. Maybe one should take into considerat on that, considering the 
circumstances, the swift-moving and intensely motivated friskytter might have been 
considered an efficient way of combating the enemy rather than a desperate measure. 
Maybe the Danish authorities really thought the friskytter might be their winning 
card, in the sense of a means they could employ in rder to distract the enemy enough 
to avoid direct confrontation on the Scanian front. The Danish war strategy during the 
latter part of the war aimed not at another full-scale confrontation in Scania but on 
diverting the attention from there and trying to beat the Swedes on other fronts (the 
Baltic provinces, Norway) and by other means (navy nd detachment warfare 
including the friskytter).  
 
The Development of the Friskytte Corps  
“Let him rage with plunder and fire 
He cannot subdue people’s hearts into loving him 
The old faith and duty remains steadfast in their minds, 
Still remains and is too deeply imprinted on them.” 
Anders Bording in Danske Mercurius 1st January 1677546 
 
Introduction 
This section contains an analysis of how the Danish aut orities elaborated a new 
“friskytte” concept that substituted the old snaphaner except in the meaning of 
criminal or thug. In part, this development was a response to the Swedish policy of 
criminalising snaphaner, in part it was a natural development of combat resources that 
was in tune with contemporary European trends.   
 
The Distinction between Snaphaner and Friskytter 
At the beginning of the campaigning season 1677 the Danes, including the friskytter, 
were preparing to take a stand that would make up for the disaster at Lund in 
December the year before. From June 1677 onwards the king issued vast numbers of 
friskytte licences and that same month the king also decreed that no “snaphaner” were 
allowed to dwell in the hundreds of Ingelstad (Ingelsted), Herrestad (Harrested) and 
                                               
546 ”Lad ham rase frit med plyndring og med lue,  
Til kaerlighed han ej kan hjerterne dog kue, 
Den gamle troskabs pligt jo fast i folkets sind, 
Vedbliver end, og alt for dybt er prentet ind.” 
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Ljunits (Lynits) since they had been causing the loca s such damage. Any snaphane 
that was caught there would be arrested and hung.547 This part of Scania was not 
particularly peaceful at the time, which there is ample evidence of in the sources 
although little research has been done into the activities of the snaphaner/friskytter in 
this area. One testimony of the precarious situation in the area and of the fear that the 
snaphaner/friskytter inspired in their adversaries is transmitted by the testimony of 
Weitik Albretch from Krakow. Albretch had been a dragoon under Colonel Jerta in 
the Swedish army. On 8th June 1677 he was caught by some Danish guards in the
surroundings of Malmö (Malmøe). The day after he explained that he had been 
stationed in Ystad (Ysted)during the past two months but the few Swedes that had 
stayed behind there had almost all been killed by the snaphaner. Major Klinckspor 
and some 200 dragoons were still in the surroundings of Ystad (Ysted)but they would 
be returning to Malmö (Malmøe) soon.548 Albretch had decided to try and get through 
the Danish lines to the Swedish enclave of Malmö (Malmøe) rather than to end up in 
the hands of the snaphaner.549 Numerous other testimonies of the situation in south-
eastern Scania during the summer of 1677 are mentioned in the chapter on Krabbe. In 
fact, Captain Klingspor who was mentioned by Albretch did not make it to Malmö 
(Malmøe) because he was captured by the “snaphaner” d sent as a POW to 
Copenhagen. The “snaphaner” that caught Klingspor were employees of the Krabbe-
Thott family, and as far as I know they were not registered as “friskytter” at all. 
However, the decree that banned snaphaner from Ingelstad (Ingelsted), Herrestad 
(Harrested) and Ljunits (Lynits) made (at least in appearance) a clear distinction 
between snaphaner and friskytter: naturally those legitimate friskytte-companies that 
were ordered to operate in the Ingelsted-Herrested-Ljunits area were still allowed to 
do so. District governor Owe Rommel in Kristianstad (Christianstad) received a 
similar order at about the same time: since the peasantry around Kristianstad 
(Christianstad) were complaining of the ravages of the friskytter Rommel should see 
to it that those who were guilty of abuse should be arr sted and brought to 
                                               
547 Sörensson, p.35: Royal Decree, 10th June 1677, Lit. K, DRA. 
548 Klinckspor is the Klingspor who would later be kidnapped at Marsvinsholm castle and sent to 
Copenhagen. 
549 The army camp at Malmö, 9th June 1677 (Leyren wed Malmø d.9 Junii 1677), Depositiones, 
DRA.”der kund blifwe nogle faa Swedske wed Ysted, som Snaphanerne hawer caputered, derfor wilde 
hand heller hazardere sig igenem de danske krigsfolck, en komme i Snaphanernes hender.” 
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Kristianstad (Christianstad).550 In this latter case it was not the matter of “every 
snaphane” that was found in the area but only of friskytter that were misbehaving. It is 
important to note that the intention of the authorities was that friskytter who 
misbehaved should be punished like other soldiers and that in the letter to Rommel he 
was encouraged to see to that.  Perhaps, by mid-1677 a friskytte who did not behave 
was called a snaphane? It is obvious that the Danish authorities were trying to 
distance themselves from “snaphaner” that by then had become a stained concept with 
all but pleasant connotations. It could also be that t ey were making an indirect 
statement by outlawing all sorts of snaphaner in certain areas. In a sense they agreed 
with the Swedes that to be a snaphane was a crime. But they were also saying that to 
resist the enemy under regulated forms as one could do among the friskytter was not 
only legal but commendable. Considering that the documents from the Krabbe case 
testify of quite fervent “snaphane” activities in the area during the latter part of 1677 
and no particular Danish efforts to hold back these activities, though single cases of 
arrests of marauders were reported, it should maybe be hypothesised that with the 
decree of 10th June the authorities did not mean anything but that operations in the 
service of the state were approved of whereas private looting and violence that was 
could not be interpreted as defence of Denmark/the Danish king was prohibited. 
 
Whereas  by mid-1677, the Danes made a fairly clear distinction between snaphaner 
and friskytter551, this was not the case with the Swedes, which the court records from 
the assizes of the hundred of Sunnerbo, Halland on 3rd May 1677 make quite clear. 
The records from this trial make no difference, andmoreover a clearly derogatory 
tone is used: whereas noble and courageous Swedes vanquish treacherous rogues, the 
                                               
550 Sörensson, p.35. Resolution på Rommels skrift af 19/6 677, I.B.,Rommel. DRA.  Owe Rommel 
wrote to the king on 19th June 1677 to ask permission to make the friskytter go regular, or at least more 
regular than they were at that point: he drove the same line as he did throughout the war and that, in 
part, was successful. Rommel insisted that regular officers head the friskytte units and that they should 
have standards and that they should take loyalty oaths on the banner. In the letter that he sent on 19th 
June he tried to promote this policy by claiming that it would put an end to the rampages the friskytter 
occasionally got away with out in the countryside and that outraged the peasants. That time Rommel’s 
request was not granted. It is the reply to it thatSörensson quotes on p.115 and that is somewhat out of
context as Sörensson presents it since it seems as if the big issue was the outrages of the friskytter 
whereas in Rommel’s letter it was the reformation and regularisation of the friskytte units that were th
main issue. He continued to drive that line throughout the war. Of course I will refer to Sörensson here 
since you think I should, and I will also refer to Fabricius III, p.115 where he mentions much the same 
thing. 
 
551 See e.g. decree that outlaws all snaphaner in certain parishes of south-eastern Scania, but certainly 
not the friskytter, p.158 of this thesis. 
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rogues murder honest Swedish cavaliers. On this day three men were brought to court 
on the charge of being snaphaner or of collaborating with them.552 The most 
prominent of these three was Jöns Tygesson (Jens Tygesen) of Göstorpshult in 
Halland who was (or had been) the bailiff of Sir Gabriel Gyllengrip. The second man 
was Olof Jöransson (Olluf Jørgensen) from Zealand who had been a soldier with 
Prince Jörgen’s Regiment but who had got separated from his company during the 
battle of Landskrona (Landscrone) and had sought shel er with the snaphaner. The 
third man was Sven Olofsson Speleman from Spång (Spaange) in the parish of 
Örkelljunga (Ørkellunge), Scania. The three men had been caught in the bailiff’s 
house by ”the noble and manly” captain Lars Hjerta and his horsemen and some 
peasants.  
During the interrogation Jöns Tygesson confessed that 50 snaphaner had come to his 
village some days earlier. The quartermaster of the snaphaner, Per Ryttare553, had 
seen to it that they all found lodgings in the village and Tygesson was given six of 
them. Tygesson had been in bed when the snaphaner arriv d but his servants and 
farm-hands were up and he himself got up to serve them some food. He later told the 
court that he had been too scared to refuse the snapha er anything. During supper 
they were saying that they had been to Sweden and that they had done a raid at 
Markaryd and that they were now heading for Fyen where they would be safe. After 
having smoked tobacco five of them went out to sleep in the stable but the one called 
Knut went to sleep on the bench inside. The snaphaner had no watches out and slept 
soundly until 7 o’clock in the morning when Tygesson served them breakfast. Some 
                                               
552 See Sunnerbo härads dombok (The Court records of the hundred of Sunnerbo), 3rd May 1677, 
www.halland.genealogi.se. This case has kindly been put to my notice by Jens Lerbom of the History 
Department at Lund University. 
553 Little is known about this man, except that he wasell-known at the time and in the few sources 
that mention him, it is taken for granted that peopl  knew who “Peder Reuchter” or in Swedish “Per 
Ryttare” was. See: Johnsson, (p.198), who mentions a trial in the assizes of northern Åsbo (Norra Åsbo 
domsbok 1680. LA) during which a witness claimed that “Per Ryttare” had beaten up a woman from 
Rye so badly that she dropped the letter she was suppo ed to deliver to “postal officer Tor Gabriel 
Hillethon at Markaryd.”  Peder Reuchter is also mentioned by Uno Röndahl (p.451) as one of the 
“missing” snaphane captains, i.e. one of many persons who are mentioned as captains or leaders of the 
snaphaner/friskytter in the sources but that we know ext to nothing about. Röndahl reports that on 20th 
July 1677 Peder Reuchter is mentioned in the sources as a quarter master and leader of a group of fifty 
friskytter at Hishult in Halland. Further according to Röndahl, on 30th August 1677 Peder Reuchter and 
“a group of Friskytter” (en Flok Friskytter) had crossed the border and gone to Markaryd where they 
had hustled 1300 heads of cattle that had been destined as food (slaktdjur) for the Swedish army and 
brought them to Landscrone. In case this Peder’s patronymic had been known, it would have been 
easier to identify him. At the time, all Scandinavians had patronymics, but commoners seldom had 
surnames. “Reuchter/Rytter” means “horserider, cavalryman” and it could have been either a proper 
surname or a nickname. 
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time after breakfast that day they Swedes arrived and started shooting in through the 
windows and put fire to the house. Tygesson, Speleman and Jöransson were caught 
while trying to escape from the flames.  
The court wanted to know why Tygesson had not sent for the Swedes who were 
hardly 20 kilometres away, but Tygesson had no promt reply. Thereafter he was 
condemned to death as a traitor. His execution would not be instant but he would have 
time to ask for grace from the king. The court explained its harsh judgment with the 
fact that Tygesson had proved himself a traitor when  did not send for the Swedes 
and that he would not have dared let a snaphane sleep inside his house unless they 
were close friends. In any case Tygesson should have killed the snaphane in question 
when he had the chance. The case was not improved by the fact that Tygesson’s son 
had ”gone over to the Danes” and that his brother-in-law used to organise drinking 
parties for snaphaner. Tygesson was declared to have”violated his loyalty to our 
Gracious King in that he has lodged and colluded with the men who are the worst and 
most evil enemies of us and our King and consequently he has committed Crimen 
Laesae Majestatis.”554  
The two “real” snaphaner fared worse. Jöransson confessed to having been with the 
snaphaner when two Swedish dragoons were caught outside the church in Halmstad 
and then murdered in the woods. He also confessed having participated in the raid 
against Markaryd. For these reasons he was condemned to death on the wheel and his 
head would be stuck on a pole and his body buried. The second ”rogue” deserved an 
even more atrocious death since he was a Scanian and had broken his loyalty oath. 
Speleman was reported to have ”fought against his righteous Lord and King and to 
have helped our worst enemy” and to have ”committed raids in our Fatherland.” He 
was also accused of having bragged of having murdered a Swedish man and to have 
been present when others had murdered Swedes. This last piece of information had 
been obtained from his ”mate” Jöransson. These crimes were more than sufficient to 
sentence Speleman to being quartered alive and put on 5 wheels. Since both men were 
”incurable knaves and snaphaner” the court decided that they should be executed 
instantly. 
This trial includes men from three different parts of old Denmark: a Scanian, a 
Zealander and a man from Halland. It was quite commn that Danish soldiers that had 
                                               
554 Sunnerbo härads dombok 3rd May 1677. 
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got separated from their companies joined the snaphaner. Sometimes they were 
deserters, sometimes prisoners-of-war that had escap d from the Swedes, sometimes 
they had simply got lost the way Jöransson claimed he had.  Tygesson, Speleman and 
Jöransson also came from totally different backgrounds. Tygesson was the prosperous 
farmer and bailiff. Jöransson was the professional soldier. Speleman’s background is 
unclear unless his surname (speleman=musician or fiddler) actually indicated his 
occupation. It should be noted that the Danes would not have called the company that 
came to Tygesson’s village snaphaner. The fact that there was a quartermaster and 
that they seem to have been fairly well organised indicates that we are dealing with a 
company of friskytter. Both Tygesson and Speleman were accused of having broken 
faith, of willingly having ignored their oath of loyalty to the Swedish king. It is ”us” 
and ”our king” against traitors and criminals who had gone over to the Danes.    
 
During the summer of 1677 the Danish army engaged in two disastrous battles. On 
26th June they tried to storm the Swedish garrison at Mlmö (Malmøe) but the attempt 
only resulted in massive losses on both sides. During the fight the Swedish governor 
general von Fersen was deathly wounded and he died some time later.555 The Danish 
army that consisted of somewhere between 11000 and 14000 men then marched in the 
direction of Landskrona (Landscrone) and took a stand at Billeberga on 13th July. 
Meanwhile a Swedish army of 10 000 regular soldiers and 4000 peasant soldiers from 
the Småland region broke up from their camp at Herrevadskloster at set out towards 
the south-western parts of Scania. 556 On 13th July the Swedes reached Tirup where 
the peasant soldiers were given responsibility for the left flank. King Charles himself 
led the right flank past Sireköping to Yllestad where they encountered the already 
battle-weary Danish army. The Danish cavalry was struck by what their commander 
von der Golz called “terror panicus” and when the whole western flank gave way 
King Christian decided to withdraw his troops inside the safety of the Landskrona 
(Landscrone) city walls.557 On the battlefield approximately 2000 dead and wounded 
                                               
555 He was then substituted by Jöran Sperling. 
556 Lars Ericson (Wolke) claims that the Swedish troops were numerically superior but Göran Rystad 
claims the contrary. See: Lars Ericson, Krig och krigsmakt under svensk stormaktstid, (War and 
Military Power during the Swedish Age of Greatness), Riga 2004, pp.216-217 and Göran Rystad, 
Slaget vid Landskrona (The Battle of Landskrona), pp.163-168 in Göran Rydstad (ed.), Kampen om 
Skåne, (The Battle for Scania), Falun 2005, p.164. 
557 Lars Ericson, Krig och krigsmakt under svensk stormaktstid, (War and Military Power during the 
Swedish Age of Greatness), Riga 2004, pp.216-217. 
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Swedes and 2500 dead and wounded Danes were left behind. A group of friskytter 
reported to Copenhagen that in accordance with their orders they had burnt four 
bridges and the remains of the Swedish camp and that they had “decapitated” all 
survivors on the battlefield.558 The Swedish army then camped at Rönneberga. After a 
short offensive that concentrated on Kristianstad (Christianstad) the Danish army was 
shipped over to Zealand again. Some detachments were left behind in the enclaves of 
Kristianstad and Landskrona (Christianstad and Landscrone). For the time being the 
friskytter were also left behind and were supposed to go on fighting the Swedes.  
 
The “little war” went on, not independently of, but in parallel to the great battles. It is 
important to note that the activities of the friskytter were not independent of the 
movements and actions of the main army, they were complimentary to them. In the 
north-west the friskytter had been trying to detain Swedish reinforcement troops and 
to ambush their convoys but these operations were gttin  ever more difficult to 
execute. Just after the failed attempt to storm Malmö (Malmøe) the friskytte captain 
Eskild Nielsen arrived at the main camp with his lieutenant.559 He claimed that the 
whole country would rise in rebellion if only they were ordered to do so. Then he 
reported that parties of Swedes were ravaging the lands between Ängelholm 
(Engelholm) and Båstad (Baasted) in the northwest: the main scope of these parties 
was to catch friskytter and as a consequence several of Eskild’s men had deserted 
from fear. Captain Eskeld now pleaded that the King should order these persons to 
return to their posts.560 Eskeld Nielsen’s report of 2nd July 1677 is an example of how 
the friskytter’s work had various aspects and also of their varying relationship to the 
                                               
558 Sörensson, p.41, reports his source as: I.S. Suppliq e, among the documents from September, DRA. 
559 Eskeld Nielsen, 2nd July 1677, I.S. DRA, No: 508. This letter is referred to by Sörensson, pp.28-29. 
Originally Nielsen came from the Bjäre (Bjærge) peninsula but concentrated his operations on the ridge 
between Halland and Scania. On 8th February 1677 an officer of the snaphaner called “Eskil” was 
reported to be the leader of a group of snaphaner in the parish of Brunnby, where they had gathered “on 
the hill there, and had boats ready in case of necessity”. The hill must have been Kullen or Kullaberg, 
the mountainous peninsula where Brunnby is situated. The name means “The hill”.(“På kullen 
därstädes”).These snaphaner got their provisions from the hundred of Bjäre. There was also another 
officer, who was more ruined (“en annan, som är mest ruinerat”), and they all had guns and rifles. See: 
Johnsson, pp.68-69 Information that lieutenant Klingspor obtained from a Danish prisoner, as reported 
among the Handl. Rör . Sk. Kr.1676-79. SRA. Johnsso w ndered who Eskeld might be since he had 
found no other information about him but it seems fairly clear that it was Captain Eskeld/Eskild/Eskil 
who is known from many other sources that have come to the light in more recent times. Not the least 
because Johnsson concentrated on the north-eastern rea whereas Captain Eskeld operated in the 
northwest and southwest. 
560 In some renewed licences the king orders those who have once joined the friskytter to go on with 
their work. See e.g. Thue Manssøn’s licence, Authorisation letter, U.S., No:588, DRA, Sörensson, 
p.28. 
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main army. They were not always asked to follow in the footsteps of the main army, 
or to work in unison with regular troops, but someti s (as in this case) they were 
simply set tasks in parallel to the regulars. Nielsen’  report is also interesting because 
it mentions how some friskytter reacted to the anti-s aphane raids up north and 
because it makes clear that Nielsen not only expected the king to take a certain 
responsibility for the friskytter but he also expected his mates to obey the king. The 
months that followed the return of the main part of he Danish army in 1677 left large 
parts of Scania in a power vacuum. Theoretically there were two kings and two 
administrations: one Danish with its main fortresses at Kristianstad (Christianstad), 
Helsingborg and Landskrona (Landscrone), and one Swedish that was led by the 
governor general in Malmö (Malmøe). In reality large tracts of land were abandoned 
by the authorities. Martin Weibull described the situation as disastrous: ”armies, 
bands of stray soldiers and snaphaner ruled the land as they pleased. Orders crossed 
orders, all parties threatened with murder and fire.”561 As is quite clear from Eskeld 
Nielsen’s reports, the situation was indubitably disastrous, but as I have already 
mentioned, neither the stray soldiers, nor the snaphaner ruled the land. Neither 
Eskeld Nielsen, nor Aage “the hare” Monsen were aiming at taking the rule in Scania: 
their goal was that King Christian V should do so on a permanent basis.  
Unfortunately chaos is often the result of a major wa in which both parties find 
themselves in a no win situation.  
 
Deserters and Renegades 
 
On the basis of a strictly organised finance system (Finanzverwaltung) the Absolute 
monarchs managed to create standing armies that were radically different from the 
mercenary troops of earlier ages (at least in contine al Europe). The army was 
subjected to the general centralisation process that was led by the monarch. In this 
kind of army the officers were mainly recruited among the nobility; it was a way of 
binding them closer to the monarchy and of incorporating them into the new system. 
According to Kunisch the ordinary foot soldiers had no personal relationship to the 
state whatsoever: “Sie wurden zu den Waffen gepreßt oder aus den untersten 
Bevölkerungsschichten rekrutiert, und darüber hinaus war das Unterstecken von 
                                               
561 Martin Weibull, Skånska samlingar, II, Till Skånes hi toria under öfvergångstiden 1658-1710, 1. 
Skånska kriget och snapphanefejden 1676-79, Lund 1873. 
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Kriegsgefangenen ein vielfach beschrittener Weg der Truppenergänzung.” All that 
held them together was constriction (Zwang). All that mattered was obeisance. For 
this reason desertion was a greater threat than war casualties.562 The irregular troops 
were often set the task of retrieving deserters from their own side and taking care of 
enemy deserters and renegades. In Scania this was one of the friskytter’s most 
important tasks as can been seen in the Depositiones documents. They were paid for 
every deserter from the Danish army they brought back to camp. In the same manner 
they strove to get hold of as many Swedes as possible, and very often these were 
deserters or stragglers. No Swede would willingly surrender to the friskytter because 
everyone knew they were authorised to “decapitate” whoever they liked of that nation 
and often did so. They were paid for each Swede they brought to the Danish army 
camp or the military headquarters in Landskrona (Landscrone) but the retribution for 
civilians and private soldiers was so low that often enough the friskytter could not be 
bothered to keep them alive. The task of catching Swedes and either bringing them in 
or killing them was sometimes taken care of by peasants or even women.563   
  
A report that might help us understand whom the friskytter picked up and why is that 
of 9th June 1677 in the Depositiones collection that st tes that that same day Aage 
Monsen (Harlof) and his friskytter had brought in ne men that they had “got hold 
of” a week earlier at Billinge near the Swedish camp at Riseberga. The first man on 
the list was Paul Hansen from Flensburg in southern De mark who had set out as a 
musketeer in the Danish army but who was caught by the Swedes during the battle of 
Halmstad. Since then he had served in the Swedish army. Hansen’s testimony consists 
of 2 pages full of information about the state of the Swedish army. Last but not least 
he reported on the movements of the great leaders of the ther side: ”Ebbe Ulfeld564 
has now gone to Sweden, and Johan Gyldenstiern is in the hundred of Gynge where 
he is burning down everything, the last place he burnt down was Agerup (modern-day 
                                               
562 Kunisch, p.2. In continental Europe most army camps were erected on open ground so that it would 
be more difficult to sneak away and the inside of the camps were closed societies where every 
individual was under continuous surveillance 
563 Fabricius III, p.91: “The fændrik had tried to escape twice but “the peasants and the women 
finally managed to catch him.” More examples! 
564 Ebbe Ulfeld had been lensmand and commander-in-chief of the Scanian forces during Horn’s War 
in the 1640’ies but he willingly went over to the Swedish side after the annexation. 
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Aggarp?).” Most other depositions are shorter than H sen’s but the basic elements 
remain the same.565  
The next man on the list from 9th June was Per Andersen from Småland (Sweden) 
who had fought in Colonel Post’s regiment. He estima ed the Swedes’ numbers to 
7000. Andersen had heard that the Swedes were expecting reinforcements from 
Sweden and that they wanted to ”defend the borders of their country.”566  
Then there was Peter Jonas from Calmar (Sweden) who had served a year in the 
Danish army and said that he would not mind working for the Danes again. He was 
serving as a dragoon in the Swedish army when he got caught by the friskytter. So 
here we have a Swede who had served the Danes and claimed he would not mind 
changing sides again!  
The next soldier on the list was Per Ottesen from “Grenna” or as we write it today: 
Gränna (Sweden), who was a dragoon in the Scanian dragoons and ”had been in this 
land for six years.” 567 The Scanian dragoons were largely composed of native Swedes 
who had moved to Scania. The fifth man was Hoken Nelsen from Kristianopel 
(Christianopel) (Scania) who was a dragoon and had a f rmstead that had been given 
to him by the Swedish state. He had served for 8 years and his father was a soldier in 
Kristianstad (Christianstad). 
The next one was Wolfs Clof from Lübeck who had his wife and children in Kiel. 
After having fought on the Danish side at the battle of Lund he had been made a 
prisoner of war and then a soldier by the Swedes. Clof said that he ”would be glad to 
join the Danes ” and enrolled with the friskytter. After Clof there was Henric Muller 
from Dresden. Muller said that he had been in Landskrona (Landscrone) with his 
Danish company about a year earlier and that he had gone out into the countryside to 
buy milk when he was caught by the Swedes. Underneath his deposition there is a 
little note that says: ”We suspect that he deserted (of his own will) from our troops.” 
The last two on the list, Peter Jürgens and Johan Helwig were of German origins too 
and had both originally fought on the Danish side. Jürgens had been caught by the 
Swedes at the battle of Lund and had remained in their service ever since. Helwig 
who came from Lübeck had ended up in the hands of the Swedes at Karlshamn. The 
testimonies of these nine men give us a fairly clear picture of what the main task of 
                                               
565 Aage Monsen Harlof’s report from 9th June 1677, Depositiones, 1677.  
566 ”det blef sagt att de wilde sende lige saa meget fock ra Suerig enn som nyligen war kommen, og 
landet wilde ey heller meere gifwe, mens wel forsware deres grendtzer:” 
567 Aage Monsen Harlof’s report from 9th June 1677, Depositiones, 1677.  
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the friskytter consisted in (apart from outright combat): procuring information about 
the enemy. Out of the 9 prisoners only Per Andersen did ot have any connection to 
Denmark; this fact makes it likely that Monsen was pointing at men that could be 
considered traitors or at least involuntary deserters. These nine “traitors” were brought 
in by the famous friskytte lieutenant Aage Monsen and his men. Directly after the 
depositions of the nine men Monsen reported the following:  
“Last Sunday at noon a woman came to Boserup, which is situated 4 miles from the camp. This woman 
had letters with her from Malmö and she was to deliver them to the Swedish camp. The friskytter went 
to look for her almost immediately but could not find her.”  
 
Did Monsen and his men chase a Swedish (female) spy sometime in between catching 
and handing over the soldiers who had been fighting for the Swedes? It seems like it 
Monsen then went on to report that:  
”there is Danish cavalry approximately 4 or 5 miles from this camp but they want to stay with the 
friskytter and ride around the country: they are asking for a permit to gain entrance to the camp. There 
still are several men who have been in hiding with the peasants all since the battle of Lund; they too 
would like to have a permit so that they could come to the camp.” 
  
What Monsen meant was probably that there were Danish dragoons that had got 
separated from the regular army and were fighting together with the friskytter. The 
disaster at Lund seven months earlier had driven may Danish soldiers to take refuge 
with peasants and friskytter in all parts of Scania. It is not to be totally excluded that 
they might have been civilians who had joined the friskytter and wanted to be 
accepted as such.568 The report from 9th June 1677 ends with a plea from Aage 
Monsen and ”some other friskytter” that His Majesty may grant them a permit to 
attack the enemy. Monsen added that he would soon deliver a muster roll of all his 
men that could be used in case any complaints should come in. The only muster roll 
of Monsen’s men that is conserved from the year 1677 is dated to January so it is not 
sure whether he actually sent in a new roll that yer. 
 
An interesting point in Harlof’s letter is where hementioned peasants that were hiding 
“men”.  Very likely it was the matter of Danish soldiers that had got separated from 
the regular army. The disaster at Lund seven months earlier had driven many Danish 
                                               
568 The Danish word ”Ryttere” that I have translated with ”cavalry” had a somewhat ambiguous 
meaning in that it originally just meant ”rider, horseman” but as a military term it was used as a 
synonym of cavalry or dragoons. 
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soldiers to take refuge with peasants and friskytter in all parts of Scania. 569 On 29th 
June 1677 Peter Jansen from Altona (near Hamburg) was accompanied by a group of 
friskytter to the Danish camp outside Malmö (Malmøe).570 Groups of friskytter came 
in every day with prisoners or persons who wanted to be accompanied to the Danish 
camp of their own free will. Sometimes the clerks only write “a group of friskytter”, 
sometimes they indicate which unit it was or the officers that led them. At other times 
it is just “Aage Monsen”, “Captain Simon” or “Captain, later Major  Dreyer.” In this 
case some anonymous friskytter had brought in Peter Jansen who had first served as a 
musketeer in the Danish army but he had been caught by t e Swedes during the battle 
of Lund. He had been ”constrained” to take service in the Scanian Regiment (that 
fought for the Swedes) but he had escaped as soon a he could. Then he sought refuge 
with some peasants in the village of Hallösa (Lyckås) and remained there until the 
friskytter came and brought him to the Danish camp. It is not at all clear under what 
circumstances the friskytter picked Jansen up from the peasants. It seems as if there 
were an underground movement that organised contacts between peasants and 
friskytter and that some peasants took it on them to hide away refugees until they 
could be collected by the friskytter that would accompany them to the Danish camp. 
 
On 21st June 1677 a friskytte by the name of Madtz Persen from the hundred of Färs
(Ferhs) brought a Swedish dragoon to the Malmö (Malmøe) camp. The Swede was a 
certain Eric Olsen Riman (Olsson Ryman or Rydman in Swedish) from the border 
region of Småland. Riman had served as a dragoon under field marshal Aschenberg 
but unfortunately he had ended up in a fight with a colleague. Right there and then 
Riman had decided to escape and had deserted the Swedish camp. He had not come 
far before he started having second thoughts and deci ed to make his way back again 
but by then it was too late because he was caught by a group of friskytter. Riman 
seems to have been left in the custody of some peasants with whom he stayed for 
three weeks. Then Madtz Persen arrived. His original mission was that of liquidating 
the Swede but the peasants pleaded for the prisoner’  lif . In the end Persen agreed on 
                                               
569 The Danish word ”Ryttere” that I have translated with ”cavalry” had a somewhat ambiguous 
meaning in that it originally just meant ”rider, horseman” but as a military term it was used as a 
synonym of cavalry or dragoons. 
570 The camp outside Malmö 29th June, 1677 Depositiones, RA. 
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bringing Riman to the Danish camp instead.571 This report transmits important 
information about the friskytter and the way they worked. It seems as if the friskytter 
were constantly on the outlook for deserters and other Swedes that they could catch. 
In Riman’s case they seem to have been unsure of what to do with him so they left 
him with some peasants until further orders arrived. Unfortunately we are not told 
whom the order of shooting Riman could be traced back to. 
 
On 21st June 1677 one of Major Dreyer’s friskytter who was c lled Per Ericsen 
consigned three prisoners that he had caught in the woods.572 These men were the 
only ”real” deserters from the Danish army that seem to have come into the camp 
during June 1677. They did not even pretend that they would want to get back to the 
Danish army again. Perhaps the evidence against them was too massive. One of them 
was Morten Persen from Næstved573 in Zealand who had deserted from his regiment 
during the siege of Landskrona (Landscrone). He had sol  his equipment and stayed 
”in this land” until he was finally caught by friskytter in Aahus.  The other two had 
much the same story to tell. 
 
A deposition from 22nd June 1677 gives us further evidence on how the friskytter 
worked. Hans Adolph von Schetwitz from Saxony had served as a corporal in the 
Danish army but had become a prisoner of war during the battle of Lund. He was then 
taken to Växjö in Sweden where he had to become a second lieutenant in the Swedish 
army. In May 1677 his squadron was sent to Scania574 where he took his chance to 
desert as soon as he could. von Schetzwitz then ”dwelled  among the friskytter” until 
he managed to get to the Danish camp on 21st June. Schetzwitz seems to have had his 
mind set on returning to the Danes all along and he found that the friskytter were the 
means by which he could do that. As in so many other cases they served as a link to 
the Danish authorities and a complement to the regular army. He also reported that in 
                                               
571  The camp outside Malmö 21st June 1677, Depositiones, DRA. The Swede’s name has been 
Danicised: most likely he was called Erik Olsson Ryman.  
572 The camp outside Malmö 20th June 1677, Depositiones, DRA. Major Hendrik Fredrik Dreyer and 
his company were mainly active on the plains around Malmö. See Röndahl pp.437-438. 
573 Here spelt “Nestved”. 
574 ”her til landet” to this country as the report from 22nd June 1677 (Depositiones, RA) has it. 
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Sweden ”Both high and low despise the Danish nation very much.” Count Wittenberg 
had even asked him “how he could have served such people as the Danes.”575 
 
Jens Jenssön från Stoby (Stoheby) was another friskytte of peasant or yeoman origins 
who had peasants working for him.576 He was good friends with Simon Andersen and 
first went to the Army Board to apply for a license in the company of Andersen. 
Jenssön continued to operate from his farmstead in the Ringsjö (Ringsøe) region even 
after becoming a professional friskytte. On his arriv l at the Danish camp outside 
Malmö (Malmøe) on 26th June he reported that he had sent a peasant to the Swedish 
camp and that this peasant had brought him useful information about the Swedish 
camp at Riseberga (Risselberg in the source).577 Jenssön now reported that the enemy 
had received reinforcements of 300 men, and a largemount of provisionings “from 
Sweden” and moreover, they were also receiving large mounts of food from the 
peasants in the area, and (according to Jenssön’s ma ) all horses and carts that were 
brought into the Swedish camp were confiscated. The people in the areas around 
“Risselberg” had been ordered to bring wagons and strong horses with provisioning to 
the Swedish camp. Finally Jenssön reported that the Swedes had built a bridge across 
the river that was broad enough for four wagons to cross alongside and that some 
were saying in the Swedish camp that they might be marching towards Ängelholm 
(Engelholm) soon. The encounter between Jenssön and the peasant had taken place in 
Jenssön’s home; this fact makes it rather likely that the bond between the two men 
was one that should be seen in the context of the local community of Stoby put it in 
his frequent reports it seems as if regular friskytte captains like him on the one hand 
had his men who were enlisted and recognised officially but that he also worked with 
”peasants” who were what one would call spies. The peasants were constrained to 
come to the Swedish camps with food supplies and wagons and other things that 
served the Swedes and that gave them an excellent cha ce of seeing what was going 
on there. 
 
                                               
575 ”Baade høye of lafwe ere saa foragtelige ower den danske nation, som Graf Wittenberg i 
synderlighed spurde ham, hworfor hand wilde tiene saadanne folck som de danske etc.” 
576 Jenssön and his company worked mainly around the Ringsjö lake in central Scania. See Röndahl, 
pp.423-425.   
577 Depositiones, DRA. Jens Jenssön’s report, 26th June 1677. 
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Other examples of ordinary peasants who seem not to have left their farms all that 
much were the “snaphaner” that appear in the court cases that were the long aftermath 
of the Captain Bendix case. The people who were kill d n the Skräddaröd massacre 
were considered “snaphaner” by the Swedes but they themselves saw themselves as a 
normal peasant community consisting of families that ran farms and employed 
farmhands that were normally the sons of neighbouring families.578 In fact Broor 
Andersson, Swen Nillsson, Nills Swensson and Truls Jönsson were all condemned to 
the stake and wheel after having been shot at home in th ir absolutely average south-
eastern farmsteads. Both their community and that of their acquaintances that survived 
(but ended up in court thirty years later) give the impression of a normal and 
honourable peasant community, which in itself illustrates how ambiguous the concept 
of a “snaphane” could be.  
  
I believe that there were three categories of snaphaner/friskytter with peasant or 
yeoman backgrounds: the first and largest one was con tituted by peasants who still 
led a normal life on their farms most of the time ev n if some of them moon-lighted 
as spies or participated in the odd attack on the Sw des.  
The second category was that of the snaphaner who were people who had given up 
normal life in order to fight the Swedes. This group might have included outlaws of 
various kinds but I have only found one case of a snaphane/friskytt who was an ex-
convict. In the documents this kind of “snaphaner” was normally constituted of men 
who owned or worked on farms or who had had quite legal jobs before the war. Many 
of them returned to their farms during the cold season. Finally there was the category 
of the registered friskytter that considered themselves part of the Danish army. Even 
among them those who could returned to their farms during the winter season. It is 
very hard to decide where the lines should be drawn. 
 
In June 1677 general major Schack proposed that a number of free-lancing groups of 
friskytter should be united into a company that could help protect the town of 
Landskrona (Landscrone). Schack believed that one way of disciplining those 
friskytter who were not officially registered would be to have them registered and 
paid. The friskytter were reportedly quite keen on the idea and assured they would be 
                                               
578 Erich Tuedsen declared that the Swedes went from one h use to another and shot whoever they 
came across. See the section on Captain Bendix. 
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able to gather well over 100 men in only a few days. They were even willing to 
renounce on monetary payment if the king entitled them to claim food rations from 
the peasantry. Schack proposed that they be provided with a nice Danish flag. 
Probably nothing came of Schack’s proposal: there is no registered reply to his 
proposal and a particular company that was tied to the governor of Landskrona 
(Landscrone) is not mentioned in any other sources.579  
 
By the summer of 1677 the snaphaner had become a serious problem not only in the 
north but in the whole of Scania. But so had the snaphane catchers, depending on 
which side of the conflict you were on. One of several Swedish responses to the 
outburst of “snaphane” activities was the establishment of a special corps of 
snaphane-catchers.  In the south this corps was headed by Captain Simon Bengtsson 
and the mayor of Ystad (then Ydsted), Olaus Harman (also spelt “Ole Hermand”). At 
the beginning the headquarters were at Näsbyholm castle, but as we will see they 
were later moved to Krageholm (then Krogholm).580 The second most important move 
against the snaphaner, and the one that was especially directed against the estate 
dominated south, was the deportation of the nobility (and gentry) to a camp at 
Vimmerby just across the border and the consequent occupation of their habitations. 
The most robust country houses and castles were turn d into heavily armed fortresses 
that were to constitute strongholds in the battle against the snaphaner. However, this 
move encountered fierce passive resistance among the Scanian nobility that tried in 
vain to negotiate a compromise with the Swede.581 The foremost spokesman of the 
nobility, Jørgen Krabbe of Krogholm (later to be called “Krageholm”), was arrested 
and executed on dubious grounds and several other prominent noblemen fled to 
Denmark as a consequence of Swedish threats to drag them to Sweden in chains.582 
Consequently the “evacuation” of the castles and noble mansions and the 
                                               
579 Sörensson, p.30, refers to: I.S., June 1677, No:520, DRA. 
580 Skriv till gen.guv, Landsarkivet, Lund, quoted by Johnsson, pp.105-106. 
581 Fabricius III: pp.121-124 and p. 141.83 men were stationed at Krogholm (46 of them were 
dragoons), 115 at Borrby in the deepest south (34 dragoons), 42 at Swaneholm (20 dragoons), 37  at 
Getinge skans (7 dragoons), 57 At Heckeberga (27 dragoons), 57 af Söffwede (27 dragoons) and 68 at 
Erichsholm (33 dragoons).  Register of the soldiers that have been selected here from the garrison for 
the  occupation of the noble houses and also of those that have been added to Söfwede from 
Erichshollm and Knutstorp,  “Specification på dhet Manskap sin heruthur Guarnisonen till  dhe  adelige 
husens besättning är  uthtagit som  och huadh  ifrå Erichshollm och Knutstorp till Söfwede är kommit”, 
GG, SRA. 
582 See the chapter on the Krabbe case. 
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transformation of them into outposts in the battle against the “snaphaner” was not 
completed until the year after. 
 
Autumn and Early Winter 1677 
During the autumn of 1677, or possibly the winter 1677-78, the Swedish commanders 
Gyllenstierna and Augustin Leijonschöld organised assemblies in each hundred 
during which those friskytter that gave up were automatically pardoned.583 Those 
“snaphaner” that accepted the amnesty offer would then have to hunting for other 
“snaphaner” themselves.584 The locals were also ordered to organise groups of guards 
or snaphane-catchers among themselves. In this manner the Swedes thought they 
would be able to fight the snaphaner from the “inside” and it was clearly stated that 
those Scanians who wanted to pass for “good Swedish subjects” would agree to 
participate in snaphane hunts and to escort Swedish convoys when necessary.585 
Sörensson interpreted the peasant guards mainly as an ttempt to create something 
like friskytter fighting on the Swedish side instead.586  To me Sörensson fails to see 
that the Swedes were trying to fight the “snaphaner” from within, and the 
consequences of that. Since I feel confident (on the basis of my research) that the 
majority of the “snaphaner” during the Scanian War we e perfectly normal people 
who continued to make part of local society, the implementation of peasant guards 
would mean that you turned one neighbour against the o er and that sometimes the 
peasant guards that took the morning shift were the snaphaner who ambushed a 
convoy in the evening. I also think it was part of a Swedish emargination policy that 
aimed at stabilising new confines between who was part of the Christian (Lutheran) 
community and not, and that definitely left the snaph ner on the wrong side of that 
confine. Emarginating and disseminating disaccord inside the groups of people who 
                                               
583  Jacobsen, pp.152-153 dates these events to the wint r of 1678, but he does not precise the dates. 
The preceding chapter ended with December1677 and the account of Gyllenstjerna’s and 
Leiyonskiöld’s campaign is the first passage of the c apter that describes the events of 1678. Sörensson 
(p.45) dates this campaign to the autumn of 1677. See also: Jensen, p.340 and Fabricius III, pp. 147-
148. 
584 Swedish instruction on snaphane hunting etc. from 1678, quoted by Johnsson, p.123. 
585 See: Johnsson, p.125 that quotes a decree from the Handl. rör. D:ska kriget 1676-79, SRA. In the 
text the ethnicities that are mentioned are “skåningar och halländingar” i.e. the inhabitants of the 
provinces of Scania and Halland. See also: pp. 122-124 for Swedish instructions on how to fight the 
“snaphaner”. 
586 Cf. Sörensson, p.46: Furthermore the commoners were called together everywhere and received 
orders to keep guard against the snaphaner on a 4-shift-basis. A certain amount of organisation of these 
peasant guards was also introduced. In this manner they (the Swedes) wanted to combat the friskytter 
with a similar organisation. They also had some success with this, quite a few “snaphaner” asked for 
parole and the remains withdrew themselves to the protection of the Danes.” 
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considered themselves communities with certain boundaries at the beginning of the 
war, in order that those boundaries might be changed. 
 
On 29th October 1677 Jens Harboe communicated to Meijer that he was sending out 
about 300 friskytter together with parts of the cavalry to find forage, which shows that 
the Danish authorities actively employed the friskytter on missions like 
that.587According to Sörensson who first mentioned the 29th October report, the 
friskytter were greatly upset that commander Uffeln would not let them inside the 
fortress.588 It seems from Harboe’s reports that Pieter Steenssön for one was already 
inside, so it can only be assumed that some friskytter were exempt from Uffeln’s 
rules. But then, it could seriously be questioned whether Stenssön should be counted 
as a “friskytte” at all since even Sthen Jacobsen describes him as a regular soldier.589 
It is also obvious from Harboe’s reports to Herman Meijer, Chief Military Prosecutor 
(general auditør) and influential enough to be called “the true commander of the 
Danish army”590, in Copenhagen that Uffeln and Harboe did not get on. In a letter 
from 24th September or October 1677 Harboe claimed that he had to make Uffeln do 
things, such as send out Pieter Stenssön on reconnaissa ce.591 But then, one might 
wonder whether anybody got on in Landskrona (Landscrone): towards the end of 
August that year Harboe had declared that “chaos reigned in Landscrone, because all 
the commanders were at loggerheads with each other” and there was even risk of a 
duel between Baudissin and von der Goltz.592 Uffeln was only in service between 30th 
August and 8th November 1677. Still according to Sörensson, when Uffeln refused to 
let the friskytter in, many of them went over to Copenhagen where they pleaded with 
the king for their right to winter-quarters and food.593 Uffeln was substituted by the 
Duke of Croy on 8th November, officially because of his poor health.594 The Duke of 
Croy did not stay long; he himself claimed he found everything in a state of chaos in 
                                               
587 Sörensson, p. 39. The letter is to be found among the Indkomne Sager, No: 519, DRA. 
588 Sörensson, p. 46  who stated his sources as: reports fr m Landscrone, November-December 1677, 
I.S. DRA.     
589 See: Section on Pieter Stensen. 
590 See: Jensen, p.299. It was Fieldmarshal Joachim Rüdiger von den Goltz who claimed that during 
Mejer’s visit to Landscrone in August 1677. 
591 But then, Harboe often did not disagree with his superiors’policies: see e.g. his 2nd January 1678 
report on torture (Harboe to Meijer, Indkomne Sager 1678, DRA). 
592 Jens Harboe to Herman Meijer, 25th August 1677, as referred to by Jensen, p.302. 
593 Jacobsen (p.153) agrees with Sörensson that most friskytter went over to Zealand that winter, but he 
claims they only stayed for the month of January. 
594 See: Jensen, p.320. 
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Landskrona (Landscrone) and his detractors claimed he was generally disliked 
because of his manners. 595 By the end of November he had been substituted by 
Meerheim who took over the position as commander. 596 Officially Uffeln was 
governor of Landskrona (Landscrone) until he died on 11th January 1678.597 
 
On 11th November the king ordered that all friskytter hat arrived in Landskrona 
(Landscrone) should swear a loyalty oath after which they would be provided for 
during the coldest months. Private soldiers received 1 rigsdaler, lower officers 2 and 
officers 4 rigsdaler a month apart from housing and food. In return they would have 
to obey the governor’s orders and help break the ice in the harbour.598 Hermansen and 
Knud Espensen Bøg599 and their companies agreed to break ice in the harbour and 
spent the winter in Landskrona (Landscrone). Bøg had received authorisation from 
Hermansen to enlist a squadron of “dragoons” and he had paid for all the expenses 
himself. In a letter to the king Bøg asks that his squadron be recognised as part of the 
regular army.600 Dreyer’s company was registered in Landskrona (Landscrone) but 
also in Copenhagen at exactly the same time. Many of the friskytter complained that 
they did not want to do chores like breaking ice and consequently went over to 
Copenhagen instead. Some of the friskytter spent th winter of 1677-1678 on Zealand 
where they were provided with lodgings, food and money, just like soldiers from the 
regular army. Eskeld Nielsen and his men found winter-quarters in Elsinore.601 Those 
friskytter that came from Blekinge should spend the winter on Bornholm from where 
it was easier for them to get back home, the Gønger should go to Landskrona 
(Landscrone).602     
Meerheim’s Mission 
Towards the end of November 1677 general major Meerheim was set on a secret 
mission. He was ordered to confiscate what forage he could find, especially on the 
great estates, and to either partition it out or burn it. Much the same rules were applied 
for horses. Meerheim was expressly ordered to employ friskytte troops on this 
                                               
595 See: Jensen, p.320. 
596 See: Jensen, p.320. 
597 Jensen, p.341. 
598 Sörensson, p.46. He refers to a Royal Ordinance of 11th November 1678, DRA. 
599 He signed his own name Captain Knudt Böge. 
600  Sörensson, p.47. 
601 Sörensson, p.24 and p.48. 
602 I.B. Arensdorff, January 1678, DRA. Sörensson, p.49. 
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mission, at least in areas where other Danish detachments could not reach.603 They 
were also expected to interrupt the Swedish postal line between Helsingborg and 
Halmstad and to confiscate the letters. Meerheim was ordered to keep the precise 
contents of these orders a secret so that others could be blamed for whatever havoc 
was wreaked.604 Sörensson hypothesised that it was only natural the Danish 
authorities expected that the friskytter be held responsible.605 In case this was really 
so, then it was not only the Swedish authorities that ried to criminalise the friskytter 
and to clump them together with whatever disobedient Scanians they could track 
down as “snaphaner”, but the Danish authorities too used the friskytter as political 
scapegoats. Nevertheless, we cannot take for granted that the Danish authorities 
expected that the blame be attributed to the friskytter. There was a distinct 
“acknowledging tendency” towards the friskytter at the time that included bestowing 
the name of the King’s Friskytter on them. It hardly seems likely that the Danish king 
would have wanted the blame for the devastation mission  to fall on an armed corps 
that carried his name. The Danish authorities certainly expected someone to take the 
blame, but maybe the scapegoats might be the more indefinable “snaphaner” that the 
Swedes (and some other people) sighted all over the land and that could be more or 
less identified with marauders and looters. There is v dence that people sometimes 
did not know what kind of troops had come down upon them, whether they were 
regular soldiers or friskytter, but on the other hand, nor were these troops mistaken for 
gangs of criminals.  It consequently remains unclear who was expected to be held 
responsible for these actions, although it is beyond doubt that they were part of a 
carefully planned Danish strategy of war, not a haphazard decision as Sörensson 
seems to have thought. Jensen stressed that the plans for this stratagem were discussed 
in the King’s Council and how Danish “strøjfpartier” were continuously sent out on 
similar missions, normally under Meerheim, Rantzau or Schwanewedel.606 Already at 
the beginning of 1677 War Councillor Herman Meijer had proposed that the Scanian 
plains be laid waste so that the enemy would not be abl  too subsist and the 
                                               
603 As Fabricius (III, p.154) noted, Meerheim and Schwanewedel specialised in setting out on minor 
expeditions with combined regular and irregular (friskytte-) troops. See also Jensen, p.418. 
604 Sörensson, pp.34-35. He refers to a ”Order to Meerheim”, 27th November 1677, U.S., No 1153, 
DRA. 
605 Sörensson, p. 35. 
606 Jensen, pp. 340-341, pp. 346-347 and p. 419 on which Jensen quotes a  memorandum written by 
Herman Meijer (?) in October 1678 that states that t e aim was to bring all forage in the land into the
Landscrone fortress, and as much food and firewood as possible.  
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population of those areas be moved to Zealand.607 It was consequently an issue that 
had important lobbyists in Danish government circles. Although Meerheim did 
receive secret orders, he most certainly had more tasks in Scania than confiscating 
forage. Jensen reported that the General Major was sent to Landskrona (Landscrone) 
at the end of November with the official excuse of c llecting information about the 
enemy, but that his real mission was to try to straighten up the situation inside the 
fortress where far too many soldiers were dying from illnesses and the internal 
organisation was in chaos. In fact, shortly afterwards, Meerheim was nominated 
temporary governor of Landskrona (Landscrone) and the situation inside improved 
considerably. 608 
 
On 22nd December 1677, the commander of Helsingborg Carl Hå d reported to 
governor general Sperling and to a “baron” friend of his  that “Mörheim” had no more 
than 300 cavalry with him, including 60 officers tha  had deserted from the Swedes 
and 50 snaphaner and that the infantry consisted of maximum 1500 men..609 It is 
obvious that Hård considered the “snaphaner” a separate group enough to mention, 
just as he thought he should mentions the “renegades”, although we do not know why 
he thought so. It could have been that they were considered less good at fighting, but 
it could also have been that Hård felt he should mention there were Scanians on the 
scene. On the other hand, and that is my main point here, the fifty “snaphaner” made 
part of “Mörheim’s” cavalry to Hård too, and he did not try to pretend they were a 
pack of murderers that were crawling behind the hedgerows on the look-out for prey. 
From a military point of view he did not report of them as one did of outlaws or 
common criminals at all.  
Conclusions: 
The first part of this section included an analysis of the Danish and the Swedish 
attitudes to the snaphaner/friskytter by mid-1677, as expressed through court records, 
official decrees, letters and authorisations. By that ime it was obvious to everyone 
                                               
607 Jensen p.242. 
608 Jensen, p.320. 
609 To Baron och gen: lieut: from Carl Hård (in German), 22nd December 1677 (Helsingborg). He 
reported the same to Sperling in Swedish on the same date (Hård to Sperling, 22nd December 1677, 
both among the Intercipierte breve, DRA. Overløbere or renegades were often Danes that had served 
under the Swedes for different reasons. Some were Scanians that had been drafted, others were 
continental- or island Danes that had been caught by Swedish troops and had taken service with them 
(voluntarily or not). Some were mercenaries of various nationalities that had served under the Swedes 
but thought the Danes would offer them a better deal.  
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that there was a wide gap between the Danish and Swe ish conceptions of what kind 
of battle techniques would be considered permissible in the war, or maybe rather what 
kind of combatants would be allowed on the battle scene. The friskytter were not only 
accepted, but frequently employed by the Danes and in the subsection on deserters 
and renegades I analysed what task they were set when their services where required. 
It is unclear to what degree their ethnic background played a role in the Swedish 
criminalisation of the snaphaner, but if nothing else it did play a motivational role in 
that their origins rendered them Swedish or at least, bound by oath to the Swedish 
king according to Swedish theories.  
 
I have also tried to underline that the snaphaner/friskytter depended on the Danish 
army and that, throughout, they worked either in parallel to or in unison with it. 
  
In the latter part of this section I have tried to s udy the events of the winter 1677-78 
as lived by the “snaphaner”. I only highlighted what I thought of particular 
importance to my analysis, e.g. the fact that the authorities were trying to provide 
lodgings for them and that they were expected to work extra in the Landskrona 
(Landscrone) harbour but obviously not in Copenhagen, although they were not very 
popular there. It is consequently obvious that a great deal of administrational work 
went into the organisation of the friskytter troops and that a notable effort was made 
on the side of the state to keep them going. Obviously because the authorities thought 
the friskytter would be of some worth in the fight for Scania. These are facts that I 
needed to include, both in order to render a coherent picture of the development of the 




The Danish authorities periodically sponsored a policy that based much of their 
operations in Scania on “party” or detachment warfare that was undertaken by 
friskytter, smaller units from the regular army and hired Croat units. Those who 
favoured this policy the most also favoured the evacuation of the population and the 
laying waste of the land so that the Swedes would not be able to subsist there 
anymore. In this section I have tried to illustrate how Danish officials employed spies 
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and friskytter in their work (Swedish snaphaner) and how they did not, and how the 
Danish state tried to tie the friskytter corps closer to itself as the Swedish state 
increased its tendency to criminalise those whom they considered snaphaner. 
 
Traitors and Spies 
Hostilities did not cease because of the winter, although there were no major 
operations during the coldest two or three months. Nevertheless, as we have already 
seen, there were activities on both sides all through the year, not the least intelligence 
operations that might prepare the way for the coming campaign. On 2nd January 1678, 
War Commissary Jens Harboe reported to Herman Meijer that they had a peasant 
sitting there (at Landskrona/Landscrone) in arrest b cause he was seriously suspected 
of being a spy. He claimed that he dealt in silk and did small business trips between 
Landskrona (Landscrone) and Helsingborg, but this man was known to be a shady 
character and he had already been in custody once. Wh n body-searched, they found a 
considerable amount of silver money (grob silber gelt) on him. They had threatened 
him with “Tortur” but it was of no use, the man stuck to his story. Jens Harboe was 
quite annoyed that he was not in charge himself because he (or so he told Meijer) 
would not have made himself second thoughts about tightening a screw or two around 
the rascal’s thumbs.610 Apparently it was not on the order of the day to use torture on 
spy suspects in Danish towns. Harboe’s comments also show that views on the subject 
of torture varied at the time and that people did discuss it. 
 
Spies did abound, however. On 5th January 1678 miller Hans Jonsen from Västra 
Karaby (Wester Carreby) just south of Landskrona (Landscrone) arrived at the city 
gates with a message from his employer, the vicar. The vicar was wondering whether 
he might send his furniture and other belongings to Landskrona (Landscrone) since 
the Swedes were evacuating the whole area within two or three (Swedish?) miles’ 
distance from the city walls. Clergy and peasants alike were being asked to remove 
themselves “mit Sack und Pack”. The Swedish district governor Lewenhaupt had sent 
out the orders from Engelholm, which also other peasants bore witness of.611 The day 
                                               
610 ”wenn ich was zu sagen hatte, wolte ich gantz keine gewissens werch daraus machen, ihm einige 
schreuben auf den deumen zu setzen.” 
611 Preen’s report of 4th January 1678 that is to be found among Harboe’s reports, DRA. This notice is 
in another handwriting, dated 5th January 1678. It was probably taken down by a scribe or guard at 
Jonsen’s arrival at the city gates. 
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after, Harboe reported to Meijer that the peasants were coming in with their 
belongings since they were afraid the enemy would brn it.612 Another clergyman 
who reported to the Danes in Landskrona (Landscrone) was Hans Gudmanni Brock 
vicar of the village Halmstad in Scania who left at least one detailed report of the 
situation to lieutenant Preen around this time.613 During the war Brock was 
imprisoned by both Swedes and Danes.614 
 
The Burning of Örkened (Ørkende) 
In February 1678 Aage “the Hare” Monsen Harlof, Niels Andersen and their Gønger 
were sent over to Landskrona (Landscrone) According to the pay-rolls they stayed 
there until 21 June.615 In March and April 1678 most of the other friskytter hat had 
stayed on Zealand came over to Scania again. Several of them had pawned their guns 
during the winter and asked the king for money to be a le to get them back. The 
Danish authorities had rather they stayed behind until the end of March because that 
was when the deadline for the Swedish general amnesty.616 When success of the 
amnesty offer turned out to have been moderate the Swedish authorities decided to try 
to intimidate the border inhabitants for real. At this time it also seemed evident that 
Gyllenstierna’s oath-taking campaign in the border regions had been of limited 
success.617  
 
In April 1678 the following orders were issued by the Swedish king to the 
commanders in Gønge: 
 “When you come to Örkende where the snaphaner are supposed not only to have most of their hide 
outs but also to have stowed away most of their booty, have all the men that are old enough to carry 
                                               
612 Jens Harboe to Herman Meijer 6th January 1678, Indkomne breve, DRA. See also: Jacobsen, p.160 
and p.163 about the evacuation orders. He stresses that the order said that the people in the concerned 
areas were supposed to betake themselves to the Swedes, not to the Danes, and that the Swedes did 
burn down property that had not been evacuated. 
613 Oberstlt. Preen’s report of 4th January 1678 that is to be found among Harboe’s reports, DRA, 
consequently under the letter H among the Incoming Letters (Indkomne Breve). This report is 
mentioned by Fabricius III, p.149 foot-note 7 although the document cannot be found under Preen’s 
name as indicated by Fabricius.  
614 Fabricius III, p.81. 
615 Harboe’s accounts quoted by Sörensson, p.50. According to Sörensson the Gønger left the safety of 
the fortress at exactly the same time as the Danish army went on campaign and he claimed that they 
then accompanied the regular army throughout the whole offensive. 
616 Charles XI’s last parole decree from 26 February 1678 in which all “snaphaner” were offered a 
chance to return to their homes. 
617 Sten Skansjö, Skånes historia, (A History of Scania), Historiska Media, Borgå 2006, p.185.  
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guns killed, but save the womenfolk and children, and then burn all the farms after having confiscated 
the cattle and the foodstuff”.618  
 
The same orders were originally also issued for the neighbouring hundred of Jämshög 
(Gemsø) but Charles XI decided to revoke them when his soldiers were done with 
Örkened (Ørkende). Supposedly people had found out about the Swedes’ plans and 
had time to evacuate before the arrival of the soldiers.619 We do not know for sure 
how many people were killed. The Swedish colonel Nils Skytte reported in his diary 
that only two farmsteads had been saved from destruction in the fourteen villages his 
men had taken care of. In his diary he only mentions e victim, “an old peasant” 
whom they did away with before going to bed after the first day’s work.620 Sthen 
Jacobsen connected the burning of “Ørchen” with the Sw dish surrender to the 
friskytter at Højnebro/Hönjarum, and he claimed that only three old men had been 
killed. It should be added that in this case, as in several others, Jacobsen got the order 
of the events on the other side of Scania quite wrong and since the Gønge friskytter 
ousted the Swedes at Hönjarum (Højnebro) on 2nd August, and Örkened (Ørkende) 
was razed to the ground in April, the latter could hardly be seen as a reprisal action for 
what took place at the former occasion.621 
 
The Planned Evacuation 
On 18th May 1678 the Danish General Commissariat ordered th  Scanians to evacuate 
the country.622 Within five weeks, they and their cattle and belongings should all go to 
Zealand and stay there “until Scania had been retrieved”. Those who stayed behind 
would have to suffer the consequences since soldiers from “foreign nations” were 
likely to wreak havoc upon the land and the Swedes w re thought to be planning a 
mass deportation of all inhabitants to Sweden and to ruin the land. In order to keep the 
Scanians safe from this sad fate, the king now ordered them to betake themselves to 
Zealand where they would be assigned places to stay until the war was over and they 
                                               
618 Fabricius III, pp.156-157. He refers to an order to Hedefält from 19th April, or so it seems from his 
rather vague foot-note. See also: Tomenius, pp. 158-173. 
619 Fabricius III, p.157. 
620 Jarnbjer, p.95 quotes Skytte’s diaries that are to be found in the Swedish War Archives 
(Krigsarkivet) in Stockholm. The farmsteads in Örkened that were not burnt down are big tourist 
attractions today, though I do not know if they areth  same as Skytte mentioned, since the descendants 
of the 17th century owners claim that the family camouflaged the buildings with leaves and branches 
so that the Swedish troops just rode past... 
621 Jacobsen, p.180.  
622 The decree in is to be found in Jacobsen, pp.163-164. It was signed by Holger Wind, Christopher 
Sehested, von Stöchen and Pedersön Lerche. 
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could return home.623  Fabricius estimated the Scanian refugees in Denmark to 
somewhere in between ten and twenty thousand. His resea ch in this area was based 
on the tax exemption certificates that all Scanian refugees were entitled to. Fabricius 
found 500 of these and counted approximately 5 family embers per certificate. He 
also found 400 beggar licenses (allmosebrev) registered on Scanians.624 Åberg thinks 
Fabricius’s numbers exaggerated and yet he declares that the Scanian exodus must 
have taken on considerable dimensions.625 In more recent times the importance of the 
Scanian refugees has been re-evaluated by Jens Lerbom who has studied lists of 
people who “emigrated” from some areas of Scania: according to these lists it was 
only rarely that refugees brought their families with them. Consequently the 
certificates mentioned by Fabricius should be counted on their own or possibly for a 
couple of persons. It should also be taken into accunt that many refugees returned to 
Scania after the war, just as the “General Commissariat” had counted on their doing. 
Maybe a notice from the beginning of June that year is connected to the evacuation 
orders: a Danish official called Lutgens wrote from the coastal town of  Dragør by to 
Herman Meijer to ask how he should act in the case of two peasants from the Scanian 
side of the Sound that had come over with all their cattle and part of their belongings 
and now wanted to go back to fetch the rest of their b longings so that they could stay 
on the other side of the Sound.626 
 
The Day to Day Work of the Friskytter 
The everyday life of the friskytter went on much as before. In the sources we keep 
finding them in the same situations, carrying out the same tasks and using the same 
techniques. On 30th May 1678 the Depositiones simply reported that a group of sixty 
Swedish soldiers had fought with a friskytte unit at “Spange” and that twelve Swedes 
                                               
623 Jacobsen, p.164. 
624 Fabricius III, p.209. 
625 Åberg 1958, p.111. Since the majority of the Scanian refugees that can be traced through Danish 
church registers cannot be connected to either kind of certificate Fabricius doubled the number of 
refugees as a hypothesis... After the war Governor General Ascheberg wanted the exiles to return and 
tried to influence the king in this direction but Charles XI stubbornly refused. When Ascheberg insisted 
that there too many abandoned farmsteads in Scania the king replied that he did not want unreliable 
elements in his border provinces so Ascheberg had better find some Swedish farmers for the  
abandoned farms.  See also: Dübeck, p.92 who not only accepts Fabricius’ alculations but also adds 
that during the first decade after the Scanian War another 5-10, 000 Scanians fled to Denmark and that 
the dimensions of this exodus should be enough to re-evaluate the classical Swedish thesis of a quick 
and smooth Swedification. 
626 Lutgens to Herman Meijer 2nd June 1678, I.B, DRA. “...bitte weiter daß ich möchte eine gnädige 
ordre bekommen, wie ich mich darin verhalten solle, ob die Schönishe leuthe Ihre Guth hollen wollen, 
undt wen sie kommen passiren mögen oder nicht...” 
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had been killed, many wounded and all their luggage left behind.627 Three days later it 
was reported that Peder Magneßen Lent628 of the Western Gønge friskytter had 
arrived on his own, bringing with him an intercepted l tter that had been destined for 
Markaryd (“Marcherød” in the text). He also reported hat the Swedes were expecting 
4000 reinforcements, both cavalry and foot soldiers, and that eight days earlier a huge 
Swedish provisioning convoy had arrived from Loshult  (“Losholdt” in the text). 
Furthermore Lent reported that there were sixty Swedish horsemen stationed at 
Mölleryd ( “Møllerød” in the text) and that on the preceding Friday, the friskytter had 
snatched thirteen horses from these Swedes while the horses were grazing right beside 
the mansion. According to Lent, people were saying that the Danes had reached 
Gothenburg and that Ascheberg would lead the Swedish troops against them.629 
 
On the same day it was reported that Corporal Bent Ha ßen of the Western Gønge 
friskytter had arrived with his unit. Obviously Lent had preceded the rest of the troop. 
They now brought five Swedish letters with them that t ey had intercepted on the 
road between “the camp and Helsingborg”. Hanßen report d that in the hundreds of 
Western and Eastern Gønge the enemy had ordered that as many carts as possible 
were to be brought to the camp outside Kristianstad (Christianstad) and each cart 
should be accompanied by three men, each with an ox. People were saying that the 
enemy had attacked Kristianstad (Christianstad) two weeks earlier but that they were 
struck back, but Hanßen emphasised that that was only what was being said, there was 
no way to find out the truth because no peasants, carters or coachmen were allowed 
into the Swedish camp. Three nights earlier three cannon shots had been heard from 
inside the city, but it what difficult to guess what that meant. Furthermore, people 
were saying that the enemy were going to try to assault the city with 7000 men. 630 
 
On 2nd June 1678 friskytter Jens Jacobss. and Jörgen Hanss. from Stenestad (?) left 
an oral report upon their arrival in Landskrona (Landscrone). They had left Stenestad 
the night before. Now they reported that the enemy were coming with 1000 cavalry 
                                               
627 Depositiones und Kundschaften 1678, R, Krigskollegiet, Forhør over og Udsagn af Fanger, 
Overløbere og andre 1677-78. DRA. 
628 This is assumably the man who is called Peder Monsen by Sörensson (p.66), and who was Aage 
“The Hare” Monsen Harloff’s brother. Peder Monsen’s served as a “cornet” under his brother 1677-78 
and then as a lieutenant. 
629 2nd June 1678, Depositiones und Kundschaften, 1678, R., DRA.  
630 2nd June 1678, Depositiones und Kundschaften, 1678, R., DRA.  
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and “1000 Swedish peasants from Sweden” and these wr  to be distributed among 
the Scanian (schaansche) peasants. They were to guard the roads and to “search out 
the friskytter in the woods”. Jacobsen and Hansen th reported that the peasants in 
their area that had been driven away from home (bønderne som her omkring fra 
drifves) were seeking refuge in the villages nearby, close to the noble mansions, and 
were leaving all their storages to the enemy, The two friskytter also reported that two 
weeks earlier their unit had beaten a “party” of 32 enemy cavalry at Broby.631 
 
In June 1677 Captain Harlof reported that there was D nish cavalry 4 or 5 miles from 
the camp but ”they want to stay with the friskytter and ride around the country: they 
are asking for a permit to gain entrance to the camp.632 There still are several men 
who have been in hiding with the peasants all since the battle of Lund; they too would 
like to have a permit so that they could come to the camp.” This passage shows that it 
was not even considered strange that friskytter and regular cavalry worked close 
together; on the contrary the regular cavalry even pr ferred staying with the friskytter 
out in the countryside sometimes. However, I would like to make clear that there were 
Scanians in regular regiments too. The Reverend John Wanngren has analysed the 
muster roll of the company of the Second National Regiment of Zealand (2. 
Sjællandske nationale Infanteriregiment) that was st tioned at Västra Vram (Westre 
Wram) during the autumn and winter of 1676.633 Wanngren has come to the 
conclusion that out of 186 men, including officers, the vast majority hailed from 
Zealand as they were supposed to be, but nine can be proved to be Scanians and quite 
a few others could possibly have been Scanians. Furthermore, there were also a few 
soldiers from other parts of Denmark and Norway, three soldiers from Bohuslän, one 
from Marstrand, one from Varberg and one from Laholm. One of the lieutenants, Jean 
or Jehan Sallibert, was possibly French.634 
 
To judge by the Depositiones reports the grazing of horses offered excellent 
opportunities for both deserters and friskytter. On 4th June 1678 a group of five 
Swedish soldiers of the Småland regiment were caught outside Malmøe while they 
                                               
631 No signature (Harboe?): 2nd June (1678 written in the margin in another handwriting), DRA. 
632 Depositiones, mense Junii 1677, no 508, DRA. 
633 The rest of the regiment was posted on the island of Gotland. See: Wanngren (1991), pp.68-70. The 
2nd National Regiment of Zealand was created in 1675. 
634 In the latter case it was the matter of soldiers whose place of origin had a name that can be found 
both in Zealand and Scania, e.g. Ramløse and Torup. See: Wanngren (1991), pp.68-70.   
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were grazing horses.635 One of the main tasks of the friskytter was to ambush Swedish 
troops and convoys; to lay hands on their goods, interrupt the communication lines 
and strike terror into the hearts of all Swedes that s owed themselves outside the 
Swedish enclaves. One of the most important tasks of the friskytter was also to prey 
on small groups of Swedes and naturally small parties of this kind were ideal objects. 
The Swedish troops in Malmö (Malmøe) included many Danish prisoners of war who 
had been forced into Swedish service and some of them managed to escape while on 
“grazing service”. Normally sixteen horsemen and some musketeers guarded the 
horses that grazed on the meadows on the other side of th  moat.636 This time five 
Swedes were captured and brought in to the Danish camp the day after where they 
had to leave statements with the depositiones scribe. They were asked to report how 
many troops were gathered inside the city walls and how big the rations of food were 
for the soldiers and how much the soldiers earned. They all responded in detail. That 
same day five Scanian civilians were also brought to the Danish camp. Olle Nielsen 
and Jens Ander Stundwirt had been grazing horses with the Swedes. Olle Nielsen was 
reported as an inhabitant of Malmö (Malmøe), Jens Ader Stundwirt was a butcher, 
Peder Haagens worked as a groom (Kriigmands Tiener), Niels Oelsen was a burgher 
and glove-maker (handskemager) who had his son Mads Niel en and his servant 
Jacob Jørgens with him. These latter three were caught in the middle of the night a 
quarter of a Danish mile from the city walls and Oelsen had all his tools with him. 
Probably they had been trying to escape from the besieg d city.  
 
Peder Pedersen from “Sandbye” in Western Gønge was a peasant who had worked as 
a registered friskytte for some time but who then spied for the Danes from his home 
and eventually had to seek refuge (and a job as a crter) in the Danish enclave of 
(Landscrone). Only eight days before his arrival in La dskrona (Landscrone) in June 
1678 he had carted food supplies from Växjö (“Wexsiøe” in the text) in Sweden to the 
Swedish camp in Scania. He promptly declared: “I know of a peasant who has come 
down here with the intention of spying for the enemy”.637 Pedersen himself had 
decided to leave his home   when the Swedes ordered every parish to provide them 
with a certain number of men and oxen who could help them build palisades. 
                                               
635 Depositiones, DRA. 
636 See: Depositio of 3rd July 1677 in which Nels Hansen of “Kiøge” reported of how he had made his 
way from his enforced Swedish service back to the Danish camp. 
637 Wid ieg en bunde needgaen at wære her nedkommen i ening at bringe fienden kundskab 
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Pedersen declared that he was a “free man” who would not obey such orders! 
Furthermore he wanted to go to “Lands Crone” in order to look for one of his sons 
who was working as a groom in the army camp outside the town. Now he was hoping 
that someone in “Lands Crone” would hire him as a carter. As further proof of 
Pedersen’s loyalty he stated that he had been a friskytte for a long time and that that 
could easily be certified.638 I cannot see why we should think that Pedersen was some 
kind of criminal with a dubious background? For all we know he was middle-aged 
man with a totally “normal” background. As so very many others that we come across 
in the sources: the Depositiones collection not only tells us of how the friskytter 
worked, it also explains how and why some people actually became friskytter. On 4 
June 1678 eight peasants from Blekinge (Bleging) arrived at the Danish camp. In their 
company were three soldiers from the Swedish Royal Lifeguards who had joined 
them on the island of Hanö (Hanöe) under the pretext that they wanted to come to 
“this land” (de vilde hid til landet). Two of the peasants declared that they would like 
to go to Copenhagen. Olluf Jörgensen and Haagen Nielsen declared that they would 
rather join the friskytter. Then there was Mogens Mogensen from Hoby (Hobye) who 
had been conscripted to a Swedish ship as a boatswain. The ship he was on was sunk 
by the Danes who set Mogensen free so that he could return home. Now he too 
wanted to join the friskytter. The next two ones, Clemmend Mogensen and Anders 
Biörnßen, wanted to take service “here in this land” (tienne her paa landet). Finally 
there was a man called Bunne Jenßen who wanted to stay “in this country” and make 
shoes.   
The three lifeguards who arrived in the company of the eight peasants were classified 
as “Swedish renegades”. Actually none of them were of Swedish orgins. Jacob Delen 
was a Scotsman who had been a sergeant in the Danish army until he was caught by 
the Swedes during the battle of Landskrona (Landscrone). Jonas Suanton was also a 
Scotsman who had served the King of Denmark but had t en ended up as a prisoner 
of war. Both Scotsmen claimed that the Swedes had maltreated them badly and that 
they had literally been forced to join the Swedish army. The third lifeguard was a 
German, Heinrich Wegner from Bremen who had been caught near Stettin and then 
brought to Stockholm where he had been forced to take service. All three of them 
wanted to travel to Copenhagen. 
                                               
638 17th June 1678. Depositiones, DRA. 
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The Sack of Ystad (Ydsted) 
On that same day (4th June), but further east,  Danish troops under Major Holger 
Trolle arrived at Ystad (Ysted)in order to collect war tribute from its inhabitants since 
the Swedes were using the harbour to ship in provisions for Malmøe. At the very 
same time the Danish fleet was sighted, on its way into the harbour and Trolle 
renounced on his money with the following words: “May God help you, for I cannot.” 
It Admiral Niels Juel with his half of the Danish fleet who had been set the task of 
interrupting communications and transports of Swedish troops between Sweden, areas 
dominated by the Swedes and Pomerania and Rugen on the other side of the Baltic. 
The Danish sailors sacked the town for a whole day and night so that “it cannot be 
imagined what was left of it”. 639 We know that the friskytter participated in the sack 
because Mayor Sivert Kofoed was chased out of his hou e by “a friskytte called little 
Mads” and had to run down to the beach in his slippers, as he later complained to 
Copenhagen. 640  Little Mads (Lille Mads) is a figure who is mainly known from 
legends and latter-day novels, in which he plays the role of one of the leading friskytte 
captains during the Scanian war and his rifle is today treasured in the Hovdala (ex-
Howdale) museum. But he does not result in the muster rolls and nobody seems to 
know for sure who he was. If it had not been for Erlandsson the snaphane catcher, 
Little Mads’s existence would have been doubted, but his last fight is described in 
detail in Erlandsson’s “Promemoria” and according to Erlandsson, Little Mads was a 
“Swedish dragoon”.641 And Sivert Kofoed seemed to have known quite well ho little 
Mads was.  
                                               
639  Jacobsen p.165, Fabricius III, p. 160 who mentions that Lund too was to be burnt down if its 
inhabitants refused to evacuate it. See also: Bjurling in Kraft and Bjurling, pp.293-294. At the time 
Ystad (Ysted) counted 2000 inhabitants, which was about the same size as Helsingborg and 
consequently large enough to be a major Scanian tow. See: Fabricius, III, p. 4 among the “Notes to 
the Introduction”. He based his notices on late 17th century Ystad (Ysted) on  O. & G. Palme’s, Släkten 
Palme, (The Palme Family), from 1917, see especially Palme, vol. II, p.188. 
640 Fabricius III, p. 160 footnote 5.The quotation comes from an official complaint to King Christian V 
from the rich merchant Jakob Palme, mayor Sivert Kofoed and Peder Hansen Gade, 26th June 1678. 
They had escaped from Ysted on a ship that took them to Copenhagen. Fabricius places the letter in the 
“Krigsk. I.S.” Collection but I have read it in the Indkomne Breve collection in the Danish National 
Archives. It is also quite interesting that Kofoed seemed to know quite well who the friskytte Little 
Mads was and that he used the term “friskytte” in his complaint although would have had all the 
reasons in the world to fob the man off as a “snaphane”. But it was obviously not politically correct to 
do so in Denmark at the time. 
641 Sven Erlandsson, §3. That Little Mads was mentioned as a “Swedish” dragoon probably meant that 
he had served as a dragoon in a Swedish regiment. However, that does not say anything about his 
nationality, although it would indeed have been interesting to know what his ethnic origins were. In 
fact a considerable part of the snaphaner had a background as “Swedish” soldiers which you were often 
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In the summer of 1678 the Swedish forces were laying s ege to Kristianstad 
(Christianstad). At the same time the Swedish enclave of Helsingborg was in a 
perilous situation and Malmö (Malmøe) was in bad need of reinforcements. 
Nevertheless the Swedish generals were reported to have declared that they would not 
hazard to send troops south or west. The reasons for this decision were three: 1) it 
would be too difficult to find means of subsistence, 2) the whole land sympathised 
with the Danes, 3) the “snaphaner” were getting stronger and would cause them more 
trouble than ever.642 The Swedes certainly saw the friskytter/snaphaner s a serious 
threat. A Hessian prisoner of war who had escaped from the Swedes reported that the 
Swedes were terrified of the friskytter who were causing them great losses.643 
 
The Danish archives contain several letters from desperate peasants who were asking 
for protection and compensation for what the King’s troops were doing to them 
during this period of time. The whole village of Herrestad (then Harrestad or 
Harrested) in the south-east wrote to the king to le  him know that first the regular 
troops had looted Ystad (Ysted)then they had come to their village where they had 
taken away all their cattle. Then a party of friskytter had turned up and they had taken 
whatever money and valuables they could get hold of so that three poor men had been 
totally ruined. For this reason they supplicated the king that they might get some of 
their cattle back.644 Some seven weeks later Johanne Jensedatter from “Skuthuuße” in 
Färs (Fers) wrote to the king for exactly the same reason, except that her “poor old 
husband” had been so unlucky as to have been severely b aten by the visitors. First a 
group of soldiers had taken all the money they had,an  then another group had turned 
up asking for cash. This second group might have been either regular soldiers or 
friskytter, Johanne was not sure.  They only had pistols and carbines, not long guns, 
she explained. When Johanne and her husband told these men that they had given 
                                                                                                                            
enough called if you were in the Swedish army, whether you were a Dane or a Scotsman or a 
Stockholmer. There is a good chance he was from the south-east of Scania since the sources and 
legends about Little Mads centre on the modern-day Ystad-Österlen area and the friskytter often but 
not always operated in areas they knew well. However, th re is also a possibility that he was an ethnic 
Swede, because there were some ethnic Swedes who fought with the snaphaner. 
642 Depositiones und Kundschaften, 11th June 1678: ”Kunde snaphanerne da mere end nogen sinde 
incommodere dennem”. 
643 Depositiones , 17th June 1678, Bastien Gebbener: ”d  giør dem stoor afbreck”. 
644 Letter from the village of Harrestad to “Monsieur” (samptlige byemend udi Harrestad), 16th June 
1678, I.B, DRA. Fabricius III, p.160 refers to this letter but makes no mention of its contents further 
than that it regards Danish outrages during that period 
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away what they had a week earlier the men beat her husband so badly that he might 
not be alive when she got back home. Then they took all their clothes, their cupper 
and brassware and whatever else they liked. Johanne had gone to “Landzcrone” to ask 
for help and to beg the king to see to it that the villains were arrested and punished 
before they hurt other people; unfortunately they wre still around in her area.645 
King Christian’s Campaign 
Meanwhile King Christian’s army was approaching Kristianstad (Christianstad) in an 
attempt to break the Swedish blockade and everyone knew that the fate of the 
besieged town might depend on food supplies and on the accessibility of the roads.646 
The friskytter were often given the task of guarding and burning bridges, a task quite 
characteristic of partisan and irregular troops: On 24th July 1678 Aage Monsen 
(Harlof) reported that he had burnt the Kumla (Kumle) bridge and to a house as well 
as to the Broby bridge the day before and that he and his men had been to the 
Hönjarum (Hönnerumbs/Hønjerum) bridge in order to burn it but the Swedes in the 
nearby fortress had prevented them from doing so by putting them under intense fire. 
It is quite clear from his report that he had had expr ss orders to burn the last two 
bridges but not the first one. He explained that he had decided to burn the Kumle 
bridge because a Swedish “party" had ordered the peasants to reinforce it so that it 
became broader and stronger.647  
 
The Swedes were laying siege to the town of (Christian ad) and the Danish army 
under King Christian V had set out to liberate it, but eventually they had been 
constrained to halt their campaign at a short distance from the town, at Önnestad 
(Ønnested). The Danish army was in a horrid state and the cavalry would not be up to 
a direct confrontation with their Swedish counterpart, nd besides, reconnaissance 
reported that there was no viable route past the Swdish encampments.648 In case they 
could not get past those, it would also become unfeasible to face the Swedes in open 
battle. The generals now proposed different alternaives to confronting the enemy 
                                               
645 Letter  from Johanne Jensedatter to the king, 24thJune 1678, I.B., No: 475, DRA. Fabricius (III, p. 
160, footnote 2) mentioned Jensedatter’s letter as one of many letters of complaint of the behaviour of 
both Danish regular soldiers and that of the King’s friskytter but makes no further comments.   
646 Cf. Jensen, pp. 363-388. Fabricius III, pp. 166-170. 
647 Aage Mogensen to Herr Generall Lütenant Arenstorp, Hestvede 24th July 1678, DRA. Referred to 
by  Sörensson, p. 40 (Aage Monsen, I.S., No: 465). In this letter Aage “The Hare” called Arensdorff his 
“gracious lord and powerful patron” or “ min Naadige Herre och mæctige Patron”. 
648 Jensen, p. 379. The scout that had provided the information was Lieutenant Pieter Stensen who was 
classified as a “snaphane” by the Swedes. 
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directly, since they knew their own army was too weak: War Councillor Herman 
Meijer advised that minor targets like the Swedish redoubt (temporary fortification 
works) and the Swedes that occupied the heights at Skepparslöv (Skibberslev) should 
be attacked instead. General Major Johan von Bülow, the Duke of Croy and General 
Major Hans Wilhelm von Meerheim agreed that open battle would be too hazardous 
but expressed no opinion on alternatives. Field Marsh l Lieutenant Claudius Saint 
Paul felt they should accept Meijer’s line and attack “the heights” and so did Field 
marshal Lieutenant Gustav Wilhelm von Wedel who als stressed that they should try 
to cause the enemy as much damage as possible. General Fri drich von Arensdorff 
whose scouts had provided the information that made the king doubt in the first case, 
naturally enough supported this view and also said that the enemy should be harassed 
as much as possible from where they were. The other generals agreed that “parties” 
and “detachments” would be their only chance to weaken the enemy. Arensdorff 
claimed this strategy would perhaps incommode the enemy so much that they would 
not dare attack Kristianstad (Christianstad) or send troops to the Norwegian front. 
 
It seems obvious from these discussions that the friskytter, or rather tactics that minor 
detachments and friskytter were most apt to carry out, constituted the Danish counter 
measure against a massive threat that they did not know quite how to fight: the 
increasingly modern Swedish army. In the Exercier-Reglement für die Kaiserlich-
Königliche Gränz-Infanterie from 1808 the tasks of the irregular border troops were 
the following:  
“die Bewegungen des Feindes zu erschweren, nicht aber seine geschlossenen Linien zu durchbrechen 
oder ihre eigenen Posten auf das äusserste und gegen überlegene Stärke zu verteidigen, oder sich gar 
davon zu entfernen, um den Gegner anzugreifen…Da also das Tirailliren…keinen entscheidenden 
Ausschlag geben, sondern nur zur Vorgbereitung und Erleichterung desselben führen soll.”649  
 
Other tasks included threatening the flanks of the en my and camouflaging the major 
attacks. Naturally they were also expected to provide information about the position 
of the enemy and about their numbers and intentions.650 
 
                                               
649 Kunisch, p.16. 
650 Kunisch, p.17: ”die taktische Vorbereitung, Untersützung und Sicherung der Operationen im 
großen.” Apart from the Exercier-Reglement Kunisch quotes F.F von Nicolai, Die Anordnung einer 
gemeinsamen Kriegsschule, Stuttgart 1781 and Georg Wilhelm Valentini, Abhandlung über den 
kleinen Kri.e.g...Berlin 1820. 
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Meanwhile the upstart military commander Löwenhielm had been sent from the 
Norwegian front to Landskrona (Landscrone) where he was to head the troops that 
were posted there. Only four days after his arrival he wrote to the Danish king who 
was at Önnestad (Ønneste). He reported that he had received information that a “fairly 
strong” Swedish troop had set out from Malmö (Malmøe) the preceding night and had 
passed through “Lunden” (Lund). Löwenhielm now complained that he only had 46 
dragoons (excluding officers)  and that he needed reinforcements, preferably a party 
of three hundred dragoons so that he could set out for the Swedes and make his 
utmost to “forbid the Enemy (with God’s help) such behaviour.”651 He repeated the 
same request, with much the same motivation, in a letter to Friedrich von 
Arensdorff’s successor some time later, but obviously the authorities did not feel that 
his line should be followed, or maybe they simply did not have the possibility to send 
reinforcements.652 Löwenhielm frequently reported on the operations of “our 
friskytter” and he also mentioned other “parties” that set out against the Swedes and 
the information that Lieutenant Steen brought in. Steen(sen) was a “snaphane” to the 
Swedes.653 
 
Löwenhielm was not the only Dane to have been informed of the Swedish party that 
had set out from Malmö. Information about the enemy’s movements sometimes 
travelled fast. On 23rd July 1678 Jenssön had just recently been to the Danish main 
army camp to receive orders from Arensdorff and he now communicated that he had 
obeyed the general’s orders and had betaken himself and his “party” to Hörby where 
they had arrived on the day of writing (a Tuesday). Once there, Jenssön had been 
informed that a Swedish “party” had set out from Malmö (Malmøe) and that they 
were now at “Söndre Ströe” (modern-day Södra Strö). At this news, Jenssön and his 
men hurried to the Getinge (Giddinge) bridge in order to find out how strong this 
party was, and they discovered that there were sixty of hem, armed with long guns 
and their commander was “Svend Erlands”654. Right then the Swedish party started 
                                               
651 Löwenhielm arrived on 20th July 1678. See: Löwenhielm to the King from that very date, I.B, DRA. 
The quote is from Löwenhielm to the king, 24th July 1678.  
652 Löwenhielm to Baron ?, 14th August 1678, I.B, DRA. “Undt weill wier allhier eine Allzugeringe 
und shwache Cavallerie haben, und nicht mehr alß 46 Reutter, dawon die helffte krank und sonst nicht 
wiel taugen...” 
653 See chapter on Pieter Stensen. 
654 Sven Erlandsson, the famous snaphane hunter. The text also says that they had “tre tremmer” with 
them, assumably three drums?. 
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moving again along the “bre leen” the broad road. They now dressed up as Danes and 
went around the area making a lot of enquiries, and in particular they asked for 
“Lieutenant Petter Stens”655 and also they sent their most heartfelt greetings to Jens 
Jenssön, warning him of the “Swedish party”.656 The man “who was supposed to be 
their commander” then told the peasants that he was on his way to Landskrona 
(Landscrone) or Helsingborg. When the disguised Swedes came to the village of 
Effwne rödh (Everöd?) they bumped into one of Jens Jenssön’s friskytter, Niels 
(Nielß) Pers657, who had just been to Landskrona (Landscrone) with “the Lieutenant” 
(Pieter Stensen) who was guiding around one of the King’s Life Guards and now he 
had letters with him. Niels Pers did not realise thy were Swedes because they were 
all wearing “Danish insignia”658, Jenssön reported. Now, the Swedes shot at him, beat 
him over the head and stabbed him with a bayonet. Then they set out for the Hasla 
(Hasle) bridge where they met a group of farmers who ere driving their oxen to 
Landskrona (Landscrone) but all the oxen were taken by the Swedes who then 
continued in the direction of Risberga (Risse berge). J nssön finally promised 
Arensdorff that he would send out two of his men to find out where the Swedish party 
were heading for that very same night. This letter reveals how intimately connected 
the snaphaner and the snaphane hunters were: Jenssön uses the term “party” to 
indicate both his own and Erlandsson’s units and both parties also seemed to be doing 
the same job, namely riding around the country trying to collect information about the 
enemy with sometimes dubious means but not without a mission i.e. to help their own 
king and country win the war. This letter also provides us with evidence that Sven 
Erlandsson was quite familiar with Pieter Stensen’s a d Jens Jenssön’s names and 
took for granted that the country folk in the area would know them in person. It also 
lets us know that Jenssön’s unit and Pieter Stensen worked together. 
 
Jens Jenssöns reports to Arensdorff from this period indicate that at least he and his 
men were working very much in the same way as before, scouting and spying as best 
they could. On 29th July he reported the following:  
                                               
655 Pieter Stensen. 
656 “...di sagde till bönderne hwor di komme at di helße Jens Jenßön Meget flittelig at hand skulle paße 
well op di Swenske partij…” 
657 Probably the man who is registered as Niels Pedersn Hiortleff in Jenssön’s muster-rolls. See: 
Röndahl, p.424. 
658 “...for di hafde alle dansk tegn på dem…” 
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“Today...I went with my unit to Hasle bridge, but I had sent two of my men reconnoitring to Giddinge 
bridge, when they came back there were two hundred Swedes from Malmöe at Gudmandtorp, they 
were on their way towards hörbÿe...ps.today at 12 o’clock they were at Gudmandtorp.” 659 
 
A week later he wrote a similar report to Arensdorff, and closed his letter with a 
Christian V seal.660 This time he reported that a Swedish unit had been pr sent in his 
area. The Swedes had come from the Swedish army came, passed through Rörum 
(Röromb) and went out to Hörby where they were at the time of writing, which was in 
the middle of the night. Another Swedish unit that d been heading towards 
“Hægenes” had also joined them. Jenssön had only just had the news and reported it 
straight away, or so he claimed. He did not seem aware that Kristianstad 
(Christianstad) had surrendered four days earlier. 
Occasionally the friskytter undertook major military actions without the aid of regular 
troops. In June 1678 Aage Monsen and his men had expugned and destroyed the 
fortress at Broby. In August that year the friskytter laid siege to the Hönjarum 
(Høynebro) fortress and eventually forced the Swedes to capitulate. The Hönjarum 
siege started some time after Aage Monsen had failed to burn the nearby bridge and 
while the Swedish and Danish armies were facing each other outside Kristianstad 
(Christianstad). When the Swedes had given up the following report was sent to 
Copenhagen:  
“Accord between His Majesty’s Friskytter of Denmark nd the Swedes at Høynebro fortress. 
When Captain Niels Anders. Had been waiting outside the fortress with his friskytter for 14 days , 
Captain Aage the Hare came to help him with one hundred men, bringing with him a trumpeter, whom 
he on 2 August made declare that if they wanted to surrender unconditionally or not then they could: 
then, since they had no more sustenance, they asked for the conditions, whereupon Captain Aage the 
Hare and the trumpeter rode over to them and asked that they should march out of the fortress with 
their rifles and then lay down their arms outside. S condly, they should all be accompanied as prisoner  
to the Danish camp outside Christianstad. 
P.S. Since the Swedes had no more sustenance and they saw that Captain Niels Andersen stood there 
ready with his three troops, and that 100 men would storm them, they had to surrender. 
Actum Høijnebro 2 August 1678 
Aage Maansen Captain                                Niels Andersen Captain 
of the Friskytter of Western Gønge                    of the Friskytter of Eastern Gønge661     
 
It is very hard to find out to what degree the friskytter went into combat without the 
support of regular troops. They ambushed and captured Swedes, yes, but whenever 
                                               
659 See for example: Jens Jenßön to General Frederich fon Arensdorfv, 29th  July (No: 30) and 8th 
August 1678, I.B, DRA. 
660 8th August 1678, I.B, DRA. The previous letter had a more ordinary seal with a pattern that 
unfortunately cannot be discerned today: it was not a Christian V seal, though. 
661 I.S., August 1678, No: 50. Also printed in Sörensson, p.43. 
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there is fighting it becomes hard to separate regulars from irregulars because the 
combatants are described as “Danish troops” and “Swedish”troops.662  
 
Kristianstad (Christianstad) was finally lost to the Danes on 4th August, and the whole 
of eastern Scania and Blekinge remained in Swedish hands. When Kristianstad 
(Christianstad) capitulated, the Danish commanders had fortunately remembered to 
stipulate an agreement in which native Scanians, civilians, soldiers and any other kind 
of combatants alike, would not be singled out from the other Danes, but could walk 
away with the rest of the survivors.663 The inhabitants of the surrounding district of 
Gønge were promised that they would receive permanent tax-exemption after the war 
if they continued to support the friskytter and stayed true to the Danish king.664 It 
should be noted that the Danish authorities asked of those who wanted to be 
considered true to their king to be true to the friskytter too. It would also be possible 
for those of the inhabitants who preferred to do so to go Landskrona (Landscrone) or 
Helsingborg and they would also receive some monetary assistance. The passage over 
the Sound would be free for all those who preferred to go to Zealand or other parts of 
Denmark.665 
 
In August Arensdorff issued an order that reads as follows:  
“Im Nahmen und von wegen Ihr. Königl. May:tt. Wird der Herr General Major Bülau hiemit beordert 
durch di Freyschützen anstecken und abbrennen zu lassen Ydsted, Trelleburg, Cimbershaufn 
und Skanöer samt den da herum sich befindenden Früchten und Fourrage. Datum im Lager bey 
Rissberg den 9. August 1678.  
                                                                           F.von Arensdorff- 
Item alle Böhte und Fahrzeuge zu ruinieren. Wie auch S hwanholm und Ouds Closter wie auch 
Söfwede und Krocholm.”666  
 
According to Fabricius, the background of this order was partly that the informers had 
told Arensdorff that the Swedish army were planning to draw down to the 
comparatively well-preserved Ystad (Ysted) area (‘den Ystedske vinkel’) to find 
provisioning. He also mentioned that Arensdorff hador ered that the land be ruined 
for the first time a little earlier that summer, by the time that Arensdorff might have 
                                               
662 See for example the case of Simon Snaphane’s unit on p. 87. (Isac Ulf) 
663 The Danes had demanded guaranteed security for all Sc nians in Kristianstad (Christianstad) before 
surrendering. See: Jacobsen, p.177. Fabricius III, pp169-170. 
664 Sörensson, pp. 52-53. 
665 Sörensson., p.53, foot-note 1 in which he refers to: I.S., 1678 Aug., No:44, DRA. 
666 Sörensson, p.52, on which page he publishes this document in its entirety. It is referred to as : 
I.S.1678 Aug., No:42, DRA. Weibull, p.73 and Fabricius (III, p.170) also refer to its contents in detail. 
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started to realise that Kristianstad (Christianstad) would be lost to the Danes.667 There 
were also proposals in the King’s Council that the land in Scania be ruined so that a 
foreign army would not be able to maintain itself there. It should be stressed, in any 
case, that Arensdorff would certainly not have been authorised to issue an order of the 
kind without the approval of the king.668 Sadly enough friskytter and regular troops 
seem to have competed at who was the best at laying the land waste. Now the Danes 
would continue the work that the Swedes had already completed in Blekinge, Gønge 
and the Landskrona (Landscrone) area (where the countryside to a distance of 30 
kilometres around the town had been laid waste by the Swedes). Apart from the above 
mentioned towns and castles, Lund and Laholm (in Halland) were also burnt to the 
ground and so were most of the other castles and masions. Malmö (Malmøe) was 
“safe” in the hands of the Swedes but had been severely damaged by bombardments 
and the long siege.  
 
Martin Weibull claimed that the Scanians turned against the Danes around this time, 
according to him because it was only now that the friskytter first received official 
support from the king : “the Danish cause was lost to the better part of the inhabitants 
of the Scanian provinces when it (Denmark) recognised the snaphane-feud as a 
legitimate war”.669  Which Weibull, quite wrongly, considered to have happened with 
the decree of 9th August 1678. In reality, the king had authorised the operations of 
both snaphaner and friskytter from the beginning of the war (as long as they obeyed 
his orders , but in that sense they were no different from other soldiers).670 Weibull 
seems to have misunderstood the very essence of the“snaphane feud” in that he 
considered it as bands of outlaws on the rampage that had little to do with the Scanian 
War in itself. He failed to see that it is extremely unlikely that there would have been 
any kind of snaphane or friskytte “movement” at all if not for the Danish king. As in 
the rest of the official Swedish discourse from the time of the Scanian War until 
Weibull’s own day he took for granted that the snaphaner were irresponsible knaves if 
not outright evil and that they did not represent the Danish state. It was certainly not 
                                               
667 Fabricius III, p.170.   
668 For all that Arensdorff was fired and court-martialled shortly afterwards.   
669 Weibull, Martin. Samlingar till Skånes historia, 1871, p.73. 
670 I felt it important to include the background of Arensdorff’s orders from 9th August 1678 and also, 
this information is relevant to the study of the operations of the friskytter since they were co-operating 
with regular troops on the orders of their superiors n a very ugly mission: that of ruining the land i  
order to make the enemy starve.  
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the snaphaner/friskytter who wanted to burn down Scanian towns and villages for 
their own pleasure and who were then allowed to do so by the king, but rather the 
king who agreed to resort to a strategy that had long since been discussed in the 
Danish War Council and that the friskytter together with other light detachments were 
to effectuate it.     
 
Autumn and Winter 1678 
Among the reports from the war scene we also have a number of testimonies that 
were transcribed in Copenhagen. People who had escap d or who had been ransomed 
from the Swedes were interviewed when they got to safe ground in Denmark. A short 
report, signed Hidenborg, from 20th October 1678 tells of two women who had 
managed to get to the capital after having been prisoners in Halmstad for three weeks, 
but who had been released on 15th of that month.671 They reported that there were 
very few soldiers left in Halmstad but that many sick and wounded dragoons were 
coming in. The two women then declared that the Swedes were complaining that 
”they could not manage to get food supplies sent over to their army camp because of 
the Danes and the friskytter.” Two of the latter were ”broken on the wheel” the day 
before the ladies came to Halmstad, consequently around 20th September.   
 
Orders were passed from the Army Board to the district governors who in their turn 
were supposed to pass the orders on to particular captains of the friskytter directly as 
it seems in these cases, whereas in other cases ther  were go-betweens like War 
Commissary Jens Harboe. During the winter of 1678-79 most friskytter did not go to 
Zealand. Instead the governor of the Helsingborg district (amtsmand) Owe Rommel 
organised winter-quarters for them. On 1 November 1678 Rommel reported that a 
group of friskytter from Blekinge had arrived the preceding day and that they wanted 
to stay in Helsingborg during the winter. At the same time he reported that a group of 
approximately 100 friskytter from Northern Åsbo (Aasbo) and Göinge (Gønge) had 
been assigned winter-quarters in some border parishes.672 Five days later Rommel 
received orders from Copenhagen that he should provide Niels Andersen, Aage 
Monsen Harlof, Peder Laursen, Eskild Nielsen and all their men with winter quarters 
                                               
671 Depositiones, Hidenborg 20th October 1678, Copenhagen. DRA. 
672 Sörensson, p.53. He refers to: Rommel to the Board f the Army (General Commissariat), 1 
November 1678, I.B.,Rommel. DRA.   
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in the Helsingborg area. They should be assigned quarters as close to the enemy lines 
as possible. 
At the same time the governor of the Landskrona (Landscrone) district, Knud Thott, 
received the same orders regarding Hendrik Dreyer, P der Christophersen, Anders 
Pedersen, Simon Andersen, Matz Oelsen and Hans Severin with their men.673 The 
friskytter that found winter-quarters in the distric s of Landskrona (Landscrone) and 
Helsingborg were assigned a monthly pay of 5 slettedaler to be exacted from the 
peasants.674  It is the internal communication lines of the Danish administration and 
army that are of importance here, and how the Danish authorities tried to solve the 
practical problems that arose in connection with the friskytter. The above mentioned 
two sets of orders are also interesting in that they connect certain captains of the 
friskytter to particular areas during certain periods and that makes it easier map the 
whereabouts of the different units during the course of the war.  
 
During the winter of 1678-79 the friskytter had to draw ever closer to the Danish 
fortresses at Landskrona (Landscrone) and Helsingborg. On 4th October 1678 
Captains Aage Monsen of the Western Gønge Friskytter and Peder Lauridsen of the 
Northern Aasbo Friskytter wrote to Arensdorff to ask for winter quarters away from 
north-eastern Scania that had become too devastated and too dangerous for them to 
operate in. They explained that they had fought His Majesty’s enemies with all their 
“might and force” and that they had tried to do good t  their fatherland so that it could 
return to its former glories under the Danish Crown as of old, but they feared that they 
would not be able to hold their stand because the whole area had been laid waste and 
looted.675 At the end of October 1678 seven hundred friskytter, mainly from the 
                                               
673 Lit.D, quoted by Sörensson, p.53. 
674 I.B. Levetzow. 9 January 1679. They seem to have tried o squeeze out more than that from the 
peasants. Sörensson, p.53. 
675 Age Moensen Capitein  and Peder Laßen Capitein to the King, 4th October 1678, Indkomne Breve, 
DRA. “..eders Kongl: Mayts: troo undersaatter och frijskytter ere aff eders Kongl: Maytt: och hans 
Mayts: högt betrodde herrer ordineret, tijd effter anden oß til Armadien at indstille som wij och efftr 
wor skyldighed, aff yderste fomue effter kommit haffuer, sampt med all wor magt och krafft, sögt eders 
Kongl: Mayts: fiender, och federne landet till nötte igien at komme i sin gammel formue under rette 
Danmarchs Crone, och der offuer sat all wor liff och timmelig welfært i störste fare, sosom en deel der 
aff fienden erapped haffuer, maattet fornemme... thi om fienden oß skulle ertappe bliffue wij for woris 
giorde tienniste imod woris  arffue Rige, aff dennem ille belönnede. ” .  ” Your Majesty’s faithful 
subjects and Friskytter have been ordered time and again by Your Majesty and Your Majesty’s highly 
most esteemed lords, to betake themself to the Army and we have obeyed (these orders) as is our duty 
to the utmost of our might, and with all our might and force we have set on Your Majesty’s enemies, 
and have tried to be of gain to the fatherland so that i  could return to its old well-being under the
Crown of Denmark, and moreover we have put our lives and earthly well-being at the greatest risk, as 
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Gønge area, sought refuge in Helsingborg because they could not hold their stand 
anymore: they declared themselves unable to hold back the enemy in the northeast. 
District governor Owe Rommel had to provide for them and found winter quarters for 
them in the area of Rosendal.676 This information is important since it tells us that at 
least these friskytter felt that they were losing the war. Furthermore, they did not turn 
up in the company of regular army units or with orders to betake themselves to 
Helsingborg (as far as we understand from Fabricius who based his information on a 
letter from general Lähndorff to Christian V that is supposed to be in the War College 
in Scania Collection. Naturally, by the end of October it was time to find winter 
quarters but these troops seemed to have given up ad also it seemed as if they felt 
they had been left on their own to keep the enemy at bay in the northeast. 
 
At the same time as the Danish authorities tied the friskytter closer to the regular army 
they also drew an even neater line between them and the surrounding peasant 
communities. Sthen Jacobsen for one complained of “the knaves” that oppressed the 
farmers and who refused to join the regular army although the district governor of 
Helsingborg (Rommel) wanted them to do so. The snaphaner treated the farmers 
badly and then the farmers betrayed them, and so Jacobsen observed more snaphaner 
than ever were caught by the Swedes. He also concluded that the Swedes were 
treating them worse than ever:  
“When the Swedes got hold of some snaphaner during th s winter, then they first tortured them 
gruesomely, burnt them under their feet with glowing iron, and then inserted a skewer into their 
bottoms and out from their noses; after that they nailed them to a tree with nails through both hands, 
above their heads, and let them hang like that until they died.”677 
 
According to Sthen Jacobsen it was only around this time that the Danish authorities 
tried to organise the friskytter more strictly and attach their forces to regular 
regiments.  
 
In Jacobsen the nexus escalation of violence-development of the friskytte corps is 
obvious. To the Swedes the dimensions and the forceof the snaphane movement was 
                                                                                                                            
some who were caught by the enemy have experienced...since if the enemy should catch us then we 
will be ill paid by them for our services for our hereditary Kingdom.” Fabricius (III, p.172) quotes a 
few words from this letter.   Note that to Monsen and Lauridsen the ”fatherland” was Scania. As 
Fabricius (III, p.226.) pointed out it was very common in early modern Denmark to speak of the 
regions of Scania/the Scanian provinces, Zealand or Jutland as the “fatherland”. 
676 Fabricius III, p.172. 
677 Jacobsen, p.202. 
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a complete surprise and something they did not know quite how to fight. They had 
very limited experience of guerrilla warfare.678 Consequentially but not 
uncharacteristically of states that are faced with that sort of threat, the Swedes 
responded with an (in that context) unheard of degre  of violence. In their turn, the 
Danish authorities tried to protect and “domesticate” the friskytter through their 
legitimation and ever closer ties to the regular army. Reverend Jacobson pointed this 
out while the war was still in course but as yet no o e seems to have taken notice of 
his conclusions.   
 
Rommel in Helsingborg sent out an order that stated that all “snaphaner” in the 
district should meet up by the Kvidinge (Quidinge) bridge for general muster on 6th 
December 1678.679  Mayor Falck Larsen went to the assembly place with a guard of 
30 cavalry and ordered the 500 “snaphaner” that had gathered there that they should 
swear an oath of loyalty and accept four standards. Jacobsen reported that the 
“snaphaner” replied that they did not mind swearing the oath but they would not 
accept the standards. Nor did they want to be commanded by regular officers because 
they already had their own ones. The sources do not tell us much about this episode. 
The same episode is obviously mentioned in a letter from the Duke of Croy to the 
Danish king from December 1678: the duke reported that Rommel had called all the 
friskytter within a radius of 30 kilometres (3 mil) to a meeting where they would be 
asked to swear an oath of loyalty and to accept an “official standard”. Croy himself 
had sent out 30 cavalrymen to the meeting.680 As Sörensson has pointed out it is 
doubtful if Jacobsen’s version is entirely correct. A muster-roll of Eskeld Nielsen’s 
company from July 1679 mentions a previous muster at Kvidinge (Quidinge) and so it 
must be assumed that the muster did take place after all.681 All other sources prove 
that the friskytter/snaphaner were extremely keen on Danish flags and banners, but 
then Rommel might have offered them regimental standards at Kvidinge (Quidinge), 
                                               
678 See also: Lars Ericson Wolke, p. 109 and p.180. 
679 Jacobsen, p.201. Jacobsen always called the friskytter “snaphaner”. I doubt that Rommel used this 
term himself, if for no other reason then because the friskytter would not have come to the muster if he 
had called them snaphaner. Fabricius mentions this episode in Vol.III: p.176. 
680 Croy to the king, 16 December 1678, I.S., No:175. Sörensson, p. 54. 
681 Sörensson, p.55. Refers to muster roll and letter from “Edskell Nielsen”, Pehr Nielsen Flink and 
Olle Nielßen Flink, 10th July 1679, Fortegnelser og Ruller over Friskÿtterm: Skaane og Bleking 1677-
80, PK nr1843-, DRA. “...herforuden findis nogen som siden sidste munstiring ved quidinge, 
Companiet hafr entviget, dem formodis ved neste Munstring sig igien skall instille…” (…furthermore 
there are a few who since the last roll call at Quidinge have left, but they are supposed to present 
themselves at the next roll call...” 
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not red and white Dannebrog flags, the sources are not clear on this point. In the same 
manner it was normally the case that friskytter/snaphaner begged Copenhagen for 
officers from the regular army.682   
 
The Kvidinge (Quidinge) muster of 1678 remains a problematic issue. Jacobsen took 
for granted that everyone would understand the implications of what he meant but 
since he wrote at the time of the events and we live today, things have changed and it 
is not at all obvious what was implicated by wanting to give the snaphaner four 
standards and officers. Other sources state that regular officers were sent out at other 
times without major problems. Some officers oscillated between being registered as 
regular or irregular (Nicolaus Hermansen, Svend Poulsen, Pflug etc.) Nor is it clear to 
us why the muster at Kvidinge (Quidinge) should have been necessary when muster-
rolls were the rule and not the exception for those who wanted to count as friskytter. 
Sörensson doubted Jacobsen’s version since he could n t understand what the 
problem was to the friskytter. I think that is an important point: namely that it is hard 
to see today what the problem was! We have ample evidence of regular officers that 
were accepted by the snaphaner, and some evidence of snaphaner that craved for 
Danish flags. I meant to underline that there is something that we do not quite 
understand that was implicated by Jacobsen’s text. Fabricius implies that it was an 
attempt to absorb these friskytter into the regular army and that the flags were 
regimental banners. Which might be an answer. But as he himself admits, only a short 
time later part of the friskytter were actually absorbed into the regular army anyway.  
 
Conclusions 
At the beginning of this section I tried to stress the uncertainty of the situation that 
prevailed during early 1678 and how the reports from the Landskrona (Landscrone) 
area continuously talked of spies, Swedish destruction of villages and planned mass 
deportations. Those were fears reported to the Danish authorities or by representatives 
of the Danish state like Jens Harboe. As is also evident from the sources, there were 
spies on both sides and sometimes spies that worked for both sides, and if the Swedes 
laid the Landskrona (Landscrone) area and the borderlands waste, then the Danes did 
their best in other regions. Nevertheless the tone in most Danish sources from 1678 is 
                                               
682 See e.g. Depositiones, Nels Persen’s report, 26th June 1677, DRA that is also mentioned on p.76 of 
this thesis. 
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subdued. The friskytter Aage Monsen (Harlof) and Peer Lauridsen officially 
resigned their task in the borderlands since it had become too much for them to try to 
hold the enemy at bay. They did not seem to believe that their fatherland (Scania) 
would ever return to the Danish Crown again. At the same time the authorities tried to 
“domesticate” and protect the friskytter through the institution of ever closer bonds to 
the regular army. In this section I have also tried to escribe how the Danish 
authorities actively employed friskytter, Croats and detachment warfare in general to 
a higher degree as the “normal” war went wrong for them. Arensdorff who 
propagated a strategy based on “party” warfare and on estroying the enemy’s 
chances to live off the land, was the leading man until shortly after the fall of 
Kristianstad (Christianstad). The fact that the friskytter/snaphaner played an ever 
more notable role in Scania at the time was consequently not the matter of the land 
being taken over by bandits but a policy that was not o ly sponsored, but planned, by 
the Danish government, as is evident from the discus ions in the War Council. As was 
noted by contemporaries like Sthen Jacobsen, the Swedes responded with increasingly 
violent methods against the “snaphaner”, whoever thy were. 
 
The End of the War 
“It is obvious to the eye that God has totally abandoned the snaphaner...” 
Letter from Georg Hindrich Lybecker to the king, 17th September 1679683 
 
Introduction 
This section deals with how the Danish government policies continued to give weight 
to the petite guerre as an efficient means to, at least, hold the enemy at bay, at the 
same time as there was a series of Swedish executions of well-known Friskytte 
officials. The end of the war also meant that the Friskytte Corps was officially 
dissolved and in this section I have also analysed how the Danes set about that task. 
 
1679 
By this time, it was becoming evident that the Danes w re losing their battle. The 
authorities tried to ship as many of the friskytter as possible over from Scania to 
Zealand although no one seemed to know how they should best be employed after the 
war. When the new bishop of Münster refused to let his fearsome troops stay in 
                                               
683 Hazelius, p.189. 
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Danish service it was proposed that the friskytter and the Croats take their place. 
Schwanewedel, Pieter Stensen and other detachment combatants continued a rather 
fierce fight throughout the summer of 1679.684 But the Swedes were hunting the 
“snaphaner” down at a terrifying pace. Already in February Captain Severin was 
caught outside Ystad (Ysted), court-marshalled and tortured to death. At the end of 
July Major Hendrik Dreyer ended his days in much the same manner.685  The muster 
roll of the Bleging Company from March 1680 listed 28 men under Captain Hanns 
Bentsen Gammelstrup. At the end of the list a short n tice is added: “…out of my 
company a number of 34 have been killed by the enemy and are now lying on the 
racks and wheels.” The list was signed by Captain Be tsen himself. He survived the 
war and settled in Denmark.686 
There was another company from the Blekinge (Bleging) area: that of Captain Jens 
Keldsøn . At an early stage of the war Hanns Bentsen served under Keldsøn but later 
he was allowed to form his own company. Whereas Bentsen’s men operated in 
Blekinge (Bleging), Keldsøn’s men were sent over to the island of Bornholm.687 
Nevertheless Keldsøn’s men were no more fortunate than Bentsen’s: in 1677 the 
muster-roll listed 60 men. Two and a half years later their numbers counted 25. A 
brief explanation was added underneath: “ 30 men killed by the Swedes”. The other 
muster rolls generally do not tell us of the fate of the friskytter.  
Major Dreyer’s company counted 20 men when it was first registered in October 
1677, 41 one month later and only 12 in 1679.688 By then Dreyer himself and his 
lieutenant had been impaled by the Swedes. We know this because a notice on the 
muster roll says so. There are no records that tell us of the fate of his troops. Out of 
the other Captains of the friskytter we know that Tge Bøg was caught by the 
snaphane-catchers and shot on the spot689, Little Mads fought Erlandsson’s men on 
                                               
684 Schwanewedel was almost killed on one of these occasions when he and Pieter Stensen co-operated. 
685 For Severin see: Johnsson, p.183, Sörensson, p.56, Edvardsson III, p.195, Röndahl, 1996, p.314. For 
Dreyer see: Sörensson p.56. Jens Lerbom has kindly informed me that according to a letter from 
Sperling to the Swedish king that is to be found in the Swedish National Archives, Dreyer was 
executed on the Saturday following 24th July 1679, in Malmö. 
686 Fabricius, III, p.216 and p.242. 
687 Where most of the survivors settled after the war. The language in the villages of Gudhjem and Tejn 
where they settled is still influenced by the Blekinge/Bleging dialect. 
688 These variations were quite normal. Towards the end of the war the muster rolls grew shorter for 
various reasons: those who could had returned to their normal lives in Scania, others had already found 
other occupations on the other side of the Sound, yet others, like Dreyer himself, got killed during the 
last, violent anti-snaphaner operations.   
689 Bøg had been to a wedding at Kronovall (then Kronov ld) Castle and was on his way home alone. 
Erlandsson reported that he was very drunk and riding asleep on his horse so they could simply shoot 
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his knees until they sabred him down and Captain Severin was tortured to death. They 
both tried to fight to death because they knew surrendering would mean a fate that 
was much worse than dying. Some of these events would have remained legends if 
they had not been corroborated by Erlandsson’s “Promemoria”.690  
 
The Swedish newssheets continuously published notices like the following: “Today a 
corporal of the snaphaner had his tongue ripped out, b th hands cut off and the sign of 
the gallows branded into his forehead and then he was sent back to his mates”691  
or “Two Snaphaner were punished on Monday. One of them had his bones crushed 
and was then sent to the racks while the other one was put on an iron skewer while he 
was still alive, they both lived until the evening…”.692   
In February 1679 the Swedish colonel-lieutenant and feared snaphane catcher 
Rebinder who was stationed at Tunbyholm (Tundbyholm) in the south-east had 
caught a whole company of snaphaner: in the newssheets it was claimed that twenty 
had been killed and eight were made prisoners, among them “an old captain called 
Sören who had been their leader.”693A week later the same newssheet reported to its 
Swedish readers that nineteen snaphaner were going to be executed at Vanneberga 
(Vannebierg) that same day; among those where captain Söfren and his German 
lieutenant who admitted to having murdered ten people and to have had mercy on 
eleven others. Among the snaphaner was also a boy of thirteen or fourteen who had 
admitted to having killed two people: “There are no w rds for the cruelty of these 
people.” On 23th February the readers were told that several of these snaphaner had 
been executed at Åhus (Aahus/Aus):  
                                                                                                                            
him at point blank. Little Mads participated in a bttle between Erlandsson and 500 (?) snaphaner but 
was surrounded by a group of Swedes when his horse wa  shot. Lille Mads was shot through the leg 
but fought on with his sword on his knees and refusd to yield so that Erlandsson’s men had to kill him. 
He was buried in the Blentarp churchyard but the Swdes dug the corpse up and put it on racks inside 
the coffin. According to legend his horse was shot dead under him so that he fell to the ground and 
dropped the key to the lock of his gun (nöglen til hjullåsen). He had been shot through both his legs so 
that he had to stand on his knees and shoot as fast as he could while he pulled the wheel of his gun with 
his teeth. This version is reported by Jarnbjer, p.93.    
690 For the “Promemoria”, see also p. 31 of the introduction and pp. 122 and 153-154 of this chapter. 
691 The Post Tijdender 23rd January 1678, quoted by Edvardsson III, p. 194 and by Röndahl, 1996, 
p.265. This event is mentioned in a court register in the Swedish National Archives (RA ÄK:65a): two 
other peasants that were charged on the same occasin with having participated in snaphane activities 
were released. The existence of this document was kindly put to my notice by Dr. Jens Lerbom. 
692 The Mercurius 10th April 1678, “En av dem rådbråkades och steglades levande, den andre sattes 
jämväl levandes på en järnstör, bägge levde de intill aftonen sent.” quoted by Edvardsson III, p.195 and
Röndahl, 1996, p.267.   
693 The Mercurius, report from Kristianstad, 8th February 1679, quoted by Edvardsson, III, p.196. 
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“Last week the already mentioned captain and lieutenant of the snaphaner, together with several 
snaphaner, were impaled and their feet nailed to the stake, two were put alive on the racks, three were 
decapitated and then put on the racks. One of the captains was buried in a church but our men had him 
exhumed and brought to Åhus where his body and the coffin were put on two racks.”694  
 
This passage should be compared to Svend Erlandsson’s account of how Little Mads 
was defeated posthumously in his “Promemoria”:  
 
“The snaphaner took him (Little Mads) and buried him at Blentarp, but Sven Erlandsson exhumed him 
and had him transported to Åhuus, where he was put on the racks in his coffin, once the lid had been 
opened and thrown away”. 695 
 
Unfortunately there are no dates in the “Promemoria”. However, Jens Lerbom has 
checked the court registers in the Swedish National Archives and confirms that the 
“exhumed” snaphane was Little Mads.  Moreover, the court records state that “only” 
eight of the eighteen (or nineteen) snaphaner were condemned to death. In fact the 
newssheet only mentions eight executions expressly, including that of the already 
dead Little Mads. 
 
In July that year, when it should have been clear to everyone that the Danes were 
losing, the Swedish newssheets still frightened their readers with the terrible 
snaphaner: they reported that the snaphaner in Scania were very strong and that they 
had occupied a small mansion near Kristianstad (Christianstad) where they had killed 
three of the six soldiers that had been stationed th re but they had saved the other 
three. They were laying siege to another mansion in the surroundings. The 
commander was Major Harlof whose troops were estimated to about 400.  Fortunately 
the snaphaner in the Blekinge region had been vanquished and Major Lybecker was 
offering them to take service in his regiment instead.696 
   
On 27th March the war commissary in Helsinborg received an order that stated that 
Scanians could be employed in the regular army (now that the friskytter corps was no 
longer necessary). 697  The Danish policy on this issue fluctuated during the Scanian 
War: there were Scanians among the regular soldier at all times but during some 
periods new Scanian recruits were directed to regular regiments, during other periods 
they were encouraged to join the friskytter. Indiviual examples of this are presented 
                                               
694 The Mercurius, 23rd and 28th February 1679, quote from 28th February, quoted by Edvardsson, III, 
p.196.   
695 Sven Erlandsson’s “Promemoria”. 
696 The Mercurius, 31st July 1679, quoted by Edvardsson III, p.197. 
697 Sörensson, p.56. The Board of the Army (General Commissariat) to the king, 19th April 1679. 
Lit.E, DRA. 
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by Hans Severin’s and Jacob Jurgensen Visseltoft’s careers. Severin was a 
professional soldier who was prepared to fight in any kind of unit as long as he could 
fight the Swedes, but Arensdorff told him to organise a group of friskytter. When 
Visseltoft volunteered, he was first enrolled in the regular army, but after some time 
as a Swedish POW he was re-enrolled as a friskytte.698 Some time afterwards Rommel 
was ordered to call all the friskytter in his district and Gønge to a general assembly in 
which they would be offered positions in the regular army. On 8th April 1679 Owe 
Rommel replied that he was expecting a large group of friskytter that he would be 
able to send over to the regular army, but only if they were offered positions as 
dragoons or in the cavalry or possibly in the fleet. They refused to serve in the 
infantry. In June Rommel’s friskytter were sent over to Elsinore where they were 
mustered and provided with lodgings.699  
 
In Landskrona (Landscrone) the situation was even more difficult. The Danish district 
governor Knud Thott reported that hardly any friskytter at all had come to town to 
register with the regular army. Perhaps because Thott was not on particularly good 
terms with Captain Simon. Thott was forever complaining about Simon Andersen’s 
behaviour. Andersen in his turn kept complaining about Thott. According to Andersen 
he and his 160 friskytter had not received any support at all during the winter months 
so that their horses had become unusable. Thott waned to force Andersen’s obstinate 
men to enlist in the regular army but feared that ins ead they would beg the enemy for 
parole. In the end Thott only saw to it that all the friskytter were registered and then 
they were assigned quarters in the hundreds of Alboand Järrestad on the opposite side 
of Scania. Naturally Andersen’s 160 men could not be expected to keep the Swedish 
army at bay on their own in that area, which Thott must have known.700  
 
In July 1679 the Swedish newssheets reported that the snaphaner in Scania were still 
growing stronger and that they had occupied a country house near Kristianstad 
(Christianstad) where they had killed three of the six soldiers that had been stationed 
there but they had spared the lives of the other thr e. They were laying siege to 
another mansion in the surroundings. The commander was Major Harlof whose troops 
                                               
698 For Scanians in the regular Danish army, see also:Wanngren (1991), pp.68-70.   
699 Fabricius III, p.176. Sörensson, p.56.   
700 Fabricius III, pp.176-177. Sörensson, pp.57-58. 
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were estimated to about 400. Fortunately the snaphaner in the Blekinge region had 
been defeated and Major Lybecker was offering them to take service in his regiment 
instead.701 In August Captain Casper Due was betrayed by his own men and 
consigned to Lybecker who was pleased to have “thatferocious murderer and captain 
of the snaphaner “Casper Dufwa” in his hands. Lybecker declared that he would never 
have been able to catch Due on his own and that he would see to it that Due would 
meet his end very soon.702 A Swedish newssheet reported as follows: 
“Today a captain of the snaphaner called Kasper Dufwa, of the nation a Polack, and with him another 
snaphane, who confessed that he had committed several mu ders with his captain, have suffered their 
well-deserved punishment.”703  
 
On 20th September 1679 King Christian decided that i  was no longer necessary to 
provide the friskytter with lodgings since their sevices were no longer needed. Those 
who wanted to stay in Denmark should be allowed to o so. If they were willing to 
take over abandoned farmsteads they would be allowed thr e to four years of tax-
exemption and they would also be provided with as much wood as they needed. Else 
they would receive 2 rigsdaler on leaving.704  
 
The peace treaty was signed in Lund on 27th September 1679. The Danes had hoped 
that they would have been allowed to keep part of the territory that they had 
reconquered from the Swedes but the French ambassador (and emissary of Louis 
XIV) replied: “Mon pauvre monsieur, pas un village”.705 The treaty said nothing 
about the friskytter and Major Harlof later claimed that they were tracked down like 
“wild and mute beasts”.706 
 
By this time Aage Monsen Harlof had been nominated commander-in-chief of the 
friskytter. Major Harlof wrote to the king to plead his and his men’s cause.707 In his 
letter he declared that they had tried to persuade the “gentlemen of the Army Board 
                                               
701 The Mercurius, 31st July 1679, Swedish Royal Library. 
702 Letter from Lybecker  to King Charles XI, 19th August 1679, SRA, quoted by Edvardsson, p.125. 
Lybecker declared that Due and his men had murdered at least 70 people, among them many dragoons 
(drabanter). It was “the peasants and six of his own snaphaner” who had betrayed him. 
703 The Svenska Ordinarie Post-tijdender, Kristianstad 4th September 1679, Swedish Royal Library, 
quoted by Edvardsson, p.197. Due’s background is very unclear. Röndahl (p.276) claims that he was a 
Danish nobleman. According to legend he had a cottage on the grounds of Vanås castle. 
704 Sörensson, p.58 foot-note 1. Kong.ord. (Royal ordinances), 20th September and 26th September 
1679. Lit.N, DRA. 
705 “Dear Sir, you’re not going to keep a single one (village)!” Fabricius III, p.182.. 
706 Sörensson, (p.63) quotes Major Harlof: “vilde och umælende Bester”. 
707 A translation of this letter can be read at the end of this dissertation.   
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(General Commissariat)” to prolong their winter-quarters and payment since all eight 
companies had come over to Zealand on direct orders with their whole equipment and 
horses. After four months they had nothing left of he provisions they had brought 
with them and all their savings were left behind in Scania and they had received news 
that the Swedes had taken it all. For the sake of their loyalty to their king and dear 
fatherland they had all become “freaks and exiles” that no one would take in or 
help.708 Harlof then continued to explain that they had all left their wives, children, 
kin, houses and money in an extremely rude manner. All of these persons were now 
living in great poverty and some of them were being arrested and executed in a worse 
than cruel manner:“We did all this and suffered it all in the hope that we would be 
saved from the Swedish yoke and in times of grace be rewarded by or gracious 
King.”709 Harlof added lists of all his remaining men to theletter. The sheriff 
(ridefoged) of the district of Kronborg (Hamlet’s castle outside Elsinore) complained 
to the authorities that the friskytter were running wild in his area and he wanted to be 
“delivered” from them. Towards the beginning of March 1679 he received passports 
and payment for all of the 500 friskytter that dwelled in the Kronborg district.710 That 
was the official end of the king’s friskytter.   
 
Conclusions: 
In this section I have tried to analyse the relationship between the friskytter and the 
authorities during the last phase of the war. I have lso put it into relation with what 
Jacobsen had to say about the transfer of the friskytte units to the regular army in one 
shape or another, and that district governor Rommel ev ntually had some success 
with this whereas Knud Thott did not quite manage it: which Sörensson and Fabricius 
both imply might have in part been due to the fact tha he and Simon Andersen could 
not stand the sight of each other. 
 
There is no such thing as “the role of the  snaphaner/friskytter during the Scanian 
war”. Their role, if one can speak of one, was in co stant transformation during the 
                                               
708 Sörensson, p.63.    
709 Aage Harlof to the King, 18 November 1679, I.S., No:413.DRA See: Sörensson, p.60. 
710 Sörensson, p.61, refers to letters from Hans Rostgaard to the Board of the Army (General 
Commissariat), 7th February 1680, I.S., June, No:221; and 1st March 1680, I.S., August, No:269, 
DRA.  The list included 2 majors, 11 captains, 14 lieutenants, 13 cornets, 19 quarter masters, 25 
corporals, 4 scribes, 2 drummer boys, 410 friskytter. 
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whole early modern era and although it crystallised towards the end of the Scanian 
War it remained highly unclear what their position really was, just as it became a 
much disputed issue what should come of the friskytter after the war. The King’s 
Friskytter Corps were just one of many outcomes of the snaphane movement, which 
in its turn was intrinsically intertwined with the peasant troops and the “land storm” 
men that the king’s emissaries had trained for generations. The war itself formed the 
multiple roles of the Friskytte Corps and their non-registered assistants. If the 
northeast had not been lost during the first months of 1677 then the Danes might have 
preferred going on  working with more numerous peasant troops instead of opting for  
friskytte troops...if the Swedes had not decided on a course of such harsh reprisals and 
criminalisation of those they branded as “snaphaner” th n the snaphaner might not 
have been remodelled into friskytter by the Danish authorities...and yet there were 
certain characteristics that were distinctive of snaphaner and friskytter in general and 
that they had in common with their predecessors in earlier Scandinavian wars and 
often enough with the peasant troops. But then the majority of the constant 
characteristics are identical with the characteristics of guerrilla warfare in general. 
Traits that rendered them very useful to the regular army. The easiest recognisable of 
these traits was precisely their knowledge of the terrain and their familiarity with the 
local population. But they were also employed on a wide range of missions and were 
required to execute a variety of tasks that all correspond to tasks that are designed as 
characteristic of guerrilla warfare in military manuals from different ages.     
 
The Snaphane Captains 
Introduction 
Pehr Sörensson argued that the account books proved that the friskytter were 
employees who worked on orders for a certain payment. Fabricius included a 
perfunctory but solidly researched outline of snaphane/friskytte actions that were 
parallel or part of the greater conflict. In essence I am trying to continue Fabricius’s 
and Sörensson’s work and continue the pursuit of the more practical aspects of the 
matter. Sörensson brought lists of salaried friskytte officers to the light, in some cases 
with notes or letters included that stated some of the tasks they were paid to execute, 
like breaking the ice in the harbours when they were in winter quarters, but generally 
not. In most cases the receipts and lists of payments only contain names that 
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Sörensson knew little or nothing about. Fabricius gave a historical face to some of 
these names. I stress the term “historical” because in the myths, local and national, 
some of those names were super famous but there were few facts to verify or 
contradict the legends with. As in the case of Simon Andersen, one of the most 
famous friskytter, Sörensson presented his authorisation licences and excerpts of 
account books in which payments to “Captain Simon” were registered.  Fabricius 
based some of his research on the “snaphane movement” on Simon Andersen’s 
reports, although his use of them was fragmentary and he seems not to have located 
Andersen’s operative zone to the correct area. Because some serious research has 
been done on Simon Andersen before me, first and forem st by Sörensson and 
Fabricius, but also by the reverend Hedwall, it has become easier to draw a general 
picture of Andersen’s movements and actions. For that reason I have chosen Captain 
Simon as the first ‘case study’ in which I try to pin down a friskytte company’s 
operations during the war. I have then analysed three other friskytte/snaphane 
officers’ actions during the Scanian War. I did notpick Svend Poulsen for two 
motives: one, that so much has already been written on him and Kim A. Wagner was 
working on his book when I started my research and two, his name has never 
appeared in the sources I have consulted. Nor did I choose Captain Severin or the 
Uggle brothers, that are undoubtedly the most famous next to Svend Poulsen. 
Unfortunately I do not have all that many sources rega ding Captain Severin, nor have 
I found much about the Uggle brothers in Copenhagen although the court records in 
Sweden contain ample information on both Severin and the Uggle brothers. Instead I 
based a little section on the comparatively unknown lieutenant Thue Piill whose 
reports transmit a factual and detailed image of an ordinary workday in the woods and 
the villages. I also wanted to include an analysis of the sources on Captain Bendix, a 
legendary snaphane whose existence has not been documented until now. According 
to Swedish court records, Captain Bendix was authorised but there are no traces of 
him among the muster rolls in Copenhagen. Possibly because he and his closest men 
were dead by the time most of the muster rolls datefrom. It was only after the 
execution of Captain Bendix’s men early in 1677 that e typical muster-rolls of the 
friskytter start to appear. I included Captain Bendix because he was representative of 
a different kind of snaphane/friskytte, one that was b sed on the work of sheriffs and 
bailiffs who surrounded themselves with armed guards, often gamekeepers and 
foresters from the huge estates that dominated those parts. That kind of 
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snaphaner/friskytter seemed to be more common in the deep south and I will analyse 
it more in detail in the Krabbe chapter. Finally there is Pieter Steensen who 
represented yet another kind of snaphane/friskytte. Contrary to Svend Poulsen the 
name of Pieter Steensen kept popping up all the timwhen I was looking through the 
sources. As did those of Jenssön and then Simon Andersen (who contrary to the other 
two has gone to legend). Fundamentally I concentrated on the snaphaner that 
appeared in my sources and tried to map their activities as closely as possible. Like 
several other officers Steensen seems to have sometimes been enrolled in the regular 
troops, sometimes in the friskytte corps. Like his even more famous colleague Nikolaj 
Hermansen he was sent out to organise friskytte companies and to do intelligence 
work in the war zone(s). Like Hermansen he moved almost all over Scania and we 
find him in different places during different periods.  
Bendix Clawssen 
Introduction 
This section deals with the fairly unknown Captain Bendix whose name has been 
added on the “missing snaphaner” list by local histor ans. Spread notices about 
Captain Bendix have been known, but much due to the confusion of names that 
appear in various versions, these have never been int rconnected. In the same manner, 
local legends about a Captain Bendix have not been con ected to the notices in the 
sources either. Danish sources reveal that Bendix Clawssen was a Danish public 
official with jurisdiction over a large part of southeastern Scania and that he was 
authorised by the authorities to recruit (conscript?) “snaphaner”. In this section I will 
try to analyse the nature of Clawssen’s tasks, in his civilian job and as a leader of a 
group of “snaphaner”. This was before the “breakthrough” of the term “friskytte”. 
Since the sources are mainly based on other persons’ c urt testimonies and 
interrogation statements about their own role in the Captain Bendix affair, I have also 
tried to analyse Clawssen’s position in society and to the community around him as 
sifted through the sources. It is for example evident that loyalty bonds to the great 
noble families (the Ulfelds) played an important role. 
 
Sheriff, Forester and Snaphane 
In June 1677 the Danish cornet Wildskött was given the task of travelling around 
southeastern Scania to round up native Swedes and Swe ish sympathisers. Whether 
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Wildskött was a regular soldier or a friskytte is impossible to tell, but it was one of the 
most common tasks executed by the friskytter. From the very first, the king had 
employed them in order to “persecute” Swedes and those who sympathised with 
them711, but as with all other tasks executed by friskytter, r gular troops were also 
used to “persecute” Swedes.712 In the middle of the native Swedes who were brought 
in by cornet Wildskött on 15th June there was a Dane from Flensburg (in southeastern 
Jutland) called Frans Rasmussen.713 Rasmussen had worked for the Scanian nobleman 
Ebbe Ulfeld for 12 years but now he occupied the position of Skowridere in the 
hundreds of Albo, Ingelstad and Herrestad. Literally ”Skowridere” means ”rider of 
the forest” and the position was that of something in between that of a forester and an 
emissary of the state.  Rasmussen had been appointed to the job by Count (Ebbe) 
Ulfeld that same year when the position had become vacant through the unfortunate 
demise of its previous occupant, Mr Bendix Clawssen. Wildskött’s report explains 
how this came to be in the following terms: 
 ”Bendix appealed to Ulfeld for pardon for what he had done against the Swedes. He handed this 
petition over to Frandtz Rasmussen who in his turn brought it to Ulfeld. The king, Askenberg and 
Ulfeld wrote on the petition that Bendix would be granted pardon if he turned in 10 Snaphaner. In spite 
of this his house was soon surrounded and broken into by Ulfeld’s men and he was then sent to the 
stake and wheel.”  
 
Now Rasmussen was arrested by the Danes on the suspct of having caused the death 
of Bendix Clawssen and of having usurped the position to which Clawssen had been 
appointed by the (Danish) king. Since Ulfeld had gone ver to the Swedes he was 
absolutely not authorised to appoint officials on behalf of the Danish authorities. 
Frans Rasmussen denied all charges, claiming that he had had no idea of what Ulfeld 
was planning when Clawssen first came to him. Instead he named five men who had 
been present when Bendix was caught and said they were to blame, not him. These 
five men included the mayor of Simrishamn (Cimmershavn) and Ulfeld’s personal 
secretary.  The deposition then states that Ulfeld had divided the territory that had 
been Bendix’s in three parts between Rasmussen, Bartholomeus Urtegaardsmand 
from Vä (Wee) and Jens Pedersen from Göinge (Gynge). Rasmussen replied that his 
only reason for applying for the job was that he had 12 children to feed and ”the 
                                               
711 As written in their licences. 
712 E.g. authorisation on p.53.  
713 Depositiones, 15th June 1677, DRA. 
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Swedes had made the whole country believe that the Dan s would never come back to 
Scania again.”714   
Bendix Clawssen’s territory as a forester was enormous and he must have been envied 
by many. Today we know terribly little about him exc pt what transpires from the 
sources that are presented in this section and that have in part already been published 
by Vigo Edvardsson and Uno Röndahl.715 Almost certainly Bendix Clawssen is the 
“Captain Bendix” that figures in numerous legends from an area that roughly 
corresponds to the territory Clawssen was responsible for as skowridere.  
Wildskött’s report does not indicate where Clawssen came from but his name is 
Danish by the sound of it. Ebbe Ulfeld himself was not only Danish by birth but the 
son-in-law of Christian IV of Denmark. Urtegaardsmand and Jens Pedersen were 
Danes to judge by their names and so were at least three of the five men Rasmussen 
betrayed to the Danes. Ethnic distinction lines do not seem to have played any role 
here. Possibly patronage did. Rasmussen was one of Ebbe Ulfeld’s old clients and 
maybe he had chosen the side of his patron in the confli t.716 Naturally Ulfeld’s party 
was that of the Swedes and Rasmussen knew very well that he would be safe as long 
as the land remained in their hands and he seems to have trusted them blindly.  
Clawssen had acted “against the Swedes.” Theoretically he was offered to make 
amends for this crime by turning in ten snaphaner but then he was sent to die the 
death of a snaphane anyway. The fact that the Swedish king gave him the option of 
making amends for his crimes by consigning 10 snaphaner indicates that the forester 
was supposed to know the whereabouts as many of these m n and perhaps even to 
have some power of command over them. If nothing else it proves that Bendix 
Clawsen was mixed up with the “devilish snaphaner” in the eyes of the Swedes. Else 
he would not have been sent to die the death of one. 
                                               
714 Depositiones, 15th June 1677: ”Hand siger at wære gifft og hawer 12 börn, derudower søgte hand 
bestilling att de kunde nære sig, der til med hafde de swenske indbildet det heele land att de danske 
aldrig komb i Scaane igien.” 
715 Röndahl (III, pp. 220-221 and p. 453) is as far as I know the only one who has made any sort of 
attempt to “identify” Captain Bendix and who has relat d information from two different sets of 
sources (the Mercurius and Winslow’s diaries) in attempt to find out more about this man. Edvardsson 
first “re-discovered” and published excerpts from the newssheets that regarded the snaphaner, but made 
no further comments in Bendix’s case and Röndahl used that material. He refers to Edvardsson as one 
of his sources at the end of the chapter.  
 
716 In the case of Ebbe’s cousin Corfitz his Danish servants and clients seem to have continued in his 
service even after he had gone over to the Swedish side. See: Aktstycken ock Anteckningar om 
Snälleröd (Documents and Notes about Snälleröd), ed. by Ludvig Larsson and Agda Larsson neé 
Berthelius, Lund 1936. Pp. 24-30.See also Fabricius, vol.I, p.135. 
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Knud Fabricius found records that attested of the execution of a “Bendiks Klausen” 
and four others as the first snaphaner to be broken n the wheel.717 Uno Röndahl 
reports of a “Captain of the snaphaner” called “Bendix Classon” who was executed 
near “Lyngsiö” and “broken on five racks (5 stegel)” on 9th January 1677. Röndahl 
also lists him as one of 29 men that are recorded in different sources as leaders or 
captains of friskytter/snaphaner but who do not figure in the muster rolls in 
Copenhagen.718 Classon is the Swedish form of Clawsen (modern Danish: Clausen). 
Wildskött reported that Clawssen had been broken on the wheel at “Lyngsøe bridge”. 
719 The Swedish newssheet Mercurius reported on 5th February 1677 as follows: 
“...a captain of the snaphaner called Bendix was brought to our camp with 12 of his subordinates, they 
were all to be sent to the racks and wheel but first they had to draw out all dead horses that could be 
found in the camp…They confessed the names of both clergymen and noblemen who have conspired 
with them.”720  
 
We also have Sthen Jacobsen’s description of the first really cruel Swedish executions 
of snaphaner that he dated to between 14th January and 2nd February 1677.721 In that 
passage he also mentioned that the captured snaphaner were made to drag out dead 
horses from the army camp at Vä (Wæ). It can only be assumed that it was Clawssen 
and his men that he meant.  
 
Was Bendix Clawssen the forester also a captain of the friskytter? The name in itself 
is not only Danish but was also unusual in Scania at the time. It is not to be excluded 
that even groups of snaphaner who were not registered in the official corps grouped 
themselves in military units and called their leaders “captains.” Perhaps Bendix 
Clawssen is not to be found in the muster rolls because his unit had never been there. 
But perhaps the muster roll has simply been lost. A witness in the Rasmusson vs. 
Swänsson trial from 1701 claims that Captain Bendix put the names of his recruits on 
a list and that Bendix showed the men he tried to recruit “papers from Tromp” (a 
                                               
717 Knud Fabricius III, p. 91 foot-note 3. The records he mentioned were: “RR 31st January 1677). 
718 Röndahl, p.543. Röndahl has constructed this list on the basis of Sörensson, Fabricius and other 
existent works. Sometimes these persons, who were mntioned in some sources as “snaphaner” and 
therefore ended up on Röndahl’s list, were quite well-known as e.g. Danish sheriffs (Mikkel Mörch) or 
regular soldiers (Peer Stenssön).  
719 Depositiones 15th June 1677. 
720 Edvardsson, p.192. (hava först måst utdraga alla död  hästar, som I lägret funnits och som därefter 
skola steglas). 
721 Jacobsen, p.89.   
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Dutch admiral in Danish service)722, which can only be assumed to be a friskytte 
licence.   
 
 In the preceding section of this chapter we were told of two villagers who almost 
ended up on the racks because a professional snaphane hunter accused them of having 
sent for Captain Bendix and his snaphaner: a concept that seemed to be so well known 
that no explanations were felt to be needed. That episode took place sometime 
between the middle of December 1676 and the middle of January 1677; or rather, 
after the battle of Lund but before the death of Captain Bendix. The places that are 
mentioned in the documents concerning Bendix Clawssen (Classon)/Captain Bendix 
are all situated within the 9 hundreds that constituted his district as a forester. They 
also correspond to the area in which the legends about Captain Bendix are told. 
 
The Skräddaröd Massacre 
Further details about Captain Bendix can be found in a court register from 1701.723  
The two farmers Jacob Rasmuson and Nills Swenss.724 had both been called to court 
because the judge felt that a recent argument between the two men had to be cleared 
up. During the altercation Nills Swenss. had said th ngs that called for public action; 
namely, that his neighbour Rasmuson had been a snapha e during the war! Now, 
Nills Swenss. handed in a written statement in which e declared the following: 
 “In the presence of me, Judge Erich Swänson end Per Nillson (he) told how the Captain of the 
snaphaner Benedix, during that last war in this country, found Nills Swenss. in the countryside and 
took him with him and wrote Nils Swenson’s name on a list among the other snaphaner who were with 
him later when he was caught, for which reason Jacob Rasmusson presumes that Nills Swänson might 
have been condemned…”. 
 
 Rasmuson adds that he too had had occasion to find himself in the company of 
Captain Bendix who wanted him to join his troops and had shown him Admiral 
Trump’s orders, but that he had said “no thank you”, whether the court believe it or 
not. Swensson did not deny. He admitted that he had met Bendix while he was out 
                                               
722 Österlens Släkt- och Folklivsforskarförening, ”Assizes in the hundred of Järesta”, (Sommarting i 
Järesta härad), 14th May 1701, http://www.osterlen.com/slaktforskning/170 st.htm 
723 The state vs. Nils Swensson Österlens Släkt- och Flklivsforskarförening, ”Assizes in the hundred 
of Järesta”, (Sommarting i Järesta härad), 14th May 1701, 
http://www.osterlen.com/slaktforskning/1701st.htm 
724 By 1701 Swedish had become the language of the official records and all names are written in that 
language, consequently a Rasmusen became a Rasmuson etc. The pronunciation, however, remained 
Rasmusen as is often still the case in Scania today. The abbreviated form “Swenss.” might depict the 
actual usage; it is still common in the area to substitute the patronymic –sen/son with a genitive –s. 
Hence Nills Swens (Swen’s son) instead of Swensen/Swensson. 
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driving his cart and that Bendix had wanted him to join his troops but that he had said 
no and that he had later fled over to the island of Bornholm in order not to be forced 
to join Bendix’s troops.  
Rasmuson told the court that a Swedish party on the hunt for Captain Bendix’s  men 
had entered the village of Skräddaröd and that during this raid several locals had been 
killed in an insensate shooting-spree.725 Broor Andersson, Swensson’s father Swen  
Nillsson and Swensson’s brother, and two brothers called Erich and Jöns Tuedsson 
were among these. At the time Rasmuson was a public official and he had seen a 
verdict that condemned Broor Andersson, Swen Nillsson, Nills Swensson and Truls 
Jönsson to the stake and wheel (stegel och hjul).726 However, Broor Andersson died 
from his wounds on the spot and only his corpse could be quartered and put on the 
wheel. Truls Jönsson also died but was later granted parole because he had been shot 
by mistake while he was eating and so he was granted a normal funeral.  
Erich Tuedsson who had been called to the stand told the court that when he was 
working as a farmhand at Skräddaröd the Swedes camedown on Captain Bendix at 
Delperöd and that then they had come straight to Skräddaröd where they had gone 
from one house to another, killing whoever happened to be in at the moment.727 Erich 
himself had been shot through the head and left for dead but he had survived because 
the bullet had passed through his teeth. In spite of heir wounds some of the others 
had managed to escape.   
Next, Judge Tillof Märtensson from Rölla was called to the stand. He declared that 
during the war he had lived on a farmstead called Wemmenlöfs torp and that he 
clearly remembered that Nills Swensson had been “taken” by Captain Bendix on 
Wemmenlöf’s grounds while he was driving a keg of beer to Stiby and that the 
snaphaner had dragged him along “between two horses”. They were desperate for 
Swensson to join their ranks because he was such a good shot.  
                                               
725 Erich Tuedsen declared that the Swedes went from one h use to another and shot whoever they 
came across.  
726 Normally this meant that the convict was first hanged and then his corpse was quartered and placed 
on top of wheels. Sometimes the convict was nailed to a pole and had to die hanging there, much as if 
he had been crucified. See: Ambrius (1996), p.63. 
727 “...då dhet swänske partiet tagit snaphane Capitainen i Delperödh komme dhe till Skräddarödh, och 
funno snaphane Bror Anderss. den dhe ihielskutit ginge så uhr ett huus i dhet andra, och sköts hwem 
som förekom.” (When the Swedish unit had taken the Captain of the snaphaner at Delperödh they went 
to Skräddarödh, and found a snaphane (called) Bror Anderss. whom they shot dead and then they went 
from one house to another shooting whoever they came cross.”) 
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At this point Nills Swensson could have found himself in bad trouble, but Jacob 
Rasmusson now chose to defend him: he declared that he had never wanted the little 
misunderstanding to end up in court. He and Swensson had argued because 
Rasmussen’s wife had been evicted “because of a lamb” nd that certain things that 
should have been kept secret had been said in public. But Rasmusson did not want to 
hurt Swensson. Eventually the court decided that both men should pay a fine of 3 
marks each for having uttered  “unwise words” but the case was closed for lack of 
evidence.    
Sheriffs, Bailiffs and Gamekeepers 
One eminent group of leaders/captains of the friskytter were originally sheriffs, 
bailiffs and gamekeepers in positions similar to that of Bendix Clawssen. Fabricius 
mentions Jon Svendsøn from Sturkö (Sturkø) as one of many friskytter who had 
occupied a prestigious position as a district official, or lænsmand, before the war. 
Fabricius hypothesised that the disastrous financial situation that had especially hit the 
inhabitants of the forest areas particularly hard was hat had driven men like 
Svendsen to enrol in the friskytter corps. I come back to that argument in the latter 
part of the thesis in which I analyse the snaphane movement on the large estates in the 
southeast where the role of the district officials nd gamekeepers seem to have been 
as important as in the north. Which in a way contests Fabricius’s view that the 
lensmaend in northern Scania only became friskytter because of the disastrous 
financial situation up there. Svendsøn had also been captain of the peasant troops of 
his parish. Jon Svendsøn had fought with the peasant troops under Michel Mørch but 
did not feel like languishing under the Swedish yoke any more so he fled from home 
leaving his wife and four children behind. 728  After that he gathered a small group of 
friskytter around him and in March 1677 he turned up in Copenhagen in order to 
obtain licence for his company, which he easily did. In the records he still results as a 
captain of the friskytter at the end of the war.  
 
Jens Kieldsen visited the Army Headquarters in Copenhagen in the company of Jon 
Svendsøn in March 1677. From the statement he left th n we can deduce that he 
participated in the resistance against the Swedes in Blekinge in February 1677 and 
that he was impressed by Hermansen’s efforts. Kieldsen claimed that the inhabitants 
                                               
728 Svendsøn, 4th March 1677, Kieldsen 18th March 1677, I.S (316 and 343), DRA. Sörensson, p.25. 
Fabricius III, p.104.  
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of Blekinge were prepared to fight to the last man if only Hermansen and his 
dragoons received more support from Copenhagen. Kieldsen asked that he and a 
group of men he had gathered be inserted into the official pay-rolls of the friskytter 
because of their efforts to “wipe out all native Swedes in Scania, Halland and 
Blekinge” and to “deprive them of their privileges”.729 Some time later we find 
Kieldsen as captain of a company of 60 friskytter in Blekinge. Hermansen authorised 
Kieldsen’s friskytter to become regular dragoons (through a royal patent Hermansen 
had received).  Eventually Kieldsen and Hermansen se m to have fallen out. 
Hermansen did not pay Kieldsen’s men and in the end Kiel sen’s company had to 
seek refuge from the Swedes on the island of Bornholm. 730 As I have already 
mentioned, lensmend, ridefogder (sheriffs) and fogder (bailiffs) seem to have 
provided the friskytter and snaphaner with an unending stream of new forces.  
In 1677 a special commission in Ronneby (Rønneby) was charged with the inquiry 
into cases of persons who were suspected of “snapphaneri”.731 Among these were 
Sheriff (länsman) John Månsson from the hundred of Öster (Østre) and his son Torkel 
Johnsson who was also a sheriff.732 Månsson did not present himself in court but his 
son did. The charges against Månsson were the following:  
1) “Having acted against the authorities of the realm.”  
2) “Having maltreated the king’s men and having called himself a major of the 
snaphaner.”   
3) “Having signed a call for rebellion and having sent it on, and having spent 
time with the enemies at Kristianopel (Christianopel). Furthermore he had 
read out a letter from the Danish king.  
All witnesses confirmed that Månsson was a “rebel leader”.733  The Danish response 
was to try to assist the snaphaner. Colonel Lützow, the commander of (Christianopel), 
sent out what the Swedish sources report as “snaphae” troops to help the others. The 
                                               
729 Svendsøn, 4 March 1677, Kieldsen 18th March 1677, I.S (316 and 343), DRA.   
730 Copenhagen, 3rd  November 1677, I.B. Skaanske Friskytter, DRA. Sörensson, p.25 and Fabricius 
III, p.206. 
731 The members of this commission were Ebbe Uhlfeld (president), Colonel Anders Ridderlöv, 
Captain Nils Broberg, the Reverend Valleman of Thorsås and Sheriff Nils Strömer. See: Johnsson, 
p.72. 
732 Johnsson, pp.72-74 and ”Landshövdingens skrivelser ti l K. Maj:t”, SRA. The names are 
Swedicised. 
733 In his war diaries professor Winslow (UB, but also Skånska samlingar 1874, pp.80-81 and 
Johnsson, pp.60-61) mentioned a John Månsson from Olsäng as the major of the snaphaner who 
ambushed Ebbe Ulfeld’s troops at Olsäng and the Aspenåsa bridge on 8th November 1676. Considering 
that Uhlfeld was now president for the commission fr snaphane inquiries it can only be supposed that 
Månsson made a wise choice in not turning up. 
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leaders on the 8th November were “John Månsson, a major from Olsängen” and also a 
peasant called Per and “tall Håkan”.734  In his absence, Månsson was condemned to 
lose his life, honour and property  and his corpse to be put on four wheels and his 
head on a stake, in case he ever turned up. Månsson’s son Torkel was charged with 
not having extracted enough taxes and with having signed the same rebellious call as 
his father, but he was in possession of a royal parole letter. Torkel Johnsson was 
present in court and it was decided that he should be sent to prison while the king 
decided on a suitable verdict.735    
Jens Tygesen from the Sunnerbo court case was yet another bailiff (birkefoged) who 
was charged with collaborating with the snaphaner i August 1677.736   
 
In July 1678 Ebbe Uhlfeld issued a warrant for four deserters, who had first served as 
friskytter with Simon Andersen, then they had been caught by the Swedes and made 
to enrol in Uhlfeld’s troops but eventually they had run away. The four men were:  
Faiher Murtensen who had worked as a “forester at Hindszöe, Esbiørn Jacobsen who 
had previously worked as a sharpshooter (forsuersskytt) and Peer who had been “in 
the service of district governor Durell” and then Nills Skytt whose patronymic is not 
stated either but normally somebody called “Skytt” occupied himself with exactly 
what his surname indicated, i.e. with being a sharpshooter or gamekeeper.737  
 
In Swedish instructions to the governors general from the time the importance of 
having ”Swänske Män” (Swedish men) in the right places was stressed whereas the 
Danes were described as incapable of holding office.738 After the Swedish take-over 
the entire Danish administration was discharged. Already towards the end of 1658 a 
high Swedish official by the name of Johan Forsman demanded that the Danish 
                                               
734 Information based on Professor Winslow’s diaries from the war, The names are Swedicised. 
735 The länsman of Hanavrå, Krister ? was accused of having started the first ”snaphane rebellion” 
together with Little John when the war first started. Handl.rör.Danska kriget 1676-77, SRA, quoted by 
Johnsson, p.149. The länsman of Västerslösa was arre ted on the charge of having served the enemy in 
July 1678. Letter from Simon Bengtsson to the governor general, 1678, Brev till gen.guv, L.A, Lund, 
quoted by Johnsson, p.160. 
736 Handlingar rörande danska kriget 1676-79, SRA, quoted by Johnsson who calls him ”Jöns 
Tygesen”, pp.95-98. The trial was held on 29th to 31st August 1677 at the Sunnerbo häradsrätt (assizes).  
737 Hedwall, p.9 
738  Three governors general wrote accounts of their time in office: Stenbock, Banér and von 
Aschenberg: ”General-Guvernören öfver Skåne, Halland och Blekinge, Grefve Gustaf Otto Stenbocks 
berättelse af  år 1662.” in Nya handlingar rörande Skandinaviens historia, 31/21, Stockholm 1850, for 
Aschenberg see: Ch.2,  and finally Gustaf Banérs generalguvernörsberättelse 1664-1668,  edited and 
commented by Ingvar Andersson, Gleerups, Lund 1940.  
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sheriffs (befallningsmän) be replaced by “capable Sw des”. Forsman complained in 
the following terms:  
“God forbid that they remain in service, it will end in disaster, for I have been told in secret that ey 
torment the people and frighten them to think that e Swedish yoke (as they call it) is too heavy and 
turn the hearts of the people from our nation, God help us get rid of them…”739 
 
Sörensson stressed the role of the fogder (bailiffs or sheriffs) that were sent out from 
the Danish authorities. The nexus fogder-snaphaner is recurrent in all my sources and 
it also seems that this development was planned from the Danish side.740 Mons 
Hacksen was a fogde, as was his brother Johan who (contrary to his two brothers) 
survived the war and went to live in Copenhagen.741 They were all sons of Jørgen 
Krabbe’s former estate manager Hack Søffrensen who was accused posthumously of 
the same crimes as his master, i.e. of collusion with snaphaner and “unnecessary” 
contacts with Danes. As we have seen earlier in this thesis, Mons Hacksen had the 
authority as a sheriff to arrest friskytter that did not behave and to consign them to the 
authorities.  Already at the beginning of the war Mons Hacksen complained of the 
snaphaner who constituted a danger to him while he was travelling.742 Whatever 
Mons Hacksen’s attitude to the friskytter was, it is obvious from the sources that he 
had authority over them and that it did not make part of his job as a “Cronofoged”743 
to arrest any friskytter but those who misbehaved seriously. His brother Johan was a 
“ridefoged” in the hundred of Färs (Fers) and had nothi g against working with 
friskytter, on the contrary, encouraged by Jens Harboe, in July 1678 he wrote to 
Arensdorff to beg for friskytte troops to be sent to him, or that he be authorised to 
muster those available in the Ringsjö (Ringsøe) area because there was a lot of work 
to be done there: the Swedes knew that all the friskytte troops were centred around 
Kristianstad (Christianstad) right then and so they w nt out and about as they liked (or 
so Johan Haksen claimed). He promised that he and the friskytter would fight 
courageously if only they were authorised to do so.744 
                                               
739 Erlandsson, p.215. 
740 See  p. 143 of this thesis where Hollænder’s and Mørch’s efforts are analysed.   
741 See chapters on Krabbe. 
742 Fabricius, III, p.37 and p.113. Nevertheless he was also considered a snaphane himself by the 
Swedes.   
743 In his index, Fabricius claims Mogens Haksen was “ridefoged” of Färs and Frosta (then Fers and 
Froste). On p.126 of volume  III Mogens Haksen is called a “kongefoged”.  
744 Letter from J. Hacksen to Arensdorff, included among Jens Harboe’s reports, 31st July 1678. DRA. 
Fabricius ( III, p. 169, foot-note 20) has consulted what seems like the same letter, but he reports it as 
“undated”. Either there is a copy without a date somewhere else in the War College collections or 
Fabricius made a slip. In November 1678 Hacksen was riding about with 100 cavalry, on his way from 
Landskrona to Färs (Landscrone to Fers) (See Sven Erla dsson’s report from Tundbyholm 20th 
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As we will also see in the third part of this thesis Jørgen Krabbe’s estate manager 
(bailiff) resigned in order to become a Danish tax collector (a kind of sheriff) but to 
the Swedes this Hindrich Peehrsøn was a snaphane who had his base in Landskrona 
(Landscrone) and then rode around the country with a band of snaphaner, especially 
to Krabbe’s estates where he had his fiancée. Moreove , the “fogder” had constituted 
the links in the contact chain that crossed Scania from one part to the other during the 
conspiracy against the Swedes in 1659. Tage Bøg had been a bailiff just like 
Erlandsson himself. One of Tage Bøg’s men had been a tax collector.745On the plains 
in southern Scania several snaphaner had a background as game-keepers and 
guardians on the noble estates.746 In fact Charles X was so suspicious of this group 




Captain Bendix was in many senses a forerunner of the riskytte troops that would 
develop during the months following his death. Although Bendix Clawssen has been 
largely forgotten by the history books, his and his men’s death as criminals set its 
mark upon the course of events in that they men were made into a statutory example 
by the Swedes. Most sources agree that the executions that took off with Clawssen’s 
death were the starting point for a new course of the Scanian War in that the friskytte 
forces crystallised and become more prominent than t e “snaphaner” had ever been. 
Nevertheless, as I have tried to show in this section, Captain Bendix and his men 
seemed to have operated much as the friskytter did. It was also evident that the Danish 
authorities who sent out troops to arrest Swedes and those who sympathised with 
them felt that loyalty bonds to Denmark and its king should have been uppermost to 
the Scanians, but that some men, like those who were accused of having betrayed 
Clawssen, felt that loyalty to a patron or to the winning party could be more 
important.  
                                                                                                                            
November 1678, Skrifvelser till konungen E-F, SRA). Obviously he had got the armed forces he 
wanted. But were the cavalrymen (Ryttare) he was commanding regulars or irregulars? 
745 Sven Erlandsson, §3.    
746 Fabricius, p.102. Herregårdsskytter. See also the section on the Krabbe case. 
747 See: Sörensson, p.32 and the chapter on Krabbe. Krabbe’s game-keeper was involved with the 









Pieter Stensen’s career during the Scanian War is maybe the best documented of all 
“snaphaner’s” and yet he remains one of the most unknown. There are numerous 
reports about him from both sides, he is mentioned i  both contemporary and modern 
history books and he left several reports and letters o the archives. Nevertheless he is 
practically unknown today and on a par with Captain Be dix he is reported by local 
historians as a “missing” snaphane whose name is known but little else. Part of the 
problem with Pieter Stensen is the numerous versions of his name that are in 
circulation: people did not connect the person thatSwedish sources described as “Per 
Stensson, the most wrathful snaphane of all” to what Danish historians described as 
the valorous and manly “Lieutenant Peter Sten.” To add to the confusion, the man 
himself signed his name as Pieter Stensen and there were other versions of his name. 
But then it is obvious from the sources that Pieter St nsen was as amphibious as his 
name and his job description.  
 
Apart from the fact that no coherent text has ever been written on Pieter Stensen until 
now, and nobody seems to have realised that the various text that were referred to in 
books and articles were about the same man, he is one of few combatants, 
commanders apart, whose entire career throughout the Scanian War can be mapped 
both geographically and as to what tasks he had. There is ample documentation of his 
doings between the early autumn of 1676 and late summer 1679. In this section I will 
analyse these sources in an attempt to classify the nature of these activities and also, 
in order to see if Stensen himself could or should be categorised as a friskytte, 
snaphane or a regular soldier. 
 
The Most Wrathful Snaphane of All 
Pieter Steensen’s name is almost omnipresent in the sources from the Scanian War. 
Most likely Pieter Stensen can be identified with the “Peder Steenssön” whom Sthen 
                                               
748 Clutterbuck, p.18. 
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Jacobsen mentions as a non-commissioned officer or “cornet” in 1677.749 Fabricius 
claimed that “Peter Sten/Stensen” was a lieutenant i  the regular army whose task it 
was to maintain the connections between the regular army and the friskytter.750 
Swedish sources, however, insist on calling him a “snaphane.” Perhaps he was a 
regular soldier who was registered as a friskytte for a while, which was not 
uncommon. In any case, Pieter Stensen appears in all sorts of sources, almost all the 
time and as with Captain Simon, his movements can be traced through them. I will 
now make a brief outline of Stensen’s movements throughout the war and an analysis 
of the tasks he was occupied with during this time.  
 
1676 
In the autumn of 1676 Stensen was in western Vram, Västra Vram, working for his 
namesake colonel H.D Stensen who was trying to organise popular resistance or 
irregular troops in the area. We know that much through the court registers from the 
local assizes of the hundred of Gärds 1680 in which Pieter Stensen’s name is 
mentioned in the the scandalous case which made the vicar of Västra Vram, Jörgen 
Offesen and his wife Catrine Eliædatter flee to Copenhagen.751 During the autumn of 
1676 most of Scania was in Danish hands and Swedish property was being 
confiscated. Lusse Per Mårtensdotter in Träne who was married to the forester 
(jägare) Herman Skultz had her vodka distiller, five cauldrons, eight big plates and 
four chandeliers confiscated by Pieter Steensen “a free lieutentant from the Danish 
troops”, who had then had the goods carted away by Hans Ågesen from Träne who, 
by 1680, claimed that he had been highly unwilling to do so.752 Ågesen then left the 
“Swedish” goods with Gregers Andersson in Western Vram. Gregers Andersson and 
his wife Sisse claimed that from there, the goods had been transported to the vicarage 
where Colonel Hans Ditlev Steensen was then lodging. At the time Colonel Steensen 
was stationed in the border area in order to try to organise an effective border defence 
system. Pieter Stensen and his men are generally mention d as “soldiers” or even 
                                               
749 Jacobsen, 105.  
750 Fabricius III, p.165. Fabricius (IV, Noter og anmærkninger, p.62) registers him as a ”Danish 
lieutenant” as opposed to Simon Anderson whom Fabricius classified as ”Friskytte officer.” 
751 John Wanngren, “Jörgen Offesen, komminister i Västra och Östra Vram – sognepræst i Jylland”, 
(Jörgen Offesen, Vicar in Western and Eastern Vram – Parson in Jutland), pp.2-8, in Gärds Härads 
Hembygdsförenings Årsbok 1999, (The Annual Book of the Local Heritage Society of the hundred of 
Gärd 1999), 1999, p. 3 of the separately printed version of Wanngren’s paper. In the book itself 
Wanngren’s paper occupies pp. 48-57. 
752 Wanngren (1999), p.3. ”en frij corporal af dhe danske”.  
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“Colonel Steensen’s soldiers” in the registers from the case against Catrine Eliædatter 
and the confiscation order is reported as having been issued by Colonel Steensen 
although it was executed by his namesake Pieter.753 No “snaphaner” or “friskytter” 
mentioned at all. 
 
1677 
Stensen had the advantage of being bilingual so that he could pass for a Swede. In a 
report from May 1677 he told the story of how, on the night between the 20th and the 
21st of that month, he an his 26 men had gone out on a “party”  in order to collect 
provisioning and that he had tricked some Swedes into believing that he was one of 
them so they told him that a Swedish convoy was at the public house in Kävlinge 
(Kiöfflinge) and so Stensen and his men could surprise the convoy while the Swedes 
were carousing.754 Two days later (23rd May) Stensen with thirty cavalry was 
commanded to collect Swedish goods from the bishop’s residence in Lund and to 
capture the Swedish royal physician Sack who was dwelling in the same city. Just 
outside the village of Waldekilde/Vallkärra Stensen and his men met a Swedish 
convoy of 162 carriages with food and drink.755 Fortunately they managed to kill the 
Swedes that escorted it and could lay they hands on all the wagons. Stensen then left 
10 of his men to guard the wagons and the prisoners.756 On their way to Lund a 
“snaphane” told Stensen that the Swedes were bringing fourteen cannons from Lund 
to the Swedish camp at Rönneberga.757 Upon knowing this, Stensen left his men 
outside the city walls and hurried inside Lund, where he promptly rode down the high 
street where the cannon convoy was passing. According to Jensen, Stensen then 
approached the head of the convoy and told him in obviously perfect Swedish that he 
(Stensen) had been sent out to warn them because the Danes were attacking and now 
                                               
753 Wanngren (1999), p.4: ”Krigs Karle” or ”Krigsfolk”. 
754 According to Jacobsen (p.105), Stensen had bumped into two of the Swedish king’s lifeguards and 
the goods they were convoying were uniforms and equipment for the Swedish king’s lifeguard 
(drabanter). 
755 According to Jacobsen (p.105) there were 150 cartloads of food and 12 of tobacco, beer and vodka. 
Jensen (p.248) reports 160 carts with food, beer, tobacco and vodka. According to Jensen these 
provisioning were destined for the Swedish army and were escorted by fourteen cavalry, of which nine 
were killed. 
756 According to Jacobsen (p.105) and Jensen (p.248) nine of the Swedes were killed and the remaining 
five were left with ten of Stensen’s men to watch the booty while Stensen went on to Lund. 
757 Jensen who agrees with this story but does not say that the information came from a snaphane 
(p.249) adds that the cannons originated in Malmö. Jacobsen (p.106) claims that Stensen first set about 
his task in Lund (regarding the medic etc.), then somebody cried out that a huge group of Swedes were 
on their way in from Malmö. 
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he would lead them into safety.758 He led them to the gates and then cried: “Hurry up! 
The Jutes are attacking!.” The Swedes panicked and rushed outside the city walls 
were a number of them were done away with by Stensen’s men.759 Another 50 men 
who had been with the convoy left their lives in Stensen’s hands760: they were all 
Scanians who had been conscripted by the Swedes. Thy all agreed to join the Danish 
infantry. The cannons were then carted (by the peasants) to Valkärra (Waldekilde) 
where the rest of their booty was waiting. Stensen th  sent out a man to ride as fast 
as he could to Landskrona (Landscrone) to ask for reinforcements, because he realised 
the Swedes would set after them. By that time the Sw dish king had already sent a 
major (Romanewidtz) and one hundred cavalry after th m, but the Danish 
reinforcements managed to reach Stensen first and so the Swedish troop had to retrace 
its steps to base camp.761 Stensen’s return to Landskrona (Landscrone) was 
triumphant, to the point that the King rode out to meet him in the company of 3000 
cavalry.762  
 
Approximately a month later, on 22 June 1677 Stensen turned up at the army camp 
outside Malmö (Malmøe) in the company of Jens Michelsen, the owner of Hovdala 
(then Howdal) castle, arrived with interesting news from the north-eastern border 
region.  He and “Lieutenant Stensen” who came with him repoted that Gyllenstierna 
had called all civil servants and clergymen in the ar a to a meeting where he had 
reminded them of their duties to the king of Sweden.763 
 
In the autumn of 1677, probably on 24th October, War Commissary Jens Harboe in 
Landskrona (Landscrone) reported to Meijer that his informants were telling him that 
the Swedes outside Kristianstad (Christianstad) were on the move, and that as soon as 
he had found out he had persuaded General Uffeln764 to send “Peter Steens with 20 
                                               
758 Jensen, p.249. 
759 Jacobsen  (p.106) claims 68 Swedes were killed but that the 50 Scanians’ lives were spared; they 
had all been conscripted into Swedish service to serve as matrosses or gunners’ assistants (artollerie-
knechte). These were then drafted into Danish regimnts. Jensen (p.249) writes that 40 were killed.  
760 Jensen (p.249) claims these were peasants. 
761 Jensen, p.249. Jacobsen, p.106. 
762 Jacobsen, p.106. See also: Röndahl, pp.234-235.   
763 Depositiones 22nd June 1677, DRA. 
764 Commander of Landskrona (Landscrone) from 28th August 1677. See: Jensen, p.303. 
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men to Borreby” in order to spy on the Swedes and although they had set out that 
morning, “Steens” had already written back to him.765  
 
1678 
On 4th January 1678, War Commissary Harboe reported to his patron Herman Meijer 
at the Army Board in Copenhagen that some days earlier, “Lieutenant Steensen” had 
brought in a minister of the church from Lund whom he suspected of having spied on 
behalf of the enemy.766 
On 28th May 1678 Pieter Steensen’s presence was reported from the Sövde (Søffuede) 
area where the Swedish troops that were stationed at Sövdeborg castle had met the 
snaphaner, “their lieutenant Per Stensson and 30 horsemen (man rytteri)767 who were 
planning to join troops with the Danish forces at Rödinge so that they could attack 
Ystad (Ysted) conjointly. Only a few days later Stens n’s company co-operated with 
regular troops in an attack on Trolleholm (then Eriksholm) castle that had been 
fortified and occupied by Swedish troops under Lieutenant Major (överstelöjtnant) 
Jurgen Rotherman. Rotherman reported that during the fig t for Trolleholm (then 
Eriksholm) Major von Schaar had caught a prisoner who betrayed that “the same 
party, that was here, operates further north, but he did not know where”.768 At the 
time of writing (3rd June 1678) the prisoner had been brought to the Swedish army 
camp but Rotherman did not believe that he knew anythi g about the Danes. This 
man had admitted to serving under “Per Stensson”.769 According to the sources it 
seems that whereas Simon Andersen was mainly employed with provisioning tasks, 
interrupting and crossing enemy lines and attacking the enemy alone or with regular 
troops, Pieter Stensen was mainly a liaisons officer and secret agent, and one of his 
main tasks was to “persecute” and collect native Swdes and Scanians who supported 
the Swedes. Another Scanian who met Stensen in the latter guise was Sir Mogens 
                                               
765 Jens Harboe to Meijer, 24th (October)? The month is illegible but it is to be found among the reports 
from October 1677. If not October it has to be September because Uffeln was only there from the end 
of August until the beginning of November. See Jensen, p.320.), 1677, DRA. “daß er Peter steens mit 
20 leute nach borreby...gesent.” 
766 Jens Harboe to Meijer, 4th January 1678. 
767 Report from Captain J. Lindeman, 28th May 1678, “Rapporter till general guvernörerna”, LA, 
quoted by Johnsson, p.143. 
768 A Danish party of 600 regular soldiers and an unknow  number of ”snaphaner” were besieging 
Erichsholm and the Swedish soldiers inside during this period. Erichsholm was but a ruin at the end of 
the war and it took a generation until it was restored and resurged as “Trolleholm”, its present name. 
769 Jurgen Rotherman to the governor general, 3rd June1678, Rapporter till gen.-guv, LA. Quoted by 
Johnsson, pp.145-147. 
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Schuaue (Svave) of Oretorp. On 6th June 1678 Sir Mogens was “arrested” by a 
“richmäster Petter Steen” and a party of “snaphaner”. According to Schuaue’s account 
to the Swedish authorities the snaphaner had come to his home, Oretorp manor, from 
where they had brought him to the boathouse where t “richmästare” was waiting 
with his cavalry. They then plundered whatever was left at the house (that had already 
been plundered by other troops). Sir Mogens then had to stay in Danish custody until 
24th October 1679.770 The Danish report of the event is conserved in the Depositiones 
collection, and it tells a different story: on the orders of General Arensdorff, “Mogens 
Schwab of Oretorp” had been collected and brought to the Danish camp. He had then 
left a detailed account of the situation in the Kristianstad (Christianstad) area and of 
what he had overheard the Swedish generals say.771 Schuaue’s report is about a page 
long and quite detailed. He claimed that there were 17 000 Swedes and that new 
troops were continuing to arrive from Sweden and that he had overheard the Swedish 
generals say that they would not waste lives on a direct attack, but that (Christianstad) 
would eventually surrender for lack of food (imidlertiid meener dee byen faar at gifwe 
sig for manquement af proviant...).772 He also claimed that the generals said they were 
not going to send any help to the garrison at Helsingborg that were under Danish 
siege, because it would be impossible for the army to find means of subsistence in that 
area. Schuaue also maintained that “the whole country was with them” (i.e. the 
Swedes) and that the army was not moving from Kristian ad (Christianstad) on 
account of the “snaphaner” that were causing them too much trouble. Finally, 
Schuaue left a detailed account of the different Swedish regiments and smaller units 
                                               
770 Application for tax exemptions, from Mogens Schuaue of Oretorp to the secretary of the 
government general Jöran Adlersten, 1st June 1683, printed in Historisk Tidskrift för Skåneland, vol 
VII, Lund 1917, pp.299-300. Schuaue/Svave writes passable Swedish and emphasises that he and his 
wife had obeyed Swedish orders when the Danish fleet landed in Scania: they had immediately betaken 
themselves to “Christianstadh! with all their belongings that were of any worth. When the Danes 
stormed Christianstad Mogens Schuaue and his wife lost everything and they were also called 
“Swedish bastard and whore” by the soldiers. (“min hustru och jagh totaliter blef ruineret och 
wdplydret, som een hver witterligit ähr, som då der inne wohre, och min hustruis och min titell war 
inttet annat än svensch schiälm och hore”.) It should be added that Schuaue’s wife, Sissela Bonde, was 
an ethnic Swede. 
771 Depositiones und Kundschaften, 11th June 1678, DRA. 
772 See also: Depositiones 13th June 1678, DRA, Hans Hinrich Gutterorm from Helligestad, Mainz´s 
report in which he claimed that it was Uhlfeld who ad persuaded the Swedish not to risk an attack on 
Kristianstad (Christianstad). Contrary to Schuaue, Gutterom spoke in terms of “the enemy” and “ours”, 
if we are to assume that the scribe rendered their wording correctly, which seems to have been the 
norm. Gutterorm’s account agreed with Schuaue’s report of what the Swedish generals were saying in 
that he (Gutterorm) claimed that “traitors from Christianstad” were saying that “ours in the town are 
already beginning to suffer from food shortage” (“...wores udi byen allereede paa vivres begynte at 
manequere...”).  
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and of how many men were in each. As in the case of many other depositions, it is 
difficult to tell what Schuaue’s real position was.773 He spoke of “snaphaner” and 
avoided any open declaration of his position which an open “us” and “the Swedes” 
discourse would have meant. Instead he seems to have said “they” and “the Danes”.774  
He also seems to have told those that took his account down that the Swedes would be 
winning: 17 000 Swedes were a lot. Other accounts in he Depositiones collection 
from the same days report varying numbers, from 2400775 to 14 000776. It is obvious, 
however, that Schuaue was not too intent on watching is word. Someone who was 
only interested in saving his own skin, would surely have adhered to the “us” and 
“them” discourse (or “ours” and “the enemy”) as most people did who left voluntary 
or less voluntary reports to the Danish authorities.  
 
Pieter Stensen does not appear in the Depositiones report of how Mogens Schuaue 
was brought into Danish custody. However, Stensen appe rs in the entrance that 
follows directly after Schuaue’s: “DITO Hanß Eggerßn born in the hundred of 
Western Gønge, collected by Lieut. Pieter Steenßen...”. It seems therefore that the 
Danish sources agree with Schuaue’s own account to the Swedish authorities that it 
was Stensen who brought him in. The Danish sources, however, do not speak of an 
“arrest”, nor do they hide the fact that Schuaue was “collected” on the express orders 
of the Danish commander-in-chief. The way Schuaue described the event in his letter 
to the Swedish authorities, it seemed as if he had been kidnapped by street robbers. 
Obviously that was what the Swedish authorities wanted to hear, and the sort of 
discourse they expected to be expressed by their subjects in Scania, because it appears 
time after time again in accounts to the Swedish aut orities.777 For once, it is the 
matter of a detail that is not difficult to prove wrong, since there are sources that can 
prove that “kidnappings” of the sort were not the dee s of outlaws but operations 
ordered by the Danish military commanders. Pieter Snsen for one spent a lot of time 
picking up persons that his superiors ordered him to bring into the Danish camp, for 
                                               
773 Maybe it should be added that Mogens Schuaue was an old army man who had served as a “cornet” 
and then “ritmester” in the Danish army. He was consequently well aware of what he was expected to 
say and what terminology would serve him best. He had also married a Swede, Cecilia (Sidsel) Bonde 
of Oretorp. For Schuaue’s background, see Fabricius III, p.27 and IV, p.195. 
774 Cf. Gutterom’s report of 13th June in which the terms “ours” and “the enemy” are us d. That kind of 
terminology is more representative of the Depositiones vocabulary in general.  
775 Depositiones 17th June 1678, DRA, the Scotsman Jacob Delen’s report. 
776 Depositiones 13th June 1678, DRA, Herman Marner from Westphalia’s repo t. 
777 Cf. Stig Alenäs’s 2008 article. 
 229 
one reason or another. Sometimes, these persons were on the lists of suspect Swedish 
sympathisers and spies that had to be brought in, aother times these persons had 
themselves asked to be convoyed out of the war zone, and yet at another times the 
Danish authorities had found out that the Swedes were after a particular person and 
decided to get hold of that potentially important person first. Examples of the first 
category would be all those on Lieutenant Wildskött’s list from 15th June 1677 (of 
which several had participated in betraying Captain Be dix)778, examples of the first 
and second category would be Baron Krabbe who was first brought into Danish 
custody in Kristianstad (Christianstad), then released and then, some time later, he 
asked of his own free will to be collected by Danish troops and convoyed to Danish 
territory,  and then Doctor Christian Foss would be an example of a person who was 
wanted by the troops of both countries, not because he was a criminal but because he 
was a skilled physician.779 It was Stensen’s task to get hold of persons like this, but it 
was his job, not a vile pursuit that he had taken to for his own pleasure (as it would 
seem from the accounts of his doings that were sent to the Swedish authorities). This 
kind of operations were organised from the Danish Headquarters and could comprise 
regular troops, friskytter or a mixture of the two, which seems to have been the most 
common option. In October 1677 the two Thott brothers (Holger and Tage) that had 
not already been “arrested” by the Danes like their older brother Knud, were 
“abducted” by Colonel Barsse’s mixed cavalry and friskytter troops that managed to 
get them over to Landskrona (Landscrone).780 A few months later, Knud Thott 
himself came to War Commissary Jens Harboe and trie to organise a similar foray 
into no man’s land in order to get his mother, Dorette Rosencrantz, out of Scania.781 
Harboe reports that ”Monsieur Tott”  wanted to send out a convoy to ”Hikeberg” 
(Häckeberga)  mansion to save his mother but Harboe doubted that it would be 
possible since that at least one hundred Swedes were stationed there. Eventually, 
Dorette Rosencrantz and her daughter Jytte Thott, Baron Krabbe’s widow, were 
“abducted” by a Danish party in June 1678.782 Similar actions were also reported of in 
Swedish sources: one of the Swedish commissary and snaphane catcher Sven 
                                               
778 See p. 211 of this thesis.  
779 See: Fabricius III, p. 145. The Swedes saw him as a traitor because he was the Danish king’s 
personal physician.   
780 Fabricius III, pp.142-143. See also the Krabbe chapter of this thesis. Harboe’s report of the event. 
781 Jens Harboe to Herman Meijer, 2nd January 1678, Indkomne breve, DRA. 
782 Dorette’s sister Mette who was the owner of Häckeberga was deported to Sweden. See: Fabricius 
III, p.144. Eventually all three ladies returned to Scania. 
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Erlandsson’s informers reported in November 1678 that t e merchants from Lübeck 
that had been collected by Danish troops from Ystad (Ysted)  were “snaphaner”, i.e. 
all but sixteen cavalrymen that the sheriff had brought with him.783  
 
Consequently, on 11th June 1678 Stensen brought in the nobleman Mogens Schuaue 
and the plebeian Hanß Eggerßen. In the first case, it i  obvious that Sir Mogens and 
the rest of the nobility constituted valuable pawns in the hands of the authorities and 
that being a man of some importance and influence o both sides, he might have 
interesting information to transmit. I do not know who Eggerßen was or why Stensen 
brought him in. The only indication of a motive that e gave in his testimony was that 
he had some knowledge of what renegades from Kristian tad (Christianstad) were 
telling the Swedes. It might even have been that he came willingly. Normally the 
scribes wrote “this or that person came in with Lieut. Steensen...” if the person was 
there of his own free will, but maybe this was not always the case. Eggerßen reported 
that the Swedish army was spread all over the hundred of Villands (Willanz) and that 
the Swedes claimed they had 18 000 men but that “there are probably around 11 000, 
well equipped men...”. Just like Schuaue, Eggerßen claimed that the Swedes were not 
intent on taking Kristianstad (Christianstad) by force, but they would “lie and starve 
them out” and try to bomb them out with the artillery on the “Blegedam”. 
“Renegades” from Kristianstad (Christianstad) were saying that as yet they suffered 
no lack of beer and bread and that people in there did not suffer more from illness 
than before. Eggerßen also claimed that the inhabitants went out on the “Berghoff” 
with the troops and made fun of the enemy. In the case of both Schuaue and Eggerßen 
I have analysed what they actually reported more in detail, in that I wanted to 
emphasise what his work really comprised, and for what reasons the authorities set 
him on particular tasks. 
  
At about this point in time Stensen was also directing some sort of intelligence central 
near Kristianstad (Christianstad). From the months of June, July and August there are 
several reports from him on the situation in that area. In June he reported to 
Arensdorff that people in the area were making bread from beer dregs and tree leaves 
but that they were all so hopeful and praying to God n w that the general 
                                               
783 Report from Tunbyholm (Tundbyholm), 20th November 1678, signed by Sven Erlandsson, 
Skrifvelser till Konungen E-F, SRA. 
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(Arensdorff?) was back in the country.784 Nevertheless, Stensen kept moving around 
the land: on the 20th June 1678 War Commissary Jens Harboe reported from 
Landskrona (Landscrone) to Army Board member Herman Meijer that “Peter 
Steensen ist auch mit seiner partej bereits wegk.”785 Stensen had obviously visited 
Landskrona (Landscrone) quite recently. 
 
From July 1678 we have two detailed reports from Stensen to Arensdorff. In the first, 
Arensdorff had sent Stensen orders to go up to the border area with his men. At his 
return from this mission Stensen despondently declar d: “ Nothing could be done for 
the simple reason that the peasants up there are not to be trusted.”786 A little further on 
in the report Arensdorff was told that that the peasants who were working for Stensen 
as spies in Kristianstad (Christianstad) were not particularly good at their work and he 
concluded in the following tone: ”if only I had had  true Dane who was reliable then 
it would have been possible to get some work done.” 787 Stensen was a bit ambiguous 
about the inhabitants of the border areas: he did let them work for him but did not 
consider them patriotic enough; very often that washat was meant by the expression 
“being a good Dane/Swede.” Most of the information he sent over to Arensdorff came 
from peasants. He repeatedly wrote: ”I have a peasant who went to Ljungebye” or 
”My peasant reports that..”. In the first of the two reports  Arensdorff was told that 
Stensen’s peasant had talked to a Swede called Billingen who amongst other things 
was proud to declare that they have driven the ”devilish Jutes” back twice.788 Later on 
the same day the peasant had talked to ”Aseenberg” (Rutger von Ascheberg, most 
presumably). The peasant begged Aseenberg that there might be peace soon and 
                                               
784 Undated report from between 4th and 18th June, 1678. Quoted from Fabricius III, p. 166. Two of 
Stensen’s letters to Arensdorf (16th July and 18th July) were inserted into Aage Monsen Harlof’s reports 
to the Army Board. Harlof and Stensen were consequently co-operating. 
785 Jens Harboe to Herman Meijer, LCrone 18th June 678, Indkomne breve, DRA. Harboe did not call 
Stensen a “friskytte” but either just used his name, writing “Peter Steensen” (as in this report) or he 
wrote “Lieutenant Steensen” as in his letter to his patron Meijer of 4th January 1678 (Indkomne breve, 
DRA). However, Harboe had a positive attitude to the friskytter and always underlined their 
importance in his reports to Meijer. 
786 ”doeg haffuer Jeg weret  der oppe huorum Min Her Generals Breff formelder...saa kunde der Intet 
udrettes aff orsagen Bönderne Intet er til Troe der oppe” Stensen to Arensdorff, 16th July 1678, 
Indkomne breve 1678; stack 4, M, DRA. Sorts under Aage Monsen Harlof’s patronymic since 
Stensen’s letter was enclosed in Harlof’s report. 
787 ”Jeg haffuer siiden hafft Bönder i den svenske Leger do g kunde der intet udwittes, men dersom Jeg 
haffde en Ret dansk Karll som var at Troe skule det vel lade sig giöre. ”   
788 ”...geffuels Jutarna haffuer fallet uth 2 ganger Men wora haffuer kiört dem ind igen.” The Swedes 
used to call all Danes (including Scanians) Jutlanders and it was considered a derogatory term; it was 
even worse to be a Jutish dog than a Danish one. 
 232 
Aseenberg answered that they would know the answer to that soon enough. The 
informer-peasant insisted and asked if there would be a decisive battle first but 
Aseenberg avoided a direct answer and replied that for Christ’s sake, they had already 
beaten the Jutes ten times over. When Aseenberg asked the peasant why he would not 
do some spy work for the Swedish king the peasant prom tly replied that they (the 
peasants) could not because they were no more trustd than the ’snaphaner’.789   
 
In the second letter Stensen reported further attacks on the besieged town and that his 
peasant had talked to a ”controleur” from the nearby coastal town of Åhus (Aahus) 
and that a large number of small ships had docked th re. The peasant had asked the 
controleur what the ships had come to Aahus for and was told that those were pirate 
ships.790 That Stensen made a distinction between peasants and ”friskytter” becomes 
clear from the last part of the second letter where  reported that he had sent two 
“friskötter” and a “renegade” to the Swedish camp on a little mission.791   
The four terms that were used by Stensen to describ the men who were working for 
him were: ”peasants” (bönder), “snaphaner”, ”friskötter” and ”renegades” 
(overlöbere). The last term was normally used by the Danes to describe deserters of 
different kinds.792 Through Stensen’s reports we can see how what is clled 
”peasants” were used as spies and informants on the Danish side, just as Sven 
Erlandsen’s reports show that there were peasants that worked for the other side. 
Sometimes Stensen received information from “snaphaner” instead. The distinction 
between one and the other does not seem quite clear. “Snaphaner” and “friskytter” 
were also sometimes mixed up in his writings.  
                                               
789 ”Aseenberg talte med bonden, da bad bonden till at det matte bliffue freed, huor Aseenberg 
svarade: ’ Ja her bliffuer vell snart’ svaret Bonden ’her bliffuer vel försst et stort slag’ ’Ja for 
gud’svaret hand ’wii haffuer slagit hannem tiu ganger.’Aseenberg spurte bonden at huor forre de icke 
wille giffue Kongen aff Suerrige kundskab, huor till bonden svart at di det ey kunde thi di ey var bedre 
troet end snaphaner.”   
790 ”Liidet dereffter spurte Bonden Controleureren at huad...skulle dere for skiibe...svaret hand det var 
Capere som var ahnkommen.”  Stensen to Arensdorf, 18th July 1678, enclosed in a report from Aage 
Monsen Harlof that sorted under M, Indkomne breve 1678; stack 4, M, DRA. 
791  ”Jeg sende i dag in offuerlobere med tuende friskötter som berette at aff Cavaleriet er hundrede 
och tie standarhrer, och en och tiuffue faner foedflcket.”   
792 An ex prisoner of war reported that during his 3 weeks in the Swedish camp outside Landscrone 
during the summer of 1677, 20 overlöberere  (renegades)  came running over from the Danes: ”some 
went into service with the Swedes, others were sent to S ockholm from where they would be taken to 
Livonia to go into service there.”(Depositiones, mens  Junii 1677, no 508, DRA). One of these 
“renegades” was a lieutenant from Slesvig who told he Swedes that he had killed a man in the Danish 
camp. The man who left the report was not technically a “renegade” himself since he had been 
captured by the Swedes and made a POW. 
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Evidence of Stensen’s work during that month also come up in an already mentioned 
letter to Arensdorff from Friskytte Captain Jens Jenssön Stoheby dated 23rd July. In it 
Jenssön reports of one of his men, Nielß Pers, who had been to Landscrone with “the 
Lieutenant.”793 It seems from Jenssön’s letter that Stensen and Nielß Pers had guided 
around one of the king’s life guards. The same lettr also shows that Sven Erlandsson, 
the snaphane hunter, knew very well who Pieter Stensen was, and where one should 
look for him. 
 
On 25th July evidence of Stensen’s work came up in the King’s Council. At the time, 
the Danish king and the main part of the army had set out on an assistance mission to 
(Christianstad) that was intended to liberate the town from its Swedish besiegers. The 
Danes were bivouacking at Önnestad (Ønnested) and on 24th it had been decided that 
they should proceed towards Vä (Wæ) along the road th t passed through Böckeboda, 
Ovesholm, Ormatofta and Mansdala.794 But on the morning of the 25th King Christian 
called together his War Council again, because he had had information from 
“Lieutenant Peder Stensøn” that it would not be possible for the Danes to march on a 
united front across the river Wæ because of the peaty consistence of the riverbed.795 
Friedrich von Arensdorff spoke himself warm for Stens n’s sake and reminded the 
council of another occasion on which the bed of the brook that passed through Wæ 
had caused problems, and he and Herman Meijer agreed that there would be severe 
problems with communications and provisioning if they chose that road. Eventually it 
was decided that the Danish army should stay put and he king sent a message to the 
commander of Kristianstad (Christianstad), General M jor von Osten, that said that he 
should surrender in case there was a chance of obtaining an honourable agreement.796 
It seems quite evident that Stensen played a role that influenced the course of things 
and that although he was considered nothing but an “angry snaphane” by the Swedes 
his work was taken seriously enough by the Danish king. 
 
                                               
793 Depositiones 23rd July 1678, DRA. 
794 These last place names are rendered in Swedish as Jensen reported them since I am not sure of their 
Danish names. 
795 Jensen, p.380. 
796 Jensen, p.383. 
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Friedrich von Arensdorff was dismissed from his positi n shortly after the surrender 
of Kristianstad (Christianstad) and would soon have to face court charges for having 
omitted to liberate the strategically important town from the Swedish siege.797 The 
king had left the army at Önnestad (Ønnested) on 30th July, claiming that General 
Arensdorff annoyed him too much and that no major action would be undertaken 
anyway, so that he (the king) might just as well return home to Copenhagen.798 One of 
the 76 dubious points that Arensdorff was later asked by the War Council to elucidate, 
was (No 12):  
 
“Whenever it was decided that there was reconnaissance to be done here or there, h  never set anybody 
on the task but Lieutenant Peder Sten or the Friskytter that did not know well enough how to, and who 
probably did not report anything but what he (Arensdorff) wanted.”799 
 
It was evident that Arensdorff was thought by others to have put great trust in Pieter 
Stensen. In the same manner, War Commissary Jens Harboe nd General von 
Löwenhielm employed Stensen’s services and spoke well of him. In a letter from 16th 
August 1678 von Löwenhielm, who was then commander of Landskrona 
(Landscrone), wrote to the king that he had sent “Lieutenant Peer Steenßen” out for 
information since the enemy seemed to be on the move fr m their camp. Now, 
Steensen had find out whether this was correct and o report directly back to “His 
Royal Majesty”.800 In itself that is evidence enough that Pieter Stensen was thought of 
as a respectable and trustworty man in some, rather high circles.It is also evident that 
the Danish king knew perfectly who he was. 
1679 
By now, Stensen was a “ritmester”, a commissioned officer of some status. At least 
that was what the Reverend Jacobsen called him in his generally anti-snaphane 
chronicle of the Scanian War.801 Although Jacobsen did not save any kind words for 
snaphaner in general, he expressed admiration of Stensen and respectfully called him 
                                               
797 Jensen, p.472. 
798 Jensen, p.383. Jensen claimed that the real reason Christian V left was that he felt too ashamed to be 
present when Kristianstad would be forced to surrender. 
799 Jensen, p.476. Jensen then comments: “Lieutenant Peder Stensøn was well-known as one of the best 
and most courageous young officers of the army, and the fact that snaphaner were used to acquire 
information was only natural.” 
800 von Löwenhielm to the king, 16th August 1678, I.B.DRA. Generally von Löwenhielm just wrote 
“we have received information that...” or “a renegade has been brought in today...” but not by whom. 
He mentions only the two names of “Lieutenant Steenß n” and “Colonel Suanwedel” in connection 
with the phrase “collect information”  (kundskab). See also: von Löwenhielm to the king July-August 
1678, I.B., DRA, esp. 22nd August in which he mentions Schwanewedel.  
801 Jacobsen, p.229. 
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a “Danish officer”. In the same manner he did not seem to consider Schwanewedel’s 
sharpshooters as less respectable than other soldier .802 Around the middle of June 
1679, Scania was almost depleted of Danish regular troops. The Danes had had notice 
that France was planning to enter the war on the Swdish side and that a French 
invasion via Westphalia was imminent. At that news, the Danish king had sent the six 
regiments that had spent the winter in Landskrona (Landscrone) and Helsingborg 
across te sea to Holsten, so that all that was left of the Danish army in Scania was 
Schwanewedel’s regiment (the Jutish National Cavalry) nd his sharpshooters.803 
When this became known to the Swedes (through the testimonies of captives), an 
officer (general-adjutant) by the name of Hörmand (probably a Danicised version of 
Hörman) who set out with one hundred horsemen from the Swedish camp in the 
hundred of Villands (Willanz). Hörmand’s aim was to take the Danish artillery and 
horses away and also the cattle the Danes had grazin  outside Landskrona’s 
(Landscrone’s) city walls.804 On his way from the Swedish camp, Hörmand and his 
men were sighted by Stensen and two of his men who were in the village of Klinta 
(Klinte) by the Ringsjö (Ringsiöe) lake that day (15th June 1679). Stensen 
immediately sent warnings to Landskrona (Landscrone) from where Schwanewedel 
set out with cavalry and sharpshooters the very same hour.805 At 6 o’clock in the 
morning of 16th June Schwanewedel’s troop attacked the Swedes at Bälteberga 
(Belteberge), first Schwanewedel himself with the sarpshooters and their long guns 
and then in a second moment, the regular cavalry attacked. Eventually the Danes 
managed to send the remains of the Swedish troop back to the main camp.806 Whether 
Pieter Stensen took part in this battle we do not kw. 
Stensen and the Clergy 
A clergyman whose wartime experiences can help us throw some light on Pieter 
Stensen’s activities is Mats Hansson (Schovgaard) of Västra Hoby and Håstad, also 
known under his Danish name Mads Hansen (Schovgaard).807 In spite of the promise 
of general amnesty that had been included in the peace treaty, the church of Sweden 
                                               
802 Jacobsen, pp.229-230.  
803 See: Jacobsen, p.229 and Jensen, p.453. Jacobsen claims that Schwanewedel only had 60 
cavalrymen.  
804 Jacobsen, p.229. 
805 This episode is accounted of by Jacobsen (pp. 229-230) and Jensen (pp.253-254) but only Jacobsen 
mentions who it was that spotted Hörmand’s troop. According to Jacobsen Schwanewedel’s troop 
comprised 60 horsemen and 16-18 sharpshooters, according to Jensen they were 100 all in all. 
806 Jacobsen, p.230 and Jensen p. 254. 
807 His case is also mentioned by Åberg (1951), p.152. In Åberg he is called Herr Matthias of Hoby. 
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instituted a commission that was to make an inquiry into the case of those clergymen 
who were suspected of having “totally forgotten their oath, fidelity and duty”. Those 
who were found guilty were not to be punished but at le st a clear distinction between 
guilty and non-guilty would have been made. 808 In 1682 Schovgaard’s case was 
investigated and as was then wont, he sent a letterof defense, plus a signed testimony 
by three of his parishioners to the commission. In both these letters “Per Stensson” 
plays a leading role. Schovgaard claimed that during the war, the “officer of the 
snaphaner Stensson” had forced him to wade forwards an  backwards across a river 
with water to his neck because he refused to spy on the Swedes.809 Schovgaard had 
had further problems with Stensen when he was transferred to the village of Örtofta 
(Ørtofte), where he not only had to share the parsonage with a troop of “snaphaner” 
but where also a huge cavalry troop under Stensen took away all the oxen in the 
village.810 Schovgaard and the peasants then betook themselves to the Danish enclave 
of Landskrona (Landscrone) to inquire after their cattle but Schovgaard was arrested 
and had to stay there. From his arrest in Landskrona (Landscrone) he then went to 
Copenhagen “to procure foodstuffs”.811 The commission that held the inquiry were 
not too convinced that Schovgaard had not stayed voluntarily with the Danes, but at 
least he was allowed to keep his calling until his death in 1696.  
Naturally, Schovgaard’s and his parishioners’  letters are coloured by a desire to free 
Schovgaard from all connections with the Danes and the friskytter, and to insert 
Schovgaard into the “us”-part of an official “us” and “them” discourse. At this point I 
would like to stress that the general Swedish discourse has tended to accept at face 
value such statements as those that characterise the l tters to the Ecclesiastical 
Commission from Schovgaard and his colleagues. I then refer to the so-called 
memories of the ministers of the church, Severin Cavallin, Alf Åberg etc. By that I do 
not mean to belittle the personal experiences of the letter writers, because I am 
convinced that some of them were made to suffer horribly by the snaphaner, but I 
think it important that the frames within which the ministers were free to write were 
narrow. And that whereas complaints in the Danish arc ives often state that the letter-
writers had no idea whether the “bad guys” who had t reatened or maltreated them 
                                               
808 See: Alenäs (2008), p.151. 
809 Alenäs (2008), p.166. 
810 Alenäs (2008), p.166: “Då kom en stor avdelning ryttare under ledning av Stensson och tog alla 
oxar i byn.” 
811 Alenäs (2008), p.166. 
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were regulars or friskytter, that does not seem to be the case with this kind of 
complaints. 
 
Naturally, Schovgaard wanted to continue his calling in Scania and during the war he 
had only tried to save himself, his family and his parishioners. He had to partake in 
the official Swedish discourse in order to be able to stay on in his service – it is highly 
unlikely that he would have written in the same tones if he had written to the Danish 
authorities. First of all he would certainly not have used the term “snaphaner” and 
especially not about Pieter Stensen, whom he also would not have called “Per 
Stensson”. And he would probably not have claimed that he snaphaner “took away” 
his oxen. It is evident from his letter that he and his parishioners were aware that the 
Danish authorities were responsible for the “snaphaner” and especially officers like 
Stensen who in fact, was enrolled in the regular army and not among the friskytter.812 
They also seem to have known that the cattle had been taken to Landskrona 
(Landscrone). As in Schovgaard’s defence letter, in Swedish propaganda the 
snaphaner were very often made out to have acted independently of the Danish army 
or not to have any connection to the Danish troops whatsoever. The oxen from Örtofta 
(Ørtofte) were confiscated by the Danish army, not “taken away” by a troop of 
robbers. Pieter Stensen had strict orders to make the clergy report what they knew to 
the Danish authorities; else he was supposed to arrest them. He was not authorised to 
use torture but keeping someone to the neck in water was probably not seen as violent 
enough a method to pass for abuse against a clergyman, or so Stensen must have 
hoped.813 In a way, the Swedes had to make believe that the snaphaner acted without 
orders. It would not have been possible to make the snaphaner pass for robbers and 
assassins if their connection to the Danish authorities had not been obscured. And a 
man like Schovgard participated in the making of this discourse because he had to be 
politically correct in order to be able to carry on the existence he was used to and had 
chosen as his path in life. For all that he probably did not like Stensen’s lot who had 
                                               
812 As far as we know today. It might also have been the case that he, like Nicolaus Hermansen, 
sometimes resulted as registered in the regular army, sometimes in the friskytte corps. 
813 Very often the authorised friskytter or regular officers who worked with the friskytter used that kind 
of methods to “pressurise” people who would not work f  the Danes actively. When it came to more 
violent pressurising and interrogation methods they seem to have passed the tasks to non-authorised 
colleagues. At least in the case of the Swede who got roasted at Lövestad it seems as if the friskytter 
were present but the “peasants” did the torturing bits. The friskytter risked court-martialling if they 
were caught torturing Swedes, not to speak of Danes (and to the king of Denmark the Scanians were 
Danes). 
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been so rude to him, he would not have expressed himself in the same terms to the 
Danish authorities and what he felt in his heart is totally unknown to us. Nevertheless, 
Schovgard’s and his parishioners’ letters are interesting because they provide us with 
information about Swedish discourse propagation at the same time as it throws more 
light on Stensen’s actual activities: he tried to recruit spies and to collect information 
about the enemy, which seems to have been his speciality, but he also executed the 
more ordinary friskytte task of collecting cattle and provisioning for the Danish army. 
 
The Reverend Sigvard Juul of Stora Harrie and then Norrvidinge also ended up in 
front of the ecclesiastic treason tribunal after the war. And even more than 
Schovgaard, his path had been crossed by Pieter Stensen during the war. Or perhaps, 
it was Juul who had crossed Stensen’s path: when the Swedish army bivouacked at 
Herrevadskloster a troop of soldiers were sent out by the king to pick Juul up and 
accompany him back to the camp.814 It was not strange at all that the Swedish king 
wanted to see Juul, because they had made friends during the king’s stay at the castle 
of Næs (modern-day Trollenäs). Juul had come there to ask for help because his 
parish was totally devastated by the war and he could not work there anymore. The 
Swedish king them promptly found him a new position in the safer village of 
Norrvidinge815 and shortly afterwards the king came to stay with Juul in the 
parsonage. Unfortunately the king’s visit was interrupted by a fire that burnt the 
whole parsonage down, because the bell-ringer/schoolmaster had been “careless” with 
the fire, 816  but the friendship remained. Now the soldiers were to escort Juul to the 
king, but while they took a beer-break on the way, Juul was informed by the boy who 
had run to fetch the beer that “Lieutenant Peder Stenson and a strong troop had come 
out of Landscrona and were blocking the road waiting for our troop”. 817 Juul 
promptly informed the commanding officer who decided to take another road so that 
they all arrived happily at the camp.  
 
Unfortunately Stensen found out exactly how their ambush had been betrayed and 
from then on (according to Juul) he had been filled with “an unchristian hatred” of 
                                               
814 According to Sigvard Juul’s own account that he sent in to the treason commission and that is now 
to be found in the regional archives in Lund (Landsarkivet i Lund). See Alenäs (2008), pp.164-165. 
815 Alenäs, (p.160) dates this event to 1677. 
816 Alenäs, p.160. 
817 Alenäs, pp.164-165. 
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Juul and had seen to it that Juul had been arrested. 818 The occasion to do so came 
some time later when, during the Sunday service, two Danish officers walked into the 
church with a decree that Juul was required to readout to the parishioners. He was 
also asked to pray for the king of Denmark, but when Juul got into the pulpit he tried 
to be as neutral as possible and said that he had sworn an oath to the king of Sweden 
whom he was also paid by and for that reason he admonished the parishioners to pray 
for the Swedish king but he also declared that theyshould not exclude His Majesty 
the King of Denmark or any other crowned head from their other prayers or the 
Lord’s Prayer. 819 Herr Juul was consequently physically removed from his position 
and from his home. In his parishioners’ testimonies it was claimed that he had been 
“caught by the snaphaner” 820 but his friend, court scribe Jacob Dominico declared 
that he was “forcefully collected by Danish troops from his altar”,821 and sheriff Matts 
Danielsson testified that Juul had been brought to Landskrona (Landscrone) by the 
Danes.  Then again, Juul’s colleague Torbiorn Joenson Varbierg testified that Juul had 
been taken “in custody” by “Danish troops” that had also plundered his house. 
Varberg specified the “Danish troops” as consisting of “Peder Steenson with his party 
of sharpshooters and snaphaner”822. Towards the end of the letter Varbierg claimed 
that the “friskytter” had taken Juul’s belongings while he was away. 823 At the 
beginning of this paragraph I wrote that Juul had been “physically removed” exactly 
because I wanted to stress how easy it is to describe the same event in various ways. 
To be caught by robbers is one thing. To be arrested by the military another. But 
Stensen was described as the leader of a pack of robbers by some and as a Danish 
officer by others. In this case I am not trying to depict either Juul or Stensen as heroes 
or villains because I do not think either of them fits into clear categories of the kind. 
                                               
818 Alenäs, p. 165. Court scribe Jacob Dominico later testified that Stensen had a personal grudge 
against Juul. On one occasion Dominico had tried to speak to “ lieutenant pähr Stensson who had 
arrested the honourable and learned Herr Sigvard Jull”, asking him whether Juul were to remain in 
custody forever but Stensen had grimly replied “no, he’ll never be released, nor will he ever become a 
man of the church again, actually he should rather lose his life.” 
819 Alenäs, p. 165. Åberg (1951, p.152) briefly mentios this case but not on what sources he relied. He 
claimed that Juul had refused to pray for King Christian but as Alenäs pointed out, Juul did not exactly 
refuse but tried to include King Christian too. Maybe he would have got away with it if Stensen had not 
had his eyes on him already. 
820 “af de danske bortfört till Landscrone”, See: Alenäs, p.162. 
821 “af di danske partier med magt borthembt ifrån hans sockne altar” Court scribe Jacob Dominico’s 
version as in Alenäs, p.162. 
822 ”Peder Steensen med sit parti aff skötter och snaphaner”. Alenäs, p.162. 
823 “af de danske bortfört till Landscrone”, See: Alenäs, p.162. 
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To me it seems obvious that they were both trying to do their jobs and that they bore a 
personal grudge to each other.  
 
Some circles of Swedish society liked to think of Scanians who fought on “the 
wrong” side as robbers and thugs. Consequently some testimonies of the Juul-Stensen 
business adhered to the kind of rhetoric that establi hed the devilish snaphaner cliché, 
either because they really believed in it or because they wanted to improve Herr 
Sigvard’s chances with the Swedes. I think it would be impossible to classify the sort 
of “snaphaner” that appear in this case as outlaws sprung from a woodland republic. 
Pieter Stensen took the first occasion he could to ge  back at Juul but he did so in 
accordance with Danish military practices and with the approval of his superiors.  
During that period Stensen seemed to have Landskrona (Landscrone) as his base, 
from there he rode out on missions and then returned with information, prisoners or 
provisioning.824 Jacob Dominico’s testimony provides us with furthe d tails of 
Stensen’s work on the day that Juul was arrested:  
“Peder Steenson came to Dagstrup with his party of sharpshooters and snaphaner and gathered the 
peasants, both from my parish and other ones, and with coercion made them help his party break down 
the churchyard wall and when something went against them they took Her Siguert and brought him to 
Lantzcrone”.825 
 
The churchyards were often used as bffastions by the Swedes826 and consequently 
Stensen’s men were trying to destroy a potential Swedish stronghold when they pulled 
down the wall that surrounded the church and the churchyard. This and other similar 
tasks were executed not because they made part a series of acts of senseless violence 
committed by a robber band (as one might be tempted to believe if one accepts the 
devilish snaphaner discourse). Stensen did not make his men and the villagers break 
down stone walls for his own high pleasure. He probably arrested Juul with great 
pleasure but he did it according to the book.827  
                                               
824 Juul claimed that Stensen rode out from Landskrona (Landscrone) to organise his ambush near 
modern-day Trolleholm (then Erichsholm).The other testimonies claim that Stensen brought his 
prisoners to Landskrona (Landscrone), among them Juul.
825 Alenäs, p.162. Torbiorn Joenson Varberg to the ecclesiastical treason court, 2nd March 1680. 
Dagstrup is called Daxtorp today. 
826 See: Fabricius III, p.14 and p.150. At Örkeljunga (Ørkellunge) that Charles XI considered to be the 
area at the highest risk of snaphane attacks, he stationed a garrison of 100 soldiers inside the 
churchyard walls. 
827 From his prison in Landskrona (Landscrone) Juul was sent to Copenhagen where he was set free on 
bail. Soon enough he ended up in a pub brawl where  had fought with another Scanian clergyman, 
Christian Sørensen Giersing from Dalköpinge (Dalkøbing) because he (Juul) called himself “an honest 
Swedish man”. Eventually Juul was freed from all charges by the Swedish ecclesiastical treason 
commission. See: Alenäs, p.163. 
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Some other clergymen who were suspected of treason agai st the Swedes and lost 
their positions after the war wrote to plead the authorities for mercy, claiming that not 
only had some of their colleagues been killed brutally by snaphaner but they 
themselves had been threatened and plundered by “the most wrathful of all Snaphane 
leaders, Pehr Steenson”.828 Two other gentlemen who did not care much for Stensen 
reported to the Swedish authorities about “the most wra hful of all Snaphane leaders, 
Pehr Steenson…who boasted that the Danes had authorised him to do whatever he 
liked”.829 However, Sthen Jacobsen, the vicar of Kågeröd (Kogere) who generally did 
not have much love to spare for the snaphaner, greatly appreciated Pieter Stensen and 
concluded that Stensen had indeed showed the Swedes hat a man he was.830   
Conclusions:  
In this section I have tried to elucidate how the very same person could be described 
in a radically different light by the two warring sides in the conflict and by those who 
wanted or needed to ingratiate themselves with the one or other side. Pieter Stensen 
was very much employed by the Danish authorities, and he is reported of as a regular 
Danish Lieutenant and Captain (Ritmester) in the Danish sources, at first frequently in 
connection with Colonel Brahe and Stensen’s border troops, then his name is more 
and more often connected with that of General Arensdorff . Even Sthen Jacobsen who 
loathed “snaphaner” in general spoke of Stensen as an exceptionally courageous 
soldier. In spite of all this he was classified as a dangerous criminal by the pro-
Swedish sources.  
Simon Andersen 
Introduction 
The main aim of this section is to illustrate how a captain of the friskytter worked on a 
day to day basis and what his relations to the authorities were. Part of the work of a 
friskytte was also to be in continuous movement, either on missions independent of 
                                               
828 “dhen argaste eblant alla Snaphane förare, Pehr Stenson…”. See: Hazelius, p.150. The clergymen 
who had been killed were Herr Madtz in Helliaryd who had been ”dragged” to death (presumably after 
a horse) and Herr Johan Saur in Gudhmantorp who had been bound between his horses, dragged 
between them and beaten until he died. It is not clear which “snaphaner” had committed these acts. 
Stensen had claimed that if the ministers did not obey him then he would practise all sorts of “tyranny” 
against them as soon as he found them at home and th t the Danes had authorised him to do whatever 
he liked. 
829 Letter from Abraham Larson and Jacobson Sörenson to the  Swedish king, no date, ”Till Skånes 
historia under övergångstiden 1658-1710, 1.Skånska kriget och snapphanefejden 1676-79”, website of 
the Swedish National Archives,  http://www.ra.se//lla/dokument/v-1871/ii-1-12.html.    
830 Jacobsen, pp.105-106. 
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the regular army or in the traces of it and sometims in unison with it. Being a 
friskytte meant to be continuously on the move and I have tried to stress that in this 
thesis and in particular in this chapter. Simon Andersen is an interesting case in that 
his background as a yeoman farmer is comparatively w l-documented and his later 
career as a friskytte is documented and described by both sides of the conflict. 
Although Simon Andersen allegedly worked from home and the bullet holes in the 
rests of what was his house are still shown, as are the rests of the underground 
passageway, the sources prove that he and his men wer  in continuous movement 
great part of the time, often preceding or following the Danish main army. A 
comparison between Danish War Council records and the operations of Andersen’s 
company around the time of the Danish attempt to liberate Kristianstad 
(Christianstad) in 1678 that Andersen’s men (like Pieter Stensen’s) were employed on 
a government mission: the goals they attacked, like the heights with the Swedish 
redoubts outside Kristianstad (Christianstad) were first discussed by the lords of the 
War Council, then Andersen, Stensen and other small and swift units effectuated these 
strategies. 
Yeoman farmer and Friskytte 
Simon Andersen was born in Western Vram in the hundred of Gärds around 1648. 
His father Anders Simonsen came from an old family that had some noble ancestry 
and at the time of Simon’s birth his father was the owner of both the massive modern-
day Tullsåkra 2 farm, also known as the “Snaphane frmstead” and the Östra Vram 11 
farmstead.831 Less is known of Simon’s mother Bolle but perhaps the Skettilljunga 18 
farmstead that was first registered on Simon (in 1674) and then on his sister Hanna 
and her husband (1699) came from Bolla’s family.832 These people were not 
peasants.833 Although it could naturally be hypothesised that Simon Andersen himself 
was a loser who turned to the friskytter in search of a more adventurous life and to get 
                                               
831 The lands that belonged to Tullsåkra 2 in Anders and Simon’s days have since been split into four 
parts of which two still belong to their family. 
832 Flensmarck, p.199. Flensmarck’s account of Simon Andersen’s life is based on Fabricius and 
Hedwall to the point that he almost copies their wods but when it comes to genealogy Flensmarck who 
is essentially a genealogist (and a descendant of the Tullsåkra family),  contributes with some new 
pieces of information that he has published in various genealogy journals earlier. 
833 But nor were many others that Scandinavian historians classify as ”peasants” in their writings in 
English: the Scandinavian “bonde” that is normally used in texts in Scandinavian could mean any sort 
of person who owns or rents land that he or his employees work, whether that land be a mere rented 
strip that was cultivated by the “bonde” who rented it or a huge estate owned by what would rather be 
called a gentleman farmer. The Tullsåkra family belonged to this latter category. I stress this in order to 
prove that Angry Simon did not come from out of the woods and he had not been brought up in some 
sort of Robin Hood camp. The Tullsåkra family were lat r registered as “skattebönder”.  
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rid of problems at home. Maybe he had had to hand the Skettiljunga farm over to his 
sister because he could not manage it? We do not know a d it is highly unlikely that 
we will ever find out. At the time Simon Andersen was twenty-eight and according to 
the standards of his society and time, he should have been well on his way in life as a 
farmer with a family of his own. But Andersen was not married and the Swedes called 
him a “farmerboy” even when he had passed thirty.834 Nevertheless it is quite possible 
that he only gave up Skettiljunga in order to fight for his king.  
 
Andersen’s career in the King’s Friskytter Corps can be traced from 20th February 
1677 when he and Jens Jenssön were in Copenhagen and obt ined authorisation from 
the Danish king to “persecute all native Swedes and supporters of the Swedes in 
Scania who try to betray and ruin their brothers and our faithful peasants and 
inhabitants...”.835 By the time Andersen and Jenssön obtained their authorisations they 
already had recruited groups of men that could constitute their companies.836 It is not 
unlikely that they had already been operating for a se son and that they had gone to 
Copenhagen with some of their men to find safe winter quarters. Several of Captain 
Simon’s muster rolls have been conserved in the Danish National Archives and later 
published. Most rolls include well over one hundred names, in May 1679 as many as 
one hundred and sixty.837 The last muster roll from 10th May 1680 was signed by 
sheriff (ridefoged) Johan Hacksen and only included thirty-one men, including 
officers. On that last list the places of origin of the twenty-eight non-commissioned 
soldiers are also stated, which was the exception rathe  than the rule on the other 
muster rolls. Out of these twenty-eight men, eight came from Häglinge (Heylinge), 
five hailed from Vram like Captain Simon himself, five others from Äspinge 
(Espinge), two from Äsphult (Espel), two from Rörum (Rørum), one from 
Vanneberga (Vannebierg), one from Göinge (Gønge/Gynge), one from Nävlinge 
(Neflinge), one from Skarhult (Scharelte), one from Gammelstorp (Gammelstrup) in 
Blekinge (Bleging) and one from Stehag (Steha). Other places of origin that turn up in 
Captain Simon’s muster rolls are: Hörröd (Hørridt),Venestad (Wennesta), Sönnarslöv 
(Sønderslef), Steensma (?), Hurva (Hurre), Lybye (?), Långaröd (Lungerød), Huaröd 
(Huerød), Everöd (Efuerød), Frenninge, Gunnerup, Angvolte (?), Lund, Blekinge 
                                               
834 ”bondedräng” 
835 Hedwall, p.5. 
836 In fact the authorisation speaks of “Andersen and Jensøn and their men”. 
837 See: Hedwall, p.36. The muster rolls from 1679-80 can be found on pp.37-42. 
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(Bleging), Frigestad (?), Segen (?), Tuetarp, Lie, Kulde, Mjölkelånga (Michelange), 
Hindbye, Hald and then there was one of Captain Simon’s closest men, “vagtmester”, 
non-commissioned officer Morten Jyde whose surname betrayed his Jutish origins. 
But with the exception of Morten Jyde and a few men from the region of 
Bleging/Blekinge to the northeast, and a Jens who maybe hailed from the city of Lund 
on the south western plains, most of the men whose place of origin was indicated 
came from areas close to Tullsåkra. Captain Simon often appeared in the company of 
his calmer colleague Jens Jenssön who was head of the Stoheby friskytter   in central 
Scania, whereas Captain Simon’s men tended to concentrat  their operations on and 
around the Linderöd ridge.838 It is likely that they referred would-be recruits to each 
other.  
 
During the autumn of 1677 Kristianstad (Christianstd) was under siege again and it 
was Simon Andersen’s main task to collect provisioning for the beleaguered city 
where the soldiers were eating mouldy malt.839 Andersen’s company gathered a 
considerable amount of provisioning in the Vram area and on 29 November the 
commander of the Kristianstad (Christianstad) fortress, general major Carl Henrik von 
der Osten and six hundred of his men managed not only to break through the Swedish 
lines but also to overcome the Swedish troops at Åsum o that they could meet with 
Simon Andersen and his men and transport the provisioning back into the fortress. It 
is quite obvious that Andersen might have annoyed th  people he got the provisioning 
from, but it is just as obvious that he was doing so because he was following orders 
and that Andersen and von der Osten were working together. Which they continued to 
do. On 22nd January the commander managed to break out and collect new 
provisioning from Andersen’s deposit at Skepparslöv (Skibberslev) and then bring it 
all back with the help of Andersen’s men again. Hedwall hypothesises that Simon 
Andersen was one of the brains behind the break-through in the other direction a 
month later when reinforcements and money were sent out from Landskrona 
                                               
838 Andersen and Jenssön not only appeared together in the Royal authorisation letters but also turn up 
together for payment of money and provisions both in Copenhagen and Landscrone and their names 
tend to be mentioned after one another in orders issued by the authorities to the friskytter, Andersen 
first and then Jenssön, whose name is often written Jensen. If I claim that Jenssön was the calmer of the 
two then it is because his reports to the authorities (among the Depositiones etc.) are calmer than his 
colleague’s. Jenssön was convinced that the Lord would help the righteous and that the fact that the 
vast majority of the population supported the Danes would bring them to victory. Andersen quarrelled 
and argued and threatened those who did not do as he liked with the hounds of hell. 
839 Hedwall, p.6. 
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(Landscrone).840 General Major Meerheim himself accompanied the troop to 
Getingebro, then they continued through Western Vram and Vä (Wæ) towards 
Kristianstad (Christianstad) where they charged at the Swedish guards at Långebro, 
broke through the lines and managed to get into the ci y. Whether Andersen or any 
other friskytter played any role for that operation we do not know. What we do know 
is that Simon Andersen and his men worked intensively with intelligence activities in 
the area during the summer of 1678.  
 
Three of Andersen’s reports to Arensdorff have been conserved in the Danish 
National Archives from that period.841 A preceding correspondence between 
Andersen and the man he calls his “benefactor” can be assumed from references to 
earlier letters but unfortunately I have not managed to track them down, if they are 
still to be found in the archives. Simon Andersen did not date his reports but the 
clerks at the Danish headquarters normally wrote the time of delivery and from where 
the observations in the report had been made. Unfortu ately, the dates are 
nevertheless not quite clear in this case. Surrounding events and the collocation in the 
archives fit the letters into the period from the beginning of June to the beginning of 
the war. Fabricius’s datation of the two letters from Andersen that he mentioned was 
vague: one was registered as “delivered” on 20th June and the other could be dated to 
sometime after 16th June. It seems as if Fabricius referred to the lett r that Hedwall 
mentions as registered on 10th June but it is not very clear.  Hedwall then continues to 
one letter that had an annotation on its back that said that the observations at “Auss” 
(assumably modern-day Åhus) had been made in the evening of the 16th June and that 
Captain Simon was at Långaröd in Färs (Fers) when he wrote the report and then 
Hedwall also quotes a letter that he dated to “sometime during June”.842 However, 
Hedwall’s datings are also far from clear. He claims that Andersen’s report about the 
sharpshooters that had escaped from Uhlfeld’s troops can be dated to 10th June but 
then Uhlfeld’s warrant for the same men was dated 12th July. Why would Uhlfeld 
                                               
840 Hedwall, p.7. 
841 Two of these are mentioned by Fabricius, III, pp.164. 65, footnote 12. I assume that Fabricius 
meant the letter that mentions the four escapees, since his wording is so similar to Simon Andersen’s. 
Fabricius also refers to Andersen’s letter as if they were to be found in the “Krigsk. i. S.” collection but 
today the originals are among the Indkomne Breve in the Danish National Archives. Fabricius writes in 
the footnote that one letter was delivered on 20th June and the other was written after 16th June but he 
does not go into detail. I do not know which one of the remaining two letters Fabricius had read or if
maybe, he found one that is no longer there.  
842 Hedwall, p.12. 
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have waited a whole month if he was interested in getting hold of the rascals? Uhlfeld 
was a highly intelligent man and he would not have waited. The relationship between 
the different reports and their dating is consequently not certain. Andersen’s and 
Uhlfeld’s reports on the four sharpshooters should s rely be connected closer in time. 
The annotation from 16th June should maybe be ascribed to the totally undated le ter 
since the most important piece of information in it is hat the Swedish troop that had 
bivouacked inside the churchyard at Åhus (Auss in this source) had marched on 
towards Malmö (Malmøe) “tonight which is Tuesday night”. But in that case the 
clerks messed the dates up.  
 
In the first (?) letter from this period, that is undated but registered as having arrived 
at HQ on 10th June 1678, Andersen communicates that four of his men that had been 
Swedish prisoners had returned. Nills Skytt, Faihre Murtensen, Esbiørn Jacobsen and 
Peer, whose surname does not appear in the sources, had been caught by the Swedes 
and forced to take service among Ebbe Uhlfeld’s sharpshooters, troops that 
specialised in turning “snaphaner” against “snaphaner”.843 While the four men were 
captives their old boss managed to send messages to them and encouraged them to 
take advantage of their experience gathering as much information about the Swedish 
camp as possible and then try to sneak away. And as Andersen states in his letter, 
since these were “honest and faithful men” who wanted His Majesty to be well 
informed, they did so. Not only did they manage to scape and bring useful 
information with them but they also stole five beautiful horses, four of Uhlfeld’s own 
rifles and a military jacket.844 Andersen preferred not to mention the latter details o 
his patron. However, the escapees informed their king and his servants at the 
headquarters about the latest Swedish troop movements, about Swedish plans to storm 
Kristianstad (Christianstad), how many cannons the Sw des had and that they were 
considering “shooting fire into the city” (“God forbid”, as Andersen commented), that 
there had been approximately eighteen thousand Swedish soldiers but that four 
                                               
843 The peace time occupations of these four men are st t d in Ebbe Uhlfeld’s “wanted” decree of 12th 
July 1678  (Hedwall, p.9) that was sent to the assize judges (häradsdommare): Peer had been in the 
service of district governor Durell, Faiher Murtens had worked as a forester at Hindszöe (Hindsjö?) 
and Esbiørn Jacobsen as a sharpshooter (forsuersskytt). Nills Skytt’s profession is not stated but 
normally somebody called “Skytt” occupied himself with exactly what his surname indicated, i.e. with 
being a sharpshooter or gamekeeper. None of the thre men whose full names are stated appear in the 
muster rolls.  
844 As results from Uhlfeld’s own letter to the judge of the hundred of Gärds (Giers), 12th July 1678, 
Opsnappede breve, DRA, published by Hedwall, p.9. 
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thousand of them had been sent as reinforcements to Gothenburg. Andersen assured 
Arensdorff that he would obtain further information when he talked to the men 
himself. Naturally, Ebbe Uhlfeld was annoyed and sent out warrants for the fugitives. 
A letter to district judge Tönneßen from 12th July in which Uhlfeld asked that the 
“treacherous sharpshooters” that had run away and go e over to the enemy should be 
asked publicly to present themselves to the authorities and if they did not do so their 
names should be stuck onto the gallows to “eternal sh me and contempt” so that all 
others who had a mind to doing the same thing would be iscouraged. According to 
Ulfeld the sharpshooters were: Nillß Skytt, Fager Mårtenßon forester at Yngsiø and 
defence shooter Esbiörn Jacobson. In this context he forgot the fourth, but he also 
added that all four had worked for the sadly deceased district governor Durell.845  
 
In his next letter, Andersen confirmed that he had received and obeyed his patron’s 
orders.846 Arensdorff had had intelligence that a party or convoy of Swedes were to be 
sent from Kristianstad (Christianstad) to Malmö (Malmøe) and he had set Andersen 
on the task of finding out the truth behind these all g tions. Now Andersen confirmed 
the suspicions. The Swedes had detached five thousand men from their main forces, 
three thousand foot soldiers and two thousand cavalry that were to escort a huge 
convoy of clothes and ammunition to Malmö (Malmøe). At the moment they were 
bivouacking in the churchyard in Auss (Åhus).847  Andersen assured that he would 
inform Arensdorff the minute the Swedes crossed the river Helgeå (Helljaa), his 
scouts were at their work day and night. Finally he reported that the Swedes were 
keeping Kristianstad (Christianstad) under constant fire and that they had shot a hole 
in the west, close to the wall.  
 
As Andersen had promised, he informed his superiors as oon as the Swedish convoy 
moved from the churchyard at Åhus (Aahus/Auss)848:  
                                               
845 Uhlfeld to the judge of the hundred of Gärds (Giers) (häradz dommeren), ...Tönneßen, 12th July 
1678, Opsnappede brefve 1677-79, 761002, DRA. A passage of the decree has been published by 
Hedwall on p.9. “I ville effter wehnligheeten bem:te skiälmske skytter 3:ne gånger effterlysse låthe 
och, dher dhe sigh jmeddlertyds icke jnställe, dess nampn dhu till een ewigh spott och skändzell på 
gallgen måtte oppslagne blifue, androm till een sky och wahrnagel, som slijkt kunna hafue i sinnett att 
föröfwe.” Fabricius (III, pp.164-165) referred briefly to this letter, though he dated it to 11th July 1678. 
846 Simon Andersen to Arensdorff, Indkomne Brefve DRA, published by Hedwall, p. 10. 
847 The Swedes often used walled-in churchyards as camps or strongholds. 
848 Letter from the Danish National Archives, Indkomne Br ve collection. It has been published by 
Anders Hedwall in his Tullsagra Simon alias Simon Snaphane. En skånsk frihetskämpe. (Simon from 
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Gentle Sir, General Field Marshal Gracious Lord! 
 
I would humbly like to inform Your High Excellency that the Camp has been moved to this Side of the 
River, and they have Marched across the bridge at Lilleöe and for each Piece that was shot from the 
town 7 or 8 Men out of the Swedish bastards fell, and People are saying that Tonight, which is Tuesday 
Night they will attack the Town, and they have demanded from Each Parish Fifty Heads of Cattle, and 
it is also said that they are going to collect Corn from Kahrls Hafn but only God knows their Intentions, 
furthermore the Party that camped on the Auss Churchya d has Marched towards Malmöe tonight 
which is Tuesday night but if we perceive that the Swedes are about to Turn away from the Town and 
towards the Crown then Your Excellency will Immediately be informed through two Healthy Men and 
horses, that will always be kept Ready; I humbly beg Your Excellency that You will Let Us know 
through the Messenger, how we should Act, I have nothi g more to announce to Your Excellency but I 
recommend You to the Protection of the Lord Almighty, and I remain 
 
Your Excellency’s 




The Town = then Christianstad, now Kristianstad or in English: Christian’s Town. 
Kahrls Hafn = modern-day Karlshamn 
The Crown = then Landscrone, modern-day Landskrona. In either case the name means “the crown of 
the country”. 
Auss = modern-day Åhus 
 
In this letter, as in the preceding ones, we can see that Andersen was first of all, in 
clear professional confidence with his superiors. He was a humble enough servant but 
the importance here is that he considered himself a servant and took for granted that 
the authorities saw him as one too. Swedish propaganda to the point that the 
snaphaner were murderous barbarians whose only motivati n was their own thirst for 
gold and blood does not fit in with Andersen’s regular reports to Copenhagen nor with 
his pleas for instructions on how and when to act. It is characteristic of the reports 
from the friskytter that they asked for instructions and reinforcements from 
Copenhagen. Andersen’s seemed to be something of a classical patron and client 
relationship to his superiors. Furthermore, an analysis of this letter makes clear that 
Andersen worked according to classical irregular troops strategies: he kept the enemy 
under close surveillance and promptly reported their movements and losses to HQ so 
that the Danish commanders would be able to make a cl arer picture of what they 
                                                                                                                            
Tullsager alias Simon the Snaphane. A Scanian Freedom Fighter.), Copenhagen 1966. Hedwall (p.32 
and p.36) stresses that the friskytter and those who fought with them but did not have the funds to join
the King’s Friskytter Corps, fought for freedom. They wanted to be free from the Swedish yoke which 
they experienced as living under conditions they had not asked for, in other words, coercion. Naturally, 
any sort of state brings a certain amount of coercin with it. But Swedish exercise of coercion was 
different from what the Scanians had been used to. Some people lived that experience as drudgery, as 
existence under a yoke similar to that of the Lord’s elect under the Babylonians. See also Flensmarck, 
p.194 who is a generally a Scanian regionalist but who is quite critical of angry Simon’s and other 
snaphaner’s doings and has preferred to take a classically Swedish stand on that issue. He even claims 
that many of the snaphaner were mentally ill. 
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were up against. In this letter, Andersen also reports what people are saying in the 
area, which was important, both as information about the military situation and about 
morale among the enemy and one’s own. And last but lost least, Andersen had 
messengers ready 24/7 in order to be able to warn his superiors of major enemy troop 
movements. He was working on the orders of his superiors and he was on the pay-roll 
of his superiors.  
Towards the end of that summer Captain Simon’s company got involved in a battle at 
Sönderslöv (Sønderslef) that was descibed by the vicar of Vittskövle, Christen 
Lauridsen Klim in a letter to his “highly honoured and dear” daughter Anna from 3rd 
August 1677.849 Lauridsen and his family had taken the Swedish side in the strife and 
in his letter he writes about “our men” vs. “the Danes” although he was a native Dane 
who wrote in Danish. Nevertheless, Lauridsen’s letter is exempt from anti-snaphane 
rhetoric of the kind that is often found in the clergy’s missiles to the Swedish 
authorities. For one thing he writes “friskytter” not “snaphaner”. Now he told his 
daughter that the friskytter were beginning to get too noisome: on the preceding 
Wednesday Captain Simon’s “party” had taken away several horses, oxen and cows 
and in the middle of the day at that! They had then spent the night at a nearby farm 
and on the following morning they left the area. Now the vicar knew that Captain 
Simon often came to his daughter’s place and so he ask d her to try to put Simon in 
such a good mood that he would give back the vicar’s four heads of cattle. Lauridsen 
then told his daughter that there had been a battle be ween “one of our parties” and “a 
Danish party”. He then goes on to declare that “some f ours were killed and some 
taken prisoner, amongst whom were Isac Ulf that Captain Simon himself caught and 
now he is riding Isac’s big brown horse...”. Lauridsen made no difference between 
regular Danish soldiers and friskytter: from his account it is impossible to tell what 
kind of Danish troops the Swedes had encountered at Sönderslöv (Sønderslef) the 
preceding Sunday.850 It is however, quite clear, that the Swedes had not been 
assaulted by highwaymen or robbers. Isac had lost his horse in a clash between “our 
                                               
849 Christen Lauridsen to Anna Christensdatter, (wife of the vicar of Andrarum, Anders Schartau), 3rd 
August 1678, Wedskuule (Vittskövle), Opsnappede breve, DRA, quoted by Hedwall, p.13.  Fabricius 
(III, p. 168, footnote 18 and p.192.) briefly refers to this letter.   
850 On the basis of Per Sörensson’s study of the account books, Anders Hedwall (p. 13.) concluded that 
Captain Simon had checked out 24 pounds of gunpowder on 23rd July 1678 (quite a considerable an 
amount) but that only five days later he was back and checked out another twenty pounds. The 
skirmish at Sönderslöv had taken place in between th se two points in time.The Danish authorities 
would hardly have let Andersen have check out more ammunition and explosives than any other 
regular captain if they had not believed in his military talent.  
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troops” and “a Danish troop”, he had not been ambushed by Robin Hoods or Dick 
Turpins.  
 Lauridsen then told his daughter that the battle  in which Captain Simon had taken 
the colonel’s horse had taken place on the Sunday, then on the Monday “the Danes” 
had gone on to burn the village of Skepparslöv (Skibersleff) down and on  the 
Tuesday it was Härlöv’s (Häreßlef’s) turn, “God help us all” as he commented. “The 
Danes” in his letter included Captain Simon’s company. It is not clear whether 
Captain Simon’s company worked together with regular troops or on their own during 
the operations described by Lauridsen, but they most certainly did so in the role of 
“Danish troops” not as robbers, which was quite clear to Lauridsen. The records from 
the meetings of the Danish War Council on 25-26th July 1678 make quite clear that 
Captain Simon was working according to a carefully considered Danish strategy that 
had been decided on by King Christian and his councillors. At this time von Osten 
had already been ordered to surrender if he could obtain an agreement with the 
Swedes and consequently Kristianstad (Christianstad) w s considered lost by the 
Danish commanders that instead had decided on trying to harass the enemy as much 
as possible and to try to cut of their communication l nes to Sweden.851 
 
At about the time of the Sönderslöv (Sønderslef) engagement, a man who might have 
been connected to Captain Simon’s troops was executed by the Swedes. Lauridsen 
informed his daughter that “a man called Ole Fiskere” had been quartered (steilet) by 
Långbro (Langebroe) because he was supposed to have helped betray the Swedes at 
Kristianstad (Christianstad) so that the town could be taken over by the Danes. The 
Swedish soldier and later professor J.J Winslow mentioned the same episode in his 
war diaries: “1678: Between 30th and 31st July old Ollof Nilsson the fisherman, who 
had come out from Kristianstad (Christianstad) with information for the Danish army, 
and had been caught by our men three days earlier, was put on the stake and wheel at 
the end of the Långebro bridge, by the big stones, on the right hand of the road when 
one is entering the city.”852 Ole Fiskere (Fisherman) does not appear in the muster 
rolls but a Jens Oelsen Fischer, (“Jens Ole’s son Fisherman”), does.853 Another man 
                                               
851 Jensen, pp. 379-383. 
852 Winslow’s war diaries, J.J. Winslows dagbok öfver kriget 1676-1679. Ollof Nilsson is the 
Swedicised form of Olluf/Ole Nielsen. Quoted from Hazelius, p.179. Hazelius also hypothesises that 
Ole Nielsen Fiskere worked for Captain Simon. 
853 Simon Andersen’s company of Friskytter, muster roll f m 27th February 1680, DRA. 
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who had managed to get into the city had been chased by the Swedes but managed to 
drown himself in the river before they caught him.854 All these events should be seen 
in the light of the decisions of the Danish War Council while the bulk of the Danish 
army was standing at Önnestad (Ønnested).  
 
Lauridsen described all this without participating  the official Swedish discourse of 
tyrannical and barbarian snaphaner, although he sided with the Swedes, maybe 
because he was writing to his daughter who knew his standpoint and to whom he did 
not feel that he had to exaggerate his insurances of good faith, maybe because he 
knew the Danes might intercept the letter and the Sw dish diabolical snaphane 
discourse was not politically correct in Denmark. However, I believe that many of the 
clergymen who wrote to the Swedish authorities felt tha  they had to adhere to the 
official discourse of the anti-snaphane crusade. Th clergymen were suspect subjects 
themselves and had to try to prove their loyalty if they wanted to keep their callings. 
Not only did they have to try and copy the language of their overlords in order to 
prove their loyalty, but they also tried to copy the r etoric formulated by that 
language. An important part of the Swedish discourse what that of “the tyrannical 
snaphaner” who were described as assassins and robbers who stole, thrashed and 
slaughtered for their own high pleasure. However, it should be noted that siding with 
the Swedes did not necessarily have to mean that you really thought the snaphaner 
were animals. One can only assume that some Swedes an  Swedish supporters knew 
that they were not. Anna Christensdatter, wife of Herr Anders, knew one of the “arch-
barbarians” in person. Her father’s principal errand in writing to her had been to ask 
her to talk to Captain Simon, if possible before Anna came to visit her father the day 
after. Lauridsen complained that the “Fri Skyttere” were becoming too audacious. On 
the Wednesday, after having met a Swedish troop in combat on the Sunday and 
having burnt down two villages on the Monday and Tuesday, they had come to the 
house at Vittskövle (Vedskøfle )855 in the middle of the day and they had taken away 
“many horses, oxen, cows and calves amongst which were also two young stallions 
and two young cows that were ours, they were only two years old, I have never seen 
                                               
854 Christen Lauridsen to Anna Christensdatter, (wife of the vicar of Andrarum, Anders Schartau), 3rd 
August 1678, Opsnappede brefve, DRA, quoted by Hedwall, p.13. 
855 I can only assume that Lauridsen’s animals had been grazing on the lands of the Vittskövle estate 
and that the “gård” was Vittskövle castle. For that reason I chose to translate “gård” as “house” that has 
an equally ambiguous meaning in that it could mean both a mansion and any sort of decent building 
where people live. 
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any as beautiful as them”. Lauridsen had then heard th t the Friskytter had gone on to 
the Maltesholm estate and he had tried to send a messenger to them but to no use. 
Lauridsen now asked his daughter to try to talk to Captain Simon since he knew that 
“he often comes to your place, please try to convince him to be as kind as to let me 
have them back, I would like to have the three dotted ones and the fourth with the 
black star.”856  
 
The same day as the vicar of Vittskövle (Vedskøfle) wrote to his daughter to try to 
speak to Captain Simon, the king of Denmark, Christian V, wrote to the commander 
of Kristianstad (Christianstad) to yield. On the 4th August 1678 the garrison 
capitulated and on the 5th they were all (Scanians included) allowed to march back to 
Landskrona (Landscrone), leaving Kristianstad (Christianstad) in Swedish hands. On 
9th August the captains Jens Jenssön, H. Severin, S. Andersen and Lieutenant Thue 
Krop were ordered by Arensdorff to betake themselves to the western parts of Scania 
(Malmøehuss Lehn) in order to help destroy all provisi ning for people and animals 
that could be found, including whatever had not been harvested yet. They also 
received strict orders to burn and plunder all farms where they found provisioning 
indoors. When and how Captain Simon obeyed these orders is hard to say. 
Arensdorff’s harsh orders were retracted after some ten days and Arensdorff himself 
was suspended from service. We know that Captain Simon was in the Andrarum area 
in the south east when Kristianstad (Christianstad) c pitulated. Shortly afterwards he 
and his troops confiscated two Swedish provisioning boats that were to sail from 
Åhus (Aahus) to Kristianstad (Christianstad).857 The next certain date is 7th October 
1678 when Captain Simon and nine of his men were ambushed at the Västerstad 
(Vestrested) vicarage by a party of snaphane catchers under Sven Erlandsson. The 
background to the ambush was probably Captain Simon’s enmity with Hans Nielsen 
Holmbye, the vicar who seemingly supported the Swedes and who had  told those of 
Andersen’s men who went to mass in his church that they would end up in hell. In 
order to punish the vicar Andersen’s men had abducte  him from home in the middle 
of the night and let him run between two horses in his nightshirt so that the scars from 
                                               
856 “...kand I giøre hannem saa god, at hand vil lade mig faa dem igen, bad ieg gierne om de tre 
blessede, den 4 er sort stiernet.” A more literal translation would be: ”…try to put him in such a good 
mood that he lets me have them back...” or “try to make him so good as to let me have them back.” In 
either case Lauridsen seems to have known Andersen and to have thought of him as irascible. 
857 Hedwall, pp.15-16. 
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the ropes they had bound him with never disappeared.858 They let the vicar run for a 
quarter of a Swedish mile, and then they let the villagers pay ransom for him. The 
episode cannot be dated. But the vicar had his revenge on 7th October when, for some 
reason Andersen and some of his men had come to a party at the vicarage, and the 
vicar managed to send a message to Erlandsson in Hörby for help. Six of Andersen’s 
men were killed on the spot, two were taken prisoner a d “examined” until they 
confessed, but Captain Simon and his servant boy escap d.859 According to legend, 
Captain Simon managed to escape because he had somehow got hold of a blue 
(Swedish) coat and managed to pass for a Swedish soldier l ng enough to throw 
himself upon his horse and ride straight through the Swedish troops that had 
surrounded the whole vicarage.860 
 
The next thing we know about Simon Andersen is that he was consigned winter 
quarters in the Landskrona (Landscrone) district on 5th November 1678. The district 
governor of Landskrona (Landscrone), Knud Thott, and Simon Andersen did not get 
on. Thott would have liked to force Andersen and his men to do regular army service 
since he thought they were of no use whatsoever except making the peasants destitute. 
But eventually Thott refrained from that policy since it might have made all the other 
                                               
858 According to Gunnar Carlqvist’s Lunds stifts Herdaminne, (Memories of the Clergy in the Diocese 
of Lund), quoted by Hedwall, p.17. 
859 Sven Erlandsson to the king, Wästerdal (sic!) 8th October 1678, DRA. In the letter Erlandsson writes 
the name of the village in various ways. He called An ersen “Tulsagra Simon”. Letter quoted in part by 
Hedwall, p. 18. Carlqvist reports a slightly different version of the facts, as the story was told at 
Västerstad (Vestrested) in later times. To Carlqvist, “the leader of the snaphaner was a farmerboy from 
Tullsåkra called Simon, the one the snaphaner called captain but the commoners Tullsagra Simenen 
(Simen from Tullsager).” Much the same story is told in Erlandsson’s “Promemoria” but in it 
Erlandsson adds that he drew the coat off “Tullsagra Simon” when Simon charged straight through the 
Swedish ranks, and that the one who was with the captain was shot down. Hedwall claims that the 
latter version was an error and that Erlandsson did not quite remember how things went when he wrote 
the “Promemoria” down since he had written to the king the day after that Captain Simon’s servant boy 
had survived. But first of all we cannot be absolutely certain that Erlandsson wrote the “Promemoria” 
himself, and even if he did he might have been writing about different persons, a servant boy who 
followed his boss closely enough to escape, and a friskytte who did not quite manage it. Fabricius (III, 
pp.174-175) also mentions this episode and comments: “The audacity of these feats were countered by 
an equal degree of cruelty in the punishments that befell the friskytter at the hands of 
Erlandsson...Erlandsson should probably have praised his lucky star that he did not fall into the hands 
of the friskytter.” 
860 According to Carlqvist who based his account on what he had heard and on the account of Samuel 
Rönnbeck who was vicar of Västerstad (Vestrested) around the middle of the 18th century and who had 
met people who had been at the party when the vicarhad offered the snaphaner beer. The dead 
snaphaner were buried along the church wall on the outside of the southwestern side were silver coins 
have been deposited ever since. 
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friskytter accept the next Swedish amnesty offer (as he concluded himself) 861, and 
probably also because he did not have enough support from the Army Board. Early 
in1679 Simon Andersen’s friskytter were mustered an consigned quarters in the deep 
south, in the hundreds of Albo and Järrestad, where they could not have served any 
scope as anything but cannon fodder for the Swedes. According to a new government 
policy the friskytter were to be based in certain areas, the inhabitants of which were 
obliged to pay their upkeep and wages. This policy was not popular, neither with the 
peasants nor with the friskytter. On 4th September 1679, when the Danish government 
had already signed the Fontainebleau peace treaty, in which the Scanian Provinces 
were left to the Swedes, Simon Andersen wrote an angry letter to the director of the 
Andrarum mills, Monsieur Teingelein. According to Andersen, Teingelein and the 
aldermen of the parish of Andrarum had not paid himis “winter quarters money” 
that the King and his ministers had entitled him to. Andersen therefore warned 
Teingelein that if he, the village tailor and the vicar did not pay him his wages of 300 
Danish rigsdaler within eight days they would be in bad trouble. By then, Andersen 
and his men were in Landskrona (Landscrone) because they could not venture into the 
Andrarum area that was too close to the Swedish enclaves. In his letter, Andersen 
stressed that by now the land was calm so that Teingelein and the village 
representatives should not have any trouble sending the money to him in Landskrona 
(Landscrone) or travelling. Stressing how calm the land was, Andersen continued: 
“You have no excuses anymore, for you or some other man can come here whenever 
you like.” And then Andersen went on:  
“And if you do not willingly oblige these recommendations Sir, then you and the Vicar can be assured 
that I will treat you so very according to His Majesty’s orders that you will sooner forget God than me, 
and there will be such Trouble that nobody will believe it. May I also remind you, my dear Inspector, 
of the last time I came to you asking for materials that were required, and you claimed that you had no 
more in the stables than you needed for yourself, but that only a few days later you supplied the 
                                               
861 Fabricius III, pp. 176-177. Knud Thott often wrote about Simon Andersen and his “insolence” in his 
reports to the king from August 1678 to the end of May 1679. According to Fabricius Thott’s reports 
from this period can be found in the “Krigsk. i . S.” but I found them in the Danish National Archives, 
among the Army Board papers. It should also be added that Knud Thott was not contrary to the 
friskytter in general, he thought them of great military use although they constituted a burden to the 
peasants. Some people in Landskrona (Landscrone) wer  saying that Captain Simon had grown so fond 
of cattle hustling that he had forgotten to fight the Swedes, as Fabricius III, p.192 footnote 9) reports 
from a letter from Sofie, Herr Hans of Tosterup’s widow to Meerheim 14th February 1679. However, 
Fabricius adds that it should not be forgotten thatAndersen was a brilliant cattle hustler not only on 
behalf of himself but also on behalf of the Danish Army and that he took his provisioning task 
seriously. And Fabricius (III, p.176) also adds that probably Knud Thott had less success in his 
interactions with the friskytter because contrary to his colleague Rommel in Helsingborg, he was not 
used to getting on with commoners.  
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Swedes with materials, which will be your ruin unless you send the aforementioned money to 
Landzcrone. I recommend you to the Lord.  
Landzcrone d:4: Sept:1679, Simon Andersen, Captain of the Friskytter.”862  
 
After that, we have no more sources that can be ascribed to Simon Andersen’s own 
hand, nor do the sources tell us what came of him after the war. His company was 
mustered in Copenhagen on 18th October 1679 (95 friskytter plus 10 officers), then 
again on 27th February in Copenhagen (11 officers, 91 friskytter). Both these muster-
rolls were signed by Andersen himself. Then the company was mustered for the last 
time on 10th May 1680 although according to Hedwall, it had been officially dissolved 
in March that year, but Andersen himself was not on he list nor did he sign it. Only 
four officers and 28 friskytter were included.863 According to Fabricius Captain 
Simon’s company was included in “The Scanian National Friskytter” under Major 
Aage Monsen Harlof by this time.864  In February (Kyndelsmäss) that year Simon 
Andersen was godfather to a child of another friskytte in the village of Værløse some 
miles north of Copenhagen, as Knud Fabricius found out.865 Fabricius pointed out that 
the christening included the more respectable part of the villagers, which in itself 
indicated that the friskytter were respected men in post-1679 Denmark and that they 
continued their lives “inside” the communities.866 After the christening at Værløse 
Simon Andersen disappears from the sources. According to family tradition Simon 
obtained a farm in Jutland from the state in recognition of his services and/or that he 
worked as a coast guard there. Tradition also has it that he died only a few years later, 
when his cart crushed him while he was digging in the sands on his lands in Jutland.     
 
There are more legends about Simon Snaphane than about ny other single combatant 
during the Scanian War, or about any of the snaphaner that preceded him in other 
wars. The snaphaner in the legends tend to get mixed up with each other, and some 
feats have been attributed to Simon from Tullsager that were certainly his to claim, 
                                               
862 Letter from Simon Andersen to Monsieur Teingelein, Landzcrone 4th September 1679, quoted by 
Hedwall, pp.26-27. 
863 Hedwall, p.41; Fabricius III, pp.240-241. Sheriff (ridefoged) Johan Hacksen had compiled the list. 
864 Fabricius III, pp.205-206. The Scanian National Friskytter comprised 349 men including officers. 
865 Fabricius, III p.216. Captain Hans Bentsen, Andersen’s lieutenant Rasmus Boesen and some other 
friskytter were also present. 
866 See: Appel, p.674 for the importance of being a memb r of the Christian community (menigheden) 
in 17th century Denmark and how the parish minister had the power to include or exclude people from 
the category of the ”menighed”. Those who were deemed unworthy of being part of it were not allowed 
to participate in important religious functions and could for example neither be godfathers to children 
nor take communion. Episodes of rage and violence against clergymen like the Nils Holmbye/Simon 
Andersen conflict should maybe been seen in this light.  
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such as the legend of the snaphane who threw himself into the sea from a rock off 
cape Stenshuvud.867 Hedwall collected a neat number of legends about Simon 
Snaphane and for those who are interested he also writes down the traditional clues 
for those who want to go on a quest for the treasure that everyone knows Simon hid 
somewhere.868 
Knud Fabricius included Simon Andersen among the friskytte officers whose 
background could not under any circumstance be included among the socially suspect 
ones.869 As Fabricius noted, Swedish historians had often claimed that all 
friskytter/snaphaner were vagrants or outlaws, so-called “asocial elements,”870 but in 
the case of comparatively well-documented personages lik  Andersen, Aage Monsen 
Harlof, Sheriff Jon Svendsøn, Eskeld Nielsen and several others, this claim did simply 
not hold water.871  
Conclusions: 
Although this section is mainly based on sources that have already been consulted by 
others, it still is of particular importance in tha nobody has related the scattered 
evidence on Angry Simon’s life and activities: Anders Hedwall who after all did write 
a booklet on Simon Andersen apparently had no knowledge of the discussions in the 
Danish War Council during the end of July 1678 thatshed an entirely new light on 
Andersen’s operations as part of an official Danish strategy in the Kristianstad 
(Christianstad) area during the same period. Both Per Sörensson and Anders Hedwall 
had already intimated that Andersen’s presence in the army account books and 
ammunition depot records imply that he was far from a bandit or outlaw, and the still 
impressive property of his family exclude the theory f his lowly origins. Far from 
                                               
867 In his “Promemoria” Erlandsson makes quite clear th t hat was Jeppe Baassen, but local legend 
insists it was Simon Böse, who survived the war and llegedly (according to another legend) died 
young in Denmark. 
868 See pp.22-27 of Hedwall’s booklet for the legends concerning Simon from Tullsager alias Captain 
Simon/Simen alias Snapphane Simon/Simon Snapphane ali s Simon Böse. Hedwall made the 
interesting annotation that the different names that Simon Andersen is known under correspond to 
different Scanian regions: whereas Simon Böse is characteristic of the Andrarum area, he is mainly 
remembered as Simon Snapphane or Captain Simon in the Tullåkra area and as Tullsagra Simon 
(Simon from Tullsåker) in non negative legends that did not originate in his direct home area .In 
the Scanian dialect “bös” can mean “bad”, “angry”, “mean”, “terrible” or maybe the most fitting 
translation in this case would be “wrathful, irascible”. Another name for the same man that we meet in 
the sources is “Tullsagre-Svennen”, the lad from Tullsagra, which also is a name that indicates that 
Simon was young (See: Johnsson, p.212.). 
869 Fabricius III, p.104. 
870 Fabricius referred vaguely to Alf Åberg’s contestations to this effect in his “Snapphanarna” from 
1951. 
871 Fabricius III, p.103. 
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defending the moral character of Simon Andersen or exp essing a view on whether he 
deserved his nickname Angry Simon, I would still like to claim that the sources 
indicate that Andersen’s unit did, at least in part, not work so much as an independent 
guerrilla unit but rather as irregular troops that effectuated strategies that had been 
decided upon officially and that either substituted or complemented traditional 
warfare.  
 
It should furthermore be stressed that one of Simon Andersen’s main tasks was to 
break through the Swedish blockade and get food and ammunition into 
(Christianstad).872 The friskytter was the one means the Danes had in order to be 
assured of a constant connection between their stronghold in the east, Kristianstad 
(Christianstad), and their south-western holdings. Kristianstad (Christianstad) was 
often blockaded by the Swedes and then only the friskytter knew the secret routes that 
could be used to cross the lines: maintaining communications on their own side and 
interrupting those of the enemy was one of the main tasks of the friskytter and Simon 
Andersen worked hard at it.  
 
Thue Piill   
Introduction 
This section contains an analysis of the routine work of a Friskytte officer and his 
relations to the community around him and to the regular army. 
 
A Trek through the Woods 
Lieutenant Thue Piill belonged to the friskytte corps and kept in close touch with 
commander in chief Friedrich von Arensdorff to whom he sent reports of his actions 
on an almost daily basis. In a ”memoriall” from the summer of 1678 Piill gave the 
following description of his daily work 873:  
”In accordance with the orders of My Lord General I rode to Sönderslöff bridge where I did not find 
anyone but some frisköter , Rames Sined was their captain. No one was to be seen by the bridge though 
they were supposed to build it up, and nor would it be possible to get a bridge built for a very long 
time. Then I rode  from Sönderslöff bridge to Öde vad where I am now. I have not been able to obtain 
any news about the Swedes but the peasants advised me to direct my path into the woods since it was 
not safe at all on the main road...the 9 dragoons culd not accompany me any further. Their horses are 
                                               
872 Hedwall, pp.6-14, analyses Captain Simon’s activities during the siege of Kristianstad 
(Christianstad). 
873 Thue Piill to general Arensdorff 16th July 1678. This letter has been published in part by Fabricius 
(vol.III, p.104). 
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too big for these narrow forest paths. Consequently I am sending them back again. After that I went 
into the woods again, that is where I am safe and as soon as I can I shall send His Excellency more 
useful information, 
16th July 1678                                              Thue Piill 
 
One detail that transpires from the letter is that Piill had had 9 dragoons from the 
regular army sent out to help him. It is interesting to see how closely the regular army 
and the friskytter cooperated and how natural men like Piill seemed to think it was 
that they should do so. But then, even Sthen Jacobsen did not deny that the regular 
army and what he called the ”snaphaner” worked together.874   
 
One thing that Fabricius pointed out was that Piill’s letter shows the close connection 
between the friskytter/snaphaner and the woods that has remained in the popular 
imagination until our days. However, it is important to remember that there were 
snaphaner and friskytter on all fronts and in all prts of the Scanian provinces, 
including the island of Bornholm, and that snaphaner, if not authorised friskytter were 
also active in other border areas like Holsten and Norway in times of war.875 Piill 
made quite clear in his letters that his main task was to find out what the Swedes were 
up to. He wrote in the first letter that he was trying to find more news about the 
Swedes. In the second letter that is dated  ”a cottge in the woods, 17th July, an hour 
and a half before sunrise” he declared that he had been told by two persons who had 
visited his mother that the Swedes were standing just o tside the town 
(Kristianstad/Christianstad).876 Obviously many friskytter like Piill worked as much 
as secret agents as anything else. 
 
                                               
874 See p.181 where Jacobsen describes Major Johan Randtzou’s attack on a group of Swedes at Båstad 
(Baadsted) which he started by sending out 16 “snaphaner” before the regular soldiers attacked. 
875 Unfortunately the limited time-space for this study will not allow us to make a survey of all kinds of 
rebellious activity that was reported in early modern Denmark but it would definitely be an interesting 
topic. See for example: Gabriel Hilleton to Colonel Charl. Hård, Markary 3rd April 1677 (Intercipierte 
Brefwe, DRA): “In Boohuuslehn the Norwegians and their snaphaner are showing their faces again, 
but appropriate counter measures have been taken agai st them.” In Poland the Strelitzer who fought 
the Swedish invasion of 1707-08 were called “snapphnar” by the Swedes. The Swedish commanders 
were the same as those that had  fought the friskytter or, in some cases, their sons. See: Röndahl 1996, 
p.385.  In the OUP Short History of Poland (Heart of Europe, Norman Davies,  1990, first ed. 
1984,(p.304.)) the Swedes are mentioned as one among six depredating hordes that descended on early 
modern Poland.  They found themselves in such excellent company as the Cossacks, Tartars and 
Transylvanians there, but also the Muscovites and Brandenburgers. The Swedish invasion at the middle 
of the 17th century goes under the name of  “potop” or “The Delug ”.     
876 ” I gor som var mandag var to folk i Perstorp til min moders som hörde hime pa ½ mill...mölleröd, i 
tyringe be nemd, de bereter de svenske stoe enu stile ved staden, som de stod tilforne, och den captin 
som liger paa Mölleröd, la alt stile...” Letter from Thue Piill to general Arensdorff, 17th July 1678. 
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 Lieutenant Thue Piill’s letters give us a picture of the friskytter as anything but 
enemies of the peasants. Piill received his fellow-spies in his mother’s house. Piill 
clearly felt responsible for the community that he liv d in the midst of. He declared 
himself to be ”assailed” by peasants who were asking for help and protection. He 
wanted to tell them to leave their homes and escape but did not dare do so without 
express orders from his superiors.877 Instead Piill asked Arensdorff to send 12 
soldiers from the ”liff garde”, a kind of special force, in order to protect his mother's 
neighbourhood.878 Traditionally these ”life guards” were all from the region of Gønge 
from where, according to legend, the toughest warriors in Denmark came. Piil told the 
general that the peasants all came to him because he knew everyone in his mother’s 
neighbourhood. Piill for one did not see the peasants as essentially different from 
himself. It is obvious that he considered himself one f them, or at least as having 
been one of them. It seems as if he had become an intermediary between the village 
and the Danish authorities. It is also clear that Piill worked with both the regular army 
and the locals; he sent his letters to HQ with a “peasant” and told the general to send 
the reply and eventual reinforcements back with the peasant who knew where to find 
him. To judge by Piill the peasants turned to the friskytter for protection from the 
Swedes and not contrariwise.Thue Piill made quite clear in his letters that one of his 
main tasks was to find out what not only what he and his men observed the Swedes 
doing but also what people were saying the Swedes were doing.879  
 
Contrary to what I thought when I first read Piill’s reports in the archives he was not a 
local boy, nor was he of peasant origins, although his mother might have been so from 
what he writes about her in his reports. Unfortunately there is a great confusion about 
names and spellings in the sources and I did not connect the Pihlkronas with Thue 
Piill until a foot-note in Fabricius made me realise that the mayor I had thought of as 
Bengt Pihlkrona had a nephew who had been a “snaphae”.880 Thue Piill belonged to 
a powerful Helsingborg family. His uncle Bent Pil (who became Bengt Pihlkrona 
                                               
877 Shortly afterwards all Scanians were actually ordere  to evacuate the country by Arensdorff! 
878  ”Ellers beder ieg Hr General at hand ud aff Nade ville unde dise bönder her om kring min moders 
paa bege veyiner: 12 styk aff liff gardit” Letter from Piill to Arensdorff 17th July 1678. Indkomne breve 
1678; stack 4, M, RA. 
879 ” I gor som var mandag var to folk i Perstorp til min moders som hörde hime pa ½ mill...mölleröd, i 
tyringe be nemd, de bereter de svenske stoe enu stile ved staden, som de stod tilforne, och den captin 
som liger paa Mölleröd, la alt stile...” Letter from Thue Piill to general Arensdorff, 17th July 1678, IB, 
DRA. 
880 Fabricius III, foot-note 11. 
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under the Swedes) was mayor of Helsingborg.881 Already in November 1676 he was 
arrested on the charge of Swedish sympathies and was put in custody in Copenhagen. 
Nevertheless the Swedes also suspected him and confiscated all his property in Scania 
because of his Danish sympathies. Bent Pil’s son-in-law Herman Schlyter who was in 
local politics too, ended up in the same kind of trubles882, as did his brother Svend 
Pil who was put under Danish military surveillance because he was suspected of 
being a spy. Bent Pil’s relatives Peter Klein and Iver Ravn, both sheriffs (ridefoged) 
were accused of the same crime and towards the end of the war, so was his nephew 
Thue Piill, who was a lieutenant in the friskytte corps. In February 1678, shortly after 
Baron Krabbe’s death, all these men except Thue had ended up on Sperling’s black 
list on the charge of high treason.883 In February 1679 Piill and his uncle the mayor 
were lodging with a Baltser Bolhagen in Copenhagen,884 but obviously Piill junior 
then managed to make his way back to Scania because he later appears in the sources 
as a county sheriff there and he lived in Perstorp until his death in 1705.885 
 
Conclusions 
There are a few things that should be especially noted about Thue Piill: 
      1) He was part of the surrounding countryside community 
      2) He did not act, except on express orders from HQ 
3) His operations were executed in co-operation with regular soldiers 
4) He acted as an intermediary between the village and the authorities. 
These factors all remove Thue Piill quite far from the traditional Swedish image of a 
“snaphane” as a robber who lived with his fellow outlaws outside the boundaries of 
                                               
881 Bent Pil became ennobled by the Swedes and assumed the name Bengt Pihlcrona. 
882 Fabricius III, p. 180. Åberg (1951, p.155), unfortunately without a source, claims that Schlyter had 
been exposed to hard sufferings by the Danes. Schlyter was charged by the Swedish inquiry 
commission with having supported the Danish cause bt Schlyter replied that on the contrary, the 
Danish garrison in Helsingborg had treated him badly because  “in his great joy he had called toasts to 
our (i.e. the Swedish) victory at Halmstad”. Because of this his house had been plundered and he had 
been forced to stay in house arrest in Zealand. Consequently Schlyter was freed of charges. But how do 
we know that Schlyter was telling the truth? How could Åberg trust what he said in front of a jury that 
had the power to send him to the stake? What we know is that Schlyter was overjoyed when the Danes 
reconquered Helsingborg in 1709. Fabricius (III, p.180) judged that Schlyter was a true Dane at heart 
since he immediately joined the Danish forces in 1709. Whatever the case, whether Schlyter was the 
true Dane Fabricius made him out to be or just someone who played with identities but had grown tired 
of the Swedes by 1709, he was definitely not the mal-treated Swedish patriot Åberg made him out t  
be. 
883 Fabricius III, pp.145-146, 
884 Fabricius III, p. 180 footnote 11.  
885 According to a notice transmitted to me by Jens Lerbom it is almost certainly the same man. In the 
Swedish records his name is “Tuve” instead of Thue. 
 261 
“normal” society and whose only contacts with the authorities would have been 
hostile ones. It should also be stressed that the Piills were not a peasant family at all, 
but rather the leading Helsingborg family with tentacles stretching quite far into the 
web of Scanian state officials that tried to balance between the two states that 
contested the sovereignty. Thue Piill himself, like several of his relatives, later 
became a sheriff in Swedish service. Loyalties apart, that is another indication of the 
frequent connection between friskytter and sheriffs, and of that it was obviously an 
advantage to have experience of the work of a sheriff in order to become a friskytte 
and vice versa. 
 
Exorcising the Devil with Beelzebub - The Snaphane Hunters 
Introduction: 
In this section I will analyse the development of the professionalised snaphane hunters 
that were entrusted the task of quenching the “snaphane movement” by the Swedish 
authorities. Since my main aim in this thesis is the snaphaner and not the snaphane 
hunters I have limited the extensions of this section o aspects and episodes that 




It is generally held that a more generalised hunt down of the snaphaner only took off 
during the latter part of 1677 and that professional s phane catchers were employed 
from sometime after the establishment of the special martial courts that inquired into 
the snaphane connections of all layers of society. The names of men like man who 
implemented the special treason tribunals, Jöran Sperling and the most successful 
snaphane catcher of them all, Sven Erlandsson, both saw their heyday from mid 1677 
onwards. But there were professional snaphane catchers before then. It has not been 
pointed out before that there were specialised snaphane hunters as early as 1676, but 
there were. 
The Tunby Case 
At the beginning of June 1677 a difficult case was reported from the south-eastern 
parts of Scania. The whole village of Tunby was pleading for help from the Swedish 
authorities.886 In the winter of 1676, just after the battle of Lund, a man called Mickell 
                                               
886 9th June 1677. Opsnappede breve, DRA. 
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Nymand887 had turned up in the surroundings of Tunbyholm castle. Nymand was 
wearing a Danish uniform and brought two horses with h m. He soon found a position 
as quarter master under Colonel Kock and his main task would be to catch snaphaner 
and find hidden Danish goods, which was a job that would suit him fine since he kept 
bragging about how good he was at shooting snaphaner. Six months later Nymand 
was reported to the authorities for having gone waytoo far in his chase.  
One of the main charges against Nymand was that he ccused whoever he did not get 
on with of being a snaphane and sent the person in question to the stake and wheel; 
such had been the fate of the village tailor whose integrity everyone in the village 
would have vouched for.888 Nymand accused two other locals of having sent for 
Captain Bendix and his snaphaner and they almost ended up on the racks, but 
fortunately Kock had saved them at the last moment. Nymand was also accused of 
hankering for other people’s property and sending them off to “the dungeons in 
Malmøe” on the charge of treason so that he could take possession of their goods.  
Another craftsman had had to accept that his house wa  emptied by Nymand and his 
men. When they wanted to burn it down too, the other villagers ”persuaded” 
Nymand’s lot not to but they could not stop them from smashing all the windows. 
Yet another man who had ended up in serious trouble because of Nymand was Jacob 
Hweffuere (Weaver) in Tunby who had had to go into hiding because Nymand had 
sworn that he would shoot him. When Nymand realised that he would not find Jacob 
at home he chose to denounce him on trumped up charges to the local noble court and 
eventually managed not only to track Hweffuere down but also to get him sent to 
prison in Malmö (Malmøe). Naturally all Jacob’s things ended up in the hands of 
Nymand. The list of men who had ended up in trouble because of Nymand does not 
stop there. In the end some of the locals reported him to the authorities.  
We cannot be quite sure of Nymand’s nationality. But what matters is that Nymand 
was working for the Swedes as a snaphane hunter and th t he abused of his position 
grossly. To him the war was a chance to get forward in the world and he did 
obviously not care by what means that happened. The fate of Jacob Hueffuere and the 
others make us realise that everyone risked being accused of being a snaphane in 
communities where men like Nymand were at large.  
                                               
887 Mickell Nymand’s nationality is not stated anywhere. In itself Mickell Nymand is a Danish name, 
but it might have been the Danicised version of Mickel/Mikael Nyman. 
888 9th June 1677. Opsnappede breve, DRA. 
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Conclusions: 
Nymand is an example of a kind of carpetbagger and sha y character that seems to 
turn up in the wake of every war; Steven G. Ellis ha  described how the allegedly 
“trusted and impartial outsiders” who were sent out from Tudor England to civilise 
Gaelic Ireland threw the whole country into chaos because all they thought of was 
“land-grabbing”.889 To a lesser degree the same can be said of many others of the men 
of modest or comparatively modest means who made their fortune in Scania around 
this time, especially as snaphane-catchers or land-grabbers.890 However, I would like 
to stress I am not claiming to state the ultimate truth about Mickell Nymand: I have 
only tried to analyse a series of events that centred on him and that took place during 
the Scanian War and that are of relevance to my thesis. It is quite possible that some 
of the villagers were involved with the Captain Bendix’s lot or with other 
“snaphaner”, but it hardly changes the image of Nymand as someone who took 




There can be no doubts as to Sven Erlandsson’s suitability for the position as maybe 
the leading snaphane hunter of his day. He had long experience of work with Scanian 
peasants and other country folk and he knew the land on his five fingers. This section 
contains an analysis of Erlandsson’s work tasks as a snaphane hunter and of how the 
snaphane hunter force in general worked. It also contains a comparison with the 
friskytte corps and of the similarities between the two forces.  
 
A Professionalised Corps 
In April 1678 King Charles of Sweden established a dragoon corps that was to 
specialise in snaphane catching. In itself this measure was a means towards the 
pacification of the border area and consequently, also n attempt to achieve safe 
conduct for Swedish convoys through the Gønge area. The official head of this corps 
was Major Bengt Månsson, commander of the city of Halmstad. Månsson was an 
                                               
889 Steven G. Ellis. Tudor Ireland, Crown, Community and the Conflict of Cultures, 1470-1603, 
Longman, London and New York 1985, pp.317-318. 
890 Perhaps Governor General Jöran Sperling should be included in this category since he described 
himself as “almost destitute” and therefore in need of the enormous Söfwede estate that unsuitably 
enough was run by an old Danish widow (Dorthe Rosencrantz). 
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original of the Gønge area himself and already during the war of 1657-1660 he had 
been a fierce snaphaner catcher. Count Pontus de la Gardie warmly recommended 
Månsson to the post with the motivation that he had such excellent local connections 
and knew all roads and paths in the area and that Månsson might be able to “bring 
over some of the very worst and most wicked rascals to his own side, which would be 
paramount to exorcising the Devil with Belzebub.” In the same manner, all snaphaner 
who had obtained pardon were to join Månsson’s troops. Fabricius commented that 
the Swedish policy had gone from fighting the snaphaner with peasants to fighting 
snaphaner with snaphaner. 891   
 
In September 1678 a Swedish party of 24 men and a lieutenant under Sven Erlandsson 
stopped for a rest at Bollerup castle. The Swedish sheriff (befallningsman) there 
feared for their safety, though: he felt that they were too close to the “snaphanebygd”, 
the area that was under the control of the snaphaner892, and so he sent to Simon 
Bengtsson at Krageholm (then Krogholm) castle for reinforcements. Erlandsson’s 
party only dared continue their journey after Bengtsson’s reinforcements of 32 
musketeers and dragoons had arrived. In fact, that same day they ran into Tage Bøg 
and 16 of his men. Bøg himself was dead drunk and was shot dead on this occasion. 
He had been on his way back from Landskrona (Landscrone) with his authorisation 
letter and a muster-roll. The authorisation was drench d in blood so that the text had 
become illegible but the rest of the documents were s nt over to the Governor 
General.893 Unfortunately these documents are not to be found in the archives today. 
Simon Bengtsson was proud to be able to report to the governor general that a 
Swedish unit only had just managed to kill “Major Tage Böök” 894 and Erlandsson 
later mentioned this episode in his “Promemoria”. 
                                               
891 Fabricius III, p.156. “...at kunne bringe de principaleste og værste skælmer på sin side, drivende 
alltså Fanden ud med Belzebub.” 
Fabricius noted that Bengt Månsson might have been identical with the friskytte leader Bengt 
Mogensøn from Fagerhult who was active in the Markaryd rea during Horn’s War 1643-45. Månsson 
is the Swedicised version of Mogensøn. However, Fabricius also noted that this hypothesis was not 
very likely. 
892 Today the ”Snapphanebygd” is synonymous with Göinge, the northeastern parts of Scania but 
during the Scanian War it was used to describe the areas that were under the control of the 
snaphaner/friskytter in all parts of Scania. 
893 Sven Erlandsson calls Bøg “Båg”. See:“Promemoria on the Snaphaner”, §3, KB; Sörensson, p.45. 
See also: “De Svenske Posttijdende” from March 1678 where captains and lieutenants of the friskytter 
are mentioned. 




Simon Bengtsson and Sven Erlandsson were just two of many Swedish residents in 
Scania who were given military charges during the Scanian war without having had 
anything to do with the army before. Normally new men like him were given charges 
as “commissaries of provisions” or “snaphane-catchers”. In a sense there was a 
parallel between “snaphaner” and “snaphane-catchers” in that many of the snaphaner 
did not have military training either. Bengtsson had been a sea-captain895 but 
nevertheless managed to become an efficient snaphane-catcher, whereas Erlandsson 
had worked as an estate manager. It was during his time as an estate manager that he 
received the name he is known under in the legends: “Banketröja” or “The Thrasher.”  
Considering that even the rather careful Jørgen Krabbe described “monsieur 
Erlandsson” as a very cruel man who would not leave the peasants a minimum to eat 
and complained to the governor general that men like Erlandsson tried to rule the 
land896 one might suspect that Erlandsson had sort of a harsh attitude on the job. 
Nevertheless the Swedish authorities appreciated his efforts and after the war he was 
ennobled under the name of Ehrenflycht (Flight of hnour).  Erlandsson’s most eager 
supporter was his officer Alexander Hummer who was an especially useful snaphaner 
catcher since he, like his arch enemy Pieter Stensen, was completely bilingual and 
could pass for a Dane. Hummer’s war diaries were later published under his noble 
name “Hummerhjelm”.897  
A position as a snaphane catcher or a provisions officer was often the beginning of a 
brilliant career during the reconstruction after the war. Many of these men were later 
ennobled for their war efforts. Niklas Jonsson who impossessed himself of the Krabbe 
family’s Fulletofte estate received the noble name of Cronaker. He later also received 
some of the Thott family’s houses as a reward for his services to the Swedish state.898  
                                               
895 According to Erlandsson, p.100. Jens Lerbom has found a notice in Hyltén-Cavallius register of the 
officers at the Kronoberg regiment that indicates that a man by the same name became a “ryttare” there
in 1662.  
896 Fabricius III, p.88. Krabbe to Fersen, 27th April 1677, SGA. Krabbe used almost the same 
expressions when he had his say about the snaphaner. 
897 See Fabricius III, p.175.   
898 Erlandsson, p.100. According to Erlandsson (p.37. a generalauditör acted as prosecutor i courts-
martial too. So what was the difference between him and a militiefiskal?).  Other civil servants who 
made their fortune as provisioners and snaphane-catchers were bergverksinspektoren mine inspector 
Carl Paulin (Lilliengrip), the mayors of Ystad and Helsingborg Olof Harman and Gabriel Månsson 
(Hilletan), church inspector Niklas Kreuger, (kronojägare) the Royal Gamekeeper Bengt Steenman and 
(sea-) captain Simon Bengtsson. Two professors fromLund University could also be included among 
these, namely Joachim Buschovius (Ehrenbusch) who became chief military prosecutor 
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Other civil servants who made their fortune as supplies officers and snaphane-
catchers were mine inspector Carl Paulin (Lilliengrip), the mayors of Ystad and 
Helsingborg Olof Harman and Gabriel Månsson (Hilletan), church inspector Niklas 
Kreuger and the royal gamekeeper Bengt Steenman. Two professors from Lund 
University could also be included among these, namely Joachim Buschovius 
(Ehrenbusch) who became chief military prosecutor (generalauditör) during the war 
and served on the court martial and Andreas Stobaeus who was a native Scanian in 
Swedish service.   
 
As I mentioned in the section on the sources, Sven Erlandsson wrote about his feats as 
a snaphane-catcher in a “Promemoria”. Whether the “Promemoria” was ever 
published is not known. It can only be assumed that the author was hoping that it 
would be so, since the account is told in the third person in order to bestow it with an 
aura of impartiality. It does not take many seconds for the reader to realise that 
Erlandsson (or his ghost writer) had read Julius Caesar’s  De Bello Gallico that is 
written in the same style:  
“Some time later Sven Erlandsson was to accompany a convoy of provisioning wagons to Ljungby, 
from Östre slätt (the eastern plains) but at southern Rörum he was attacked by the snaphaner who 
pursued him to Raflunda where he had to surrender all his goods to them, while he and his men took 
refuge in the Churchyard. The Snaphaner climbed onto the roof of the Vicarage and shoot at the 
members of the convoy but at last the Vicar let them into the church and from there they managed to 
send a request for reinforcements to Ljungby but when t e snaphaner realised what they had done they 
burnt the Vicarage down.”899 
 
Amongst other things Erlandsson also described how t e famous friskytte Jeppe 
Baason was caught.900 This episode remains a well-known legend in the area where it 
took place although the protagonist of it is often said to be Captain Simon. In reality it 
was the less well-known Baason who was unfortunate enough to be spotted by 
Erlandsson in the surroundings of Månstorp (Monstrup). The Swedes were spying on 
him in secret but General Ribbing’s groom was a bit drunk and got fed up with 
waiting so he attacked on his own and was shot down by Baason who also took the 
young man’s horse. Then Baason and his men retreated quickly but the Swedes 
followed them and managed to push Baason himself to cape Stenshuvud (a 
                                                                                                                            
(generalauditör) during the war and served on the court martial and Andreas Stobaeus who was a native 
Scanian in Swedish service.   
899 Röndahl (II, p.316.) has dated this episode to the winter of 1679. Erlandsson did not write the dates 
of the episodes in his “Promemoria” himself.   
900 The names in the “Promemoria” are often Swedicised: Baasson’s Danish name was probably 
Boesen. 
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promontory in the southeast) where they cornered him. Baasson managed to get 
himself to a rock in the middle of the sea and Erlandsson offered him parole but 
Baasson refused to accept. Erlandsson then sent for a b at and two divers but when 
Baasson realised what was going on he threw his gun and his money into the sea and 
then the jumped himself. Now, Erlandsson reported to the Swedish king that Baason’s 
dead body was soon dragged up from the waters and it was then taken to Nygård 
where two other snaphaner, Pehr Siudare and Åge alias Kongapågen, had to hang it 
feet upwards from an oak tree. Then they were killed too.901 Like many of his 
opponents, Erlandsson had a background as some sort of estate manager or bailiff, 
and he knew the land well after having resided a long time in Scania. I have already 
mentioned that Alexander Hummer showed similarities with his arch-enemy Pieter 
Stensen, not only in linguistic competence and daring, but also in ruthlessness. Two 
other categories of snaphane catchers, namely that of a native of the Gønge region and 
possible ex-snaphaner like Bent Monsen/Bengt Månsson who started up a snaphane 
catcher force and that of the ex-lensmand Ebbe Uhlfeld who did much the same thing 
on a higher level, also based their success on the same technique as the Swedish 
snaphane catchers, namely using the snaphaner’s methods against them. That was a 
conscious (and clever) choice on the side of the Swdes who aptly compared it to 
exorcising the devil with Beelzebub. Under other aspects too, the snaphane catchers 
were similar to their main opponents:  War Commissary Sven “The Thrasher” 
Erlandsson worked much in the same manner as his enemy Pieter Stensen: he kept a 
network of informers and spies going from where he happened to be at the moment, 
and he then reported what news he had collected from clergy, officials or peasants on 
to the Swedish king.902 One example is his report from 20th May 1678 in which he 
tells of a vicar who had sent a spy to Landskrona (Landscrone) who then came back 
with news about the situation for the vicar and Erlandsson. 903 Then on 18th June 1678 
a sheriff (fierdingsman af Winslöf och Wanneberga) told him of a peasant from 
                                               
901 Their names were Pehr Sudare from Siudaretorpet in the hundred of Albo and Åge alias 
Kongapågen (The king’s lad) who was caught at Båretofft . As reported by Erlandsson himself in his 
“Promemoria on the Snaphaner”, KB. 
902 See: Erlandsson’s letters to the king in the Swedish National Archives (Skrifvelser till Konungen E-
F SRA) e.g. report from 20th May 1678 in which he tells of a vicar who had sent a spy to Landskrona 
(Landscrone) who then came back with news about the si uation for the vicar and Erlandsson.  
903 See: Erlandsson’s letters to the king in the Swedish National Archives (Skrifvelser till Konungen E-
F SRA) Report from 20th May 1678. Erlandsson reported from “Mölleredh” that D nish military and 
snaphaner had been bivouacking just a mile away, at Torup, for two nights, but the day before they had
left in the direction of Färingtofta (Færingtoffte). 
 268 
Göinge (Gønge) who had interesting news to tell from his recent trip to the 
Landskrona (Landscrone) area. The sheriff begged Erlandsson not to make known 
where the information came from because the “snaphaner” would kill the peasant if 
they found out.904 Regarding the importance of keeping up to date with hat people 
were saying and with what they claimed they had seen and heard in enemy territory, 
Erlandsson excused himself with the Swedish king for having referred what a peasant 
had seen inside the Danish enclave at Landskrona (Landscrone) in June 1678 claiming 
that it was his duty to refer such peasant chatter to His Majesty the King.905 However, 
His Majesty Carolus himself used “the peasants” as his foremost source at 
times.906Another spy left a report a trip to Landskrona (Landscrone) to Erlandsson on 
20th November 1678: on his way to town he had accidentally bumped into “the 
Danish King’s sheriff Johan Hacksön with 100 cavalry that were on there way from 
Landscrone to the hundred of Fers. Hacksön asked the informer if it was true that 
Swedish military had been stationed at the mansion of Tundbyholm and the informer 
said “Yes, that there were 1000 men, at which the ors turned back to Landscrone 
again”.907 The informer then reported that the situation was calm in Landskrona 
(Landscrone) although he saw lots of cavalrymen and a few “Rascals” (Crabater)908, 
with which he probably intended friskytter. The informer also told Erlandsson that the 
Danish troops that had collected a group of merchants from Lübeck from Ystad 
(Ysted) were snaphaner, all but sixteen dragoons that the sheriff had brought with 
him.909 Yet again we see that the line between snaphaner and not snaphaner was 
vague. In this case it had only been known that “Danish troops” had evacuated a 
                                               
904 See: Erlandsson’s letters to the king in the Swedish National Archives (Skrifvelser till Konungen E-
F, SRA) Report from 18th June 1678. 
905 Sven Erlandsson to the king, Hörby 18th June 1678, Skrifvelser till Konungen E-F, SRA. ”…af min 
underdånigste skyldighet har dock ey underlåta kunnat, at Eds. Kongl. Maytt. lijkväl sådant bondetal 
allerunderdånigst relatera…” 
906 e.g. In a letter to Johan Gyllenstjerna of 30th June 1677 (Carolus to Gyllenstjerna, Intercipierte 
breve, DRA), in which he tells Gyllenstjerna how governor general Fersen had driven off the Danish 
assault on Malmøe and that just as the peasants were saying, the enemy now seemed minded to leave 
(“...och som Bonden seijer skall fienden wara sinnat at brÿta derifrån up.”). 
907 Jacobsen (p.200) mentions that in the autumn of 1678 “a garrison of 200 men were posted at a 
mansion house called Tundbyholm in order to maintain communications between Malmöe and 
Christianstad.” The Bendix case records reveal that Swedish troops were stationed at Tunbyholm 
(Tundbyholm) during the preceding winter too. See the subsection on Clawssen. 
908 A Swedish derogative for ”snaphane”, ”friskytte.” See also: Letter from Lauritz Falckman to GA 
Örnewinge, 29th July 1678, (Interciperte Brefwe, DRA), in which Falckman tells his patron Major 
Örnewinge that theirs (the Swedes) were charging daily and that “some of the crabater had fallen. 
(nogra af crabaterne hafwa stupat).” 
909 Report from Tundbyholm, 20th November 1678, signed by Sven Erlandsson, Skrifvelser till 
Konungen E-F, SRA. Dragoons is here the translation of ”ryttere”. 
 269 
group of foreign merchants from Ystad (Ysted) but not what kind of troops. Now the 
informer could provide the details that the majority had been “snaphaner” but sixteen 
had been regular dragoons under the county sheriff, who himself would pass under the 
definition “snaphane” according to the Swedes. Co-operation between different kinds 
of Danish troops rendered the definition of the distinguishing lines difficult to the 
Swedes. Furthermore, once again there is the so frequently recurring nexus 
friskytter/snaphaner – sheriff. 
 
Conclusions 
If the Swedish governor general of Scania, Jöran Sperling once expressed his fears 
that the snaphaner wanted to rule the land, then th leading Scanian nobleman of the 
day once claimed that Erlandsson and his likes tried o rule the land.910  This is not the 
only similarity between the snaphane catchers and their prey. In fact, it seems obvious 
that the Swedes tried to establish a corps that could fight the Friskytter on their own 
terms and that based their work on the same operational methods. As is stressed in 
this chapter, the sources show that Sven Erlandsson and Pieter Stensen worked much 
in the same way. In this sense, the snaphane hunters were a sort of anti-snaphaner that 
mirrored their enemies backwards. 
  
The Executions of the Snaphaner 
 
“The torturer’s gesture brands the order that wants to gain acceptance through submission into the flesh 
(of the sufferer).”911 
 
Introduction 
It is the escalation of violence and how it should/could be interpreted as a language of 
power that is in the focus of this section. Why was it so impossible to recognise the 
snaphaner/friskytter as combatants? Why was it not e ugh to decapitate them? What 
line of reasoning led the Swedish authorities to decide to brand the snaphaner as 
criminals? But then, on the first hand, the category of people who were called 
snaphaner by the Swedes during the Scanian War was largely a category that had been 
invented, or possibly, reinvented, by the Swedish aut orities.   
                                               
910 Fabricius III, p.88. Krabbe to Fersen, 27th April 1677, SGA. Krabbe used almost the same 
expressions when he had his say about the snaphaner. 
911 Michel de Certeau, “Le corps torture, parole torturée”, in Cahier pour un temps, Èditions du Centre 




The measures taken against the “snaphaner” from early 1677 onwards were not 
something that the Danes and Scanians had anticipated, exactly because they were so 
out of the ordinary. During the Karl Gustav Wars (1658-1660) and during the first 
phase of the Scanian War the Swedish authorities were more lenient.  Then, the crack 
down on Captain Bendix’s friskytter was only the beginning of what was to come. 
The violence against the snaphaner was escalated gradually, from the execution of 
Clawssen onwards to that of Hans Severin which was an extraordinary example of 
cruelty. As the Scanian War went on and the snaphane movement took on 
considerable dimensions the Swedes responded by instituti g special forces of 
snaphane-catchers that had it as their only task to track down snaphaner and special 
tribunals that dealt with traitors. They also published lists of suspects that were to turn 
themselves in to the special tribunals. There were special “snaphane” tribunals that 
could condemn snaphaner without recurring to normal law procedure. However, while 
the war was going on it was not necessary to send the snaphaner to any sort of court at 
all.   
 
According to Swedish law there were two kinds of death penalty: “simple” or 
“qualified”. The simple death penalty meant hanging or decapitation. The qualified 
death penalty depended on the severity of the crime. Th  most common version was 
that the prisoner was sent to the wheel (rådbråkning). 912 This method was widely 
known on the European continent (though never practiced in England for example). 
The classical version consisted of “an iron flanged wheel being placed on top of the 
spread-eagled victim, the wheel then being repeatedly struck, breaking the bones until 
                                               
912 Ambrius (1996, p.62) describes this punishment in the following terms: “On the continent the 
convict was stretched out so that he lay on his back and he was lashed to a cartwheel. Then the 
executioner first crushed his limbs and his back with heavy blows from a blacksmith’s hammer or an 
iron baton. If the executioner was good at his craft and had done his job in the right manner then the 
victim should still be alive at this point, and if he was, then it was time for stage two of the execution. 
The broken limbs were inserted between the spokes of the wheel and the whole construction was 
mounted on a pole (hel stegling).” This punishment was also an old Germanic  tradition and in heathen 
times it had been considered particularly cruel since dead people were thought to be able to return to 
life as long as their skeletons were intact. See also: Oscar Bjurling, “Ystads Historia 1658-1792”, pp. 
175-494, in Salomon Kraft and Oscar Bjurling Ystads Historia Del I, Från äldsta tid till 1792 (A 
History of Ystad Part I, From the Oldest Times until 1792), Aurora AB, Ystad 1956, p. 205 on which 
Bjurling describes the “Stegel och hjul” method efficiently enough, pointing out that at the time it was 
considered a means of sending someone to the Lord already cleared of his sins. Bjurling also points out 
that in 1700, exactly for the same reason, the Reverend Lacander accompanied a woman who had done 
away with her child to the stake where she was to be burnt, assuring her of God’s infinite goodness.  
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eventually the coup de grace was administered to the neck or chest, further blows 
which brought death.” In different countries there were different variations of the 
method. In Scandinavia the right hand was sometimes amputated before the victim 
was tied down. 913 Sometimes the right hand and/or the head were cut off. The dead 
body was then quartered and bound to a wheel (or a gridiron) where it was left on 
display. Normally the head was put on a pole on the same place, in order to “warn 
other people.” The sword was reserved for people of greater dignity. During the 
Scanian war it is only mentioned in one case in my sources and that was that of Baron 
Krabbe who, however, insisted that he wanted to be shot. After the war the authorities 
became milder. The executions of ex-snaphaner continued for at least twenty-five 
years after the war, but far from all were condemned to death and when they were 
decapitation was the most common execution method.914  
 
In February 1679 Hans Severin of the King’s Friskytter was court-marshalled at Åhus 
(Aahus) and condemned to the stake and wheel, hanging and spitting on a stake, in 
spite of the fact that Meerheim himself had pleaded for him with the Swedes. Capten 
Severin’s fate has become emblematic of the whole situation during the Snaphane 
War.915 Because Severin had been conscripted by the Swedes an  then made a career 
for himself in the Swedish army during thirteen years they considered him a deserter 
gone arch-criminal.  The Danes saw Severin in a completely different light. General 
Meerheim wrote to Ascheberg in order to plead for the life of one of King Christian’s 
most valorous soldiers but that did not change the verdict.916 Meerheim would not 
have pleaded for the life of a bandit or outlaw. There was not the least suspicion that 
Hans Severin should have killed or plundered for his own gratification. Nevertheless 
Severin was “impaled alive, not internally but betwen the spine and the skin through 
the neck and then skewered onto the stake with his feet nailed to it and his hands 
bound: under the gallows with the loop loosely around his neck.”917 A circle of fire 
was also lit around the “arch traitor”. It consequently took him between seven and 
                                               
913 Geoffrey Abbott, Rack, Rope and Red-Hot Pincers. A History of Torture and its Instruments, Eric 
Dobby Publishing, Ltd, 2002 (originally 1993), p.227. 
914 See the section on the snaphaner and the church in w ich the Tuesen case is mentioned. 
915 Captain Severin has become something of a martyr to the Scanian national-romantics of today. For 
that reason I hesitated before presenting his case as “ mblematic” but I think it was, and it is well-
documented from both sides and in various sources. 
916 Cronholm, p.194. Cronholm refers to a letter of 23rd February 1679 among His Majesty’s letters in 
the Swedish National Archives (K. Maj:ts br. 23 Febr.1679, R. Re.g.). 
917 Linde-Laursen, p.51. Röndahl, pp.440-441. 
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eight hours to die.918 The execution of the already severely wounded Hans Severin 
was witnessed by a huge crowd. The Swedish authorities had tried to get as many 
people as possible to watch the execution because they wanted “respect for the law 
and fear of joining the snaphaner” to be instilled into the populace.919  
 
In order to avoid biased interpretations I would like to stress that Swedish execution 
methods were no crueller than those of many other early modern states. Extreme 
cruelty made part of the language of power both of the state and the church in early 
modern Europe. There were differences in the preferr d methods but then violence is 
influenced by culture too. Possibly the old Viking heritage and eastern European 
influences played their role for the Swedish choice of torture and execution methods. 
But again I would like to emphasise that although impalement (spitting) of criminals 
was uncommon in Western Europe it was hardly less cruel than the continental and 
British methods described by Michel Foucault in his Surveiller et punir. In 1757 a 
patricide called Damiens was condemned by Louis XV to be subjected to the 
following treatment:  
“tenaillé aux mamelles, bras, cuisses et gras des jambes, sa main droite tenant en icelle le couteau dont 
il a commis le dit parricide, brûlée de feu de soufre, et sur les endroits où il sera tenaillé, jeté du plomb 
fondu, du l’huile bouillante, de la poix résine brûlante, de la cire et soufre fondus ensemble et ensuit  
son corps tiré et démembré à quatre chevaux et ses cendres jetées au vent.”920 
 
 Since the executioners had some trouble in making the horses tear Damiens’s body 
apart they eventually, after several attempts, had to cut him to pieces themselves. 
Damiens was still alive when the bonfire was lit.921 Damiens’s case was certainly no 
more humane than the execution of Hans Severin; the difference is that whereas 
Damiens was a civilian who considered himself a civilian, Severin was a soldier who 
fought for his rightful king and patria according to the state he fought for. 
                                               
918 This detail was first communicated to me by Jens Lerbom who noted that Åberg had not been able 
to decipher the manuscript. See: Document in the Swdish National Archives: RA M1336. 
919 See also: Jonny Ambrius, Att dömas till döden. Tortyr, kroppsstraff och avrättningar genom 
historien, (To be Condemned to Death. Torture, physical punishment and executions throughout 
history), Vällingby 1996, p.61. 
920 Michel Foucault, Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison, Gallimard, 1975, p.9. 
921 Another example of “European” punishment methods is presented in detail by Foucault: Punishment 
for high treason, supplice des traîtres décrit par W. Blackstone, Commentaire sur le Code criminel 
anglais, trad.1776, I, p.105. La traduction étant destinée à faire valoir l’humanité de la législation 
anglaise par opposition à la vieille Ordonnance de 1760, le commentateur ajoute: “Dans ce supplice 
effrayant par le spectacle, le coupable ne souffre ni beaucoup ni longuement.” “Plus de ces supplices 
où le condamné est traîné sur une claie (pour éviter qu  la tête n’éclate sur le pavé), où son ventre est 
ouvert, ses entrailles arrachées en hâte, pour qu’il ait le temps de voir, de ses yeux, qu’on les jette au 
feu; où il est décapité enfin et son corps divisé en quartiers.” 
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The Swedes feared that if the friskytter’s status as oldiers was recognised it would 
become even more difficult to hold back popular resistance in Scania and that 
consequently, the “snaphaner” would become too powerful.922 Recognition of the 
friskytter might also weaken popular support for the Swedish cause in Sweden itself 
(and the motivation of its mainly conscripted soldiers). The impalement victims were 
no longer champions of the Danish king when their corpses were pushed off the stake. 
They had been transformed into Swedish criminals, or at least that was what their 
executors were hoping for. In a way it was a propaganda war between Sweden and 
Denmark, the messages of which was inscribed on people’s bodies. Those were 
messages that ordinary people were expected to decipher correctly. Maybe my most 
obvious example of bodies used as conveyors of messag 923 is that of the Swedes 
who were tortured by the Brandstad friskytter:  
“when they (the snaphaner) entered the Lövestad forest they first grilled the quarter master over the fire 
until he was both black and brown and then they crushed his bones and put him, still alive, on a wheel. 
A peasant was ordered to chop one hand of the officer who was then liberated with the order that he 
should go to the Swedish king and tell him that the snaphaner had taken care of him.”924 
 
 
During torture a certain number of mechanisms are activated: these mechanisms aim 
at reducing the victim to “universality”, a human being who is deprived of everything 
that distinguishes him/her from other human beings.925 One of these mechanisms is 
that of transformation through psychological and physical wounds. This kind of 
transformation has a cultural basis. As a method it works in the same way as the 
initiation rites of the “primitive” cultures of ancient and modern times, including 
military training and college hazing in the world of t day. The scars confirm the 
temporary or permanent rupture of the alliance with the religious, ethnic or political 
group that the victim used to belong to.  In itself, torture is a method of provoking 
trauma. Deliberate traumatising has been used in var ous cultures throughout history, 
not only for the sake of extracting information and confessions, but also in rites of 
                                               
922 The Swedish governor general Jöran Sperling even imagined that the snaphaner wanted to take over 
the whole of Scania. Sperling to the king, 1678, SRA: ”...snapphanarna ämna Kristianstad blockera, att 
fästningen snart skall bliva uppgiven och att sedan hela landet utöver skall falla i deras våld.” Quote: 
Johnsson, p.133. See also: Eskeld Nielsen, 2 July 1677, I.S. DRA, No: 508, quoted by Sörensson on p. 
28. In this letter, Nielsen claimed that the entire population would rise against the Swedes if only the 
Danish king would order them to. 
923 The concept of bodies used as conveyors of message is taken from Llewellyn Barstow. See for 
example p.146. 
924 This letter has been published by amongst others Röndahl (1996) p, 276. 
925 See: Haritos-Fatouros (p.40) who mentions “deindividuation and value reformulation”. 
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passage and initiation. Its effects are the same, no matter what the cultural origins of 
the victim are.926 Deconstruction and traumatising techniques are built on the same 
principles and have the same results in U.S. army taining camps as in Yoruba 
initiation rites. It could be called a way of inoculating the intention of the torturer (or 
those he/she represents) into the victim.927 The torture techniques that are practised by 
Westerners today are similar to those that were used during the Scanian war.928    
 
When the Milanese intellectual Pietro Verri wrote his “Observations on Torture” in 
the 1770ies he felt that he had to prove that men of all times had criticised the usage 
of torture: “it is a mistake to claim that it is a modern invention to feel horror for 
torture.”929 He did not only call Cicero in his defence, but also Saint Augustine, 
Quintilian, Seneca and Valerius Maximus.930 The main argument of the ancients was 
that pain forces even the most innocent man to lie and so, torture is useless as a means 
of extracting information. Writing about the Middle Ages Michel Foucault concluded 
that: “Torture was not an uncontrolled expression of anger, but a technique whereby 
minutely calibrated amounts of pain could be administered to the criminal’s body; an 
                                               
926 Sironi, p.38.  
927 Sironi, p.28: ”Il processo di tortura è una tecnica di inoculazione dell’intenzionalità di tutto un 
gruppo, tramite l’interfaccia costituita dai torturatori, in un altro gruppo, tramite un’altra interfaccia, 
ossia il torturato.” 
928  Some of the most common torture methods: The establishment of an obsessive total code as a 
system. This code of behaviour sanctions the division of the world between “masters” and “servants” or 
rather, between torturers and authorities on the one hand and opponents who have to be subjected and 
psychologically annihilated on the other.  The prisoner learns that he has to accept absurd and illogical 
rules. Friskytter and snaphaner who were prisoners  in the  Swedish camps had to do jobs that normally 
only the nightman did. See: Jacobsen,  p.89 and Haritos-Fatouros, p.34.  Logical perversion. A sense of 
impotence (for the prisoner) and omnipotence (for the torturers) is constructed through the mechanism 
of logical perversion. Situations of impossible choi es and paradoxical messages are characteristic. A 
typical situation would be the one where the prisoner has to choose what kinds of torture his comrades 
will have to face. To stay alive you have to hurt others and go against your beliefs, culture or ethics. 
Another example would be those snaphaner who were offered to stay alive a little longer if they 
executed their comrades first like Kongapågen and his mate who had  to desecrate Baasson’s corpse, or 
like the two peasants who were caught and of which one had to hang the other before he too was killed. 
There is no right or wrong that follows logical rules. (Haritos-Fatouros, p.46.) Sometimes the 
persecutors are good to you, sometimes not. This mechanism works towards the deconstruction of the 
prisoner’s identity. 
929 Verri, p.83. 
930 Pietro Verri, Osservazioni sulla tortura, Newton Compton, Roma 1994 (originally published in 
1804), pp.81-82. On p.81 he quotes Cicero’s Pro Silla: “Illa tormenta moderatur dolor, gubernat natura 
cujsque tum animi, tum corporis, regit quaesitor, flectit livido, corrumpit spes, infirmat metus, ut in tot 
rerum angustiis nihil veritati locus relinquatur.” (La tortura è dominata dallo spasimo, governata dal 
temperamento di ciascuno, sì d’animo che di membra; la ordina il giudice, la piega il livore, la 
corrompe la speranza, la indebolisce il timore, cosicché fra tante angosce nessun luogo rimane alla 
verità.) 
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organised ritual in which that body was marked by the power of the sovereign.”931 
Indeed the Greek psychologist Mika Haritos-Fatouros claims that the situation has not 
changed over the years. Her research into the field of torturers and how they are 
created has led to the conclusion that anger still has very little to do with torture.932 
The torturer and his/her trade are tools in the hands of the authorities: they constitute a 
way of impressing power into the bodies and minds of th se who are supposed to 
obey. Even in those cases in which the victim dies, his pain is used as a tool that 
instils obedience into the minds of others. Torture still plays a role as a deterrent. In 
January 2005 the Egyptian daily El Messaa concluded that the horrendous images of 
the torture that the prisoners in the Abu Ghraib prson had to endure had been 
published by the Americans in order to frighten the Iraqi resistance into 
submission.933 Torture is a rite of passage that transforms a soldier into a thug, a 
faithful Dane into a Swedish deserter. It makes the victim take a on a strictly binary 
vision of the world: there is good and bad, clean and dirty, nothing in between. The 
torturers make their victims understand that there is only one right world order: the 
one in which torturers are strong, secure and powerful and victims are vermin.934  The 
intentionality of the persecutor crushes the victim’s sense (and capacity) of having an 
identity of his own. The torturers’ thoughts invade his mind.935 Finally, this 
mechanism is characterised by violations of taboos and that, in its turn, results in a 
cultural blank, or rather, deculturisation. Sironi attributes three main functions to 
torture: obtaining information, extracting confessions and cancelling the culture of 
belonging: 
 “(Torture) reduces the person to his/her universal component and deprives him/her of his uniqueness 
and his bonds. Through the individual who is being tortured the persecutors want to hit the group of 
belonging; you attack the ‘collective part’ of the individual, the one that unites him/her to a group that 
the aggressor has chosen for a target, and in that way he relationship between the individual and the 
collective is unhinged.”936  
 
                                               
931 Michel Foucault, The Will to Truth, Tavistock, London 1980, p.180, quoted by Mika Haritos-
Fatouros, p.115. 
932 Mika Haritos-Fatouros, The Psychological Origins of Institutionalized Torture, Routledge 2003, 
p.181 and p.238. Which is also very much what Foucault s ys in his Surveiller et punir. 
933 Quoted in the Italian daily Il Messaggero, 18th January 2005. Haritos-Fatouros (p.149) claims that 
torture has the dual task of extracting information and intimidating the public. 
934 Sironi, p.36. 
935 Sironi (p.36.) expresses this mechanism eloquently: “Se te la cavi, dentro di te deve rimanere in vita 
solo la scimmia che è nell’uomo. Faremo sparire in t  tutto quello che fonda la tua singolarità.” 
936 Sironi, p.37. 
 276 
Culture creates meaning.937 According to modern psychology researchers it holds 
peoples lives together and makes existence bearable. In a sense it is the pair of glasses 
through which the things our eyes register are given m aning. It renders us able to 
interpret the world and feel safe. The separation fr m one’s culture of origin always 
causes a trauma. The invalidation of it can be even more serious, in the sense that 
invalidation is the same as denial (“you don’t exist”) or denigration (“you belong to 
the bad guys”). Identities are instable and keep changing. Some aspects of our 
identities, like ethnicity and nationality, remain in the background until particular 
circumstances turn our attention upon them. Different aspects of our identity continue 
to change place between the centre and the periphery of attention.938 Our identity is 
also continuously changed by new experiences. Ageing is the most palpable change in 
our self perception. Our bodies change drastically between childhood and old age, and 
yet we all keep a certain feeling of continuity and particularity. There is something 
that persists and that overcomes the workings of the years on our identities. Our 
identities are conglomerates of fixed characteristics and a growing supply of 
experiences that life itself provides us with as it passes. The more we can bring 
ourselves to accept the unchangeable parts of our identities, the easier it gets to accept 
the unavoidable changes that time brings with it. 
 
The psychiatrist Marcello Vignar defines torture as a means of destroying those 
intimate beliefs that constitute the basis of the victim’s identity and consequently 
defines him/her as a person. Seen from that point of view torture becomes a tool that 
can bring about the “deactivation” of those who constitute a danger to law and order. 
It effectuates a paralysis of the governed.939  Through fear the authorities try to obtain 
a fundamental confirmation of its legitimacy. By executing the “snaphaner” like 
murderers, with singularly cruel methods like spitting on a stake, the Swedish 
authorities conveyed a new vision of the world to the Scanians.  Torture effectuates a 
rift between the sufferer and the world. Firstly because the victim is bereaved of his 
                                               
937 Cf. Margaret Moore’s article “ Nationalism and Political Philosophy” (pp.94-104 in The Sage 
Handbook of Nations and Nationalism, Gerard Delanty and Krishan Kumar eds., Sage Publications, 
London Thousand Oaks/New Delhi, 2006) in which she explains how difficult it can be to change 
identity and culture ”like hats” even though it is quite possible and probably even the norm to do so. 
The mere fact that many identities are shaped in relation to others or as opposed to others (being 
Scottish means not being American) might render it difficult to change between some identities.   
938 This paragraph is based on Richard A. Moskovitz’s Vil e i speglingar –borderline sett inifrån, 
Dualis 2001, p.70. (Translation of Lost in the Mirror, Taylor Publishing, Dallas, 2001). 
939 Marcello Vignar, quoted by Sironi, p.20. 
 277 
language and identity. Pain sends him/her to a universe where friends, family, politics, 
religion have ceased to exist.940 That is why confession (betrayal) also ceases to 
matter. The only voice that is left to the sufferer is that of a speechless baby or animal. 
The torturer always tries to dehumanise the sufferer.941 A person who has been 
humiliated beyond a certain degree starts to think of himself/herself as non-human, as 
an animal, or vermin. Secondly because the spectators or bystanders start to see the 
sufferer as non-human. People who have assisted the torture, or have to live with 
psychologically and/or physically mutilated torture victims easily come to see them in 
the same way. Those grotesque sounds and that deformed body cannot possibly 
belong to a beloved son or husband. Human beings ted to doubt or deny the suffering 
of others, simply because it is so very difficult to grasp the depths of it, because it is 
easier to believe that only non-humans could be exposed to such torments. Physical 
pain is not easily shared, communicated or justified when believed in. Its 
incommunicability distances the sufferer from the rest of the world. It resists 
objectification in language because it takes no object, it has no “of” or “for” like love 
or fear. It shatters language and sends the sufferer back to a “state anterior to 
language, to the sounds and cries a human being makes before language is learned.” 
Pain has triumphed when it brings about an “absolute split between one’s sense of 
one’s own reality and the reality of other persons.”  942 The French psychologist 
Françoise Sironi’s study of the psychology of torture starts with the phrase: “torture 
steals the voice.”943 The treaty said nothing about the friskytter and consequently they 
were tracked down like “wild and mute beasts” as they themselves put it.944 The 
image of the animal, the animalesque and monsters that are not allowed to have a 
voice is recurrent through the sources from both sides.945 On the one hand it is the 
Swedes’ attempts to classify their arch-enemy as such, on the other it is the arch-
enemy’s wild fear of becoming what they knew they were not. Once you have passed 
“the confines of the species” doing things that human beings do not do you have also 
                                               
940 Scarry, p.29: “in confession, one betrays oneself and all those aspects of the world-friend, family, 
country, cause-that the self is made up of.” 
941 Sironi, p.25.        
942 Scarry, p.4. 
943 Sironi, p.11: (La tortura ruba la voce) 
944 Sörensson, (p.63) quotes major Harlof: “vilde och umælende Bester”. 
945 In the same manner as witches, bandits and murderers were not allowed to have a voice. 
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passed a passage point from where it is difficult to re urn.946 This kind of process is 
called dehumanisation and it takes place when cultural aboos are violated.  
   
 Like many others Håkan Erichsson from Kolbengtseröd had not gone to church for 
all the time he was a snaphane but they had “lived in the woods like beasts and 
soulless creatures.”947 they had all become “freaks and exiles” that no one would take 
in or help.948 On the other hand, the Swedish officer who was roated on a spit was 
transformed into a pig by the Brandstad friskytter. As the war proceeded increasingly 
violent measures were taken against the rebellious Scanians.The friskytter were not 
able to pay back in the same coin. They could not execute their captives like 
criminals. It seems as if these orders were normally t ken seriously. Friskytter who 
disobeyed orders or misbehaved were arrested by the county sheriff and consigned to 
the authorities who had them court-martialled.949  But naturally, there were numerous 
ways to avoid the eyes of the authorities. Tasks that friskytter were unable to do could 
naturally be executed by “snaphaner” or “peasants”.  
 
The whole scapegoat mechanism and the representing of rebels/guerrillas as monsters 
is not uncommon at all. In itself, that is not a tend ncy or trait that is particular to the 
Swedes (as is sometimes implied by Scanian and Danish nationalists) but rather a 
reaction that seems to be inherent to states that are faced by an insurgency threat, 
especially in conquered or annexed territories. To a greater or lesser extent that tends 
to happen in similar situations. In the same manner that the language of the 
rebels/monsters was depicted as gibberish that should be transformed into a proper 
language (Swedish.). Those who did not learn the real language were not part of the 
Christian community and could not participate in the Eucharist or get married. 
Exclusion from the Christian community was an efficient weapon in the hands of 
early modern authorities.950 Reshaping and restyling so that reality could be perceived 
as righteous and true was an important component of the Swedish policy in Scania.   
 
The Hi-Jack Effect 
                                               
946 Haritos-Fatouros, p.63 (Training in dehumanisation).    
947 Rydstrand, p.25. “Haver varken han eller de andra va it i all den tiden uti någon kyrka eller brukat 
sine salighets medel, men såsom bestar och oskäliga reatur följt skogen.” 
948 Sörensson, (p.63) quotes major Harlof: “vilde och umælende Bester”. 
949 Fabricius, vol.III. pp.102-105.   
950 See: Appel, p.674. 
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There is one important point regarding the “Scanian question” that has long been 
neglected and that is the fact that scholars like Fabricius and Alf Åberg and local 
historians like Uno Röndahl all based part of their r search on a set of fundamental 
questions that were of a psychological rather than a historical nature. Fabricius started 
out doing research on Scania because he was stupefied by the fact that Scanian 
schoolchildren derided Danish kings that had been th ir own ancestors’ rulers and Alf 
Åberg was rather puzzled by the fact that after only a century some of the official 
instances in Scania seemed to have no clue that Scanian had once been Danish.951  
Åberg turned to the most recent psychological findings of his day for an answer and 
suggested that the Scanians had reacted like hijack victims who fall in love with their 
kidnappers (the Stockholm syndrome) because in a situ tion where there is no hope of 
liberation human beings tend to become one with the enemy, This psychological 
analysis might provide an explanation of the total identification with Sweden and 
Swedish values that so astounded the Danish historian Knud Fabricius. But it is an 
explanation that presumes massive collective trauma and deculturisation for the 
Stockholm syndrome is the result of exposure to that kind of stress factors. It is a 
contradiction to claim that the transition from Danish to Swedish rule was smooth and 
perhaps the least troublesome change of state in history, at the same time as you 
affirm that the population were struck by the Stockholm syndrome.  
 
It is extremely interesting that both Alf Åberg and the Scanian regionalist Uno 
Röndahl come to the same trauma-theory conclusion although they take widely 
different views of the Scanian question and the snaphaner in general. To Röndahl 
”ignorance is power” and it is through the systematic suppression of the history of the 
Scanian provinces that has kept the official Swedish version afloat for 300 years. 952 In 
order to explain the Scanians’ apparent docility afer 1680 Röndahl quotes Barbara 
Tuchman who claims that terror never wins unless it becomes total.953 Röndahl set out 
with the preconception that the Swedes were war criminals that had created the 
situation on purpose, but he did not take into consideration that even if he were right 
and a number of Scanians might have experienced a snse of terror at the time, that 
state of things might have been the result of many f ctors.  
                                               
951 See: Introduction. 
952 Röndahl 1996, quote: p.195 
953 Röndahl 1996, p.386 quote from Barbara Tuchman, De första saluten, Stockholm 1989. 
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More recent research than that which Åberg (or any of the other scholars and writers I 
have mentioned in this subsection) had access to at the time, indicates that the victim 
does not so much identify with the persecutor as become “possessed” by him. 
Passivity is a normal reaction to war, torture and trauma. Severly traumtised persons 
tend to become “deactivated” and show an utter fear of violence. When they find 
themselves in a situation in which they are supposed to defend themselves, they either 
avoid conflict, remain totally paralysed or react with violence but in an unsuitable 
manner and in the wrong situations. In the same manner, hatred often leads to 
passivity, especially if the object of this feeling is a deeply feared authority figure. 
Conformity and obedience is most easily achieved through arbitrary violence that 
reduces the weaker part to a state of  “learned” helplessness. Those are forces that 
maintain social hierarchy and bind individuals to authority.954    
 
Victims do not take on the identity of the aggressor until things get really bad and 
then it is not a voluntary action but the result of utter passivity or even, resignation. In 
her Trauma and Recovery the psychiatrist Judith Lewis Herman stresses the 
consequences of long-term captivity and dominance o human beings: the most 
common symptoms are passivity and incapacity to act, helplessness and apathy. This 
kind of experience also leads to identity problems and a tendency to continue to serve 
the destructive ends of one’s captors. The Stockholm syndrome that Alf Åberg 
explained the reactions of the Scanians’ with is the result of reactions like those 
described by Lewis Herman.955     
 
It should be added that if a state of passivity wasinduced into the Scanians it was not 
necessarily the result of a conscious Swedish policy. Towards the end of the Scanian 
War when Danish troops were looting and laying waste the land quite as thoroughly 
as the Swedes, there was a widespread feeling that the Danes had abandoned them 
                                               
954 Françoise Sironi, Persecutori e vittime, Strategie di violenza, (Translation of :Bourreaux et victims, 
Psychologie de la torture, Èditions Odile Jacob 1999) Feltrinelli 2001, p.155 and Haritos-Fatouros, 
p.136 and esp. p.159.   
955 Judith Lewis Harman, Trauma och tillfrisknande, Estland 2007. (Original version: Trauma and 
Recovery, Basic Books 1992.), pp.142-143. 
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and the Swedes would never let them go again.956 As Harman stresses: in a major 
armed conflict a sense war weariness and defeat might become almost endemic and it 
is only natural to keep one’s head low, and only natural not to rush to the arms next 
time round if you are not convinced that there is a ch nce to win.  
 
Conclusions 
Violence was an important component of the Swedish anti-snaphane policy that very 
much centred upon the emargination of the snaphaner from the “normal” population. 
At the time emargination, or ending up outside the C ristian community, if you like, 
meant becoming an outlaw who could and should be punished the way the snaphaner 
were. 
 
Torture is primarily a means of silencing dangerous voices, only at a secondary and 
less certain stage it becomes a means of extracting information. Thirdly, it is also a 
way of re-creating the world.957 Scania had to be re-imagined as a Swedish retrieved 
province and its inhabitants had to fit into the pattern. The Scanian rebels were 
restyled into monsters, destroyed and replaced by true Swedes, obedient subjects, 
pious members of the Christian community. I do not mean that many people were 
replaced in a physical sense. Sometimes they were but in most cases they were not. It 
was enough that they were replaced by obedient subjects in the imagination of people. 
Only the most disturbing elements were physically removed and replaced. Those were 
the elements that were made into scapegoats that cleaned the slate for a new way of 
conceiving of Scania. 
  
The Dregs of the Human Race 
“The worst about the Friskytter is that there is no order and no manners among them so that if 
only they had real Officers, they would be able to defend themselves better, and the peasants 
would not be bothered by them so often as when the bad people among them take command.”958  
                                               
956 See: Skansjö, pp. 186-188. On p. 186 he stresses that Scanian resistance had ebbed out, possibly 
because it did not seem to stand a chance. He also stresses (p.188) that the sack of Ystad and similar 
Danish incursions created great mistrust in Scania. 
957 “ Unmaking resides in and can thus be represented by two relatively self-contained events, torture 
and war, the first of which is its most complete and therefore most perfect representative. Because the 
deconstruction of creation takes a specifically political form (torture, war), it might seem most 
appropriate to trace the outlines of the opposite event again in a specifically political form, such as the 
moment when a new country is being conceived and costructed (made-up, made-real), or when an 
already existing country, having been partially destroyed, is being re-imagined and re-constructed 
(remade-up).”Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain, The Making and the Unmaking of the World, Oxford 
University Press 1985, p, 177. 




Opinions on the snaphaner and friskytter vary and varied. As was exemplified by 
Pieter Stensen in earlier chapter contemporary sources would glorify or vilify the 
same person to exaggeration, often depending on the ationality of the source but far 
from always so. It should be noted that there were many Danes and Scanians who 
distanced themselves from the friskytter/snaphaner, but as far as I know, no Swedes 
who praised them or called them heroes. This section ontains a partial explanation as 
to how and why the friskytter/snaphaner raised such conflicting feelings even 
amongst those they considered their own.  
An International Phenomenon 
A tendency to confuse guerrillas/partisans with outlaws and criminals is characteristic 
of the fight against guerrillas, be it literary or physical.959 The Romans called the 
“insurgents in Spain street robbers and highwaymen, their leader was the latronum 
dux.”960 Although the petite guerre certainly could trace its roots to the Middle Ages 
and far beyond, it took on a new form under the absoluti t monarchs. In its essence it 
was a kind of rebellion against official army techniques, but a rebel force that could 
be channelled into the service of the state (i.e. th  king).961 The irregulars that 
Johannes Kunisch studied often had a bad reputation. During the campaign of 1745 
Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick called the Austrian irregulars “Diebe und Räuber” that 
were always hiding behind trees and did not behave like courageous soldiers at all.962 
Valentini claimed that the Croats of the Seven Years’ War and the Bavarian War of 
Succession (Erbfolgekrieg) had become all-time masters of the art of ambushing. 
Valentini accused the Croats of “unaufhörliche Neckereien” and of “beständig im 
Lande herumkriechen und auf Gelengenheit lauern, etwas wegzuschnappen”.963 In the 
same manner de la Croix concluded in his Abhandlung vom kleinen Kriege, zum 
Gebrauch der Freycompagnie that the Parteigänger or Freycompagnien often were 
                                               
959 The Greek civil war 1944-47 was called “an anti-bandit struggle” by the Greek political, economic 
and military leaders who were allied with the king and the British against the Communists. (Haritos-
Fatouros, p.24.) 
960 Lacqueur, p.8. 
961 Kunisch, p.80: “das Ausbrechen aus den durch ein vrabsolutiertes Reglementierungsdenken 
gesetzten Normen, - den antimechanistischen Gegenschlag gegen ein artifizielles, sich in 
kalkulierbaren Gesetzmäßigkeiten verstrickendes Heeressystem.”    
962 Kunisch, p.27. Letter from Brunswick to Herzog Karl, 8 August 1745, Archiv Wolfenbüttel. 
963 Kunisch, p.27. Valentini, Abhandlung über den kleinen Krieg, p.357.  
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seen with hatred or disgust by others. 964 Frederic the Great considered the irregulars 
an inevitable evil: “Da sie nun aber doch einmal unentbehrlich waren, so entstand eine 
greuliche Mißgestalt.”965 Johann von Ewald who wrote an Abhandlung von dem 
Dienst der leichten Truppen i 1796 nevertheless declared that the object of his study 
consisted of the “Abschaume des menschlichen Geschlchts”. In 1789 Georg 
Wilhelm von Bolstern declared that the irregulars were “das Rendezvous für die 
Ausreißer der gegenseitigen Armeen”.966 In a military manual from 1766 the “Frei-
Bataillons” were accused of stealing, looting and debauchery by the Prussian officer 
who wrote it. According to Kunisch the Austrian Grenz r were different from other 
irregulars in that they were bound together by “national bonds” (nationale 
Bindungen). Nevertheless they also obtained a reputation for being “beutegierigen, 
zügellos plündernden und mordlustigen Draufgängern”. 967 
 
Kunisch has an explanation for the accusations against the irregulars. There is no way 
of denying that the irregulars often behaved unconventionally, mischievously or even 
criminally. Kunisch claims that these problems were du  to the structural problems of 
the army organisation rather than the evil charactes of the irregulars themselves.968 
When the Austrian army enlisted an irregular company by the name of “das 
Trenksche Pandurenkorps” in 1741, it was ordered that all bandits on parole in the 
area should be conscripted and ordered to stop their “Raubereyen.”969 We can only 
guess at the demoralising effect it had on the other members of the Pandurenkorps. In 
the same manner the irregulars were often reinforced by the enlistment of deserters 
and renegades. Another demoralising factor was constituted by the fact that the 
Austrian irregulars received their main income through looting. Much like the Danish 
friskytter, their army pay was low and the Austrian authorities believed that many 
men were attracted to the irregulars by the hope of being allowed to loot in a way that 
other regular soldiers were not allowed to. The Austrian irregulars did receive some 
                                               
964 Paris 1752, pp.105-132. 
965 Kunisch, p.34. 
966 Der Kleine Krieg oder die Maximen der leichten Infaterie, Kavalerie, Scharfschützen und Jäger, 
Magdeburg 1789. Kunisch, p.90. 
967 Idealistischen Project zur Einrichung der Armee written by an anonymous officer in 1766, quoted 
by Kunisch, p.35. 
968 Kunisch, p.37: “Vielmehr herrschte zwischen den hemmungslosen Ausschweifungen der leichten 
Truppen und den Bedingungen, unter denen sie zu Kriegsd ensten angeworben und ins Feld geschickt 
wurden, ein Wechselverhältnis, das viele der Übeltaten weniger als Böswilligkeit und verstocktheit 
unverbesserlicher Missetäter, sondern als strukturelle Mängel der Heeresverfassung erscheinen läßt” 
969 Kunisch, p.37. 
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supplies from the army depots but often it was difficult to get the supplies through to 
them since they were operating on the other side of the enemy lines.970 
Just like the Austrian Grenzer troops the friskytter w re sometimes accused of 
lasciviousness and libertinage.971 When Jens Ottesen was caught by the Swedes he 
was immediately accused of loose living and debauchery. The snaphane-catcher who 
found Ottesen and his colleague Jensen at an inn in Ystad wrote a conscientious 
account to Sperling about the occurred. First and foremost Bengtsson the snaphane-
catcher pointed out that Ottesen had been staying with a widow whom he had 
promised to marry but that he had not done so becaus  of the other snaphaner and the 
tax-collector (kronofogden) who had ordered him to leave town. Ottesen had reported 
his presence to mayor Hartman who replied: “I do not want you to stay here. You 
have whored with a widow and tempted a married woman away from her husband”. 
Then the letter stresses that Ottesen and Jensen wer  actually caught at a public house 
where the two of them were lodging in a chamber that was right opposite that of two 
women and the doors of both rooms were wide open! 
 
 Towards the end of the summer of 1678 Major Niels Tommesen Tidemand of the 
King’s Friskytter wrote an angry letter to the Swedish commander of Ängelholm 
(Engelholm), Sven Broch.972 He accused Broch of having tried to entice friskytter 
over to the other side. According to Tidemand the Sw dish commander was spreading 
false rumours that said that many friskytter had joined the Swedes and that those who 
remained on the Danish side were torturing their Swedish prisoners atrociously. 
Tidemand replied indignantly that the friskytter would have wanted to treat their 
prisoners like the Swedes did but they were not allwed to pay back in the same coin 
because they were professionals who respected military ethics. Tidemand continued: 
“As long as this land has healthy men with Danish blood in their veins there will be more and more 
children in the kingdom of Sweden who will weep and cry…unless you agree to grant our men military 
status so that we can ransom those of us who become prisoners of war. His Royal Majesty of Denmark 
has employed and ordered us to be officers (majors, ritmester, lieutenants and non-commissioned 
                                               
970 Kunisch, p.39. In Scania this problem was not so evident since the Danish enclaves remained close. 
When the friskytter/snaphaner in the northeastern area of Blekinge got too isolated they withdrew to 
Scania.  
971But then the Scanian people as a whole were accused of “Danish libertinage”. See: von Ascheberg, 
p.20. 
972Tidemand was also one of the protagonists of the classical Swedish snaphane novel D n siste 
snapphanen (The Last Snaphane) by Carl August Cederborg in which Tidemand is called “Nils 
Thomasson Tideman” and is a robber who gets hung by the energetic Swedish officer/snaphane catcher 
Alexander Hummerhjelm. In the novel and in the loca legends Tidemand’s angry son, Per 
Tidemansen, remained with the snaphaner until long after the war. See: Mellhed, p.54. 
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officers etc) and consequently we are not allowed to pursue the enemy in murderous ways but have to 
ride in uniform on our horses and attack in honourable ways…We do not sneak upon innocent people 
in our free time but keep ourselves busy taking care of our horses and cleaning our guns and uniforms. 
Furthermore I would like our enemies to know that the peasants should not be punished for our 
sake…but if we find out that a peasant is bringing messages to the enemy then he becomes an enemy 
himself.”973 
 
Tiideman’s letter speaks for itself.  There is no need to explain that he considered 
himself a soldier and clearly explained why: he andhis men followed military tactics, 
fought like soldiers, dressed like soldiers and wanted to die like soldiers. Instead 
many of them had to die in the worst and most humiliating manner one can think of. 
He called the Swedes “skælmer”, the word the Swedes normally used to describe 
delinquents and snaphaner.974 It describes someone very unreliable, with a touch of 
“bastard” to it. To Tiideman the Swedes were “skælmer” because they were tricking 
friskytter into asking for amnesty with false promises. Honest men would not try to 
trick soldiers into joining the enemy, nor would they make enemies that had fought a 
good fight die the grisly death of a criminal. From Tiideman’s point of view the ones 
who were not playing fair game were the Swedes. He also emphasised that it meant 
something to have Danish blood in one’s veins and that to him, ethnic identities were 
not optional. Tidemand’s letter is a good enough explanation of the snaphaner’s 
“whys” in general but also as to particulars like that of wearing uniforms and leading 
a normal military life. He claimed that real friskytter wore uniforms and dedicated 
their free time to taking care of their horses, uniforms and guns and that it was only 
slander that had it that friskytter spent their time off mugging people. I do not know 
which version is true, if any, but it is obvious from his letter that there was a uniform 
issue, and that it was of consequence to Tidemand to assume all the external 
paraphernalia of regular soldiers. However, Broch did not feel that he and Tidemand 
had much in common, and even less that he had anything to feel sorry about. In 
September 1678 Swedish newssheet reported that a “major of the snaphaner” had 
written a letter to one of the Swedish commanders in which he begged that the 
Swedes might treat their prisoners in “an honest soldierly manner”. The Swedish 
commander responded that if the major wanted to meet him and his men in honest 
battle, then he would treat his prisoners in an honest manner, but as long as they hid in 
                                               
973 Röndahl , 1996, pp.448-450. Tideman’s letter is to be found in Nordiska Saml.Nr.205, Uppsala 
University Library, it is also quoted by Kjær, Gjøngehøvdingen Svend Povlsen og Snaphanerne. Et 
Bidrag til Snaphanetidens Historie, Dansk-Skaansk –Forening 1974 and by Hansgaard , pp.144-145.. 
A photocopy of the original has also been published by Mellhed. 
974 Some Scanians agreed with the Swedes on this point: Reverend Jacobsen for one. He preferred 
calling them “the ungodly snaphaner” though. 
 286 
the woods and murdered people they would get what murderers and bandits 
deserved.975 
 
The letter at the beginning of this section was written by friskytter that belonged to a 
contingent of some 700 friskytter from the hundreds of Åsbo (Aasbo) and Onsjö 
(Onsiø) that were based on the central ridge of Söderåsen (Søndreaas). In this letter 
they complained of their colleagues who were growing too undisciplined: there were 
certainly miscreants among the friskytter, but nevertheless that was not what friskytter 
were supposed to be like. Real friskytter (like the authors of the letter) were not bad 
people who mistreated peasants. On the contrary they ob yed military discipline and 
considered themselves part of the Danish army. The registered friskytter were eager to 
distance themselves from the free-lancers that could behave as they liked. In the 
summer of 1678 Lieutenant Tue Krop had problems with his own men who would not 
refrain from sneaking out to harass the peasants and because of this problem Krop had 
found himself constrained to renounce on a planned mission to Simrishamn 
(Simmershavn). At that point he wrote to Arensdorff and asked that all those who 
wanted to count as friskytter should meet at Landskrona (Landscrone) on a certain 
date so that they could hear from the general himself what their orders were.976     
  
The representatives of the Danish civil administration often complained about the 
excesses of the friskytter; they sometimes claimed that the friskytter did more damage 
than good, that they plundered the peasants and made them un-cooperative.977 A Dane 
who was strongly critical of the friskytter was overauditør Claus Reenberg who 
complained of the friskytter in every report to theauthorities that he wrote: “the 
destruction that the friskytter are causing is indescribable” and “They are very 
                                               
975 The Mercurius, 10th September 1678. SKB. Quoted by Röndahl, 1996, p.265. Although there were 
no names in the article I assume that the major and the commander were Tidemand and Broch because 
there were not that many majors of the friskytter and not that many Swedes that were intitulated 
“commander”, nor any other known cases of correspondence between a major of the friskytter and a 
Swedish commander, and especially not in 1678. 
976 Fabricius III, p.164. Letter from Tue Krop to Arensdorff, undated but among the June 1678 letters. 
From the very same period there is a letter to kingChristian V from an unknown captain of the 
friskytter called Svend Bjørnsen from Osby, 12th June 1678, in which Bjørnsen also complains that his 
friskytter had become unruly and that stricter orders from above were needed because he could not 
keep his men from stealing from the peasants. Fabricius stated that both these letters were in the 
“Krigsk. i. S.”. Jens Lerbom has pointed out that “Björnsson” was hardly very unknown, he seems to 
have been ‘Sven from Mossaröd’, quarter master of the Østre Gynge company, that Sörensson 
mentions on p. 65. 
977  
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stubborn, proud and cruel people, if you give them free reins now they will get ten 
times worse than before” and again “the peasants are out aged.”978 However, the 
Danish authorities punished abuse and misconduct severely when possible. It was not 
uncommon that friskytter that had broken the disciplinary rules were handed over to 
the authorities for punishment.979 Friskytter who disobeyed orders or misbehaved 
were arrested by the county sheriff and consigned to the authorities who had them 
court-martialled.980 In those cases they were arrested by their colleagues, usually on 
the order of a “fogde” or sheriff.  In June 1677 district governor Owe Rommel in 
Kristianstad (Christianstad) received orders (in reply to his own inquiry about how he 
should act regarding problems with the friskytter) hat since the peasantry around 
Kristianstad (Christianstad) were complaining of the ravages of the friskytter he 
should see to it that those who were guilty of abuse should be arrested and brought to 
Kristianstad (Christianstad).981 That kind of orders was not just empty words. There 
were efforts from the authorities to keep law and order among the friskytter. In a 
report from 29 June 1677 among the Depositiones we can read that the friskytter had 
brought in a group of three men and a woman. Two of the male prisoners were 
friskytter: Jens Jacobsen982 from Stenestad and Swend Anderson from Kågeröd 
(Kogere). The sheriff of Färs (Fers), Mons Hacksen had ordered the friskytter to arrest 
them because they had been ”behaving badly.” 983 Jacobsen was 20 years old and had 
been married for two years. Andersen was 24 and had been married for 5 years. He 
was a tenant of Knud Thott and his 16-year-old stepson Michel Olsen had 
accompanied him to the Danish camp. These men were not outlaws but made part of 
the outskirts of the circles of the great Thott andKrabbe families, just like Hacksen 
himself.984 The fourth person on the list was Berete Stensdatter who had been brought 
                                               
978 Fabricius III, p.155. Reenberg’s reports were date 3rd and 6th April 1678 and are to be found in the 
“Krigsk. i. S”  collection in the Danish National Archives. 
979 Cf. the case of kongefoged Mons Haksen who brought in t ree friskytter that had misbehaved to the 
Danish camp. 
980 Fabricius, vol.III. pp.102-105.   
981 Sörensson, p. 35. Resolution på Rommels skrift af 19/6 1677, I.B. ,Rommel. DRA.   
982 Jens Jacobsen was working as a friskytte again a year later, so he was obviously not dismissed from 
service.   
983 ”effter Cronfogdens Mons Hacksens order taget af friskytterne formedelst hand ilde hafde hanteret 
sig der i landet.” Depositiones, 29 th June 1677. Mons Hacksen was the on of Krabbe’s old bailiff 
Hack Söffrensön. He died during war. His brother Johan was also a ridefoged. Already at the beginning 
of the war Mons Hacksen Jørgen complained of the snaphaner who consituted a danger to him while he 
was travelling. Fabricius (III, p. 37) 
984 ”Swend Anderson hiemme i Kogere Sogn, aff Knud Tottes godtz.” 
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in ”because she was planning to inform against the friskytter.”985 Another arrested 
friskytte was Henrik Jørgensen who was accused of having shot a fellow friskytte in 
or around Landskrona (Landscrone) and was court-marshalled and condemned to 
death.986 
 
Another example of how the Danish authorities tried to keep the friskytter under 
discipline and the civil servants away from corruption is a letter from War 
Commissary Jens Harboe to General Arensdorff of 9th April 1678 in which Harboe 
defends himself against accusations of having helped th  friskytter steal horses from 
some farmers.987 Harboe remembered that some friskytter had brought in a few horses 
some time earlier and that a group of angry farmers had come in at the same time, 
claiming that the friskytter had treated them badly and then stolen the horses from 
them. Harboe asserted his own honesty and loathing of corruption and intrigues, and 
declared that the friskytter had been arrested and interrogated by the “General 
Auditeur”, i.e. Herman Meijer who was a very influential man in Copenhagen. 
 
It should also be added that complaints against the ravages of the regular troops were 
often enough filed: the troops from Munster that fought for the Danes were feared all 
over Denmark and Scania for example.988 Sometimes those who complained of the 
behaviour of the Danish troops had no idea whether the soldiers who had beaten 
and/or plundered them had been friskytter or regular soldiers. There was no certain 
way of distinguishing a friskytte from a regular soldier.  
 
The Friskytte Outfit 
 
“We ride in uniform on our horses and attack in honourable ways…We do not sneak upon innocent 
people in our free time but keep ourselves busy taking care of our horses and cleaning our guns and 
uniforms.”  
Captain Tidemand of the King’s Friskytter in a letter o the Swedish army officials.989 
 
 
                                               
985 ”Berete Stensdatter…blef indbragt til leyren aff aarsage att hun wilde Angifwe friskytterne.” 
986 Fabricius, III, p.105. 
987 Jens Harboe to General Arenstorf, LCrone, 9th April 1678, Indkomne Breve, DRA. 
988 See Chapter on Krabbe who claimed his bailiff had s ved his tenants from the terrible Munster 
regiment. 
989 Röndahl , 1996, pp.448-450. Tideman’s letter is to be found in Nordiska Saml.Nr.205, Uppsala 
University Library, it is also quoted by Kjær, Gjøngehøvdingen Svend Povlsen og Snaphanerne. Et 
Bidrag til Snaphanetidens Historie, Dansk-Skaansk –Forening 1974. 
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Official uniforms had only just been introduced in the regular army during the 
Scanian war. We know today that at least some friskytter wore red uniforms but not 
how frequent it was. Svend from Boarp was described n the following manner: “Sven 
had a red coat, a rapier and decorations and a hat with its sides bent upwards, a 
carbine gun and pistols on the saddle.” 990 According to legend, Captain Simon 
Andersen from Tullsåkra (Tullsager) was characterised by his scarlet coat.991 During 
the war the same Svend from Boarp was sent over to Elsinore to buy uniforms for 
Captain Eskeld’s company several times.992 Presumably, he was not the only friskytte 
to have been sent on such an errand and Captain Eskeld’s men were probably not the 
only ones to wear uniform.   Fabricius claimed that uniforms were rare but that flags 
and banners were common. Sörensson declared that all the sources tell us is that the 
friskytter were “well equipped”, but does not comment more closely on their 
clothing.993 In any case there is enough evidence to allow us to presume that the 
friskytter often enough did not dress like peasants. One way of telling a peasant from 
a friskytte was to check his wardrobe and belongings. In February 1678 the Swedish 
authorities were informed that two “snaphaner” were to be found at an inn in Ystad 
(Ysted) where they had taken rooms right opposite the doors of two women of 
questionable reputation. Adequate measures were immdiately taken: the snaphane-
catcher Simon Bengtsson, captain Peter Klingspor and mayor Olaus Harman went to 
get the rascals who were called Jens Ottesen and Herik J nsen.994 The two men 
                                               
990 See Edvardsson (III, p.130) who quote court witnesses that mention that Sven from Boarp always 
wore a red coat (like the Danes) and a rapier. Also: Johnsson, p.129. Sven claimed to be of noble 
origins and called himself a quarter master. 
991 Legend registered at Nöbbelöv, Västra Wram, 2nd July 1843, quoted by Edvardsson, III, p.71. 
Tullsagra-Simon was also characterised by his two horses: one to ride upon, the other a pony that 
kicked and bit all those who tried to follow him. 
992 As can be seen in the Bjäre härad court registers, 17th June 1684, quoted by Edvardsson, III, p.133. 
993 Fabricius, p.102, Sörensson, p.31. 
994 Johnsson (p. 128, Skrivelser till gen.-guv från Simon Bengtsson 27 februari 1678, LA) refers to their 
names in their Swedified form Jöns Ottosson and Henrik Jönsson.Ottesen was one of the “snaphaner” 
present on the Marsvinsholm estate when Klingspor was kidnapped, which he admitted to but claimed 
that he had only made part of the rear guard and that he had been posted at Örsjö and consequently 
could not describe the attack in detail. Nor had Ottesen participated in the attack in the wood (skogen) 
outside Ystad, but he and Jensen had had remained inside the city where they had stayed until dawn 
when they set out for Hörby. Hartman claimed that commander Brackel and his men had tried to come 
down on the snaphaner at Ystad one evening around nine but that they had failed to find them. Ottesen 
and Jensen explained that they had hidden themselves in an attic that time. Ottesen had at some timefor 
was granted parole for his snaphane-activities and since that time he had stayed first with his mother 
and then with a “ryttaränka” a Swedish soldier’s widow at Ystad. He had promised to marry this 
widow but in the end he did not dare because of the “other snaphaner and the tax collector” who had 
ordered him to leave the city but to stay in the nearest surroundings. The tax collector (kronofogden) 
was a Danish official of some importance. Now, in front of the court Ottesen claimed that at the point 
when he was ordered to leave the city by the snaphaner and the fougde he had turned to the city council 
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claimed to be peasants on a town visit but Bengtsson insisted they had been at least in 
part dressed like soldiers and he asked them why simple peasants would walk about in 
army jackets (kollertar), boots and studs? Nor could they provide the Swedes with an 
explanation as to why two peaceful peasants would keep bullets, powder and weights 
in their bags? Moreover they had also been found to be in possession of an elegant 
coat with silver hems.995 
Another indirect indication of the way friskytter dessed is given by the episode when 
Shipper Henning from Malmö (Malmøe) was mistaken for a friskytte and shot in the 
stomach996: Shipper Henning was the only burgher in Malmö (Malmøe) who sided 
openly with the Swedes and fought on their side voluntarily.997 Henning Olsen also 
facilitated Swedish money transactions, as is clear from a letter from J. Hoghusen at 
Wä (Wæ) to “Mons. Hoghusen Conseiller de la Chancelleri  pour Sa Maj de Suede, 
Jönköping” from 24th March 1677. J Hoghusen had sent a check (wexel) for 300 daler 
to Thomas Jyde in Malmø (Malmö) but that probably the money would not be paid 
out until “Henning Ols arrived.998 In spite of the fact that Shipper Henning was a very 
rich man who would not have shown himself in anything but the best clothes, he was 
once mistaken for a friskytte when he was trying to et some Swedes into the 
beleaguered city and almost died from the bullet wounds. Shipper Henning was a 
Norwegian and it is therefore doubtful whether his accent could have triggered the 
accident. He would hardly have spoken Danish/Scanian perfectly and even if he did 
there is no reason why he should have done so with Swedes. Nevertheless it is not 
totally unlikely that he did so or that somebody mistook Norwegian for Danish. 
However, one can only assume that his “burgher outfit” did not set him out 
particularly from what one might take for a friskytte or snaphane. 
                                                                                                                            
and that he had spoken to two members of it: Lars Kofod and mayor Hartman. The latter had told him 
that it would be better if he left because “You have li ed in whoredom here with a widow and you have 
enticed a wife away from her lawful wedded husband you have never been up to any good.” At this 
point Jensen claimed he had decided to leave the ciy but he was nevertheless caught at an inn there 
some time later, in the company of Hendrik Jensen and two ladies with whom he had taken rooms (one 
for the ladies and one for the gentlemen as the court records stated.). 
995 Letter from Simon Bengtsson, Peter Klingspor and Olaus Hartman to Sperling, Krogholm  27th 
February 1678, Skrivelser till gen-guv, Landsarkivet I Lund. Quote from Johnsson, p.129. Kollertar, 
patronkök, krutpung och lodpung, med silverband kantad pagerock. The ”snaphaner” were called Jöns 
Ottosson and Henrik Jönsson (Swedish for Jens Ottesen and Hendrich Jensen). 
996 See: Depositiones report from Landscrone, 10th December 1677, DRA. The episode had taken place 
a few days earlier. 
997 On 3 July 1677  (Depositiones) Nels Hansen reported that ”Shipper Henning put the Corps de 
Guarde on fire while the field marshal commanded the Hussars (drabanter) to attack the Danes...”. As 
for the other burghers Hansen claimed that they were forced to go to the city walls. 




In this section I have tried to point out that criti ising irregular troops and guerrillas 
and accusing them of criminal acts, lewd behaviour and various other things is 
probably as old a phenomenon as the battle techniques that guerrillas and irregulars 
use. I have also tried to emphasise that the friskytter themselves agreed that there 
were disciplinary problems among their troops but tha a true friskytte did not 
misbehave. On the contrary there were efforts to curb disorderly behaviour both from 
the side of the Danish state and the Friskytter themselves. There was an express wish 
on their side to distance themselves from miscreants.  
  
Consequently I have also tried to show how contempt of guerrillas/irregular troops 
seems to be intrinsic to their very existence: they b come a sometimes embarrassing 
element that cannot be easily fitted into the official disciplinary pattern.999 Although 
the petite guerre certainly could trace its roots t the Middle Ages and far beyond, it 
took on a new form under the absolutist monarchs. In its essence it was a kind of 
rebellion against official army techniques, but a rebel force that could be channelled 
into the service of the state (i.e. the king).1000  
 
 
The Snaphaner and the Church 
“We are neither Germans nor heathens, so why should you preach in Swedish to us?” 
Scanian parishioner to a Swedish minister of the chur , 16811001. 
 
Introduction 
The sources do not offer us many chances of understanding what opinions were held 
by “the man in the street” in late 17th century Scania, and if we would try to delve into 
the minds of the woman or the child in the street, the task would become next to 
impossible. Very likely, the “men in the street” tha  have left most traces in the 
sources from the Scanian War were the snaphaner and it is about their religious and 
                                               
999 Kunisch, p.80. Unlike some other military historians Kunisch would not characterise the irregulars 
as “remnants” of intractable pre-Absolutist forms of fighting (“einen unbewältigen Restbestand 
vorabsolutistscher Formen”).     
1000 Kunisch, p.80: “das Ausbrechen aus den durch ein vrabsolutiertes Reglementierungsdenken 
gesetzten Normen, - den antimechanistischen Gegenschlag gegen ein artifizielles, sich in 
kalkulierbaren Gesetzmäßigkeiten verstrickendes Heeressystem.”    
1001 Röndahl, 1996, p.355. The parish was Gessie and the clergyman was reverend Wulff. 
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“national” interpretation of the situation that this section is going to be about. In this 
section I have tried to analyse the conditions under which a religious discourse was 
used and naturally, by whom and why.   
 
Between Two Fires 
In most wars throughout history both warring parties have claimed that they, and only 
they, had God on their side and this was also the cas during the Scanian War. When 
the Danish king and his army landed at the village of Råå in June 1676 the king 
proclaimed that he was there under righteous arms and that he would free the 
languishing Scanian provinces from the burden that were weighing so heavy on their 
shoulders. Nevertheless the Swedish king also thought he had God on his side and 
when he won the battle of Lund in December that same year, he proclaimed that it 
was a sign from God that proved that He was on the sid  of the Swedes. 1002 
 
In the 19th century the church historian Severin Cavallin wrote that during the 
Scanian war, the clergy were expected to obey both the Danish and Swedish 
authorities and that consequently, they literally ended up under crossfire, so to speak 
“between two fires”. Naturally the clergy constituted an especially vulnerable 
category since none of them could avoid choosing sides or at least, pretending to do 
so.  But it was not only the clergy that were being bombarded with radically different 
religious messages from two sides; in fact this problem regarded the entire population. 
How then did people decide what and whom to believe and to believe in? Bishop 
Winstrup in Lund tried to promote the version that the loss of the Scanian provinces 
and the consequent sufferings were God’s way of punishing the Danish people for 
their sins and that the Scanians should accept whatever he Lord sent them.1003 At the 
                                               
1002 Cf.  The message of King Christian V to the Scanians: ”...since His Royal Majesty for these and 
other reasons of utter and judiciary importance finds himself obliged, with his righteous arms...now t 
dedicate himself to the liberation and salvation of the above mentioned provinces that are languishing 
under a burden, with the conviction that God will bless this enterprise from heaven...” Helsingborg, 1st 
July 1676, (”...da Hanss Kongl. Maijestet aff disse och andre höijwichtige och retmessige aarsager sig 
finder obligeret sine retferdige waaben...nu fremdeliss til offuerbemeldte under byrden suchende 
provinciers befrielse och redning at henvende wdi visse förhaabning, at Gud aff himmelen dette 
forretagende vil velsigne...” ) in Sthen Jacobsen, Den Nordiske Kriigs Krønicke, Kjöbenhavn-Lund 
1897, ss.38-40.) and the message from the king of Sweden:”We Carl of God’s grace king of Sweden, 
the Goths and the Wends etc. herewith make known that since it pleased God the Almighty to render 
our arms victorious and fortunate against our enemy…” HQ 9th December 1676 in Jacobsen, p.77.( 
”Wi Carl med Guds naade Sverrigess, Gottess och Wendiss konning etc. giöre witterligt, att saasom 
Gud, den allerhöijeste, haffuer naadigst behagett at giöre vore waaben imod vore fiender lychelige...”)  
1003 Winstrup’s attitude towards the Scanian transition has been analysed by Hanne Sanders in 
”Religiøst eller nationalt verdensbillede? Skåne eft r overgangen til Sverige 1658 (”A Religious or 
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very same time there were other interpretations of the war that claimed that the 
Scanians were languishing in Babylonian captivity and that sooner or later, this 
virtuous people would be liberated from the tyrants that refused to listen to the voice 
of their conscience and instead insisted on continui g to torment a people in 
captivity.1004 However, one might wonder whether ordinary people list ned to what 
was being preached to them? How much did they pick up of the messages that kings, 
bishops and warlords were trying to inculcate into their heads? The further we go 
back in time, the harder it becomes to make out what “ordinary” people really thought 
and felt.  
  
 The sources leave enough evidence for us to be able to conclude that it meant 
something to be “Danish” or “Swedish” three hundred y ars ago too, but those 
identities included components that were different from the ones that constitute the 
“Danish” or “Swedish” identities today, and those components that were identical to 
their modern counterparts were perhaps given a less prominent place than today, or 
maybe the contrary, a more prominent place.1005 Generally, religion and religious 
identities occupied a more prominent place then thain the secularised Western world 
of today.1006 Amongst others Hanne Sanders has pointed out that God and his 
relationship to humanity constituted a fundamental part of one’s ”national” identity in 
the early modern world.1007 This view of the identity of the single person is radically 
opposed to to that of “classical” nationalism that sees the relationship of the single 
person to the nation as fundamental to one’s personal identity.  When Jørgen Krabbe 
was condemned to death for high treason, crimen laesae majestatis, and collusion 
                                                                                                                            
National Conception of the World? Scania after the transition to Sweden in 1658), pp.231-252 in 
Hanne Sanders, ed. Mellem Gud og Djævelen. Religiøse verdensbilleder i Norden 1500-1800, 
København, Nord: 2001, in particular p. 239: ”To Vinstrup the war consequently remains a tool in the 
hand of God: a tool that the Lord can use for or against the peoples that live on Earth. He brings war as 
a punishment and ends it as a gift.” 
1004 Aletophilus (Olluf Rosencrantz), En sandfærdig replique...København 1678, s.36), wished that the 
Swedes had listened long enough to their conscience to restitute Scania to Denmark because this option 
would have meant that so much violence could have been avoided and the Swedes would not have 
bought themselves a place in hell. Exactly the same view was expressed by the author of “Unavenged 
Blood”.    
1005 Se: Harald Gustafsson, “The Eighth Argument. Identity, Ethnicity and Political Culture in 
Sixteenth-Century Scandinavia”, Scandinavian Journal of History 27, 2002, pp.91-114. In particular 
p.91.  
1006 With this I would not like to make little of the role of religion today, not even in the West. Many 
scholars, especially in the more recent past, tend to underestimate what religion and God mean to 
people today.   
 1007 Sanders (2001), pp. 251-252. 
 294 
with the enemy he personally interpreted it as God’s punishment for a deathly sin he 
had committed in his youth. However, at the same ti he also claimed that the 
Swedish authorities had forgotten their religion and that they were acting contrary to 
the voice of their conscience. It came quite natural to noblemen like Krabbe, Olluf 
Rosencrantz and the Thotts to interpret the conflict in religious terms. But is it 
feasible to suppose that Krabbe shared his views with his snaphane-friends?  
Maybe it was only in the upper strata of society that t e Scanian War was interpreted 
as a cosmic battle between good and evil, sinners and the righteous? I will now try to 
analyse the official “crime and punishment” discourse in documents that regard the 
snaphaner, at the same time as I will try to analyse what the snaphaner themselves had 
to say about the matter.       
 
The Official Discourse   
“Instead of the oath and loyalty that you have all pledged but unfortunately have shamefully abused of 
and made light of, to no measure have you considered the salvation of your souls, but you have 
delivered yourselves unto eternal damnation…For as long as you persist in your evil intentions and 
doings and dedicate yourselves to  abominable and treacherous sins against your righteous lord, master 
and authority, nothing but an eternal curse hovers over you day and night and over your wives, 
children, belongings and property too.” 1008 
 
Just as in most other wars both parties of the confli t in Scania could proffer a long 
list of arguments and theories that prodded their own views. In the public letters that 
the Swedish king sent to the Scanians his tone was not particularly religious. 
Normally he tried to pull at other heartstrings than the religious ones: he might 
reprove the Scanians because of their lack of faithfulness and reminded them that they 
had once sworn him fealty. In a manner of speaking that sort of argument is still 
religious since Carl XI considered himself God’s Elect and failing faith against him, 
the Scanians’ earthly master, was the same as betrayal of their Lord in Heaven. But 
contrary to most of his warlords Carl preferred not to use an abundance of religious 
terms when he addressed the Scanians. In many of these epistles he claimed that he 
really believed that the Scanians had “the safety and welfare of the kingdom at heart” 
and that his emissaries could help them liberate themselves from whatever 
                                               
1008  ( I stället för den ed och trohet som I allesammen eder förpliktat men dessvärre skamligen 
missbrukat och alldeles slagit i vädret, i intet mål tänkt eder själs salighet, utan levererat eder till den 
eviga fördömelsen...Nej aldrig så länge I framhärden uti edert onda uppsåt och förehavanden samt söka 
eder utii denna vederstygglig och förrädiska synd emot eder rättmätige konung, herre och överhet, utan 
den allmänna förbannelsen svävar över dag och natt,s mt över edre hustrur, barn, gods och 
egenom.”) General Georg Henrik Lybecker to the population of Göinge/Gønge, 14th April 1679. 
Quoted by Johnny Ambrius in his History of Scania, http://home1.swipnet.se. År 1679. 
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misconceptions they might erroneously have embraced.1009 The Swedish generals 
Gyllenstierna and Lybecker used a language that was impregnated with the religious 
ideals and conceptions of the time and they claimed that faithfulness to Sweden was 
the first step on the road to heaven.1010 In the Swedish propaganda the Scanians were 
threatened with fire and brimstone both in this world and the next if they took arms 
against the Swedes. As can be seen from the quotation t the beginning of this section 
General Lybecker in particular tended to appeal to religious sensibilities in his 
attempts at persuading the Scanians from siding with the Danes. 
 
It was not impossible to gain forgiveness even if one had sinned (”peccerat”) against 
one’s righteous king: repentance was accepted if it was perceived of as sincere. In 
their epistles and proclamations to the public the Swedish authorities assumed, or 
pretended to assume, that the Scanians had been led astray and that, in their naïveté or 
stupidity they had let themselves be used by criminals.1011 Very often the ex-Danish 
subjects responded with exactly the same rhetoric and claimed that they had been 
kidnapped or tricked by “murderous” snaphaner and naturally, they now repented 
sincerely what they had done.1012 Contrition, if sincere, was regarded as a valid excuse 
even for snaphaner, unless one had caused the death of an inborn Swede. In his letter 
to the commonalty of Norra Åsbo (Nørre Aasbo) in March 1677, Gyllenstierna 
claimed that the Swedish victories were due to ”God’s help” and that the Scanians 
should ponder upon that and repent whatever their foolishness had let them be tricked 
                                               
1009 Letter to the commoners in the Blekinge and Kronoberg (län) from Carl XI, 28th January 1677,  
Opsnappede breve, DRA. Quote: ”riksens välfärd och trygghet om hjärtat”. A part of this letter is 
quoted in Edvardsson II, p.171. 
1010 Gyllenstierna often introduced his letters with ”Be saluted in God Almighty” (”Hällsen medh 
Gudh allmäktig”) so that the recipient would understand that he was a man who respected the 
traditional Lutheran moral values. See for example his letters from  Bäckaskog/Bäch-skough och 
Glimåkra/Glimager 16th March and 3rd April 1677 that are to be found in the ”Intercepted Letters” 
collection in the Danish National Archives. Excerpts are also quoted by Edvardsson II, pp.172-173. 
Furthermore it should be mentioned that Gyllenstierna’s everyday language seems to have been spiced 
up with expressions like: ”I’ll sell my soul to the devil if Landskrona and Copenhagen aren’t blockaded 
in two weeks’ time”, but in these cases the religious significance of the words should probably not be 
taken seriously. The quote is from Jens Michelsen’s (of Howdale castle) report in the Depositiones 
collection, 22nd June 1677, DRA.   
1011 ”out of foolishness against their righteous king ad master have been found to have sinned” (“af 
oförståndh emoth theras rätta konung och herre, funnes hafva peccerat”) as Gyllenstierna wrote in his 
letter to the commonalty of Norra Åsbo on 16th March 1677, see: Edvardsson II, p. 172. The fealty 
contract of the hundreds of Vånga and Oppmanna states hat the “motion” in Scania had been caused 
by “a few loutish and noisome persons” that had led all the others astray.  See: Edvardsson II, pp.178-
182, quote: p.179.  
1012 See: The letter from the fifteen snaphaner to the king, the snaphane from Halland and the one from 
Österlen.   
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into doing.1013 Each man had a choice that was his own responsibility. Youth, poor 
wits or being a woman were considered valid excuses if one had chosen the wrong 
side in the cosmic battle. The first two circumstances could (and should) be outgrown 
so that one reached the stage in life where maturity and wisdom allowed one to see 
which one was the right side in the battle between good and evil. The last 
circumstance (belonging to the weak sex) was incurable but exactly because of that 
women were more often excused than men. If they were led into temptation by the 
Danes and went about the Devil’s business, it was primarily their male relatives 
(fathers, husbands etc) who were held responsible for that. The women of the 
snaphaner did generally not have to suffer the same penances as the men, not even 
when they had participated actively in resistance activities. They were sometimes sent 
into exile by the authorities, but to my knowing they were not tortured and I have only 
found one case of a woman who was executed on the charge of having participated in 
snaphane activities.1014   
 
Religiosity in the Friskytters’ Reports 
In those letters and reports that can be traced back to the hands of the 
friskytter/snaphaner today religion is not something that was often mentioned. 
Generally the sources that were actually produced by friskytter/snaphaner are quite 
sober reports from the front that were meant to facilit te the work of the regular army 
and the decisions of the commanders to whom the reports were addressed. Normally 
there was no room for spiritual matters in that kind of epistles. The friskytter 
generally reported the position of the Swedish troops in their area and what people 
were saying about the Swedes. They also reported about their own situation: how their 
unit was faring, if they needed equipment or if somebody was dead or wounded, but 
not about their relationship to God. The vast majority of the letters that Thue Piill, 
Simon Andersen, Jens Jenssön, Aage Monsen, Pieter St nsen and many other friskytte 
officers sent to HQ are highly representative of that kind of reports: as factual as any 
military report from today and conserved in considerable numbers in the Danish 
                                               
1013 Gyllenstierna’s letter to the commonalty of Norra Åsbo, 16th March 1677, Edvardsson II, p.173.   
1014 Stig Alenäs claims that one of the major problems during the Swedish bishop’s visitation of the 
diocese in 1680 was whether the wives of the snaphaner would be entitled to the Eucharist. To be 
suspended from the Eucharist equalled suspension from society. See: Alenäs, Stig. Lojaliteten, 
prostarna, språket. Studier i den kyrkliga ”försvensk ingen” i Lunds stift under 1680-talet, 
Studentlitteratur, Lund 2003, p.41. 
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archives.1015 Aage Monsen Harlof was maybe the most prolific repo t-writer of them 
all. His reports were always detailed and detached in their tone. Monsen would for 
example write to HQ to ask for more efficient weapons so that the could reach the 
Swedish positions more easily: when his company was laying siege to the Hönjarum 
(Hønjerum) fortress in July 1678 he realised that te only way they could put the 
enemy under direct bombardment was if they could get a set of ultra-modern cannons 
that could shoot at an oblique angle: consequently he wrote to Arensdorff to ask for a 
couple of “Falcheneter” as that kind of guns were called:  
“...we could not get out into the open because of all the bullets. But if it would please Your Excellency 
to send us a Couple of Falcheneter cannons, so that we could shoot on the Walls, then we would try 
again. Methinks we will get them.”1016 
 
Another category of reports from the friskytter areth  statements they left when they 
entered the Danish camp. Sometimes they simply consigned the written reports they 
handed in or a weekly or even daily basis during the campaigns but at other times the 
clerks took down an account that was reported on the spot. One of the most diligent 
”reporters” was Jens Jenssön from Stoby. He both wrote reports and left oral 
statements on a regular basis. In an oral report frm 26th June 1677 he told the clerk 
that he had sent a ”peasant” to the Swedish camp and th t this peasant had then 
returned with important information about several aspects of the Swedish camp at 
“Risselberg” (Riseberga). They could now be quite certain of what it looked like and 
what the routines were. The encounter between Jenssön and the peasant took place in 
Jenssön’s own home that worked as a kind of central fo  spies and resistance actions. 
People who had hidden away refugees from the Swedes could contact Jenssön in 
order to find out how the refugees could be transported to the Danish enclaves most 
safely. Large part of Jenssön’s work consisted in that kind of tasks.1017 Captain 
Jenssön had a generally positive attitude. On June 28th 1678 he reported to 
Arensdorff that the people in his area (Froste og Fers) were quite angry with the 
Swedes and that the Swedes on their side, were “so confused in their thoughts, that 
                                               
1015A few can also be found among the ”Intercepted letters” from the Scanian War in the Swedish 
National Archives. 
1016 It is the same letter in which Monsen reported the burning of the Kumle bridge. "…vi kunde intet 
baare os der for Kugler men dersom det behagede hans Excelentz att sende os ett paar falcheneter, att 
vi kunde schude paa wollene, saa ville vi endnu proberet. Jeg troer vist, at vi schulle hae den;". 
Hedwall (Skånska friskyttechefer 1676-1679, Dansk-Skaansk forening 1962, p.2) quotes a few lines of 
Monsen’s letter in original, these amongst them. This particular letter has been published in Swedish 
translation by Vigo Edvardsson (vol.II, p. 163). 
1017 Depositiones, mense Junii 1677, no 508, DRA. Jenssön’  company mainly worked in the 
Ringsøe/Ringsjö area in central Scania. See: Röndahl, pp.423-425. 
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they continue to change their minds, and one never knows which way they will go, 
either up or down.” He was also one of very few military men who mentioned God in 
a non-formal way in his reports: in the same letter Jenssön confidently declared that 
although the Swedes threatened him every day he was not afraid because “the Lord 
lives in the centre of the land and he helps those who are in need.”1018 
 
Bilingual Pieter Stensen did not only deal in deception and take on under cover work 
among the Swedes but he also directed a spy central much like that of Jens Jenssön. 
Whereas Jenssön was based in his home and centred his operations on that area, 
Stensen’s place of origin is not known and so we do not know if he had centred his 
net of connections and spies in the Kristianstad (Christianstad) area around his home 
or simply around temporary quarters that he had establi hed there. In July 1678 
Stensen let one of his peasant spies accompany him to the Danish camp so that the 
peasant could leave a full statement to the clerks. The peasant primarily emphasised 
the state of mind inside the walls of the beleaguered city Kristianstad (Christianstad) 
where he had obviously managed to sneak in: “It can hardly be said that the enemy is 
held in high esteem by those inside the city...they ar  always making fun of them in 
there.”1019 None of the officers mentioned here wasted their words. Nor did they call 
the heavens above in a situation where the recipients of the reports wanted facts, logic 
and initiative. With the exception of the odd “God bless you and your family” at the 
end, military reports were off-limits to religious rhetoric in late 17th century Denmark. 
  
But were there any contexts at all in which it would be appropriate for a friskytte 
officer to mention God’s name? Yes, there were. In letters and appeals to the 
authorities in which they appealed to somebody for something they were often fell 
back on a religious discourse and/or on a Christian ide tity. In some situations it gave 
a good impression to be a man of spiritual values. There were times when one had to 
remind the authorities that they were fellow Christians that shared the same values 
and that God was on all of their sides, but not that of the enemy. Sometimes the same 
argumentation was used in appeals to both sides. One should be careful of imagining 
that the whole population were devout Christians at the time, because they were 
definitely not. A lot of people did not have the slightest fear of incurring the wrath of 
                                               
1018 Fabricius III, p.165. Letter from Jens Jenssön to Arensdorff, 28th June 1678, (Krigsk.i S.). 
1019 Depositiones, DRA, 11 Junij 1678.  
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God: probably because they did not believe in it. And yet, Christian rhetoric was 
important and it was used to transmit the idea of a decent person, an honest man who 
made part of the community of Christians that also included the king and all his 
faithful subjects. Chances were that the recipient of the letter would soften and 
concede whatever grace was asked from him if the supplicant proved himself a 
humble servant and sincere believer. It was also an pportunity to remind the person 
whom the letter was addressed to that if he wanted to go to heaven he had better 
remember his Christian virtues and take the chance to do some good in the world. 
Even if you did not share these values yourself it might be useful to use Christian 
rhetoric since the recipient was supposed to believ in it. Referring to God and the 
Bible was a guarantee of honesty, sincerity and of shared values. However, it should 
not be taken for granted that all the people who made light of Christian rhetoric 
weren’t believers.  Although it was not uncommon at all o write to the Danish king 
that God was on his side and to assure the Swedish king in another letter that one 
prayed for his victory, it did not always mean that one was not a Christian. It did not 
even mean that the letter-writer did not have a personal opinion in his heart. During 
the Scanian War many people took to religious rhetoric when they communicated 
with the authorities and since loyalty and faith were intrinsically combined, one had to 
swear things to God that one did not mean if one wanted to survive. Similarly the 
clergy were sometimes caught at praying for both kings in church in a vain attempt at 
satisfying the requirements of both sides. 
   
It was quite common that a friskytte unit turned directly to the authorities in order to 
try to obtain a favour or to complain of their superiors. An example is the letter that 
the friskytter of Wånga and Oppmanna (in the hundred of Villand) wrote to the 
Danish general Meerheim in order to complain of their major (Henrik Aagesen Pflug) 
who was not sufficiently keen on attacking the enemy. They also complained that the 
civil servants, the sheriffs and some of the peasants in the area were quite un-
cooperative. On the contrary, some of these people had done everything to obstruct 
the friskytter’s work but fortunately “God had punished these people for their 
disloyalty”1020 In June 1679 fifteen friskytter/snaphaner who had been caught by the 
                                               
1020 Edvardsson II, p. 136. The peasants in Villand also wrote to the king to complain of the behaviour 
of the Danish soldiers and the snaphaner. See: Edvardsson II, p.141. Finally, it should be added that 
General Major Lybecker who commanded the Swedes in that region felt that everybody there fought 
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Swedes wrote to the king ask for mercy. They claimed to have been in prison for three 
years by that time.1021 They had no excuses for what they had done but pleaded with 
the king as a fellow Christian. None of the fifteen denied having been a snaphane but 
none of them had been one any longer than fourteen days and they all swore to God 
that none of them had ever hurt another human being. At the beginning of the letter 
the fifteen ex-snaphaner claim that they had all been forced to join the snaphaner, but 
half a page later they claim that they had been naïve enough to let themselves be 
“persuaded to seek such ungodly company”1022 and consequently they admitted to 
have sinned both against God and the king. They finished their letter by swearing that 
they would never again join “that kind of company” and finally, they expressed their 
most sincere hope that it might be possible to findthe same kind of grace and 
forgiveness with the king as with God in heaven, sice “man’s nature is frail” and 
only God can improve the character of a man who ends up with perfidious and false 
people.” Is it then feasible to assume that the fift en ex-snaphaner really believed 
what they said? Or was it simply empty words that tey hoped would sound right to 
the ears of the authorities? 
I have no definite answer to these questions but yet again I would like to refer to a 
work on the persecution of the witches: in his Thinking with Demons: the Idea of 
Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe1023 Stuart Clark emphasises how important it is to 
take “belief” as a “motivating factor” seriously. In Clark’s case it was the matter of 
belief in witchcraft, magic, “superstition” and the paranormal, but it is if possible even 
more important to take belief in God and all that goes with it, faith if you like, 
seriously. In certain situations religious rhetoric were used as mere tools that could 
serve a scope, but in other situations the sincerity of religious rhetoric should not be 
underestimated. If we choose to create too great distances between us and the past, or 
between us and religious faith, we will sooner or later end up rendering overly exotic 
or patronising whoever acts for reasons that we cannot quite recognise ourselves 
                                                                                                                            
the Swedes fiercely and that the peasants informed the snaphaner of every Swedish movement. As we 
see, the same situation can be described in many ways. 
1021 Edvardsson II, pp.137-138. Quotation p.138. The Swdicised names of the fifteen snaphaner are: 
Hans Fajersson, Sören Anderesson, Frans Loding, Per Pehrsson, Olof Svensson, Per Bengtsson, Jöns 
Persson, Nils Matzon, Håkan Persson, David Jonsson, Pehr Månsson, Olof Månsson, Sven Persson och 
Jöns Larsson. Unfortunately the letter does not tell us the place of their imprisonment.   
1022 ”…en halv sida senare påstår de sig ha varit lättsinniga nog att låta sig ”bedraga till sådant 
ogudeligt sällskap”.” 
1023 Clarendon Press, Oxford 1997, Chapter One. 
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in.1024 It is far too easy to create distances where there do not have to be any. Only a 
few years ago, in 2003, Apps and Gow claimed that people today cannot understand 
what it felt like to live in times when the state justified the use of torture.1025 Five 
years later, most people in the Western world have realised how easy it is to get used 
to living in a culture that accepts that dangerous individuals are being put to 
torture.1026 
 
I will now end this section with an analysis of the religious views of three friskytter 
whose letters and reports contain some hints as to their relation to God. Aage Monsen 
Harlof, commander of all the remaining friskytter during the latter part of the war, 
was normally a very sober war correspondent but in November 1679 he wrote a 
desperate letter to the Danish king in which he literally begged that his men be 
conceded winter quarters and wages although the war was lost and the friskytter no 
longer needed.1027 In this letter Harlof did not use his usual strict military tone but 
instead he tried to play on the emotional heartstrings of his sovereign whom he turned 
to as one Christian to another, albeit one was in power and the other not. Harlof 
claimed that the friskytter had sacrificed everything for their king and country: they 
had now been forced to abandon their homes and families without hope of return and 
what was worse; they knew that those they had left behind had been punished for their 
sakes. Their original intention had been to save their beloved fatherland from the 
Swedish yoke but instead of winning rewards they had been transformed into “freaks” 
and exiles. Harlof now begged the king to help his “poor exiled men” who had done 
nothing but their duty and who had only obeyed the orders of others but were now 
about to perish from hunger and frost: “God will reward such Royal Grace when Your 
Royal Majesty and the whole Royal Family and their ancestors have to face God’s 
merciful Tribunal on the day of the Resurrection of the Just.” 1028 Harlof presents a 
                                               
1024 See e.g. Bengt Ankarloo ( Att stilla herrevrede. Trolldomsdaden i Vegeholm (To Placate the Wrath 
of the Lord. The Sorcery Deeds at Vegeholm, Stockholm 1988, p.13): ”Historicism has a tendency to 
exoticise: it considers past times so totally different, that we always run the risk of misunderstanding 
them. Only lifelong intimacy with the mentality of times passed and gone enables the scholar to 
describe that era correctly.” Ankarloo adds that, in its turn, this line of thought risks creating ”an 
exclusive class of mandarines that guard their secrets with jealously”. 
1025 Apps and Gow, p.76. 
1026 Cf. Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay.  
1027 A translation of this letter can be found at the end of this thesis. The letter in its original version 
was published by Sörensson, p.60. Else, the letter itself can be found in the Danish National Archives, 
Major Aage Harlof till kungen, 18 November 1679, Indkomne Sager, 1679 No: 413.    
1028 Sörensson, pp.59-60 samt Röndahl, pp. 339-40.    
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picture that is diametrically opposed to Lybecker’s religious interpretation of the 
actions of the Scanians during the war. Contrary to what Lybecker claimed, Harlof 
and his men had not wallowed in sin and evil, but rather sacrificed their whole lives 
and those of their dear ones in the hope of freedom. Harlof was convinced that God 
knew that and those who shared knowledge of the truth with him would be rewarded 
in heaven when the time came. Major Niels Tommesen Tidemand shared the very 
same conviction, which his letter to the Sven Broch, the commander of Ängelholm 
(Engelholm), clearly shows:   
“And in response to the fact that you have tortured, pined and burnt our men, who are common 
soldiers, in response –with the help of God- we hope that we will get hold of some of their Swedish 
noblemen and commissioned officers, so that they may die an even more painful death...but we swear 
to God in heaven, that we will keep our word and never sneak treacherously upon anybody1029 
 
Tidemand assumed (or hoped) that the Swedish commander would share the same 
religious values as himself and that his own word of honour would seem more reliable 
if he could convince his colleague on the other side that he himself was a devout 
Christian. Indirectly, Tidemand intimated that the Swedes did not act like Christians 
and that they would have to learn to repent their sins if they wanted to count as 
Christians.   
Last but not least I would like to analyse the religious worldview of a less famous 
“snaphane” as it transpires from Swedish court records. Contrary to the two preceding 
cases the sources in this case were produced by enemy hands. For that reason I do not 
know whether “Nils Tuasson”, whose real name was probably Niels Tuesen or Nels 
Tuesøn, was a friskytte or just a youngster who had to keep away from the Swedes on 
account of a precipitous deed he committed on the spur of the moment. His case has 
already been mentioned by several historians but Tuesen’s statements have never 
been analysed. I chose to concentrate on Tuesen in this context since he was a 
profoundly religious man whose seemingly insensate return to Scania after twenty 
years only becomes comprehensible if interpreted as an attempt to listen to God’s 
voice. In April 1700 “Nils Tuasson” from Holmatorp, Vittsjö had to face court on the 
charge of having been a “snaphane” during the Scanian War.1030 When the war was 
                                               
1029 ” Og derimod, at I haver stejlt, sarteret og brændt ud af voris folk, som er gemene, derimod –næst 
Guds hjælp-  håber vi til, at vi  skulle få af de svenskes adelsp rsoner, såvel som højere officerer, som 
skulle lide slemmere død...mens vi besværger os på ved  Gud  i himlen,  at vi disse foreskrevne ord vil  
holde, og aldrig nogen skal gå og snige sig på nogen...” Niels Tommesen Tidemand to Sven Broch, 
1678, Nordiska Saml.Nr.205, Uppsala universitetsbibliotek. See also: Röndahl, p. 449.   
1030 Edvardsson, II, pp.55-62. Edvardsson’s sources were the court registers from the assizes of Västra 
Göinge, 20th, 21st and 30th April 1700, Landsarkivet  Lund.  
 303 
lost, Tuesen escaped to the other side of the sound and made a living there, but he 
longed home all the time and as the years passed he felt worse and worse.1031 In the 
end Tuesen decided that he would return home becaus he was convinced the 
wonderful water in Scania would do him good. Naturally his friends warned him that 
the Swedes would arrest him but in the end he managed to persuade a friend from 
Elsinore to row him over and from the Helsingborg aea he managed to make his way 
home. Exactly as he had thought, he felt better as soon as he started drinking Scanian 
water again, but unfortunately he was soon arrested and put in custody in a military 
prison. During the court case against him, Tuesen admitted that during the summer of 
1677 when he was a young and thin man, he had killed a Swede and then joined the 
“snaphaner”. During the interrogations, Tueson stoically declared that it had all taken 
place according to God’s will. When the soldiers stole wo heads of cattle and three 
pigs from his mother, twenty-year-old Tuesen had got extremely upset with the 
Swedes and had sworn to kill the first Swedish soldier that crossed his path. The 
occasion came on a summer’s day when Tuesen and a couple of his neighbours were 
out mowing the lawn behind the vicarage and a man in a grey coat came walking 
down the road and asked them which direction Markaryd was in. Tuesen promptly 
replied that he would give the man a good description, and then he jumped over the 
fence between the vicar’s garden and the road, snatched the stranger’s weapon from 
him and cut his throat with the explanation that the devil would show him the way to 
where he was going.1032 During the proceedings in court, Tuesen explained that it had 
all been “ the providence and design of a god”1033 but that if he had understood things 
then as well as he did now he would have thought twice before acting. When the 
judge asked him if he repented his sins he chose not to answer directly but explained 
that he would accept whatever decision the authorities came to but that he was hoping 
that God would be show him mercy. He could not repent having gone back to Scania 
since he was fully conscious of what he was doing when he made that choice: the evil 
that had assailed him and that had made his suffer so much in his head had 
disappeared and he was now a healthy man who chose to suffer for his sins. To 
Tuesen this option was much better than continuing to suffer in Denmark. When the 
                                               
1031 The nature of Tuesen’s problem is not quite clear. Tuesen said he felt ”förstörd i huvudet”, literally 
”ruined in my head” which in modern Scanian could mean either that Tuesen suffered from migraines 
or some sort of mental problems. I am not quite sur what it meant at the time.   
1032 There were several witnesses of this episode and they all claimed that they had not interfered 
because they were afraid to end up in trouble with the snaphaner.  
1033 ”en guds försyn och skickelse.” 
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crown prosecutor, the “kronans befallningsman”, demanded that Tuesen be judged 
according to the letter of the law, Tuesen started crying but at the same time he 
publicly  thanked God and the court and declared that he would gladly suffer in this 
world on account of his sins. The final verdict was not merciful: the High Court had 
decided that Tuesen should  “give a life for a life” and that consequently that  ”the 
murderer and snaphane Nils Tuasson will be beheaded, quartered and put on the 
wheel, as a well-deserved punishment for himself and as a terrifying warning to other 
wicked people.”1034 Tuesen’s own comment was that e would rather sell his soul to 
the devil than die by the axe and those who had decided that that should be his fate 
were indeed “a foreign land” to him.1035 In April 1700 the Göta court confirmed the 
verdict and decided that the “murderer and snaphane” should die on account of the 
“terrible murder” he had committed and because he had betrayed his lawful king. 
Tuesen was executed in May 1703. 
Tuesen stood up for what he believed in: namely, God. He also insisted that he did not 
have to answer for his sins to anybody but God and that he was about to lose his life 
because he was a man who listened to God. The fact th t the Scanian water had made 
him well again was proof enough that he had not been wrong in his interpretation of 
God’s will for himself. That was God’s sign to Niels Tuesen in a time when man still 
thought that God interceded actively in the world. 
  
 The Gross and Pernicious Attitude of the Clergy  
 
At the beginning of 1677 governor general Fabian vo Fersen enjoined the Scanian 
clergy not to socialise with snaphaner and on the contrary, to send all snaphaner they 
could get hold of to Malmö (Malmøe). A few weeks later, Fersen changed his policy, 
probably after consultations with his superiors: he now ordered bishop Winstrup to 
tell the clergy to preach to the snaphaner in church. In the sermons that were directed 
to the snaphaner the clergy should urge the snaphaner to abandon their evil pursuits 
and return to their usual occupations. They should make clear that all those who 
showed true repentance of their since would be forgiven. The clergy were also asked 
to write lists of those farm boys and others who would not apply for amnesty so that 
                                               
1034 Edvardsson, II, p.60. Quotation from Edvardsson II, p.62. 
1035 Edvardsson, II, p.61. Tuesen quoted the Psalter book with these words. 
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those sinners could be arrested and sent to Malmö (Malmøe).1036 These letters prove 
that the governor general considered “snaphaner” and “f rm boys” as closely 
connected concepts and that he took for granted that they went to church on a Sunday 
morning like everybody else. If Fersen had thought tha the snaphaner were some sort 
of robbers that lived outside the village community he would not have thought it 
worth the trouble to direct the Sunday sermon to them. Nor would he have assumed 
that the parish ministers had a clue or two as to wh the snaphaner might be. Fersen 
was well aware that the majority of the snaphaner were to find among quite ordinary 
parishioners.    
 
The Danish authorities were also aware of the whereabouts of the “snaphaner”. In a 
decree from June 1677 the Danish king enjoined the clergy that they should let the 
friskytter bury those of their comrades that had been xecuted by the Swedes. 
Furthermore the clergy were informed that the friskytter were authorised to destroy 
the execution grounds and that no minister of the church was allowed to refuse a 
friskytte the Holy Communion since the friskytter were only men who had been 
forced to abandon their homes by the ravages of the Swedes. In the same decree the 
king urged the clergy to respect the friskytter andtreat them no different from the way 
they treated other parishioners since they had beenemployed by the king himself as 
his ”Soldiers and Servants.”1037 
 
Consequently, the authorities on both sides knew that there were “snaphaner” who 
attended church services regularly and that they could be assumed to listen to, or at 
least hear, sermons.1038 One minister of the church who decided to take the Sw dish 
injunctions seriously was Hans Nielsen Holmbye at Västerstad (Vestrested) who 
                                               
1036 Fersen to the Swedish king, 27th Januari 1677, SRA, in Pehr Johnsson’s, Snapphanefejden, Brev 
och anteckningar, Örebro 1910, pp.80-82; Letter from Winstrup and Andreas Stobaeus to the Scanian 
clergy 17th February 1677, in Handlingar rörande det skånska kriget 1676-79, SRA. Quoted by 
Johnson, p.79. 
1037 Decree, 9th June 1677, U.S. , No:573. Sörensson, p.27.
1038 In a report to the king from 27th May 1678, general major Lybecker mentioned a “snaphane” called 
Little Tufve, whose father was had the post station at Marklunda in the parish of Osby. Little Tufve and 
his brother Big Tufve had joined the snaphaner and had been present when a corporal was shot to death 
at the Hönjarum bridge although they had both obtained amnesty through the intervention of their 
father. Little Thue had then threatened to kill a farmer at Loshult if the farmer did not give him money, 
which he did. Now the unhappy father was trying to et a new parole letter for Little Tufve but 
Lybecker advised the king not to concede him one. Istead he suggested that the “guards” by the 
Hönjarum bridge arrest Little Tufve on his way to church the following Sunday, because Little Tufve 
went to church “as if he had done nothing wrong.” See: Edvardsson, III, p.123.  
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preached to the snaphaner in his parish that they would end up in hell if they did not 
change their ways.1039 As mentioned in the preceding chapter this sermon had very 
sad consequences; ”Angry Simon” had the parish minister kidnapped and tortured to 
make him repent his threats. Holmbye was ransomed by his parishioners but in his 
turn, he set the Swedes under Sven “The Thrasher” Erlandsson on the friskytter so 
that nine of Andersen’s men were killed.1040 Simon Andersen was obviously 
convinced that he and his friskytter were not the on s who were going to burn in hell. 
They had another discourse to fall back upon: namely, the one that was propagated by 
the king of Denmark and that described the Swedes as unl wful intruders and tyrants. 
Simon Andersen was a captain of the friskytter with a perfectly legal license to attack 
the enemy and to persecute Swedes and their followers.   
  
Unfortunately, much of what is known or believed to be known about the snaphaner 
can be traced back to legends and is for that reason not of much use when one tries to 
write history. In this context I thought I would mention the Odders. Reverend Morten 
Jørgensen Odder and his son Lars who was also a minister of the church were both 
tried on the charge of collusion with the snaphaner. At least Odder sr. was quite close 
to losing his neck on that occasion although he was conceded grace at the last 
moment.1041 According to legend this gentleman organised church services on a stone 
in the middle of the woods that is now a tourist attraction. According to a legend that 
is reported by the Swedish historian Fryxell, Odder was kidnapped by the snaphaner 
and forced to give the Eucharist to them on that stone.1042 Whatever the truth is, the 
only sources that are available today, even as regards the legends are Swedish and 
would consequently hardly reveal if the Odders were not quite as contrary to 
snaphaner as they claimed to be in court. Odder was indicted by the ecclesiastical 
treason tribunal in 1681 but their final verdict is not known. The other two persons 
who were called to face the tribunal together with Odder junior were both former 
friskytter. Whichever side the Odders were on in their earts, they, like all other 
clergymen, would have been in an untenable situation during the Scanian war. Those 
                                               
1039 Röndahl,1996, pp. 303-304. 
1040 Sven Erlandsson, “Promemoria”, KB, Ny kgl. Samling 1076, 4o. Anders Hedwall, Tullsagra Simon 
alias Simon Snapphane, En skånsk frihetskämpe, Dansk-skaansk tidsskrift, Oktober 1966. Pp.14-18. 
1041 Edvardsson II, pp.65-74. 
1042 Edvardsson, II, p.74. Edvardsson quotes Fryxell’s Berättelser ur svenska historien. (Tales from the 
History of Sweden). For the ”altar stone” at Ekeby, see: Edvardsson II, p.32.  
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who did not want to become turncoats and serve two masters had practically no other 
option but to leave the country.  
    
On 19th January 1677, the Swedish governor general in Malmö (Malmøe) Fabian von 
Fersen communicated to the king that the situation in Scania was extremely 
worrying.1043 The inhabitants of the province were unreliable and they all supported 
the Danes. Fersen could feel how their evil and loathing grew day by day. According 
to Fersen the clergy were no different from the rest of the inhabitants: they were “up 
to their necks in evil, agitated and excited” and this whole pernicious situation 
constituted a safety risk to the Swedes. 1044As Stig Alenäs pointed out in his 
dissertation on the Swedification of the church, the clergy were “intermediaries 
between the bishop and the parishioners and participa ed in their protests and 
dialogues. They were supposed to resolve conflicts in co-operation with both 
authorities and the local population.”1045  It was consequently of utter importance to 
the Swedish government that they could trust the local clergy, including the bishop, to 
transmit the right message to their parishioners.1046 In his article “Scania and the legal 
system 1658-1684” Jens Christian Vesterskov Johansen points out that 
communication between the early modern authorities and the inhabitants could take 
place in at least three ways. There was an individual channel through letters of appeal 
that burghers and peasants alike could send to the king, and there were two collective 
ways of communicating: 1. The communications from the authorities that the local 
ministers read aloud in church and 2. The court proceedings at the local and regional 
assizes (byting and herredsting).1047 
 
                                               
1043 Fersen to the king, 19th January 1677, Generalguvernörsarkivet, SRA. Most of Fersen’s letters 
were in German (his mothertongue) and in his own writing. Fersen was born in the Baltic provinces 
and hardly ever used the Swedish language. He always spoke German to the Scanian nobles for 
example. This letter takes the form of an official report and is written in Swedish with another person’  
handwriting.    
1044 ”i ondskan nedsänkte, exciteradhe och opwäckte...” och detta prästernas ”enorme och skadelige 
förhållande” utgjorde en säkerhetsrisk för svenskarna. 
1045 Alenäs (2003), pp.25-26. 
1046 Naturally it was also an issue with the Danes, especially towards the end of the war when it seemed 
more and more likely that the Swedes would win.  
1047 “Skåne og rætsvæsenet 1658-1684”, pp.61-80 in Karl-Erik Frandsen & Jens Christian Vesterskov 
Johansen (eds.), Da Østdanmark blev Sydsverige. Otte studier i dansk-svenske relationer i 1600-tallet 
(When Eastern Denmark became Southern Sweden. Eight Studies in Danish-Swedish Relations in the 
17th Century), Skippershoved 2003. Quote: p.62.Vesterskov Johansen adds that unfortunately the 
communications that the clergy read aloud in church have seldom been conserved to our days. 
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Now, Fersen reported that hardly any parishes at all had celebrated the thanksgiving 
service that had been decreed after the battle of Lund, but when the “encouragement-
letter” from the Danish king was read aloud in the c urches on 18th December 
everybody had cheered. One clergyman who had been ind fatigable in his efforts to 
distribute and read out not only this letter but also one from general Meerheim to the 
Scanians, was Christopher Corvinius in the Ystad (Ysted) area.1048 Corvinius’ 
eagerness had caused great damage to the Swedes and now Fersen felt that severe 
measures should be taken against the Scanians in general and the clergy in particular. 
The first step should be to exchange the native clergy for Swedes. For this reason the 
Swedish minister Magnus Lacander had been given deaery of Ystad (Ysted) instead 
of baron Krabbe’s candidate Christopher Corvinius.1049 Unfortunately this decision 
had created problems since even the Right Reverend th  Bishop of Lund, Peder 
Winstrup had supported Krabbe on this issue. Now Fersen proposed that Winstrup 
who was of a certain age should be made to accept th  presence of a vice-bishop of 
Swedish origins. With the passing of time the senescent bishop would surely realise 
that he would feel better if he could spend his last few years in peace and quiet in his 
own home! If only the Swedish bishops would send down some able Swedish 
ministers to Scania then it would become easier “to combine and unite the nations 
with each other...”.1050 Furthermore, Fersen informed the king that in order to 
guarantee the safety of the realm, the Danes did not let native Norwegian clergymen 
work in Norway, or at least not many of them. Norwegian clergymen were sent off to 
”Denmark and Jutland”.1051 The last step proposed by Fersen was that a special 
tribunal for the inquisition of snaphane suspects and ll other suspects should be 
instituted.    
 
                                               
1048 Fersen enclosed the original letters with Corvinius’s signature so that the king could see that he was 
telling the truth. Corvinius also called himself ”Raffn” and ”Ramm”. All three words mean ”raven” in 
respectively Latin, Danish and Scanian.    
1049 Jørgen Krabbe did not have the ius patronatus, i.e. the right to choose the ministers of the chur , 
in Ystad (Ysted) although he had that right in several of the surrounding parishes, but obviously he was 
normally able to exert influence on the choice of the town clergy too.  
1050 “att combinera och föreena nationerna medh hvar and e…”. 
1051 Fersen then informed the king that the Danes hardly let any Norwegians occupy positions of 
political importance but left the majority of those to “Danes and Jutes”. According to Fersen that policy 
was a way of “combining and uniting the nations with each other.”(...att combinera och föreena 
nationerna medh hwer andre). He told the king that he had liberated two vicar positions (callings) in 
order to be able to substitute the Danish ministers on these posts with Competent Swedish ministers 
(Capable Swenska prester) so that the inclinations of the parishioners could be “straightened and 
corrected.” (retta och Corrigera). 
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By that time, Fersen only had a few months left to live. In June that year he was 
mortally wounded during the siege of Malmö (Malmøe) and died some time later. He 
was then substituted by Jöran Sperling. Nevertheless F rsen’s proposal was at least in 
part successful. The substitution of Danish ministers did not take on the dimensions 
he would have liked at all, but a quite efficient tribunal was instituted in Malmö 
(Malmøe) with branches in at least two other towns (Helsingborg and Örkelljunga), 
and lists of “infidelity” suspects who would have to face these tribunals were issued. 
One of the first persons who had to face the Malmö (Malmøe) tribunal was baron 
Krabbe who could be indicted and eventually condemned to death, in part because of 
his role in the Corvinius affair. General prosecutor Breuer who led the preliminary 
inquiries declared that Krabbe’s stubborn support of Corvinius had proved that the 
baron had a predilection for criminals and oath breakers.1052 Breuer saw Corvinius as 
a hypocrite and turncoat who did not respect the words f Our Saviour the Lord 
Christ. The baron had disgraced himself and his estate utterly by supporting a person 
like Corvinius when there were numerous suitable and honest Swedish men available 
for the post.1053  Corvinius was not only a criminal but a sinner.  
 
The Corvinius affair gives us a clearer image of the precarious situation of the clergy 
during the Scanian War. Not only were personal relationships closely entwined but 
also that problematic issues like snaphaner, loyalty to he king, being a patriot and a 
good Christian regarded all social classes. Another point that is obvious in the 
documents from the Corvinius affair is that there were those who wanted to expel all 
Danish ministers of the church from the Scanian provinces, although this policy did 
not win out in the long run. The writings of Fersen and Breuer do not let us doubt the 
existence of that line of thought. In the article “Religious or National World View? 
Scania after the Transition to Sweden in 1658” Hanne Sanders claims that the Swedes 
did not try to confer Scanian callings to particularly many native Swedes, at least not 
before the Scanian War and even later only in limited numbers, since the so-called ius 
indigenis that gave ministers that hailed from the area preced nce to callings in their 
home province. According to Sanders, later developments in the direction of 
                                               
1052 Breuer emphasised that Fersen not once, but several times, had incited Krabbe not to help 
Corvinius with his career since it was unsuitable that a man who at best was neutral should become 
head of other ministers. Native Swedish men with good merits were needed on such jobs.   
1053 Breuer’s Second Intercession, 15th October 1677, Rosencrantz, p.73. ”Mindre war dhet tienlige, at 
een reedelige och wel meriterat Swensk Mand, för hannom skulle tilbacka sättias....” 
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conferring more Scanian callings to native Swedes depended on a uniformity desire 
rather than a Swedification policy.1054 In his Bishops in the Diocese of Lund 1638-
1865 and the Events Surrounding Them Allan Green claims that the ius indigenis 
question remained a big issue during the entire transition period until at least the times 
of bishop Mathias Steuchius  (1694-1714) and that it was side-tracked on purpose 
during certain periods. According to Green, bishop Canutus Hahn (1680-1687)1055 and 
Steuchius both tried to introduce as many Swedish born ministers to Scanian callings 
as possible, since they wished to facilitate the introduction of the ”uniformity” and 
that was difficult with Scanian ministers who did not manage to speak Swedish 
particularly well.1056    
The Fight for the Souls  
”A captain of the snaphaner who used to be buried in a church, has been exhumed by ours and brought 
to Åhus, where his body with the corps has been put on the racks. And, since all these have committed 
serious crimes, they have also had to suffer the punishment they deserved.” 
Svenska Ordinarie Post-Tijdender, 23 februari 16791057 
The fact that many snaphaner/friskytter took an interest in religion can be understood 
from the fact that they went to church on Sundays and maybe even organised services 
in the woods. In the same manner they also wished to be buried like Christians, inside 
the churchyard walls or in the church. In this article I have tried to point out that some 
snaphaner/friskytter like Niels Tuesen obviously were deeply religious, and maybe, 
like Aage Herlof, they had taken in the Danish official discourse that claimed that the 
Scanians had been living in a Babylonian captivity with yokes on their shoulders.1058 
It was only natural for their times that that should be the case. As A. Hallenberg has 
pointed out in his book on the spiritual culture of 17th century Blekinge (Bleging), the 
sacraments were given extreme weight and forgiveness and grace was found through 
them. Personal, inner conversion and individual respon ibility in front of God had not 
                                               
1054  Sanders, pp.245-248. 
1055 The Swedish born vice bishop whose presence BishopWinstrup had to accept from 1677 onwards.  
1056 Allan Green, Biskopar i Lunds stift 1638-1865 och händelser kring dem, Libris 1986. See pp. 32-33 
and pp.50-51. Also pp.49-50: It had been to no use that a list of Danish words (’idiotismi’) that the 
ministers of the church were encouraged not to use had been distributed.     
1057 En snapphanekapten, som varit begraven i en kyrka, är v de våra uppgraven och förd till Åhus, 
där hans kropp med kistan är satter på stegel. Och, såsom alla dessa hava grova missgärningar begått, 
så hava de ock utsått sådant straff, som de förtjänt.”   
1058 See also the Hodomoriana Hahniana, the not very flattering poem about Bishop Hahn that
continued the theme of the Babylonian captivity in the 1680ies: “Have you never read that Israel was 
captive and under Babylonian rule, until many years had passed they had to sit there in fear. Who 
knows if Scania will not have her day, when she goes away to her own family, own alter, measure and 
speech...”  (”Har du det aldrig læst, at Israel var fangen/og under Babylon, til mange år var gangen,/ 
mått’sidde der i frygt. Hvem veed, om Skåne ej kan h  sin visse tid, indtil det går sin vej/ hen til sin
egen slægt, sit alter, mål og tale…”) (my italics). The poem was written by an ex-friskytte who had 
gone back to university, Hans Mand. The quote is from Fabricius IV, p.119. 
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yet become the word of the day in Scandinavian religios ty, but it was participation in 
common rites that brought salvation to the individual.1059 
 
The Snaphane War came to assume ever more macabre overtones and in a few cases 
even degenerated into a fight for the corpses of already dead snaphaner. From the 
winter of 1677-78 onwards the Swedes adopted increasingly violent execution 
methods that until that point had been saved for criminals who had committed 
particularly heinous (civilian) crimes. This tendency first became apparent in January 
1677 when Sheriff Bendix Clawssen’s unit of snaphaner/friskytter were betrayed and 
caught by the Swedes in the south-eastern parts of Scania.1060 Clawssen himself was 
drawn into a trap. During the consequent interrogati ns Clawssen provided the 
Swedes with a long list of  ”traitors”. We do not know how Clawssen was persuaded 
to betray both clergymen and noblemen as he did, but we do know that he and his 
men were forced to do the humiliating work of the “nightmen” while they were 
waiting for their execution.1061  
 
In his ”Promemoria” Sven Erlandsson reveals that the snaphane catchers also fought a 
”religious” battle with their prey: Erlandsson was proud of having exhumed 
snaphaner from hallowed ground so that the bodies could be put on the rack, as a 
warning to others.1062 An example of a man whose corpse on the contrary ws 
transported in the opposite direction was Truls Jönsso  from Skräddaröd who was 
shot by mistake during a Swedish massacre. During the hunt for adherents of Captain 
Bendix the Swedish soldiers had gone from house to house shooting down all the men 
in the village without asking questions. Later on, Truls Jönsson’s family managed to 
                                               
1059 Aug. Hallenberg, Blekings allmoge efter Roskilde fred. Bidrag till kännedom om ståndets 
materiella och andliga kultur under senare hälften av 1600-talet, ( The Commoners of Bleking after 
the Peace at Roskilde. A Contribution to the Knowledge of the Material and Spiritual Culture of this 
Estate during the Latter Part of the 17th Century), Karlskrona 1929, pp.276-277. 
1060 For details see chapter on Captain Bendix. 
1061 The Mercurius 5th February 1677: …(the snaphaner) first had to drag out all the dead horses that 
were to be found in the camp and they will thereafter be put on the racks. (“hava först måst utdraga alla 
döda hästar, som I lägret funnits och som därefter skola steglas.”) Quote from Edvardsson III, p.192  
1062 One of these cases was described by Erlandsson (”Promemoria om Snaphanerne”, Ny kgl. Samling 
1076, 4o) in the following terms: ”Among these was one called little Matz who was born in Höby in 
the hundred of Ingesta…the snaphaner took and buried him at Blentarp, but Sven Erlandsson dug him 
up and brought him to aahus in which place he was put on the racks in his coffin, once the lid had been 
opened and thrown away.”Iblandt desse war en hette lille Matz som var född i Höby i Ingesta 
härad...Snaphanarna tågo och begrof hånom sedermera i bl ntarp, men Sven Erlandsson tog hanom upp 
och lät föra hanom till ahuus derest han blef satt på stegel i Kistan, sädan loket wår upslagit och 
bortkastadt.”   
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free him of all charges and he was granted a Christian funeral and to be buried in 
hallowed ground.1063 It was consequently important for the Swedes to convince the 
Scanians (and maybe people back home) that the snapha er had no right to be buried 
in hallowed ground. In other words, they wished to make clear to everyone that the 
snaphaner were not the King’s Friskytter with righteous arms but murderers that were 
going to burn in hell, unless they repented their sins during their last moments on the 
stake. If that version had come natural to the Scanians, it would hardly have been 
necessary to go to such lengths to teach them the “truth”.    
 
The grotesque fight for corpses that went on during the Scanian war should rather be 
interpreted in religious terms. In his article on religion and magic in the penal system 
during the first part of the 17th century, the Danish historian Tyge Krogh has analysed 
what executions and torture meant during the early modern era and I have found his 
interpretative framework quite fruitful in my attempts to understand why it became 
necessary for the Swedes to treat the ”snaphaner” as they did.1064 Krogh emphasises 
that executions and corporeal punishment were very concrete events that took place in 
public. In this manner the authorities carried on a dialogue with the population. The 
execution ceremony became a religious ceremony:    
”God demanded that the Christian prince should execute blasphemers, sodomites, murderers and those 
who had committed incest, but God also wanted the churches to fight for the soul of the offender until 
the very last. According to Luther the human being was defenceless when confronted with the 
temptations of Satan. Infallibly, the humans sinned an  only the grace of God could save them. It was 
therefore essential for the single human being to confess his faith and repent his sins. This possibility 
was offered even to those who were condemned to death.”
1065  
 
In this manner the sinner was given a chance to repent his sins and be redeemed. The 
snaphaner were wrenched from the claws of Satan so that they could go to heaven. 
During the early modern era good Lutherans found themselves in a situation in which 
they continuously had to choose between good and bad, between the path of the Lord 
and that of the Evil One; it was a universe that centred upon man but which was also 
characterised by a binary worldview that was always threatened by “inversion”, that is 
that the good and true worldview would be reversed to its contrary.1066 The concepts 
                                               
1063 Summer-assizes of the hundred of Järesta, (Sommarting i Järesta härad), 14th May 1701. 
1064 ”Religion og magi i straffesystemet i 1700-tallets første halvdel”  in Sanders, pp.105-120. 
1065 Krogh in Sanders, p.112. 
1066 What Stuart Clark calls a “a binary vision of the world”. Se: Thinking with Demons:The Idea of 
Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe. Oxford: Clarendon, 1997, p.112.  According to Clark everything 
was divided into pairs of contraries like “ good/evil, order/disorder, soul/body, and male /female” and it 
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of “inversion” and “binary worldview” are characteristic of modern-day torture 
research. The torturer tries to instil the “correct” worldview into his victims: the one 
in which torturers are strong, confident and powerful and victims are vermin. Sooner 
or later the tortured accept this strictly binary worldview: there is good and evil, clean 
and dirty, white and black but nothing in between. The intentionality of the torturer 
crushes his victims’ capacity of experiencing an identity of his/her own: the thoughts 
and worldview of the torturer has taken the upper hand over the mind of the tortured 
person. This mechanism is also characterised by the infraction of various taboos, 
which in itself leads to a cultural vacuum, or “deculturisation”.1067 The 
snaphaner/friskytter described themselves as animals (Monsen) and were described as 
such (vermin, soulless beasts) , at the same time as is became essential to them to hold 
on to the Danish worldview in which they were human beings and not animals, in 
which they “only were peasants that had had been driven away from their farms by 
the Swedes.” The image of the yoke appears in testimonies from all layers of society, 
which in itself might signify that it constituted a “discourse” that penetrated 
Danish/Scanian society during the Scanian War. It had been absorbed even by millers 
and carters, whom it served to help them ascribe a m ning to what was going on 
around them during a very difficult time. Naturally it was not easy to know what one 
should believe and a man like Aage Monsen Harlof admitted that he sometimes had 
come to consider himself a “monster” that had no part in the existence of ordinary 
people. But in the end he nevertheless wrote to the king to reclaim his humanity and 
his right to live on the same terms as other people, lik  all other subjects of the Danish 
king. The “snaphane” Håkan Erichsson from Kolbengtseröd in Halland ended up in 
court and “confessed” that he and his comrades had not been to church in a very long 
time but had lived in the woods “like animals and soulless beasts.”.1068 The Danish tax 
collector Hendrich Peersøn who had previously served as estate manager at 
Krageholm (then Krogholm) castle was called “vermin” a d ”snaphane” by the 
Swedes.1069 In modern-day Russia president Putin calls the Chechnyan rebels 
“animals and monsters”. Russian mass media call them “bandits.”1070 This tendency 
makes part of a long rhetorical tradition that can be traced to Antiquity:  in order to 
                                                                                                                            
was utterly dangerous to try to move the equilibrium between the single units of one of these pairs. See 
also: Sanders, p.7.  
1067 Sironi, p.36. 
1068 Rydstrand, p.25.   
1069 Aletophilus, Breuer’s second intercession 15th October 1677, pp.70-71. 
1070 Quote from the French documentary ”Putin’s System” from 2007.   
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learn to live with the fact that someone constitutes a threat to our style of life and 
moral values, or that someone constitutes a menace to our physical safety or even 
worse, that of our loved ones, it is but all too easy to choose to brand that person as a 
ungodly bastard or bandit. It is not difficult to dubt the very humanity of that person. 
Putin consequently draws the conclusion that the cru lty of the Chechnyans proves 
that they are wild beasts.   
Theology students and Snaphaner 
The newly established university of Lund closed at the beginning of the Scanian War 
and did not open again until 1681.1071 A few of the students of the Scanian/Danish 
nation enrolled in the army while they were waiting to be able to pursue their studies. 
The theology student Jørgen Hansen Horster, son of the doctor (provinsialläkare) 
Hans Georg Horster, was a corporal in the friskytte troops during the Scanian war. 
Many years later, when he was curate of the parish of Oderljunga/Perstorp, he was 
accused by another clergyman, the reverend Wättring of Ingelstorp of having been a 
“snaphane” during the war and of having plundered the vicarage of Ingelstorp in the 
company of some other “snaphaner” who called him “corporal” during the early parts 
of the winter of 1676 (before the battle of Lund). Wättring had not had any idea of 
who the corporal was until he met Horster at a conference for the local clergy in the 
1680ies. Horster never commented on the charges officially.1072 As a Swedish 
clergyman he was known as “Jöran Horster”. I have found no traces of a Jørgen 
Hansen (Horster) in the muster rolls, but Fabricius refers to a report from him to the 
authorities about the Swedish charges against the vicar of Lemmestrø, Johan Clausen 
Trænovius.1073 War Commissary Jens Harboe mentions a “Jörgen Hanss.” as a 
friskytte (Jens Jacobss.)that had come in from Stenestad on 2nd June 1678.1074 
Fabricius also mentions a Jørgen Hansen Horst who was a “Danish sheriff” 
(ridefoged).1075 It might have been the same person. Jørgen Hansen Horst was 
mentioned together with Mogens Haksen and Henrik Persen, Baron Krabbe’s bailiffs 
                                               
1071 For a long time the authorities were uncertain whether the new university should be re-opened. See: 
Weibull & Tegnér, p.23 and p.26. 
1072 Mellhed, pp.174-175. 
1073 Fabricius III, p.83 footnote 12. Letter from Jørgen Hansen Horster, 11th April 1677, in what 
Fabricius calls “Krigsk. i .S”. In that letter Horster reported that the vicar of Lemmestrø was not only
facing charges of high treason but of theft because the Swedes claimed he had stolen four mares from 
Börringe (Børringe) when the Danish fleet under Tromp landed at Ystad (Ysted). Trænovius was 
condemned to death but at the last moment the king tra sformed his punishment to exiliation. 
1074 Jens Harboe’s reports, 2nd June (1678), Indkomne breve, DRA.   
1075 Fabricius III, p.146. 
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who both joined the Danish forces quite soon after th  Danish return to Scania. These 
three men worked in the same area in southern Scania. Both Haksen and Persen were 
discarded as  “snaphaner” by the Swedish authorities. It might therefore have been 
possible that Horster had a similar position during the Scanian War. The bailiffs 
Mogens Haksen, Henrik Persen and Jørgen Hansen Horst ended up on Sperling’s 
black list in February 1678, about a month after Baron Krabbe’s execution.1076 A 
“preaching snaphane’s” name was put on the gallows in Malmö (Malmøe) during the 
war, as results from the inquiries of the Swedish ecclesiastical treason 
commission.1077 The name of the preaching snaphane was Jöran Hansson Horster and 
the prelate who had let him preach, the vicar of Grönby Petrus Bering, was later 
called in front of the treason commission because of the event. Bering promptly 
replied that he had not had the slightest idea that the man was supposed to be a 
snaphane. The treason commission asked him to send in further explanations. 
Unfortunately we do not know more than that today. As far as I know Horster himself 
was never called to answer to the treason commission, possibly because of his good 
contacts with eminent Swedes like his father-in-law who was a professor in Lund. It 
can only be hypothesised that Jørgen Hansen managed to ain enough credibility with 
the Swedes to be able to resume his theology studie wh n the University of Lund re-
opened after the war and then get ordained in 1684.1078 
 
Another theology student who became a “snaphane” was Major Hermansen’s 
lieutenant Jacob Visseltoft whose father was the vicar of Visseltofte, Jurgen 
Visseltoft.1079 Visseltoft junior had first joined the regular army but was caught by the 
Swedes at the battle of Lund. He was then detained as a POW but Ebbe Ulfeld 
somehow managed to get him free. Visseltoft then set out for the Danish enclave of 
Landskrona (Landscrone) where he reported to the military headquarters. He was 
                                               
1076 Fabricius III, p.146. The special tribunal instituted by Sperling on the suggestion of his predecessor 
Fersen had lists of suspected traitors published and the longest one was the one from February 1678 
that included a large part of the burghers of Helsingborg and several personages from the circle around 
Baron Krabbe.  
1077 Alenäs (2008), p.180. 
1078 Maybe it should be added that Horster remained a country curate for the rest of his life, which is 
rather odd for a clergyman. All his requests for promotion were refused, allegedly because there had 
been complaints against him but maybe his wartime activities had not been directly advantageous to his 
career. 
1079 Sörensson, p.27, refers to: Jakob Visseltoft, 27thFebruary 1677, I.S. No: 316, DRA. Jakob’s father 
was the vicar of Visseltofte, Jurgen Visseltoft.. 
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finally placed among Hermansen’s Friskytter.1080 After the war “Jacob Jörgen 
Wesseltoft” was called to respond to the treason commission, in order to respond to 
the charges of having been a snaphane and of having visited Copenhagen during the 
war.1081 
Other theology students/clergymen who worked as friskytter during the war or who 
were later accused of having been snaphaner were Lars Mårtensson Odder who was 
still a student in 1681 when the treason commission called him. Odder and his father 
Morten Jørgensen had both been arrested on the charge of being snaphaner during the 
war and Odder sr. almost lost his neck.1082 Another theology student whom the 
commission expected to present himself to explain his actions was Hans Hansson 
Werming.1083 
Hans Eriksen Mand 
Mand was a captain under Nicolaus Hermansen (Nikolaj Hermansen). Before the war 
Mand, who hailed from the other side of the Sound, had been a student at Lund 
University. At the beginning of the war he was arrested by the Swedes, as Fabricius 
pointed out, quite contrary to the university norms.1084 Fabricius first stated that Mand  
became a “befalingsmand” or sheriff during the war,1085  but later he claimed that 
Mand was a captain under Hermansen and that two other s udents, Jakob Pedersen 
Bredal and Jakob Jörgensen Visseltoft served under him as “captain lieutenant” and 
lieutenant respectively.1086 The Reverend Sthen Jacobsen in his turn bestowed Hans
Mand with the titles of “marauder general”, “that thief” and “the rascal” who claimed 
that one fourth of all brewery and distillery utensils in Scania belonged to himself, 
when Arensdorf had ordered that all that sort of equipment should be confiscated.1087 
Jacobsen blamed General Arensdorff for the destruction that was wrought on Scania 
during the summer of 1678, and according to Jacobsen, Mand was Arensdorff’s most 
willing servant who was extremely sad because of all the vodka distillery equipment 
                                               
1080 Fabricius III, p. 
1081 Alenäs (2008), p.180. Alenäs quotes the protocols fr m the ecclesiastical treason commission of 
1681. 
1082 Edvardsson, pp.65-74. 
1083 Alenäs (2008), p.180. Alenäs quotes the protocols fr m the ecclesiastical treason commission of 
1681. Unfortunately the names are swedicised and so it is sometimes difficult to identify them with the 
Danish names of the Danish records. 
1084 Fabricius III, p.50. Fabricius IV, p.52 of the index, also calls him a “student and captain of the 
friskytter.” 
1085 Fabricius III, p.50. 
1086 Fabricius III, p.106. 
1087 Jacobsen, p.166.  
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that would be left unused when Arensdorff’s confiscation order was annulled and 
Arensdorff called back to Copenhagen. Furthermore Jacobsen claimed that Mad had 
been just as willing a servant to the Swedish district governor, Leijonschiold, at an 
earlier stage. Jacobsen’s final verdict on Mand was th t he had only fought for 
himself and not for the kingdom of Denmark. Later on in his life Mand composed a 
poem that caused him much trouble: the Hodomoriana Hahniana, a not very flattering 
poem about Bishop Hahn that continued the theme of the Babylonian captivity in the 
1680ies.1088  
Conclusion  
Naturally the constant calling for God’s help was a kind of rhetoric that might easily 
be experienced as pompous and fake by the modern-day reader, and probably some 
people felt the same in the 17th century. However, it is important to stress that it can 
be supposed that many people at the time really believed in the values they 
represented in their rhetoric. Independently of how deep the faith of the single person 
was (or was not) Christian rhetoric was expected to sound good and to suscitate vivid 
feelings among the receivers of the message. One was expected to believe, even if one 
was simply a “snaphane”. There is hardly any need to add that naturally, the King’s 
Friskytter took for granted that they had the Lord n their side. Had they not parted 
from the supposition that they fought for the “good and just” they would not have had 
any motivation at all to continue to make part of a paramilitary organisation in which 
they risked more than life itself and where it was demanded that they obey certain 
rules. 
  
To a certain extent the Swedish policy in the Scanian provinces aimed at changing the 
reality that the Swedes had first found there so that i  could be adapted to a form that 
would suit the Swedish realm better. Anders Linde-Laursen has claimed that some of 
the north-eastern towns were replaced by “Swedish” towns in the vicinity in an 
attempt to reshape and restyle.1089 Much in the same manner, the rebels were re-
modelled into criminals or even, animals. Reshaping reality so that it could be 
                                               
1088 : “Have you never read that Israel was captive and under Babylonian rule, until many years had 
passed they had to sit there in fear. Who knows if Scania will not have her day, when she goes away to 
her own family, own alter, measure and speech...”  (”Har du det aldrig læst, at Israel var fangen/og 
under Babylon, til mange år var gangen,/ mått’sidde der i frygt. Hvem veed, om Skåne ej kan ha sin 
visse tid, indtil det går sin vej/ hen til sin egen slægt, sit alter, mål og tale…”) (my italics). The quote is 
from Fabricius IV, p.119.   
1089 Linde-Laursen, Anders. Det nationales natur. En studie i dansk-svenske relationer. Lund 1995, 
p.47.  
 318 
perceived as righteous and just became an important constituent of the Swedish policy 
in Scania. Charles XI was a pious man who needed to feel that he was acting in 
accordance with the will of God. It was also important that Charles’s subjects at home 
and around Europe conceived of “their universe” as th t of the “good guys”, else it 
would have become too hard to motivate them for active combat service and to make 
them send their sons to war. According to the biographer of Charles X, Anthony F. 
Upton, the king was convinced that the Scanians had broken the law of God and that 
he himself and his subjects were united by ”a common endeavour to discover and 
obey God’s will for Sweden  .”1090 
Just like many other Scanians, the friskytter and those who were called snaphaner, 
chose to trust a radically different discourse. In case they had taken the Swedish 
propaganda seriously they would have had to consider themselves the devil’s 
henchmen who deserved nothing but the worst. But they obviously did not see 
themselves in that light. Those friskytter and snaphaner who have left statements 
regarding this issue in the sources were firmly convinced that they were fighting on 
the side of the good and righteous. If, in the end, victory would not be theirs it still did 
not mean that the Swedes had been right in keeping Scania and treating people the 
way the had. According to Danish propaganda it would sooner or later be the Swedes 
who would suffer the most since they had committed the worst sins and had refused to 
listen to their own conscience.1091 Many Scanians and probably all friskytter adhered 
to that kind of beliefs. We have testimonies of counts, footmen, carters and why not, 
the king himself, who used the Babylonian captivity discourse in order to motivate 
their personal resistance to the Swedes. This fact indicates that there was space for 
personal freedom of choice at the time and that even if the northern European 
worldview was practically identical from one realm to another it did not exclude 
different interpretations: interpretations that in heir turn could become dangerous 
weapons or bulwarks of vital importance, depending o  who chose to adhere to them.  
 
Conclusion of Part II: Who and What Were the Snapha ner?  
A person who scouted for the Danes or who brought letters between different 
outposts, or who spied on behalf of the district governor (amtmand), was a 
”snaphane” to the Swedes if, in times of peace, he dedicated his time to modest 
                                               
1090 Anthony F.Upton, Charles XI and Swedish Absolutism, Cambridge University Press 1998, p.113. 
1091 En sandfærdig replique, p.36. 
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occupations like ploughing, cobbling or sewing.   Furthermore, all those who had 
enrolled in the official corps of Friskytter during the war, were automatically branded 
as “snaphaner”. As a rule any Scanian who in any manner had used arms against a 
Swede was included in that category, unless the Scanian was of noble extraction. The 
higher the walk in life you tread, the smaller was the chance of going down as a 
snaphane. The reverend Sthen Jacobsen of the parishof Kågeröd (Kogere), near 
Landskrona (Landscrone), would probably not have been condemned for snaphane 
activities if the Swedes had discovered that he was indeed spying on behalf of the 
Danes, possibly he might have been charged with collusi n with the snaphaner. The 
same can be said of Jens Michelsen, the owner of the Hovdala (then Howdale) estate 
in northern Scania, who informed against the Swedes. In those cases, social position 
was crucial. The Swedes did not classify men of some standing (be they noblemen or 
not) as snaphaner, although collusion with snaphaner was enough for capital 
punishment. The minister of the church, Mårten Jörgensen Odder was accused of 
collusion with snaphaner but, at the very last moment, he was reprieved by the king. 
None of these men would have been classified as snapha er by the Swedes even if a 
peasant who had committed exactly the same “crimes” would have been so. 
“Snaphaner” in the sense that it acquired during the Scanian War, was a category that 
had been created from outside, by the Swedish authorities and it was not a term that 
anybody used to denote themselves. 1092  At least not after the institution of the 
(Danish) King’s Corps of Friskytter. The category of men that I am analysing here is 
mainly composed of friskytter, since they were those who left the largest number of 
written sources in the archives. Nevertheless, I have also included sources that can be 
traced to the hands of, or deal with, people who were classified as snaphaner by the 
Swedes. In a manner of speaking, being a ”snaphane” was a social classification that 
indicated which social group one belonged to.1093  
 
Many “snaphaner” did absolutely not consider themselves as such. It can only be 
hypothesised that some of them only came to think of themselves as snaphaner when 
the Swedes (the executioners perhaps) had convinced them that all they were was 
”louts and snaphaner”. In their Male witches in early modern Europe Lara Apps and 
                                               
1092 ”.. att Krabben skulle lade svensken vide, att disse som de kalder snaphaner var der att finde 
skulde dommen haffde optegnedt huor de rare at finde som mand dett skulle lade vide.” 
1093 However, this was not always the rule regarding those who were registered as friskytter: Casper 
Due was a nobleman and Bendix Clawssen occupied a distinguished position (skowridere).   
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Andrew Gow describe how persons who had never before thought of themselves as 
witches came to identify themselves with that connotati n through the workings of 
torture.1094 Apps and Gow emphasise that some of those who were ex cuted as 
witches actually dealt in magic and other mysterious things, but that these persons too 
tended to prefer being called other things than witches.1095  
 
The category ”witches” was consequently a classification that had been created from 
the outside, by the “enemy”.1096 The same thing can be said about the category 
“snaphaner” in the sense that it took during the Scanian war. “Snaphaner” as in “the 
godless snaphaner”, “the barbaric snaphaner” and the “monsters and wild beasts” 
were created by the Swedish authorities. Originally the term “snaphane” was a vague, 
but not negative denotation of peasants in arms, guerrilla-style warriors and possibly 
(but I have no evidence whatsoever from the sources that this was the case), outlaws. 
If, before 1676, its connotations were fluctuant and not weighed down by negative 
associations, the situation changed with the war when t e term “snaphane” came to 
denote the dregs of society. As Alf Åberg has pointed out, the Swedish state included 
all sorts of personages in this classification.1097 What Åberg failed to realise was that 
this classification was largely created from the outside, i.e. by those very same 
authorities. During the German witch hunts a contemporary torturer claimed that it 
was no use even being a count, one might as well say wh tever the persecutors 
wanted if one wanted to avoid the worst kinds of suf ering.1098 This was also the case 
with the so-called “snaphaner”. 
                                               
1094 Manchester University Press 2003, pp. 17-18. Exactly the same process has been described by 
Anne Llewellyn Barstow in her Witchcraze-A New History of the European Witch Hunts (Harper 
Collins 1994, p.xiii) in which she claims that modern Indian women who have been abused by their 
displeased husbands’ families succumb to the same psychological mechanism. The women internalised 
the message that the were intrinsically evil once they had been the target of other people’s aggressions 
and desire for power long enough.      
1095 Often enough the local wise women and men, as well as midwives, spaewives and fortune-tellers 
were re-named ”witches” and ”sorcerers” by the authori ies. Today the same professional category 
prefer to call themselves healers, clairvoyants or mediums. Apps and Gow prefer using the term 
”witch” for both sexes. When it is necessary to distinguish between the two sexes they use the 
expression “male witches” for men.     
1096 The example in Apps and Gow is Johannes Junius, a fifty-five-year-old local magistrate at 
Bamberg who was tortured and condemned of witchcraft on most dubious grounds. His case is well 
testified by the sources.   
1097 See: Åberg, 1958, p.102. 
1098 Apps and Gow, p.82 foot-note 36. The advice was given by Johannes Junius’s torturer when as he 
wanted to warn the Burgermeister of denying the charges of witchcraft: “Erdenke etwas, dann ir könnt 
die marter nicht ausstehen, die man euch anthut, vnd wann ir sie gleich alle ausstehet, so kompt ir doch 
niht hinaus, wann Ir gleich ene graff weret...” 
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Vigo Edvardsson pointed out that the Swedish fealty campaign of 1677 caused a 
division of the inhabitants between those who had signed the Swedish ”fealty-
contract” in which they promised to stay at home in peace and quiet and to denounce 
all snaphaner and those who had chosen not to. Edvardsson commented that it was 
“the part of the population that was loyal to the Swedes that had presented 
themselves, while the snaphaner stayed away from the meetings.”1099 However, one 
might wonder whether those who did not sign the contract really considered 
themselves as snaphaner? Just as one might question Edvardsson’s conclusion that all 
those who did sign constituted “the loyal part of the population” when quite some 
show of Swedish muscle had been necessary to get them to sign. Nevertheless, I 
believe that Edvardsson’s point is an important one in that he realised that the actions 
of the Swedes created a difference that had not been th re before: the fealty campaign 
and other similar measures created “snaphaner” in the sense of “murderers and 
bastards”.        
 
With this I do not want to claim that the snaphane-movement was a figment of the 
Swedes’ imagination. The friskytter constituted a physical reality that had to be dealt 
with in some very concrete manner. So did the more general forms of Scanian/Danish 
opposition to Swedish rule. The friskytter were quite real and quite combative: so 
much so that the Swedes in the war zone were terrified of them. In the same manner 
most other persons who could be classified as snaphaner exhibited quite physical 
presences and in many cases they had indeed opposed the Swedes in one way or 
another. Many scholars have interpreted the snaphane-movement as the result of 
social malcontent and as a protest against misery and abuse committed by the 
representatives of the state.1100  
Contemporary interpretations did not come to very different conclusions. The Scanian 
nobleman Olluf Rosencrantz despised the snaphaner at the same time as he felt true 
compassion for them (as he did with peasants in general). According to Rosencrantz 
                                               
1099 Edvardsson II, p.188. 
1100 See: Fabricius, III,  in particular pp. 101-102 where he claims that the snaphaner were peasants that 
suffered financial collapse when their usual trade routes were cut off and the tax system changed after 
the Swedish take-over. According to Fabricius these men first become outlaws and then friskytter. On 
this issue Alf Åberg (1958, pp. 75-77) follows Fabricius line. More recently, Karl Bergman (2002, 
pp.78-79) has claimed that in the aftermath of the Scanian commission, social discontent found its 
safety valve in the snaphane movement.   . 
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the snaphaner were quite ordinary peasants who wanted to avenge the maltreatments 
the Swedes had submitted them to during the interwar period: 
   ”some ordinary Peasants and Commoners in the conquered Scanian Provinces, during these Times 
of War, had sought out the right Occasion to avenge the Maltreatment, Derision and Contrariness with 
which they all in unison and with great misery claim that they have been exposed to in many Ways by 
the Swedish Officers and Civil Servants since they left Danish rule and that since that Time they have 
been maltreated by them, always with Punches and Blows,, heavy Burdens and Taxes, and among other 




Olluf Rosencrantz was firmly convinced that the Swedes wanted to do away with all 
Scanians of Danish origins, independently of which estate they belonged to.1102 
Holger or Knud Thott continued much in the same vein as Rosencrantz, with the 
difference that the snaphaner and friskytter were df nded more expressly.1103 
According to the author of this booklet they all wanted to be called ”friskytter”, 
whether they were registered in Copenhagen or not. He also claimed that only a 
Swede would call those “snaphaner” who really were only ordinary peasants who had 
decided to fight for their righteous king and country. They never called themselves 
anything but friskytter! Thott explained the origins of the snaphane-movement in the 
following terms:     
”When the King of Denmark landed in Scania with his army, many of the country folk took service 
with the King of Denmark as Scouts and Friskytter, after which they set out, under the command of 
                                               
1101 See pp. 26-27: “nogle gemeene Bönder oc Almues Folck i de conqvesterede Skaanske Provincier, 
ved disse Krigs Conjuncturer, kunde haffve sögt Leylighed til at hefne den onde Medfart spot oc 
Fortred som de endrecteligen oc ynckeligen beklager dem at väre begegnet med i mange Maader aff de 
Svenske Officerer oc Betienter siden de ere komne fra den Danske regiering at de siden den Tid haffver 
väret aff dem ilde tracterit, med idelig Hug oc Slag store Tynge oc Contributioner, oc iblant anden 
haard ond oc spottelig Medfart daglig maatte höre derhos at mand icke anderledis burde at tractere de 
false Jytte Hunde.”  
1102 See: Aletophilus (Olluf Rosencrantz?), En sandfärdig REPLIQUE imod Den falske Deduction,som 
underfundligen er sammenspunden til at bemandtle den Morderiske oc Tragoediske Action Som 
Gen.Leutenant oc Vice-Gouverneur i Mallmöe Baron Jörgen Sperling Sammesteds lod anrette offver 
Den Höyädle oc Velb: Herre Baron Sl. Jörgen Krabbe Den 16.Januari 1678, (A Truthful Replique 
against The false Deduction, that cleverly enough has been thought out in order to cover up the 
Murderous and Dramatic Action That Gen. Lieutenant and Vice-Governor in Mallmöe Baron Jörgen 
Sperling had arranged in that very location against The Noble and Distinguished Lord Baron the late 
Jörgen Krabbe on 16th January 1678), Copenhagen 1678. See p.32: ”the late Baron’s Persecutors, from 
endless Hatred and Cruelty towards the majority of the remaining Scanian inhabitants of Danish Birth 
and Extraction would gladly like to follow in Caligula’s footsteps.”(den Sl.Barons Efftertractere aff et 
umettelig Had oc Grumhed til de fleeste aff de offverbleffne Skaanske Indbyggere aff Danske Biurd oc 
Extraction gierne skulle ville effterfölge Caligulae Exempel”) and p.12: ”the natural Hatred and thirs 
for Blood against all people of Danish Descent and Extraction, which alone is the true Reason for their 
having set in action such a Murder and Tyrannical Behaviour.” (det naturlige Had oc Blodgierighed 
imod alle Danske Affkomst oc Extraction, hvilcket alleeniste er den rette Aarsag som dem til saadan et 
Mord oc Tyrranniske Medfart haffver operret.”) 
1103 Unfortunately I have not been able to certify which of the two Thotts was the author. 
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their assigned officers, against the enemy of Denmark which was the Swedes, in order to serve their 
most righteous lord according to their Natural Duty.”1104  
 
According to Thott the snaphaner and friskytter were people who fought on the right 
side, i.e. on the side that society, their righteous king and God would have wanted 
them to fight. Thott’s interpretation of the friskytte movement is interesting since he 
was one of very few contemporaries who did not only express his “for” or “against” 
the friskytter/snaphaner but he also tried to explain the “why” and “how” these people 
entered into combat against their one-time overlords. Thott emphasised that they were 
“kinsfolk” ie. soldiers and that they did not behave worse than other soldiers. Swedish 
propaganda tended to depict the snaphaner as murdero s beasts that acted on no 
authorisation but their own but Thott fiercely opposed this view. Neither Thott nor 
Rosencrantz denied that the friskytter proceeded by violent means but they both 
claimed that this was so because the Scanians had been provoked to violence by the 
Swedes who avenged themselves with fire and the sword on anyone who was not on 
their side.1105 Finally I would like to quote Major Aage Monsen Harlof of the 
friskytter who explained that he and his men had become friskytter “…because we 
were Hoping that we would once more be saved from the Swedish Yoke and in Times 
of Grace be Rewarded by our Most Gracious King.”1106   
  
                                               
1104 MS Rostgaard 4to, 93, KB. Fabricius called this manuscript Det hefnraabende blod (Blood Calling 
for Revenge).Translation: ”Der Kongen aff Danmark kom paa Skoneland med sin armee, vahr der 
mange aff Landfolcket som toge tieniste hos kongen aff Danmarck som Parthie gienger oc friskytter, 
derpaa toge de bestilling under tilskickede officerir imod Danmarcks fiende som vare de svenske, at 
tiende deris retteste herre effter Naturens Plict.” Here Thott betrayed his familiarity with contemporary 
philosophical trends in mind: the Danish historian Tyge Krogh has pointed out that at the time, many 
philosophers considered ”nature and the history of the different societies as expressions of the divine 
order and consequently alternative sources for our knowledge of God’s will”. (Naturrättsfilosofin) 
Quote from Krogh’s ”Religion og magi i straffesystem t i 1700-tallets første halvdel”, (Religion and 
magic in the penal system of the first half of the 17th century), pp.105-120 in Sanders 2001, quote p. 
107.  Furthermore, Krogh (pp.108-109) emphasises that sins and/or crime that went against the order of 
both society and nature arose the wrath of God and God demanded that that kind of abominations 
should be extirpated from the world. Seen from thispoint of view the capital punishment was an order 
from Above.     
1105 ”the example that the King of Sweden in Denmark has been in that he came down with sword and 
murder on all those that opposed his side.” (dett exempell som Kongen aff Sverrige udi Danmarck 
statueredt med sverd oc mord offuer alle dem som giorde hans parthie offuerlast.) 
1106 “...i den Forhaabning, vi kunde igen frelsis af Suenschens Aag og i Tiiden af Naade winde 
Belönning hoes worris Allernaad. Konge.” Aage Harlof to the Danish king,18th November 1679, I.S., 
No:413, DRA. The letter has been published by Pehr Sörensson, p.60.   
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Part III:The Krabbe Case  
“I have sinned against all of God’s 10 commands, I have led a bad life, and have not shied from 
pernicious actions until now that I am not far from death and can see the disaster that was mine with 
my very own eyes”1107   
 
Introduction: Selling Oneself to the Devil 
On a summer’s day in 1676 the wealthy country squire Jørgen Krabbe was taking a 
walk in the park when his bailiff Hindrich Peersøn suddenly turned up with a paper in 
his hand. It was an authorisation from the Danish kng that entitled Peersøn to work as 
a tax collector. By that time almost all of Scania had been taken back by the Danes 
and Krabbe had sent his bailiff to ask for a safeguard letter for his estate Krogholm 
that is now known as Krageholm. Jørgen Krabbe was shocked and exclaimed: ”Do 
you want to sell yourself to the devil? You’ll have to prepare yourself to become an 
exile and an outlaw!” 1108  From a Swedish point of view Peersøn had become a 
snaphane and in the sources he was mentioned as the”Swedish nation’s worst 
persecutor”.1109   The following year Krabbe was court-marshalled on the charge of 
high treason against the Swedes. One of the most seriou  charges against Krabbe was 
that he had let Peersøn continue in his service even aft r that day in the park when he 
declared that he had become a “snaphane”. Governor General Sperling declared that 
he would rather have expected the sky to come crashing down than that baron Krabbe 
should prove himself a traitor. And yet, Sperling felt that the baron had now showed 
his truly Danish colours. Krabbe himself insisted that he was and always would be an 
honest Swedish  and patriot.1110 
 
This part of the thesis concentrates on the so-called Krabbe case that brought the 
leading Scanian nobleman of the day to the scaffold in the midst of the Scanian War. 
                                               
1107 Jeg hafr syndet mod alle de 10 Gud budord, lefwet ild , og icke taget mig være for skade, førend nu 
jeg icke er langt fra døden, og seer min store ulycke for mine øyen.” Jørgen Krabbe’s ”Bönnebog”, 
p.25. 
1108 ”Vilt du nu Fanden i Vold, det du maa forsickre dig, och bereede dig til, at blifve Landflyctig, och 
en Rømnings-Mand?”Jorgen Krabbe’s Reply to the Second Instance of the ”Prosecutor”, 23th October 
1677, in Aletophilus, En sandfærdig REPLIQUE imod Den falske Deduction, sm underfundligen er 
sammenspunden til at bemandtle den Morderiske oc Tragoediske Action Som Gen.Leutenant oc Vice-
Gouverneur i Mallmøe Baron Jørgen Sperling Sammesteds lod anrette offver Den Høyædle oc Velb: 
Herre Baron Sl. Jørgen Krabbe Den 16.Januari 1678, København 1678.  This episode and parts of this 
chapter have been published in Jojan Vadenbring ”Omvi blifver svensk. Identitetsfrågor i 
övergångstid” (If we become Swedish...Identity Issues in Times of Change),  pp.160-179 in Harald  
Gustafsson & Hanne Sanders,  Integration och identiteter i det förnationella Norden, (Integration and 
Identities in the Pre-National Nordic Countries), Göteborg/Stockholm förlag 2006. See especially pp 
160-161. 
1109 8th October 1677 Lorens Basch to Krabbe, Aletophilus p.17. 
1110 Fabricius III, p.135. 
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The court case against him centred upon his relations t  people around him who were 
not only Danish-minded but in several cases also “snaphaner”. The severity of the 
charges against Krabbe also depended on the fact that the prosecution claimed that his 
private correspondence betrayed his considering himself a Dane. Both these points, 
the relations of the snaphaner to the manorial world that dominated most of Scania, 
and the importance of identifying oneself as a Dane or a Swede will be in the centre 
of the analysis in the following sections. 
 
One of Knud Fabricius’s main theses was that Denmark lost Scania because the 
national feelings of the nobility were not awakened until it was too late. A Danish 
nationalist like Fabricius naturally felt that Krabbe was a dubitable character: the 
baron was an inborn Dane and his behaviour should have been predictable. A true 
nationalist does not change nationality. From that point of view it is odd that Krabbe 
could claim that he was Swedish although he behaved lik  a Dane and spoke Swedish 
with a Danish accent. He might even have looked like a Dane. However, the kind of 
nationalism that Fabricius represented did not exist in the 17th century. If one sees 
nationalism as a product of the French revolution, industrialisation and the modern 
world the Krabbe case has to be seen in a different light.1111 In this chapter I will 
analyse how patriotic rhetoric was used in the documents that remain from the trial 
against Krabbe. I will also try to analyse what role collective identities and loyalties 
played. The Krabbe case brings conflicting loyalties l ke royalism, religion, 
Swedishness and Danishness to the fore. There were Danish and Swedish identities at 
the time but we cannot take for granted that they awakened the same sort of emotional 
response as today or that they conveyed the same associ tions.1112  If we set out from 
a desire to find the roots of nationalism or, on the contrary, from the firm conviction 
that nationalism is a modern phenomenon we might easily get blinded. Maybe it is a 
different kind of reality that one has to look for: a time and a world when loyalties and 
identities other than those we are used to played an important role. What did Krabbe’s 
and Peersøn’s detractors mean when they spoke of a nation?  What did Krabbe mean 
when he said that he was a Swede and a patriot?  
                                               
1111 Eric J.Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780, Cambridge University Press 1990, p.75. 
Eric J Hobsbawm claims that ”the nation” is a modern phenomenon that was created by nationalist 
ideologies that, in their turn, were a product of the French revolution and industrialism.  
1112 Harald Gustafsson, ”The Conglomerate State: A Perspective on State Formation in Early Modern 
Europe.” Scandinavian Journal of History 23, 1998, s.210. 
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It is important to try to use other terms than those that are immediately connected to 
modern nationalism. The ethnie concept is quite useful in this context. I do not speak 
about ”nationalism” but try to use the term ”patriotism” that is normally used in 
Scandinavia.1113 However, my sources use  words like ”nation” and ”ational hatred” 
on almost every page and I would find it too confusing to use modern substitute terms 
in the analysis. It should be kept in mind that it is the matter of 17th-century nations 
and national hatred and that the aim of this chapter is to analyse what contents were 
attributed to these words way back then. 
 
Jørgen Krabbe’s Background 
 
Introduction 
This subsection contains a biography of Krabbe’s first years and a brief analysis of the 
lines of thought that dominated the environment he grew up in.    
 
The Early Years 
Jørgen Iffuersen Krabbe was born into an illustrious Danish family on 21st August 
1633. The ancestral home of the family was Jordeberga (Jordebjerg) in southwestern 
Scania but Jørgen was born at Laholm castle in the province of Halland, where his 
father Iffuer was commander-in-chief of the troops. Later Iffuer was promoted to the 
fortress at Varberg close to the Norwegian border in the north. Jørgen’s mother Karen 
Ottesdatter Marsvin descended from another important D ish family. Jørgen had a 
brother who was three years older, Tage, and two sister  called Karen and Sophie.  
Jordebjerg was razed to the ground during the Swedish invasion of 1643-45 (Horn’s 
War). Legend has it that Iffuer shook his fist against the sky and swore to fight the 
Swedish dogs till the bitter end. Nevertheless Iffuer Krabbe had to accept defeat and 
hand the fortress over to the Swedes when Halland was ceded to Sweden in 1645. 
However, Iffuer Krabbe chose to take the whole archive of the county of Varberg 
with him instead of surrendering it to the Swedes as established in the peace treaty of 
Brömsebro, an act that made him go to history as a “saboteur” and hater of 
                                               
1113  Gustafsson,, “The Eighth Argument”, p.112. Regnalism, protonationalism and ethnicism have also 
been proposed. 
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Swedes.1114 After the introduction of absolutism in Denmark Iffuer Krabbe was on the 
commission that elaborated the first Danish unitary l w book (den danske lov) and 
then, in 1661, he became governor of Norway. Both Iffuer and his brother Niels were 
important “pre-industrialists” in Scania: they both ran pot ash works at the same time 
as they dedicated themselves to public life. Iffuer Krabbe had a house of moderate 
dimensions between the Nørregade and Nørrevold in central Copenhagen.1115 They 
always spent part of the year in the capital. 
Later on in his life Jørgen would declare that was proud of having been born to a good 
family and of having received a thoroughly Lutheran education that taught him all the 
Christian virtues that belonged to his estate and illustrious family; virtues that were of 
great use to Krabbe in the service of his “king andfatherland.“ Krabbe spent his youth 
in ”studiis humanioribus” and in all sorts of ”exercitiis” that appertained to a cavalier 
of some standing. In order to be able to honour his fatherland even more he then went 
to ”foreign countries in order to improve his knowledge of the languages, customs and 
constitutions of these foreign Nations”. He also studied statesmanship and 
government.1116 Krabbe then continued his grand tour to France, Italy, England, the 
Netherlands and Germany. His studies enabled him to serve his fatherland and ”any 
Lord or Powerful Man.”1117 In September 1653 Jørgen and his older brother Tage
enrolled at the University of Orléans where Tage was elected chairman of the Natio 
Germanica.1118 Two years later they went on to Padua where their father also had 
studied in 1625. 1119  Sometime in 1656 they returned to Denmark. Later on in his life 
                                               
1114  Dübeck, Inger. Fra gammel dansk til ny svensk ret. Den retlige forsvenskning i de tabte territorier 
1645-1683, (From Old Danish to New Swedish Law. The Judiciary Swedification in the Lost 
Territories, 1645-1683), Rigsarkivet/G.E.C Gad 1987, p.49. Iffuer Krabbe lived from 1602-1666. 
1115 Ramsing, H.V., Københavns Ejendomme 1377-1728: V Nørre kvarter, (Property in Copenhagen 
1377-1728: V The Northern Parts) Ejnar Munksgaards forlag, Copenhagen 1967, p. 92. It was the 
matter of Karré nr. 5, Matr nr.54 and 310-311. By 166  he had sold it to Otte Pogwisch.   
1116 ”til at erkynde sig i udländiske Nationers Sprock, s icke oc Constitutioner; oc til at erlange 
videnskab om hvis som til verdslig Politie oc Regiering henhörer. 
1117 ”hvor med hand oc ved sin hiemkomst her i Riget hafde giort sig capable, sit Fäderneland oc 
enhver herre oc Potentat med god Fruct oc Nytte at kunde tiene.” p.4. 
1118 E. Wrangel, ”Danske og norske Studenter der ere indskrevne i Natio Germanica ved Universitetet i 
Orléans”, pp. 124-162, in Personalhistorisk Tidsskrift 4:I, Kjøbenhavn og Christiania 1898: ”1653, 
Sept. 22: Tago Krabbe, eq. Danus; Georgius Krabbe danus.” Glabo, Henning. ”Danske studerende i 
Orléans. Tiden 1560-1688, pp.151-174 in Personalhistorisk Tidsskrift, 8. Række, IV:Kjøbenhavn-Oslo 
1925, p.157. 
1119 H. Riis-Petersen,”Danske og norske Studenter ved ud nlandske Universiteter og Kiel Universitet”, 
(Danish Students at Foreign Universities and Kiel University), vol.III (unpublished), 1961, RA; ”Danes 
in Italy” Danish Institute in Rome, www.dir.it Jørgen and Tage Krabbe are registered in 1655. Not only 
Germans but also Flemings, Dutchmen and Scandinavias were considered Germanic and 
consequently belonged to the Natio Germanica. See: Lucia Rossetti, The University of Padua, An 
Outline of its History, Edizioni Lint, Padova 1988, p.46. 
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Jørgen would thank God for having brought him home to his fatherland after the wild 
years abroad in his youth. After his years on the Continent he went back to Denmark 
where he worked for Frederik III as a royal secretary at the Royal Chancellery. 
 
Conclusions: 
Before the cession of the Scania to the Swedes the Krabbes were now for their 
hostility to Swedes. Jørgen Krabbe did consequently not grow up in an environment 
that preached peace and brotherhood between the Scandinavian nations. Nevertheless 
it is evident from his own writings that he grew up in a profoundly Christian home 
and that he was proud of his high rank and of his valorous ancestors. From the 
beginning he had dreamt of serving his king and country and he studied at a grammar 
school (Sorø) and university in order to be able to serve his fatherland and  ”any Lord 
or Powerful Man.”1120 Although the fatherland was an important issue in Jørgen 
Krabbe’s writings about his earlier years he also made clear that his upbringing and 
studies had also prepared him to be able to serve a lord different from the one who 
had been his ancestors’. With that claim he also showed that as a nobleman he also 
adhered to an older line of thought that gave more weight to the relationship between 
lord and liege than to the patria and the nation.  
Fabricius accused the Scanian nobility of being totally devoid of ”national 
consciousness” and only thinking in terms of their class. To prove this he quoted 
Corfitz Ulfeld who had made the following declaration during a stay in France: “Well, 
the true noblemen are in Denmark where the king cannot even make them go out of 
their houses if they do not want to.”1121 I am not sure whether I agree totally with 
Fabricius when he claimed that noblemen like Corfitz Uhlfeld felt a more intense 
sense of belonging with other European noblemen tha with their own countrymen of 
other classes. Although Jørgen Krabbe’s outlook on life had many points in common 
with that of Corfitz Uhlfeld, he would not have felt a foreigner in Stockholm if that 
had always been the case. My argument here is that traditional noble values and 
patriotism existed side by side and sometimes clashed. I also believe that people (like 
Krabbe) could choose which way they preferred to see things, although sometimes it 
became a subconscious choice. Krabbe appealed to a more traditional set of values 
                                               
1120 ”hvor med hand oc ved sin hiemkomst her i Riget hafde giort sig capable, sit Fäderneland oc 
enhver herre oc Potentat med god Fruct oc Nytte at kunde tiene.” p.4. 
1121 Fabricius, I, p.69 : ”Nej, udi Danmark ere de rette Adelsmænd, hvem kongen ikke en Gang kan 
tvinge til at gaa ud af deres Huse.” 
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where concepts like “patriot” and “fatherland” existed but had not quite crystallised. 
Sperling and Breuer appealed to values that corresponded closer to the kind of 
patriotism described by Gunner Lind in his article “Old Patriots”; in it Lind analyses 
the way the concept of “fatherland” was used in Denmark up until the introduction of 
absolutism in 1660. This concept had first gained a broader value when the idea of 
defensio patriae was broached in Denmark at the very beginning of the 17th 
century.1122 By mid-century patriotism based on the duty to defend the fatherland had 
become a force in its own right and not only in the upper strata of society.1123 If Lind 
is right,  Krabbe and the Thotts and their contemporaries all grew up reading 
Encomion Regni Daniæ, Nør-Nissom’s A Short Danish Chronicle and other popular 
history books that were directed to readers that “wish their dear fatherland well, and 
wants its best from the bottom of their hearts and victory against its enemies.”1124 And 
so they had grown up with the idea that one’s duty was to defend one’s fatherland and 
if not with the sword, well then by other means such as work and travels. Rosencrantz 
claimed that Krabbe had studied for the fatherland  Krabbe himself that he had 
worked (at the Danish chancellery) for it. Lind points out that the kind of patriotism 
that was flourishing in Denmark around the middle of the 17th century actually 
questioned “noble honour as a fundamental value in life.” 1125  
 
Accepting Swedish Rule 
Introduction 
In this section I will analyse the relations that the Krabbe clan were faced with as 
Denmark lost the eastern provinces and consequently the Krabbes’ ancestral lands to 
the Swedes. As a clan they eventually compromised, although the single constituents 
of the extended family had to make personal choices, young Jørgen among them. A 
                                               
1122 Gunner Lind, ”Gamle patrioter”, (Old patriots), pp.91-115, in Søfart, Politik, Identitet, tilegnet Ole 
Feldbæk, Handels- & Søfartsmuseet på Kronborg, SøhistoriskeSkrifter XIX, Falcon 1996, p.95. When 
the ”European” idea of local militia was introduced in Denmark the concept of ”fatherland” was much 
used in order increase the loyalty of the (local) so diers. For the introduction of franc-archers in France 
and militia (under Machiavelli) in Tuscany that led to the institution of Danish militia towards the 
middle of the 16th century see: John R. Hale, Guerra e società nell’Europa del Rinascimento, Laterza 
1987, pp.218-222. (War and Society in Renaissance Europe, 1450-1620, Fontana books 1985). The 
relation between Danish militia and snaphaner is still not clear to me. 
1123 Lind, p.102. 
1124 Lind, p.103, quotes Jens Søffrensøn Nør-Nissum, En kort Dansk Krønicke, Copenhagen 1649, 
introduction: ”som vel mener deres käre fädreland, og af et oprigtigt hjerte söger dets bedste og gavn 
mod dets fjender.” 
1125 Lind, p.102: ”Ud fra den kunne man stille spørgsmål ved den adelige ære som fundamental 
livsværdi...” 
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certain tendency to compromise became characteristic of he Krabbes from this point 
in time onwards, although the Swedes were wary of them. 
 
The Karl Gustav Wars  
Then came the war against Sweden that changed everything. During the siege of 
Copenhagen Jørgen Krabbe served on the Danish side. His whole family were fervent 
supporters of the Danish cause. One can only guess what their reactions were when 
the Scanian provinces were lost to Denmark in 1658. The war went on for another two 
years but the Danes did not manage to win their lost lands back, except for the island 
of Bornholm. 
In 1658 Iffuer Krabbe had been offered to become Marsh l of the Realm (rigsmarsk) 
which was the highest political position one could get. He had said no to the offer 
because he wanted to retire from public life and enjoy his otium on his estates in 
Scania. The Swedish ex-ambassador to Denmark, Magnus Durell warned the Swedish 
king of Iffuer Krabbe who was far too powerful: “there was nothing to fear from the 
Scanian nobility unless it found a leader in Ifwar Krabbe”. According to Durell, Iffuer 
Krabbe had too much power and too many relatives and friends in Scania;  these facts 
would render it much easier for him to win people’s hearts be they noble or not. His 
Majesty’s ministers and servants would not stand a chance if it came to that. One 
could only pray to God that the Danes or the Dutch would not attack because “the 
whole country would have a leader to count on”. Another potential danger was if the 
Scanian nobility came to feel oppressed under Swedish rule. Durell adviced the king 
to let his ministers “keep an eye on Ifwar Krabbe, more so than on the rest of the 
country”. Another Scanian whom the Swedes were keeping an eye on was Count 
Uhlfeld. The king was suspicious of his intentions because he seemed to be hand in 
glove with the rest of the Scanian nobility. Maybe it would be better to “remove” him 
if he did not start “behaving better”. According to the Swedish king, both Uhlfeld and 
the Danish Chancellor of the Realm (rigshofmästaren) Geersdorff had been so drunk 
when the treaty was concluded that they could not get out of bed.1126   
 
That summer Governor General Stenbock reported to the king that some of the 
Scanians had rather submitted to “the Turk than to us”. The noblemen were grumbling 
                                               
1126 Cronholm, p.40. 
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about the new custom duties that were being imposed n export to Denmark.  Iffuer 
Krabbe told Stenbock that he assumed that His Majesty would grant him and the other 
noblemen special “grace”. Stenbock complained to the king that unfortunately it 
would be necessary to keep Krabbe in a good “humeur”.1127 Nevertheless Iffuer 
Krabbe did not step back from public life for another few years: he participated in 
political life as usual during the autumn of 1660 when things were returning to 
“normal” in Denmark.  The cession of the Scanian provinces did not mean that the 
inhabitants were excluded from Danish politics or the court circles. Nor did it mean 
that minor officials like Iffuer’s son Jørgen were expected to renounce their careers 
for an uncertain Swedish future. At the time Jørgen was working as a chancellery 
secretary. This was the starting step of the Danish cursus honorum in the early 
modern era. It was a way of raising ones fortunes i the world but, at least according 
to Ladewig Petersen, not the point from where real aristocrats would have had to set 
out. Chances of becoming a councillor of the realm were existent but not good.1128  
 
During the estates-general of September-December 1660 that led to the declaration of 
the extended rights of the king, Iffuer Krabbe was one of those who represented the 
nobility most assiduously: he worked actively against absolutism.  When the 
“hereditary kingship” (arvekongen) was celebrated on 18 October 1660 general major 
Krabbe carried the “blood banner” (blodfanen) as usual during royal processions. 1129 
J.A Fridericia claimed that the king’s aims had become obvious to the public by the 
end of 1660 or at the latest, before the end of January 1661, though Frederick seems 
to have had his mind set on becoming absolute from the very beginning. The Act 
concerning Absolute and Hereditary Government was published on 10th January 
1661.1130 Was it a coincidence that Jørgen Krabbe declared that he would become a 
                                               
1127 Cronholm, p.40: Royal letter 25th June, 8th July 1658 (Riksregister): “Turken, än under oß”; p.41: 
Stenbock to His Majesty 8th and 15th July 1658, ”nödigt att hålla Krabbe wid godt ”humeur”.” 
1128 E. Ladewig Petersen,”Landsdommerkorpset under adelsvælden, Rekruttering, karrieremønstre og 
status,” Historisk Tidsskrift 93:2, (Provincial Judges During the Rule of the nobility: Recruitment, 
Careers, Status), pp.279-295, see p.288. It should be noted that more than anything it was important to 
keep close to the king: In his article”Court and Nobility in Early Modern Denmark” Leon Jespersen 
(Scand.Journ.History 27 2002, pp.129-142, p.141) has pointed out that “proximity to the king was 
more important than the salary of the court offices.” The Krabbes always tried to stay in the king’s 
proximity, whether they were under Swedish or Danish rule.   
1129 Fridericia, pp. 506-507, and p.537. 
1130 The so-called Enevoldsarveregeringsakten. See: Sebastian Olden-Jørgensen, “Christian V’s og 
Frederik IV’s politiske testamenter” (The Political Testaments of Christian V and Frederick IV) in 
Historisk Tidskrift 95, ed. Carsten Due-Nielsen and Anders Monrad Møller, Copenhagen 1995, pp.313-
348, quote p.348. See also: Fridericia, p.543 and p.528. Fridericia doubted whether Frederik III had 
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Swedish subject during the last week of December 1660?1131 In his analysis of the 
actions of the Scanian nobility during the transition era Knud Fabricius concluded that 
the coming of absolutism was crucial for many of them. Staying in Scania meant that 
they would be able to maintain their customary rights and privileges under a Swedish 
king who was not absolute. In Denmark they would be at the mercy of an absolute 
monarch who had it in his mind to change many things. In June 1661 the privileges of 
the nobility in Denmark were “confirmed” but these privileges did not include their 
time-old taxation rights over their peasants.1132 Changes like these probably 
convinced many Scanian noblemen to opt for the Swedish monarch instead of 
Frederik III. Jørgen, Iffuer and Niels Krabbe did not make up their minds about 
becoming Swedish until it was obvious that absolutism was to win the day in 
Denmark. When young Krabbe declared that he would swear fealty to the Swedish 
king he was offered a position as county judge by the Danish king. When he 
communicated this to the Swedes he was promised the corr sponding position in 
Scania. Jørgen Krabbe was the first one out of the entire Scanian nobility to pledge 
fealty to the Swedes. Governor General Stenbock was pleased as Punch at the sight of 
“General Major Iffuar Krabbe’s son” who popped in ad offered his services exactly 
when the Swedish authorities had started to despair of the nobility. He also told the 
governor general that his uncle Niels Krabbe was plnning to take the same step, 
which made Stenbock hope that the rest if the nobility might follow in his footsteps. 
1133  Young Krabbe was in such a hurry to see his fiancée that time that he offended 
the Governor General by not staying on for dinner. But he did pledge loyalty and so 
did his father and uncle some time later.1134 Consequently, Niels, Iffuer and Jørgen 
Krabbe gave up one pair of king and fatherland for another pair. Niels claimed that it 
did not really matter because his true fatherland was Scania, no matter who ruled it. 
Their friend Olluf Rosencrantz was of the same opini n.1135  
                                                                                                                            
really had his mind on absolutism from the beginning but Olden-Jørgensen (p.309) claims that the king 
actually conspired with a group of burghers in order to win the day and that the conspirators were 
aiming for absolutism from the start. 
1131 Letter from Otto Stenbock to the king, 27th Decembr 1660, Gen.guv över Skåne, SRA. 
1132 Fridericia, pp. 506-507. 
1133 Otto Stenbock to the king, 27th December 1660, GG,SRA. 
1134 Iffuer and Niels Krabbe swore their oath on 29th January 1661. They both had lunch with the 
governor general who reported to the king that at le st Niels Krabbe seemed friendly and behaved very 
well. See: Letter to the king, 29th January 1661, GG, SRA. 
1135 Rosencrantz (1679),.p2. 
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Even if the oath was a personal choice it did not necessarily have anything with one’s 
personal sympathies to do. Oaths of allegiance and loyalty could be seen an 
affirmation of early modern citizenship, defined in relation to the king.  It might 
simply have been a question of strategy in situations like that of the annexation of 
Scania. Many families chose to split their possessions between two sons: one on each 
side of the Sound and it might have seemed the logical thing to do in times when no 
one knew who the future lord of the land would be. With a foot on each side of the 
waters chances of survival were definitely higher. 
 
Conclusions 
The Swedes saw a potential threat in the Krabbes from the very beginning and the 
Swedish king was informed at an early state that Iffuer Krabbe might become a front 
figure for the Scanian nobility in case they decided to cause trouble. But although 
Iffuer Krabbe was seen both as a bitter enemy of the Swedes and as too influential he 
eventually opted for Sweden. It seems obvious from the sources that it was in part a 
political decision taken by the Krabbe clan when it turned out that that the Absolutist 
wing would win the day in Copenhagen. For all that Iffuer Krabbe hated Swedes he 
might have hated Absolutism even more. Now, Iffuer’s eldest son remained on the 
Danish side of the Sound and took care of their lands there. Jørgen Krabbe stayed on 
in Scania like his father and uncle. The way he described it himself it had first and 
foremost been a personal decision. To Jørgen Krabbe the greatest doubt had been 
whether he should give up his career in the Danish C vil Service, not the least because 
the king in person had promised him that he would soon be promoted if he chose to 
stay in Denmark. When he was promised the same opportunities in Sweden he 
decided to become a Swedish subject. Another personal issue that made him opt for 
Sweden was his relationship with Jytte Thott. Both Jørgen Krabbe’s own account and 
the Swedish sources state this as one of his motives for choosing to stay on in Scania 
under Swedish rule was his wish to be with his young fiancée. Consequently, many 
factors contributed to the personal choice of overlord that many people had to take 
when Scania came under Swedish rule. Political acuteness, career opportunities and 
personal affairs were all motives for Jørgen Krabbe and his closest relatives when 
they made their choice. Finally, another factor that w s stressed by Niels Krabbe was 
his regional patriotism, in that he felt that Scania was more important to him than 
being the liege of one king or another. 
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The Interwar Years 
Introduction 
The years between the Karl Gustav Wars and the Scanian War (1660-1676) have been 
considered both as disastrous and as hardly different from the preceding eras by 
various traditions. Most research has concentrated on “how things really were” during 
this era, but it is not the aim of this analysis at all. I have not tried to go through the 
Krabbes’ account books in order to check whether thi  affairs really deteriorated on 
account of the Swedish overlordship. It is the personal perceptions of Jørgen Krabbe 
and the existence of certain currents of thought that can be proved through an analysis 
of them that are of interest here. 
 
A Division of Lands 
In 1661 Iffuer Krabbe’s vast holdings were divided between his two sons: Jørgen got 
what was then called Krogholm1136 in Scania and Tage Gunderslev in Denmark. 
Karen got Fulltofta (then Fulletofte) in Scania although she was living abroad with 
her husband Just Høgh who was a diplomat. The house in Nørregade was sold in 
1661. The reason for this might have been that Iffuer and his wife had inherited a 
house behind the St.Nicolai church from Oluf Parsberg who died that year. 1137 
On 25th August 1661 Jørgen married Jytte Thott, the sixteen-year-old daughter of the 
nobleman Otte Thott and the granddaughter of the “King of Scania” Tage Thott. The 
Thotts were an older and more influential family that owned great part of the lands 
that were contiguous with the Krabbes’ and the Marsvins’ estates.1138  Until then the 
Thotts and the Krabbes had been rivals that never took the same side in political 
                                               
1136 Modern day Krageholm. In my sources it is also called: Kroegholm, Krogeholm, Kraageholm and 
Kragholm. Sthen Jacobsen (p.77) called it Kraageholm (pronounced Krogeholm with a short o), just as 
he used “kraag” for standard Danish “krog.” Krageholm is probably a Swedish hybridisation. I feel that 
it would be anachronistic to use the modern Swedish name for it here. Krabbe never called it anything 
but Krogholm, just as he never used the Swedish version of his name “Jöran”, although he liked using 
the Latinised “Georg” or “Georgius” in his youth. A list of Danish place names and their modern 
swedicised substitutes will be added at the end of the thesis. 
1137 The Krabbes only inherited the house two years later though. See: H.V.Ramsing, Københavns 
Ejendomme 1377-1728: I Øster kvarter, (Property in Copenhagen 1377-1728, The Eastern Parts) Ejnar 
Munksgaards forlag, Copenhagen 1943, p.52. It was the matter of Karré Nr.6, Matr.216 between the 
Store and Lille Færgestræde. 
1138 The Thott  family is the oldest Scandinavian noble family; it has been known since the Viking era 
(8th century AD). See: Röndahl, 1981, p.229. In 1651 Tage Thott the older owned Skabersiø, 
Verpinge, Barsebæk, Ulstrup, Erichsholm, Herrested and Bjersiøholm. On his main estate, Skabersiø 
modern-day Skabersjö) he had gathered the elite of the Scanian intellectuals of his day: amongst others 
the poet Anders Bording and the historian Vitus Bering. See: Fabricius I, pp.40-41. 
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disputes but the marriage of the two youngest representatives of the families 
concluded a union between them that would prove its durability during the hard times 
that were to come. Maybe it was simply a clever political move in the face of the 
Swedish annexation and the hypothetical threat of Swedish interference in the Scanian 
equilibrium.  
The wedding took place in “Malmö in Scania” as it said on the corolla nuptialis 
where the mention of Sweden was avoided but toasts were drunk to both kingdoms to 
a number of three to Denmark and two to Sweden.1139 Krabbe was very close to his 
wife’s three brothers Knud, Holger and Tage Ottesen Thott and remained so for the 
rest of his life.1140 At the beginning of the 1660’ies “Jöran” Krabbe and Jytte Tott 
were registered as owners of “Krageholm, Högestad, B ldringe and Jordberga” in a 
Swedish register of Scanian noblemen and women who had sworn the oath of 
allegiance.1141 
 In 1664 Krabbe became a member of the Swedish Riddarhus ( app. house of lords). 
He was one of very few Scanian noblemen who spent long periods in Stockholm and 
attended the Riddarhus on a regular basis. Krabbe himself claimed that during his 
years in the Diet (Riksdag) he had always worked “for the best of the fatherland and 
its inhabitants.”1142  Knud Fabricius accused Krabbe of having been an informer for 
the reason that he actually reported what he had herd from his Danish friends to the 
Swedish diet.1143 Krabbe made friends in Stockholm. One of those was Johan Paulin 
who would risk his own career and honour for Krabbe many years later. Nevertheless 
the “Danes” were frowned at by many Swedes who were annoyed by the way they 
behaved and dressed. The entrance of the Scanian nobility in the Riddarhus was 
                                               
1139 Corolla nuptialis, Georg Krabbe, Copenhagen 1661. Personregistret,  LUB.
1140 The Thott brothers did not always get on between th mselves, however. Knud and Tage ended up 
in court and Knud tried to harass his younger half-brother as much as possible. (See: Fabricius I, p. 58). 
Amongst other things he interrupted Tage’s hunts. Knud lived at Næs (modern day Trollenäs), Tage at 
Erichsholm (modern day Trolleholm), and Holger at Marsvinsholm. Holger was also registered as the 
owner of the Søvde estate, that he had received as part of his future heredity from his mother Dorthe 
Rosencrantz but she continued to run that estate hers lf until the family was expropriated by the 
Swedes in 1678 and the whole estate ended up in Jöra  Sperling’s hands. Later Søvde was sold to 
governor general Rutger von Ascheberg, allegedly in order to pay for Holger Thott’s debts.See: 
Fabricius IV, p.240. 
1141 Cronholm, p.34. The names are all swedicised. Knut Thott and his (first) wife Sophie Brahe were 
registered as owners of Knudstorp. Holger and Tage Thott were registered as “not of age yet” but 
Holger owned Söfde and Marswindsholm and Tage Eriksholm. 
1142 ”A Prayer for one’s enemies and persecutors”, Jørgen Krabbe’s “Bönnebog”, The Royal Library. 
1143 See the Riksdag records from May-July 1664 when Krabbe first was admitted. For the latter 
episode see the Riksdag records from 18th July 1668 (p.236) in B.Taube & S. Bergh (eds), Sveriges 
ridderskaps och adels riksdags-protokoll, (The Riksdag records of the Swedish nobility), vols. I-XVII, 
Stockholm, 1855-1902. 
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opposed by many who felt that “a conquered nation” had no honour and no right to 
equal rights with Swedish families of ancient lineag s. During these years Krabbe was 
involved in an outdrawn lawsuit against a Swedish upstart called Niclas Jonsson. 
Krabbe’s sister Karen was married to the governor of Norway Just Høgh and let 
Krabbe manage her affairs in Scania. Krabbe then sold Karen’s estate Fulltofta 
(Fulletofte) to Jonsson but never received a penny for it. Which was the immediate 
cause of the lawsuit. The fact that Krabbe tried to get Fulltofta (Fulletofte) back from 
a native Swede would become fatal to him. In the autumn of 1666 Iffuer Krabbe died. 
The house in Copenhagen was inherited by his daughter Sophie and her husband 
Kjeld Krag of Trudsholm.1144 However, Jørgen Krabbe continued to spend part of the 
year in Copenhagen so he might have owned other property there. 
 Krabbe became increasingly frustrated under the Swdish rule. In 1670 he was 
employed shortly on a landtax revision committee but after that the Swedes did not 
make use of his services except to demand loans. He was not paid for his work on the 
revision committee.1145 Krabbe complained to a Swedish official that he had been 
persuaded to leave Denmark and a future as county jdge of Zealand by Charles X 
Gustaf’s “gracious promise”. It cost him 6000 rigsdaler to exchange his property in 
Denmark with that of his siblings in Scania. He spent a lot of money on loans to “this 
and that person” who had promised to procure him a position in the Swedish 
administration. His Majesty the king had sent him on numerous journeys and 
commissions that he had to pay out of his own pockets.1146 His petitions to the king 
and the chancellor (riksdrots) demonstrate that he felt that the Swedish king had not 
fulfilled his promises. In 1673 he complained that e was now over forty and had 
wasted away twelve years in the countryside without an ”employe.”1147 He felt that he 
would become a disgrace to his family and good name. His father and his uncle Niels 
had both had important positions in the Danish administration and Jørgen had 
believed that he would be able to follow in their footsteps under Swedish rule. He 
                                               
1144 He inher 
1145 Together with notary Daniel Gudmundsen and  Dr. Chistian Foß, Krabbe consitituted the 
committee for the hundreds of Luggude, Bjäre and Åsbo. As established by a decree of 1st May 1670. 
The members of the committees were elected on the basis of their knowledge of the land. Nobody was 
allowed to work in their own areas in order to avoid corruption. In Krabbe’s own hundred it was the 
Scanian nobleman Steen Holch,  Krabbe’s Swedish archenemy Niklas Jonsson and Swen Jacobsson (?) 
who constituted the committee. See: Cronholm, pp.172-173. 
1146 Cronholm, p.198. 
1147 From Krabbe to the king, Bibliographica, RAS: ”Jag derhos mine aar och alder skulle saaledis paa 
landet uden employe henslitta, huilcket Jeg maa beklag  nu offuer 12 aars tid haffua maat giort...” 
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would never forget that the Danish king had promised him the position of county 
judge (landsdommer) in Zealand if he stayed in Denmark and that he had been 
promised an equivalent position by the Swedish king. Seventeen years under the 
Swedes would never bring him an opportunity of the kind, no matter how many 
petitions he sent to the higher spheres in Stockholm.   
During the inter-war years Krabbe kept sending petitions to the king in which he 
asked that his people should be relieved of the burden of the billeted regiments. In 
1673 he wrote to the king complaining that a cavalry company had lodged in the 
villages around Ystad (Ysted) for 30 days and that t ese villages had been ”badly 
dealt with and some peasants totally ruined.”1148 He then calculated the value of all 
the food the soldiers had eaten to 1600 daler in silver. Together with a notary he also 
started an official inquiry into the question of the behaviour of the troops but for 
reasons that he did not “want to mention”, the inqury had to be given up. 
Conclusions 
Krabbe’s correspondence from the interwar years show t at he was becoming an 
increasingly bitter man and that he blamed the Swedish overlordship both for his 
failure to make a career in the administration and for his increasing financial 
problems. Although it could be claimed that he should have been pleased with his 
obtaining a place in the Diet and that he was able to give his home province and his 
estate a voice in that context, Krabbe himself did not hesitate to give voice to his 
delusion in his letters to Swedish friends and acquintances. He would rather have 
made a career for himself at the bar as he would have in Denmark; for all that 
Denmark at the time had become strictly absolutist. Although Krabbe never ceased to 
stress that he was bound by oath to the King of Sweden, he also perceived of the 
coming under Swedish rule as a deterioration of things, both to him personally and to 
the people on his lands. He claimed that nothing like the billeting of considerable 
troops on his lands and in the surrounding areas had ever taken place before and that 
their economy had been totally run down because of it. In this sense, Krabbe’s letters 
reveal that there was a current of thought that blamed the Swedes for some of the 
societal problems that were perceived to exist in the 1670’ies and that on an 
individual level it was quite feasible to blame one’s joblessness or financial problems 
on the coming of the Swedes.  
                                               
1148 Krabbe to His Majesty, no date but almost certainly early 1673, Biographica, RAS. 
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Krabbe during the Scanian War 
 
Introduction 
This section contains an analysis of how Krabbe and the people around him tried to 
balance between the two states that contended the rule over Scania when war broke 
out again. It was obviously not only the clergy that found themselves so to speak 
between two fires during this era. However, as we have already seen at the beginning 
of this part of the thesis, some of the people around Krabbe did not try to “balance” at 
all: Hindrich Peersøn, for one chose Denmark and to be branded as a “snaphane” by 
the Swedes, as soon as the Danish fleet landed. What made some people take sides at 
once? And how did they explain that? The same questions could, and should, be asked 
regarding those who tried to be devious or simply fa tered and that is very much what 
this section is about.  
 
Between One King and Another  
A new war between the Nordic kingdoms broke out in 1675. Jørgen Krabbe 
immediately went to Vänersborg in southern Sweden to offer his services to the king 
but the king was not interested. Then Krabbe returnd to Scania to ask the Governor 
General if he could be of any service there but he rec ived the same brusque reply.  
He offered his services to the Swedish king on two more occasions: at Vä (then Wæ) 
and Trollenäs (then Næs).1149  
Scania was invaded by the Danish army in June 1676. When the Danish fleet under 
Admirals Tromp and Juel came to the bay of Ystad (Ysted) Krabbe was in the 
company of General Fersen. The Danes landed and the Swedes were forced to retreat.  
                                               
1149 Krabbe, in Aletophilus, p.144. At first the Swedish authorities had considered employing Scanian 
noblemen on their side during the conflict. It was feared that “those who were spending their time on 
their estates without any particular employment” would be offered tempting positions on the other side. 
(Government instructions to regional governors in Scania, “Handlingar rörande danska kriget 1676-
79”, SRA; Quoted  by  Johnsson, p.48.) The regional governors were therefore asked to send in reports 
on all noblemen in their area who did not occupy official positions, including noblemen of Swedish 
descent. During the inter-war years the Scanian nobility had been largely ignored and left to occupy 
themselves with their estates and nothing else. Jørgen Krabbe for one had been sending around job 
applications for years without the least success: it was obvious that Stockholm knew that some of the 
noblemen would very much have wanted to work all along. All of a sudden someone had come to think 
that these frustrated noblemen might actually constitute a risk and for some time it looked as if they 
would be offered employment. As things turned out, however, these plans came to nothing. Maybe 
because, after all, it was deemed that the Scanians were not reliable enough. Even Swedish educated 
young men like Tage Thott who was in Swedish servic were sent back to where they came from.  
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Baron Krabbe went to Fersen for advice as to what he should do but Fersen replied 
that the only advice he could give him was to return to Krageholm (Krogholm) and 
stay put there. Some time later General-Admiral Tromp summoned all noblemen of 
the surroundings to Ystad (Ysted): Krabbe, Holger Thott and Christian Bilde were the 
foremost of these. Tromp sent a Dutch captain by the name of Le Maire and fifty 
dragoons to deliver a letter to Krabbe in which he asked why His Excellency had not 
rendered homage to his righteous king yet. If His Excellency presented himself in 
Ystad (Ysted) on Tuesday 4th July at Mayor Mattis Friis’s place a perfect opportunity 
to do so would be offered him. In that case His Excellency would remain safe and all 
war troubles could be avoided. Else His Excellency might, unfortunately, be exposed 
to fire and plunder according to the rigours of war.1150 Krabbe wrote to Fersen for 
advice but we do not know whether or what Fersen replied. In any case Krabbe and 
his neighbours presented themselves punctually on 4th July. Tromp made them swear 
on their knightly honour that they would stay quietly on their estates. Some time later 
Tromp felt like a little holiday out in the countryside and went to Krabbe’s Krageholm 
(Krogholm) which is the estate that is closest to Ystad (Ysted).1151 
 
In a fairly short time the Swedes were driven out of m st of Scania and Danish 
sovereignty was re-established. Krabbe and the Thott br hers were summoned to the 
Danish camp to pay homage to the Danish king and to deliver their tax registers so 
that they could be taxed (jordeböger). Rosencrantz claimed that they had tried to stall 
their departure as long as possible because they were hoping that the Swedish king 
would come and save them.1152 When they realised that their hopes had been vain 
they decided to ride to the Danish army camp. They w re not treated like foreigners 
by Christian V. According to the Swedish sources they rushed to Landskrona 
(Landscrone) as soon as they could and became great favourites with the king. Krabbe 
and Knud Thott rushed in by the side of the Danish k ng with great ”empressement” 
when the castle of Landskrona (Landscrone) surrended on August 3, 1676.1153 Later 
                                               
1150 Rosencrantz reported that they had to obey this summons since they were in the hands of ”a foreign 
Power” and knew that it would be dangerous not to p.66. See: Cronholm, p.199. 
1151 Rosencrantz insisted that he had only stayed for tw  hours, p.66. 
1152 p.67. 
1153 Rosencrantz claimed that they only did so out of curiosity. They had not acted differently from 
many other ”honorable cavaliers and foreign nations that take no personal interest in our war.” (p.69): 
”at hand som mange andre fornemme Cavalliers oc fremm de Nationer, som uinteresseret i voris Krig 
var kommen offver alleene for den Kongl. Danske Armee oc Leyer at besee ved Slottens uformodelig 
hastig Ofvergang oc Erobring fuldte ind med aff Curiositet...” 
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the Swedes claimed that their tent had stood next to that of the Danish king.1154 They 
also claimed that Krabbe became a favourite with the Danish king during the summer 
of 1676. Rosencrantz found this accusation ridiculous since everyone knew that the 
Danish king had had Krabbe arrested on the suspicion of being a ”good Swede”.1155 A 
major and 70 dragoons brought the baron to Kristianad (Christianstad). For a couple 
of days Krabbe was kept a prisoner in Kristianstad (Christianstad), in spite of having 
obtained a safeguard letter long before. Then he was brought to the Danish Army 
Camp where it was resolved that he should be taken (hostage) to Copenhagen.1156 
Fortunately his numerous connections on the Danish side managed to get him set free 
on condition that he give his word that he would not m ve from Krageholm 
(Krogholm). His wife had written a petition to the Danish king that is still to be found 
in the War College collections.  It seems that Krabbe had asked to be permitted to 
plead his cause in the presence of the Danish king but that he had been denied that 
”grace”.1157  
 
Shortly after the battle of Lund on 6th December 1676, Jørgen Krabbe and Knud Thott 
asked the Swedish governor general for safeguard letters for their estates. Charles XI 
commented sourly that the two gentlemen had showed no signs of affection for 
Sweden until luck had turned.1158 The Swedish authorities proclaimed that a 
Thanksgiving Service should be held in every church on 3rd  January, 1677 in order to 
celebrate the victory. Krabbe’s parson Corvinius sent the written order on to his 
colleagues in the surrounding parishes and then he celebrated the Thanksgiving 
service obediently enough.1159 It was only that the Danish war commissary Christoffer 
                                               
1154 See: p.65 and p.68 (quote) Rosencrantz denied the first charge and claimed that they had stayed 
with one of their tenants in the village of Hostad: ”..Bleffve de endelig foraarsaget at haffve deris 
Ophold i Närvärelsen hos en aff deris egne Bönder ui Hostad en Fierding Veys Fra Leyeren...” 
1155 See: p.69: ”...Hans Kongl.Mayestet selff haffde ham i störste Suspicion for at väre en god Svensk 
oc derfore lod hannem siden affhendte fra sin Gaard Krogholm oc fangen indfördte udi Christian-
Stad.” 
1156 Krabbe’s first instance, p.13. and the second p.100 in Aletophilus. 
1157 p.70: Hvor fra hand icke uden andris intercession oc store Forbön bleff entlediget saa at hand icke 
engang erholt den Naade at tale med Hans Kongl. Mayestet aff Danmarck. 
1158 Cronholm, p.197. 
1159 Corvinius is listed under the name of Raffn/Ramm in the church registers at the village of 
Snårestad  where he worked. Da. “raffn”, Sc. “ramm” means “raven” which is “corvus” in Latin. It was 
very common among Danish clergymen to translate their prosaic Danish names into Latin (cf. the 
common surname Kjær “marsh, bog” that became Paludan/ s/ .) Letter from Christoffer Corvinius to 
the clergy in the hundred of Herrested, Söfvested February 21, 1677 (sic!) The date must be wrong 
since Berro Glimager signed December 27 below), Breuer’s Second Intercession, 15th October, pp.85-
86. Unfortunately this letter seems to be corrupt. 
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Lindenow  followed up the Swedish order with a letter hat said that each and every 
clergyman who celebrated the ”fictitious victory” would soon end his days in a 
deplorable manner. Lindenow kindly asked the clergy to sign the letter in order to 
prove that they had partaken of its contents. 1160 Which Corvinius also did and sent it 
on to his colleagues as well. As a consequence of this Corvinius was suspended from 
office and the new (Swedish) parson in Ystad (Ysted), Lacander, soon took over his 
place.  
 
Early in 1677 Krabbe visited Governor General von Fersen in Malmö (Malmøe). 
During this visit Fersen told him that Corvinius had been denounced for having sent 
on a letter from the Danish authorities that forbade the Scanian clergy to celebrate the 
”ficitious victory” at Lund.1161 On 19th January Fersen sent a report about the general 
situation to the king.1162 In it Fersen declared that the state of affairs in Scania was 
very worrying. The inhabitants of the province were unreliable and their minds were 
all inclined towards the Danish side. He felt how they grew in their “malice” every 
day and felt that soon there would be conspiracies going on everywhere. On 3rd 
January hardly any parishes had celebrated the Thanksgiving Service for the Swedes, 
but they had all gladly listened to a letter from the Danish king from 18th December 
that had been read out aloud in the churches. Corvinius had spread out this letter and 
another one from Meerheim “with great diligence”. Fersen sent over originals with 
Corvinius’s signature so that the king could see that he was telling the truth. He felt 
that something had to be seriously done about the matter. The first measure he 
proposed was to exchange the native clergy for Swedes. For this reason the Swedish 
minister Magnus Lacander had been appointed “pastor” of Ystad (here: Ystedh). The 
bishop wanted Krabbe’s man (Corvinius) for the job, which was a bit of a problem but 
then Fersen suggested that bishop Winstrup would have to accept the presence of a 
vice-bishop of Swedish origins.1163 If the Swedish bishops would send down able 
Swedish ministers to Scania then it would become so much easier to “combine and 
                                               
1160 Letter from Christofer Lindenow to the clergy in the hundred of Herrested, Christianstad December 
29, 1676, Breuer’s Second Intercession, 15th October, pp.83-84. 
1161 Letter from Krabbe to Fersen, Krogholm 21st January, 1677, Breuer’s Second Intercession 15th 
October, 1677, pp.86-88. 
1162 Contrary to most of his little epistles in German that were written in his own handwriting, this four-
page report was written in perfect Swedish and in what looks like different handwriting. Probably that 
of a scribe. Fersen grew up in the Baltic provinces and very rarely used Swedish. 
1163 Fersen also expressed his opinion that Winstrup was so old that it would be better for him to sit at 
home in peace and quiet during those few years that he might still have left. 
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unite the nations with each other.”1164 After all the Danes did not employ any 
Norwegian ministers in Norway, or at least not very many, because the realm was 
safer that way. Norwegian men of the church were sent off to “Denmark and Jutland”. 
Last but not least, Fersen proposed that a special tribunal (Judicium) against 
snaphaner and other suspect people be instituted.   
 
 On 21st January Krabbe wrote a letter to Fersen in which he tried to explain the whole 
Corvinius affair in a favourable light.  He sent over both the Swedish and the Danish 
circular letters and then he explained that Corvinius had only signed the one from 
Lindenow because it had been brought to him by a group of Danish soldiers that 
would have put the threat into effect if he had refus d. Krabbe then stressed that 
Corvinius was one of the oldest and most virtuous clergymen in the hundred and 
definitely the best preacher. In his letter Krabbe also implied that maybe Corvinius 
even deserved being appointed vicar (prost). He obviously did not know that the 
Swede Lacander had already been appointed to the post. Fersen promptly replied that 
Krabbe had better stop insisting on this issue since t was highly unsuitable that other 
clergymen should depend upon a man who in the best of cases could be said to be 
neutral: ”an honest Swedish man with all the required merits should not have to stand 
back for him.” Neutrality was something that could be conceived of but it was not 
accepted. Perhaps ordinary people could try and stand outside the conflict, but 
clergymen had to take sides since both sides requird their services. Out of 104 
parsons in the Scanian provinces 57 were reported as de d or missing after the 
war.1165 Krabbe’s actions in the Corvinius case would later b  judged as an attempt to 
defend delinquents.1166 
 
Around this time Krabbe also went to visit the Swedish king who bestowed a 
baronetcy upon him but Krabbe was far from enthusiastic. In a letter to his ex-bailiff 
and friend Hack Söfrenssön he described the events in the following manner: 
 
 ”I returned from the King some days ago, all my wishes were granted. I was allowed to keep 
Höegesteedh, I was granted a tax exemption on Kroegholm, Ingildstrup was also exempted and will be 
                                               
1164 “till att combinera och föreena nationerna medh hvar andre…” 
1165 M.Weibull, Skånska samlingar, II Till Skånes historia under övergångstiden 1658-1710, Skånska 
kriget och snapphanefejden 1676-1679: 4. http://www.ra.se//lla/dokument/v_1871/II_1_4.html 
1166 Breuer’s Second Intercession, 15th October, p.73: ”Mindre war dhet tienlige, at een reedelige och 
wel meriterat Swensk Mand, för hannom skulle tilbacka sättias....” 
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classified as my other farms, against my will I had to accept the title of baron and other great Royal 
Promises….”1167  
 
Sometime during the winter of 1676-77 Krabbe’s brother-in-law Knud Thott was 
“abducted” by the Danes.  The Danish authorities declar d that the abduction had 
taken place very much against Knud Thott’s will. Knud stayed nice and calm in his 
arrest in Lands Crone.1168 
At the beginning of February Krabbe came to the governor general with a letter from 
the king that was dated 6th February. In it the king asked Fersen to try to clear up any 
problems that Krabbe  might  have with other people: “wann Krabbe einige wirdt 
beschuldigen können, die ihm übel nachgeredet haben, di selben für mich besheyden 
undt der grund ihrer beschuldigung vernehmen…”1169 So far the only one who had 
had anything to say about Krabbe  was Colonel Sehest d who had complained that 
Krabbe was a “good Swede”  and had told everyone how much he hated Krabbe and 
that once he had let his regiment surround Krabbe’s mansion so that he had been 
closed in. 
 
However, Krabbe was worried that the Swedes might be questioning his loyalty. On 
27th February he wrote to his Swedish friend Bent Rosenhane in order to ask him to 
try and find out whether the king gave credit to the rumours that someone was 
spreading about Krabbe in court circles. It appears from the letter that someone was 
accusing Krabbe of being ”an unfaithful subject” that ad committed offences against 
his lord and king.1170  In May Fersen asked Krabbe if “Mogens Hacksøn”1171 was in 
his service and if it was true that Krabbe had helped him to a position as a Danish tax-
collector (Crone fouget).  Krabbe replied that Hacksøn was the son of his one time 
bailiff but he was not working for him. Krabbe emphasised that he had never helped 
anyone into the service of the Danes.1172   
 
                                               
1167 Kroegholm, 27th January 1677, From Krabbe to Hack Söffrenssön, see Exc rpts! 
1168 Letter from Knud Thott to Sperling, 19th May, 1678, in Rosencrantz (1679), pp.18-23. 
1169 Fersen to the king, 19th February 1677, GG, SRA. 
1170 Letter from Krabbe to Baron Bent Rosenhane, Krogholm 27th February 27, 1677. DRA.(copy): 
”indtil såå lenge Jag nogensinde kand offerbevisas at haffva Committeret noget mod min aller nådigste 
herre och konge som en otrogen undersaatte...” 
1171 In other sources this man’s name is spelt ”Mons Hacksen” or “ Mons Hacksøn”.  
1172 Krabbe, in Aletophilus, p.139. Mons Hacksøn was considered a ”snaphane” by the Swedes.   
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The Thott-Krabbe clan were losing credibility among the Swedes. Young Tage Thott 
was frozen out from Swedish court circles in spite of his occupying a position as 
page-boy (kammerherre).1173 After the battle of Lund Tage’s friends in the Swedish 
army told him he had better get out of there as soon as possible because some people 
were spreading really nasty rumours about him. The Thotts and Krabbe were 
considered a potential hazard to the security of the realm, in part because they had 
close relatives on the other side. Krabbe’s brother Tage had remained there from the 
beginning. His sister Karen’s husband Just Høgh was first governor of Norway and 
then Denmark’s ambassador at the Nimwegen conferenc. Krabbe’s other brother-in-
law Jørgen Due was an important government minister. Some of Krabbe’s friends 
from his childhood immediately opted for the Danes when the war started and then 
received important positions in the Danish war administration in Scania. The Thotts 
had even more connections to the other side. No matter how many times they pledged 
faith there would still be people who wondered whether they had chatted one word 
too much to their friends and relatives.  Since it was enough to keep in touch with 
one’s connections on the other side to be classified as a traitor it is also clear that there 
were plenty of reasons for people to spread rumours about the Thotts and Krabbe even 
when they were still officially on the Swedish side. During the spring Swedish troops 
were billeted at Krageholm (Krogholm) and the surronding farms. One of the 
Swedes was a quarter master by the name of Lorenss Basch.  Krabbe wrote to Fersen 
to complain of the situation:  
“Words aren’t enough to describe our miserable and piteous situation. We are given prey to the enemy 
and our own side plunder and steal all that we own: horses, cows, and everything that is kept in chests 
and boxes, especially from the peasants. Your Excellency can judge for Himself what the effects are on 
people’s thoughts and affections. Tonight Christian Bilde and his wife, my niece, who is pregnant and 
expecting any day now, had to escape from their home and take refuge at my place since our people 
(the Swedish troops) were plundering all over at their place. They took his oxen and told him that they 
were going to put the house on fire.”1174   
 
On 25th May the troops left Krageholm (Krogholm).1175 During this distressful period 
Krabbe was forced to pay 10.000 rigsdaler in contributions to both sides. Considering 
that an average aristocrat in Denmark made 20.000 a year at the time of the cession of 
                                               
1173 Rosencrantz (1679), p.46: ”Saa snart hand effter Slaget for Lund underdanigst indstillede sig som 
før er ommeldt hos Hans Kongelig Mayestet aff Sverrig møtte hannem der Truseler oc haarde ord...” 
He had encountered similar reactions already when t Swedish king left Malmö in the early summer 
of that year (1676). 
1174 Cronholm, p.199. During this period the Swedes were laying waste the border areas in the north, 
but it seems from Krabbe’s letters that they were also using tough methods in the south. 
1175 Aletophilus, p.18. 
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the Scanian provinces it is easy to understand that he found it hard to manage the 
situation.1176 Christian Bilde and Arill Swawe wrote similar lettrs of complaint to the 
Governor General. When Fersen received Swawe’s letter from 4th April he brusquely 
wrote “Dieser Brief soll mir verwahret werden und alle von derselben Natur, so noch 
einkommen werden” at the back of it.1177 
 
In June 1677 the heads of the Scanian noble families were ordered to meet up in 
Malmö (Malmøe). The order was issued by Fersen shortly before his untimely death 
on 30th June 30.1178 Unfortunately the snaphaner got hold of the first batch of letters 
so the order had to be repeated.  This order is to be f und in 12 copies among the 
Intercepted Letters: all signed by Fersen and worded slightly differently depending on 
whom the addressee was. The most personal version was the one that was meant for 
Krabbe. The other eleven letters were addressed to the rest of the cream of the crop of 
the Scanian nobility, including some Swedish newcomers.1179    Since this batch of 
letters is to be found in the Danish National Archives today it must have been picked 
up by snaphaner too. It is unclear whether Fersen fou d out that another dispatch had 
been lost and had the letters written again or whether they were sent out in duplicate 
from the beginning.   The same order was then repeated for the third time by Fersen’s 
successor Jöran Sperling. The decision to deport the nobility was triggered by the 
snaphaner/friskytter that blocked the roads and threatened to kill anyone who tried to 
obey the orders of the governor general and go to Malmö (Malmøe). Or perhaps, the 
snaphaner/friskytter provided the nobility with a pl usible excuse not to go.   Sperling 
often claimed that all Scanians followed their leadr Krabbe and the rest of the 
nobility. Passive resistance was a problem that had to be dealt with too. All castles 
and mansions were to be cleared out in order to leave space for Swedish troops that 
would turn them into strongholds from where the snaphaner could be fought more 
efficiently.  
 
                                               
1176 Cronholm, p.198. 
1177 Swawe’s letter and Fersen’s comment are printed in M. Weibull, Skånska samlingar, II Till Skånes 
historia under övergångstiden 1658-1710, Skånska kriget och snapphanefejden 1676-1679: 4. 
http://www.ra.se//lla/dokument/v_1871/II_1_4.html   
1178 Sperling later commented that the only noble families that were left by that time were those around 
Ystad so that was why the order was only sent out to them. See the section on Sperling’s Deduction. 
Fersen was wounded in the head during the Danish assault on Malmö on June 25 and 26 and died some 
days later. 
1179 Intercepted letters.... 
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Conclusions: 
Although some people apparently found it easier to take sides than others, there are 
often strong incentives involved in the choice making. Hindrich Peersøn for one was 
obviously very happy about the opportunity to become a “foged”, else he would not 
have waved the certificate at his former (?) boss. Danish sovereignty offered him 
opportunities that perhaps would have been harder to come at under Swedish rule. It 
could also be added that being an inborn Dane constituted an obstacle to making a 
career in the administration under the Swedes and that consequently, since it was not 
so to the Danes, it was easy enough for people like H ndrich Peersøn to identify with 
that side. Krabbe vacillated, but his aims in life w re also completely different. He 
was middle-aged and it is doubtful whether he by now wanted do something else 
other than running his estates in Scania. It seems as if that was his main aim but we 
cannot be sure. Knud Thott was “abducted” by Danish troops around this time and 
later he made a splendid career in the civil administration and the closest circles 
around the king of Denmark. Maybe that was also still an option for Krabbe. What is 
evident in the sources is that from after the battle of Lund onwards the Krabbe-Thott 
family were beginning to feel discredited by the Swedes and Krabbe seemed 
convinced that he was being slandered in certain circles. Even his youngest brother-
in-law, Tage Thott was brusquely dismissed from the Swedish court where he was 
then a page boy, for no better reason than that he was Danish. In this sense, the 
nobility and gentry were being driven towards the Danish camp by Swedish 
suspicions and perhaps also by the hope of career opportunities they felt they had 
been bereft of under Swedish rule. Fabricius saw the decision to deport the nobility as 
a tactical move on the side of the Swedes: principally it was seen as an element in the 
war on the snaphaner but also as a way of getting rid of the nobility and gentry that 
(according to Fabricius) were seen as very dangerous in their ostentatious passivity. 
 
 The Abduction of Basch and Klingspor  
“...offentlig bekiender for dig min gode Gud, at jeg r en gieldbunden og grow synder, der icke 
alleniste er fød og undfangen i synden; men end og saa der udi min gandske lifs tiid fremdraget hawer, 
og fortørnet min gode Gud og herre, i mange maader, m d tanker, ord og gierninger...”1180 
 
Introduction 
                                               
1180 Jørgen Krabbe’s prayer-book, p.22. 
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This section analyses the workings of the friskytte/snaphane organisation on Krabbe’s 
lands and in the closest surroundings. It also concentrates on the connections between 
Krabbe and the persons who were considered by the Swedes to be snaphaner, and of 
whom at least some almost certainly were Danish frikytter. During this period it was 
not very clear who ruled over that part of Scania ad so the people in the area found 
themselves at the mercy of the authorities and troops of both countries. 
 
Tax collectors and Snaphaner 
 
In July 1677 the Swedish king had his headquarters at Rönneberga near Landskrona 
(Landscrone). On the 18th of that month Colonel Bernt Mellin sent his quartermaster 
Lorens Basch to collect debts and war contributions n the Ystad (Ysted) area where 
the regiment had been stationed two months earlier. In his company Basch had two 
other quartermasters of lower rank, a physician and at least one groom.1181   
The day after Basch arrived at Krageholm (Krogholm). He promptly communicated 
his orders to the baron who answered in the following terms: ”I cannot do anything 
about that. The enemy has taken everything. If the King does not want to defend us 
then we cannot give any contributions.” Basch demanded either a written statement or 
payment but the baron replied: ”I will have to think about that until tomorrow” and 
asked where Basch was heading for. No witnesses were pr sent. Then Krabbe asked 
Basch how he had dared travel straight through the hundred of Färs (Fers) that was 
infested with snaphaner. At which Basch confidently replied: ”I fought courageously 
with them and shot one or two and then I burnt a farmstead to the ground!”1182    
 Basch told the baron about the recent battle of Landskrona (here: Lands Crone). He 
described it in the following terms: ”...on the Danish left flank they behaved like dogs 
and we had no choice but to slaughter the Infantry like so many piglets.”1183 Then 
Basch said that he would be kind to Krabbe’s peasants but that he would have to exact 
some money from the peasants in the village where h had been assigned night 
                                               
1181 Lorenss Basch’s petition to General Sperling, 1678, Lit A in Rosencrantz. They had been absent 
since May 25 See: Basch’s court statement , 8th October 1677, in Aletophilus, p.18. 
1182 Krabbe’s first court statement (inläg), 5th October 1677, in Aletophilus, p.11. Basch’s court 
statement , 8th October 1677, in Aletophilus, p.19: ”aldrigh nembde Hr.Baronen eller hans Fouget noget 
Ordh til migh om Snaphannerne. ” 
1183 Basch’s letter of 9th October 1677, in Aletophilus, p. 21: ”...de uppå den Dankse vänstre Fliglen 
hølle sigh som Hundsvutter, det var intet annat for os at giörra end stiche Infanteriet ihiel som 
Grussar...” 
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quarters. He declared that he would be back in two days’ time and said good-bye. 
That night Basch stayed at Kiöppinge.1184 
Meanwhile Krabbe had received a new visitor: one of his mother-in-law’s farm-hands 
who had come down from her estate Sövdeborg (Söfvde) some 13 kilometres north of 
Krageholm (Krogholm). This servant reported that the snaphaner had paid them an 
unexpected visit and that they had asked if they had seen any Swedes. Krabbe 
supposed it was Basch they were after since he knewthat Basch had visited the bailiff 
(fougde) of Munkasjö (Munke-Siø) that was very close to Sövdeborg (Söfvde).1185 
Krabbe also knew that Basch had been telling people that he was going to Tosterup 
(Taastrup) to collect taxes. That same evening 60 snaphaner passed Krogholm on 
their way to Tosterup (Taastrup). Halfway there they stopped at what had used to be 
Krabbe’s estate Högestad (Høgested) where they met Krabbes garden boy from 
Tosterup (Taastrop) and a boy whom Tage Thott had apprenticed to Krabbe’s game-
keeper1186. The snaphaner asked for Basch and then they all rode on to Tosterup 
(Taastrup) castle to look for him. The snaphaner knw that he was either at Tosterup 
(Taastrup) or Bollerup (Bullarp).They turned the place upside down in their quest but 
all they found was Mogens Peerssøn the vice-bailiff in bed. Then they ate and drank 
beer and eventually Mogens joined them too. It is unclear what the role of the boys 
and Mogens was. 
On 20th July Basch went to Glimminge Tuggerup to see court bailiff (tingfougden) 
Christen Nielsen.1187 Meanwhile Krabbe’s peasants had come to him complaining that 
Basch wanted 3 pounds of bread, 2 pounds of meat and 2 daler in silver or 5 silver 
mark from every farmstead. Krabbe knew that his peasants had already paid the 
Danes that month and that most of their cattle had been confiscated so he decided to 
                                               
1184 Lorenss Basch’s Petition (supplique) to General Sperling, 1678, Lit A in Rosencrantz.   
1185 Krabbe, in Aletophilus, p.105. Krabbe claimed he had wanted to warn Basch.Krabbe’s mother-in-
law was Dorthe (Dorette) Rosencrantz. 
1186 ”min Urte-Dreng fra Taastrop och een liden Jeger Pog som min Svoger Tage Tott hafde saat udi 
Lære hos min Skytte.” Krabbe to Sperling, 2nd Sept. 1677, in Sperling’s Deduction, p.31. Tage Thott 
was the proprietor of Erichsholm (Trolleholm). 
1187 The same man is called Nilsson in Rosencrantz (who might have been quoting Basch), Nielsön in 
Breuer (Second instance p.61). Probably Nielsen since almost all local judges were Danish until 1683. 
Contrary to many other native public servants they w re not discharged at an early stage since they 
were experts on Scanian Law. It was only when Swedish law was introduced in 1683 that these local 
judges were replaced by Swedes. See: Alf Erlandsson, Skånska Generalguvernementet 1658-1693 och 
dess arkiv, Lund 1967.p.165 the “tingsfogde” or “herredsfoged” was an ”amateur” judge without 
schooling, normally a farmer who presided the ”häradsting” the court of each hundred. Some of these 
local judges were analphabets. See: Erlandsson, pp 154-155 and 220-221. As for Glimminge Tuggerup 
I do not know exactly what it would correspond to today. Perhaps Tågarp some distance north of 
Glimmingehus.   
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send his bailiff Christopher over to try and placate Basch.1188  Christopher arrived 
around noon and told Basch that the baron sent his greetings and wanted to know if 
there was any way his tenants might be exempted from t ansport duties: they were so 
busy with the harvest that they could not transport victuals to the army camp. The 
bailiff also told Basch that the baron promised to pay his debts and that he would 
come and visit Basch the day after if Basch would only let him know where he was to 
be found. Basch then told his men where they were going, and he did so while at 
dinner with Christopher. The Swedish party was to split up into three groups that 
would spend the night in separate places about 2 Swedish miles apart. He himself was 
heading for Bollerup (Bullarp). Later on Basch would explain that he had let the 
bailiff know where they were going because he thougt ”the baron would behave like 
an honest Swedish man towards me.”1189  Christopher then went to tell the peasants 
that they would have to have 5 marks ready for the following day.1190 On his way 
back Christopher bumped into a group of snaphaner who asked him who he was and 
where he had been. Christopher told them that he was Baron Krabbe’s bailiff and that 
he had been to see Quarter master Basch in order to try and work out a tax deal with 
him. Now he was on his way back to his master to see what he had to say and the 
following morning he would have to return to Basch. T e snaphaner then ordered 
Christopher to lead them to Basch and he agreed.  
 
That same night when Basch was sleeping ”like a log” Hindrich and Mons Peerssön 
arrived in the company of 66 snaphaner. At exactly the same time the other two 
groups of Swedes were surprised by snaphaner accompanied by “Krabbe’s men”.1191 
The snaphaner surrounded Bollerup (Bullarp) castle and went in and caught Basch, a 
physician,1192 two quarter masters and two grooms. The victims were stripped of both 
clothes and belongings. Later Basch would claim that i  was Krabbe’s two bailiffs 
who had led the troop with guns in their belts and that the two of them had made a 
prisoner of him with the words: ”Du Schwedscher Hund, nu wollen wir dich 
                                               
1188 Krabbe’s Response to the Prosecutor, 9th October 1677, p.45. 
1189 Basch’s court statement , 8th October 1677, in Aletophilus, pp.17-18. 
1190 Krabbe’s Response to the Prosecutor, 9th October 1677, p.46. 
1191 Basch’s Petition to Sperling, in Aletophilus, Lit.A.  Basch’s court statement , 8th October 1677, in 
Aletophilus, p.18. 
1192 In Krabbe’s first court statement (5th October 1677 in Aletophilus, p.10) he claimed that B sch was 
caught by the snaphaner at Taastrop. Since Bollerup is the place that is mentioned in all other sources 
even by Krabbe I have chosen to consider this as a mistake. Taastrop (Tosterup) and Bollerup are only 
a few kilometres distant from each other.  
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prüglen!”. 1193 Mogens also told Basch that the misery he found himself in now was a 
punishment for all the times he had beaten the vice-bailiff black and blue for no 
reason.1194 Then they brought one of the grooms into the courtyard and shot him.1195 
Meanwhile some other snaphaner were torturing Basch in order to try and make him 
tell them where the rest of his money was.1196 The snaphaner told Basch that he was 
only getting what he deserved for having said that e Danish soldiers cried like 
piglets when they died.1197 Some of the men wanted to shoot Basch but the Lieutenant 
who was in charge took the Swede under his wings and brought him inside the castle. 
After that the two bailiffs took their leave of the snaphaner and all the time they were 
whispering and chattering along. 
 
Then the snaphaner invigorated themselves with 3 tuns of beer and set off for 
Kiöppinge. Once there they sat about and waited for further orders from the bailiffs. 
At 10 in the morning they set off in the direction f Krageholm (Krogholm) but on the 
way they met one of Krabbe’s servants who called th game-keeper of General Major 
Hans Walthers1198 who was in charge of the vanguard and cried: ”Hurry p! We just 
had a visit from he and Captain Klingspor have only just left for Marsvinsholm! Ride 
faster so that you can get him too!” The six best horsemen were sent in the direction 
of Marsvinsholm, while the rest of the snaphaner split u  in two troops. The first of 
these brought the prisoners to Krageholm (Krogholm) and the others went to the 
village of Örsjö (kringrände).1199  
 
                                               
1193 “You Swedish dog now you’ll get a good beating”. Krabbe’s first court statement (inläg), 5th
October 1677, in Aletophilus. It is interesting that the Danes spoke to the Swedes in German. The 
general view is that (Low-) German was only used when one of the interlocutors was a native German 
speaker. Just like today, Swedes and Danes tended to speak their own languages to each other or to turn 
it into Scandinavian pidgin. Stig Örjan Ohlsson ( 1979, pp.38-41) emphasises the fact that German was 
spoken to some extent even among the lower classes in Scania and that German might also have been 
used when native speakers of that language were not involved.  
1194 Krabbe’s first court statement (inläg), 5th October 1677, in Aletophilus.: ”all dend Ulycke som du 
nu hafver er for det du hug mig blodig oc pröglede mig uden Aarsag.” Obviously, on the side of the 
bailiffs it was a question of personal grudges. 
1195 Breuer called this man a ”ryttere”. See: Breuer’s second instance, 15th October, in Aletophilus, 
p.63. 
1196 Please note that this is according to Basch’s own account. 
1197  According to Basch. See: Basch’s letter of 8th October, 1677, in Aletophilus, p.21. 
1198 General Major Hans Walthers Skötte 
1199 Interrogation of the two snaphaner Jöns Ottosson and Henrik Jönsson, Ystad, 27th February 1678, 
Letters to the governor general, Landsarkivet, Lund, quoted by Johnsson, pp.128-131. Ottoson 
admitted to having made part of the rearguard when Klingspor was caught, i.e. He and some others 
were left behind at Örsjö. He denied having participated in the attack in the woods outside Ystad. That
night he had been with Henrik Jönsson in Ystad. Unfortunately Jönsson told the court contrariwise. 
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Klingspor had arrived at Ystad the day before and that same morning he set out for 
Krageholm (Krogholm) some 11 kilometres to the northwest. When Klingspor was 
told that the baron had gone to the Marsvinsholm estat  he went after him.1200 At 
Marsvinsholm Klingspor was met by the squire, Holger Thott and his brother-in-law 
Krabbe. The three of them were taking a walk in the fruit-gardens when a group of 
snaphaner fell on them. All of sudden, Thott and Krabbe where nowhere to be found. 
Klingspor was captured and his groom shot on the spot. Krabbe’s garden boy and 
Tage Thott’s gamekeeper’s lad were both there. Then t  snaphaner took their latest 
prisoner with them and set of for Krageholm (Krogholm) to divide their booty. 
Meanwhile Krabbe had materialised and hurried after th  snaphaner in order to try 
and buy the lives of the prisoners. He offered the snaphaner money in exchange for 
Basch’s life and they accepted it.1201 There were 8 snaphaner to every man at his 
house so that he and his men stood no chance.1202  The prisoners were then taken to 
Kristianstad (Christianstad) where they were registred officially as prisoners of war.  
Later Krabbe would claim that he had sent a report to Fersen immediately. 
Unfortunately no such report was to be found in the Swedish archives when the trial 
started. What is sure is that on 2nd September Krabbe reported to Governor General 
Sperling that the snaphaner had forced some of his men to participate in the 
kidnapping of Basch and Klingspor.1203  In the same letter Krabbe reported that he 
had already written to War Commissary Svend Erlandsson in order to ask him  if he 
had any idea of whether any of Krabbe’s men ”had done something they should not 
have.” This was when Sven Erlandsson had visited th Krageholm (Krogholm) area 
and had held an ”inquisition” there.1204  
Conclusions 
In this case the actions of the snaphaner were carefully planned. Someone saw to it 
that they could attack the Swedish party in three diff rent places contemporaneously. 
Probably the same people or the same network that had enabled them to follow 
                                               
1200 Krabbe’s first court statement (inläg), 5th October 1677, in Aletophilus. 
1201 Krabbe’s first court statement (inläg), 5th October 1677, in Aletophilus, p.12. 
1202 Krabbe’s response to the Prosecutor, 9th October 1677, in Aletophilus, p.50. This means that ere 
must have been 8 or 9 grown men at Krageholm (Krogholm). 
1203 Breuer’s Second Instance, 15th October, p. 61 and Extract Nr XII. 
1204 Breuer’s Second Instance, 15th October, p. 65, and Extract Nr XII., and Krabbe, Aletophilus, p.128. 
This notice provides us with yet more information on Sven Erlandsson’s tasks during the Scanian War. 
Krabbe’s account shows that by mid-1677 Erlandsson was travelling around making inquiries into the 
state of things on the noble estates and also he was obviously meant to keep account of whether there 
were any snaphaner. It is interesting that Krabbe at l ast pretended that Erlandsson might know more 
about Krabbe’s own employees and tenants than Krabbe did himself.  
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Basch’s footsteps that closely. There was also some degree of military discipline and 
a lieutenant whose commands were obeyed. There was a v nguard. Nor were they 
enemies of the peasant community around them. They were part and parcel of it. At 
least in the case of Krabbe’s men.  Let us assume that Basch was telling the truth. 
Then we would have an estate where the lord of the manor was keeping an eye closed 
to the fact that a not insignificant part of his employees were participating in anti-
Swedish activities. These employees occupied all sorts of ranks from bailiff to 
garden-boy. The anti-Swedish activities ranged from egular jobs in the Danish army 
to passive support of the Danes (proved by laughing at captive Swedes etc). In this 
latter kind of support women were involved too.   
 
Krabbe’s account of the evening after Basch’s visit offers us some interesting 
information about the snaphaner. They had crossed the plains and woodlands of the 
hundreds of Torna and Färs (Torne and Fers) and seemed to be fairly well-informed. 
They were after Swedes and were not interested in bothering rich old ladies about 
anything but information (in this case at least). Since their numbers corresponded to 
the average for a company and military grades were used among them it can be 
assumed that it really was a (registered?) company.The  had a clear scope for their 
actions and were not out to kidnap anyone in their way with a fat purse. The story as 
we have it is the one that Krabbe was told by his people and it is the only version we 
have. Perhaps they actually did tell the truth. As we have already seen in the 
preceding chapter, the snaphaner were wont to drag people along by force when they 
had orders to do so, and many witnesses claim they did so in very arbitrary cases too. 
Most people who were accused of having been with the snaphaner defended 
themselves by saying that they had been dragged along by force. But if it was a well 
known fact that that was their modus operandi, people who had actually joined the 
snaphaner willingly were likely to proffer it as anexcuse when they were caught. 
Naturally, it was a comfortable excuse but in order to sound plausible it must also 
have been an excuse that seemed realistic. Krabbe’s excuses to the Swedish 
authorities also show that he used one of the most common clichés to explain to the 
Swedes why oneself or someone else one cared for habeen sighted or caught in the 
company of snaphaner: i.e. that this person had been shanghaied or at least forced 
very much against his own will. 
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There is no way of knowing whether the two boys, Mogens and Christopher were 
actually impressed into the snaphane-forces or whether they had been snaphaner all 
along. In either case I believe they can be defined as ”snaphaner.” My scope here is to 
analyse the snaphane movement against the background of a pseudo-feudal society 
like that of Krabbe’s estates around Ystad (Ysted). It makes no difference to this 
aspect of the analysis whether the snaphaner in question were impressed or not. To 
judge by the actions of Krabbe’s men during the twodays in July when the Basch and 
Klingspor were kidnapped, they were neither reluctant nor unwilling to fight. To tell 
the truth, they did not seem unprepared to fight eit er, considering that they were all 
armed to the teeth from the beginning. The garden boy had pistols and knives hanging 
from his saddle and his friend had a huge rifle. Admittedly, those were days when one 
could not feel safe even in one’s own home. Most men w re armed and not only with 
knives, but not as heavily armed as Krabbe’s men on this particular night. Moreover 
these men had neither tried to escape nor to stay in the back rows. On the contrary, 
they had all taken active part in the action. Christopher was said to have used his 
rapier as enthusiastically as any of the snaphaner d all the witnesses heard by the 
court agreed that he had eaten and drunk and been as merry as any of the snaphaner 
after their ”feat.” Christopher himself admitted tha  the two boys had gone on a 
nightly raid with some of the snaphaner and that they ad been in the best of moods 
and very merry when they returned. Mogens Peersøn who insisted that the snaphaner 
had dragged him out of bed and into the night was accused of actually taking 
command. In any case it was not him but the lieutenant who won the day when the 
destiny of the prisoners was to be decided upon. Mogens wanted to do away with 
them but the lieutenant would not let him. Which indicates that the lieutenant of the 
snaphaner did invest some authority after all. Besides the lieutenant is the only 
member of the original group of snaphaner that is mentioned as an individual. With 
the possible addition of the gamekeeper who led the vanguard. As for those of 
Krabbe’s men who partook in the actions one of them was a Danish tax-collector 
(Crone fouget) and ex-bailiff, another one was bailiff on the estate of the most 
powerful family in Scania, one was a sixteen-year-old who was apprenticed to the 
gardener on the estate, one was a twenty-year-old youngster with a huge gun who was 
the gamekeeper’s lad. A fifth of Krabbe’s servants helped the snaphaner as an 
informer or scout. There were could be no doubts as to his actions being voluntary or 
not.   
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It is obvious that Mogens did not mind partaking in the action. Perhaps because it 
gave him a chance to get personal revenge. Basch had given him a good thrashing on 
at least one earlier occasion and this was Mogens’s chance of getting his own. To 
him, Basch was not only a dog but a Swedish dog. This is one occasion where we can 
see how national identities were used to acerbate pre- xisting conflicts even on a 
personal plane. Mogens would probably have loathed any tax-collector who took 
advantage of his power in order to mistreat other people. But it seems as if he loathed 
Basch even more because he was Swedish. And not only Mogens, because Basch 
claimed that he had been ”tortured” by a group of snaphaner who wanted to make him 
suffer for having spoken derisively of Danish soldiers. Perhaps they too had personal 
quarrels with tax-collectors, soldiers that they had d as lodgers, officials that had 
acted in a way they were not used to or even abused them physically. Representatives 
of a central state and system that were new to the country and used methods that were 
not the same as the good old ways. Officials and soldiers that, after all, spoke a 
different language and therefore did not even sound the way representatives of the 
king should sound. Men like Basch. The conflict was there and national identities 
crystallised around it. Perhaps men like Mogens would not even have thought about 
the nationality of a cruel tax-collector if it had ll happened twenty years earlier when 
Scania was still part of the heartland of Denmark. It would simply have been the 
matter of a bastard that needed to be marked and so they would have sneaked up on 
him one dark night anyway. But the Swedish occupation and the ravages of the 
consequent war had made things different. The existence of the snaphaner made 
things very different for they provided Mogens with an opportunity for his personal 
vendetta at the same time as he could lash out against the Swedes in general. All 
within the limits of the law if one was a Dane.  
 
Why did the snaphaner shoot the grooms right away? Perhaps it was a pecuniary 
question. They knew someone would be willing to payfor the lives of men like Basch 
and Klingspor but no one would want the grooms. Thelieutenant also knew that he 
might gain some merit by bringing Basch and Klingspor to the war commissariat at 
Kristianstad (Christianstad) but the grooms would only be a burden to them.1205 
 
                                               
1205 Erlandsson, “Promemoria on the Snaphaner”. 
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As for the local community on the whole, people seem d to have been afraid of the 
snaphaner: Dorthe Rosencrantz who quickly sent a messenger to warn her son-in-law 
Krabbe of the snaphaner, the total absence of anyone at all who stood up against the 
snaphaner or tried to stop them. This latter fact could also be interpreted as tacit 
consent. Perhaps the local community did not mind if Basch got a good beating and 
his followers were killed. Perhaps they were all the happier if some Swedes had to 
bite the dust. But once the trial in Malmö (Malmøe) had started it was not impossible 
at all to find witnesses who were willing to testify about both this and that even if it 
would cost Krabbe and his men their lives. Which in its turn indicates that perhaps 
there were those who would have stood up for Basch nd the Swedes if they had 
dared to challenge the snaphaner. One might only wonder whether Jytte Thott and the 
other women at Krageholm (Krogholm) really laughed their heads off at the sight of 
Basch in chains or whether they cried their eyes out at the shame of it as Jytte’s loving 
husband claimed. Some months ago I stood there on the ramp where the drawbridge 
used to be and looked up at the windows of the ”frustua” right above me. The frustua 
was the ladies’ parlour where the mistress of the house used to spend her days with 
her maids. I stood there on the gravel of the driveway and looked at some bits and 
pieces of Swedish cannons that were lying about there. There is no frustua anymore. 
And yet I looked up at the windows and thought well, this is what Basch saw when he 
was brought here by the snaphaner, that is where thy sat. So what did he see, smiling 
faces or bitter tears? Or was it even so that the ladi s were sly enough to turn their 
laughter into tears when the baron arrived? As we will see later, Jytte Thott’s chamber 
maid Anne Andersdatter was very close friends with a notorious snaphane. So it 
seems rather odd that at least Anne should have cried at the sight of a group of 
triumphant snaphaner. It would not be so odd if Krabbe tried to protect his wife. He 
knew that she would have a hard time of it trying to prove that she was on the right 
side once she was on her own, as he suspected she would be. 
In any case it is quite clear that the snaphaner who ere involved in this action were 
also normal members of the local community. In the case of Walter’s gamekeeper it is 
not clear whether he still kept his position or whether he had become a full-time 
snaphane/friskytt. The latter option is the most probable one in case he had come with 
the troop all the way from Torna (Torne). The members of registered companies 
worked full-time and their activities ranged all over the province. In this case they 
went a considerable distance. From the hundred of Torna (Torne) and perhaps 
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beyond, to Krageholm (Krogholm) and to Kristianstad (Christianstad).  Another 
gamekeeper who was involved was Krabbe’s who had stowed away the booty, as the 
Swedes were to discover. 
 
Basch’s Complaint against Krabbe 
 
“I always ran the greatest risk because of their continuous threats, which God the Almighty and the 
whole of my neighbourhood know to be true.” Jørgen Krabbe on the “snaphaner” in his prayer book.  
 
Introduction 
In this section I will analyse the events that led up to Krabbe’s arrest, both on a micro 
level and on a macro level in that coincidences and personal grudges certainly played 
as big a role as the greater political events that were the background of both Krabbe’s 
arrest and execution. Some of the motives for Krabbe’s death can be traced to the 
events that resulted from the deportation order. Krabbe’s choices and actions can only 
be understood against the background of the ”threat” of involuntary exile in the north. 
For that reason I will try to analyse what the prosect of that exile really meant to him 
and the people around him. The decision to deport the nobility was triggered by the 
snaphaner/friskytter who blocked the roads and threa ened to kill anyone who tried to 
obey the orders of the governor general and go to Malmö (Malmøe). Or perhaps, the 
snaphaner/friskytter provided the nobility with a pl usible excuse (for when it really 
mattered they would let them go where they liked anyway). Either way the operations 
of the snaphaner/friskytter were crucial. This is also an excellent opportunity to study 
the role the snaphaner/friskytter played as emissaries of the Danish king. 
 
”A Highly Useful Emigration” 
The deportation plans were proceeding. At this point the snaphaner sent out a troop of 
about 100 men to guard the road between Ystad (Ysted) and Malmö (Malmøe) that 
most of the noblemen would have to take to obey Sperling’s orders. They also sent a 
message to Krabbe that said that they would shoot him o death in his own parlour if 
he set out for Malmö (Malmøe). The other noblemen were kindly informed that if they 
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left, their estates would be plundered and their families killed.1206 Krabbe, the Thotts, 
Christian Bilde and Arild Swawe1207 then sent a petition directly to the king of 
Sweden in which they pleaded their cause. Then they wrote a letter to the same 
purpose to Sperling in which they also congratulated him on his having been 
appointed Governor General: ” since you are a man who, for a long time, has been 
known by everyone in this land to be sensible, generous and reasonable enough to be 
our friend, benefactor and patron.” Fabricius commented dryly that that kind of 
incense was wasted on Sperling.1208  Only a few days later the noblemen received a 
brusque answer1209 to the point that they and their families would have to go to 
Sweden with no further delay and that they would be convoyed by Swedish troops. If 
they did not meet up in Malmö (Malmø) on 3rd September they would be in deep 
trouble.1210 At this point another missive was sent to the Governor General, in which 
the noblemen declared that Sven Erlandsson had promised to convoy them all from 
Marsvinsholm castle to Malmö (Malmøe) but that he and his men had failed to turn 
up. Now the area was swamped with snaphaner that were threatening to murder their 
families if they left so they could no longer risk it.1211 King Charles let them know 
that he would send a troop to Krageholm (Krogholm) that would convoy them to ”old 
Sweden” on 6th October.1212 At this news first Christian Bilde and then Jørgen Krabbe 
set out for Malmö (Malmøe) in order to try and persuade the governor general.    
       
On 25th Sperling reported to the king that Krabbe had come to town on behalf ”of the 
whole bunch” (the nobility) in order to appeal for a change of policy so that they 
would not have to set out on the ”journey” that had been planned for them.1213 The 
situation in Malmö (Malmøe) was so troublesome thatSperling asked the king for 
help because he feared that Krabbe might win the day else. In the same letter Sperling 
                                               
1206  See: p.72: ”dersom Adelen reyste ind i Malmöe ville de ruinere oc affbrände alle deris Adelige 
Gaarder oc afplyndre alt hvis der fandtis oc deris F uer oc Börn dräbe oc omkomme.” 
1207 The same surname was spelt ”Schuaue” by Sir Mogens of Oretorp. The modern version would be 
“Svab”. “Schuaue” and “Swawe” were pronounced identically. 
1208 Fabricius III: p.122. 
1209 Rosencrantz called it ”harsh and relentless” (haardt oc ubarmhiertigt), p.72. 
1210 Fabricius III: p.122. 
1211 Fabricius III: p.122. 
1212 Fabricius III: p.124. Sperling seemed to consider 1st October the departure day. See his letter to the 
king from 29th September, 1677, GG, SRA.  
1213 It is rather telling that Sperling calls the nobility ”the whole bunch” here. Normally it was the word 
he used to describe the snaphaner. It could also be translated as ”horde.” If this postscript is dated 
correctly then the dates should be changed. It means that the prisoners arrived on 24th September and 
that Krabbe had been at Sperling’s place or office that evening.   
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reported that something had happened at his place the night before. Krabbe had come 
over to plead the cause of the nobility. In front of Sperling and several other of His 
Majesty’s servants Krabbe protested his loyalty and si cerity towards His Majesty ”as 
he was wont to do” and then ”he exclaimed that he wished to God that the good 
fortune or grace would be granted him that someone would appear who could accuse 
him of infidelity towards the authorities for not only would he prove his sincere 
loyalty to the whole world but he would also disprove the rumours that had been 
spread about him everywhere.” Krabbe repeated this with ”violent animosity and 
excitement” several times but then he was interrupted by the arrival of a visitor. It was 
General Lieutenant Schulße’s son who had come back from his captivity in 
Copenhagen. The young man declared that some other officers had been liberated 
with him, amongst them Captain Klingspor.  Krabbe’s consternation showed both in 
his ”mode and in his face.”1214 Krabbe then hurried home to send two messages to 
Klingspor while the latter was still on the quay. Quarter master Basch was also among 
the ransomed prisoners and both he and Klingspor had then told Sperling that “he” 
had colluded with the snaphaner. The governor general finished his letter to the king 
by saying that he would inquire into the case before ”he slips out” and then it 
remained to be seen whether ”he” was innocent or guilty.  1215 
 
That evening Krabbe hurried back to the Vestergade and sent his coach boy Eggert 
out to get hold of Klingspor. Eggert approached Klingspor already on the quay but 
then he hurried back home to tell his master that Klingspor was coming up from the 
seafront. Krabbe who was sitting in his parlour responded that Eggert should go back 
and ask Klingspor to come over.  (broen) and then come to his residence twice in 
order to try and persuade him to come over to Krabbe’s house in the Västergatan 
(then Vestergade).1216 Then the coach boy met Klingspor in the street and asked him 
to come to the baron’s but Klingspor said he had to see the governor general first but 
that he would come after that. Eggert went back to the baron who told him to go find 
                                               
1214 Deduction, p.23 and letter from Sperling to the king 25th September.   
1215 Sperling to the king, GG 1677-78, SRA. ”Jöran” is a wedicised version of Jørgen. In most 
Swedish documents Krabbe is called Jöran. On the contrary Sperling is sometimes called Jørgen in 
Danish documents. The pronunciation of the two names is similar in standard Danish and Swedish. 
1216 First court statement of the Prosecutor, 5th October 1677, in Aletophilus, p.40 and Breuer’s Second 
Instance, 15th October, p.67. Krabbe’s house was the so-called “Kockska huset” that is one of the oldest 
and most well-preserved in Malmö today.  
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Klingspor again and invite him to dinner.1217 Klingspor accepted some money from 
the baron but did not come over for dinner.1218 Basch had bumped into Krabbe in the 
central square (Stortorget). The baron had offered Basch redress – according to Basch 
on his own account, but according to Krabbe himself for the sake of his vice-bailiff. 
Basch then signed an accord (Zeddel) that said that he nd the vice-bailiff were 
even.1219  Krabbe then sent a couple of servants over to Basch’s with 24 silver daler. 
Nevertheless, Klingspor and Basch went to the governor general’s and consigned 
written statements in which they denounced Krabbe for collusion with snaphaner.1220 
Basch who assumed the role of plaintiff reported everything that had happened during 
those fatal days in July. He added that he had trusted the baron because he thought he 
would act like a ”faithful Swedish man” but unfortunately the contrary had been 
proved.1221  
 
Under House Arrest 
Krabbe was now ordered to stay inside the city walls by both the Chief Military 
Prosecutor (General Auditeur) and the Town Major1222. Both Krabbe and Christian 
Bilde pleaded that he might remain free until he had been able to get hold of those of 
his employees that were accused but this wish was not granted them. Krabbe then 
asked that someone should be sent to look for them because once they heard of his 
arrest they would go into hiding but Sperling replid that he should write for them. So 
he did and he also sent a list of their names to Sperling. On 26th September Krabbe 
wrote an ”Explanation” to Sperling. Unfortunately it has not been preserved.  In it he 
asked to be informed of whether any of his employees had been involved with the 
snaphane-movement and he promised to punish whoever had been so.1223  
On 29th September Sperling communicated to the king that he had announced (again) 
that all of the nobility and gentry would have to betake themselves to the other side of 
”the old Swedish border”. The direct consequence of this announcement was that 
Krabbe and Christian Bilde went to Sperling’s residnce to appeal for mercy on 
                                               
1217 Later Krabbe would say that he had asked Klingspor to dinner because he had always considered 
him a friend and he wanted to make good for what had happened. Krabbe, in Aletophilus, p.131. 
1218 Krabbe’s Response to the Prosecutor, 9th October 1677, p.50. 
1219 Breuer’s second instance, 15th October, p.67. 
1220 Basch wrote a relation about the way he was caught. See: 8th October 1677 court statement. 
1221 Basch’s Petition to Sperling, Lit A,  no date, in Aletophilus.  
1222 Sometimes it is claimed that Krabbe was  in house arr st in the Västergatan  (then Vestergade). 
1223 Krabbe’s first court statement (inläg), 5th October 1677, in Aletophilus; Breuer’s Second Insta ce, 
15th October, p. 65. 
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behalf of all noblemen and gentry of the province. Sperling told them that they had 
better obey His Majesty’s orders and not oppose themselves to his wishes. Sperling 
continued: ”at which they both entreated me to send His Majesty the humble petition 
that is enclosed here.”1224 The petition was dated Malmö (Malmøe), 24th September 
and signed by the two noblemen mentioned above. It was written in Krabbe’s own 
handwriting in quite passable Swedish.  Sperling made no mention of it in his letter 
from 25th September so it probably was not handed over to him until four days later. 
In the petition Krabbe and Bilde explained that the nobility had not come to Malmö 
(Malmøe) when the king had called them because the journey was considered too 
dangerous and the snaphaner were threatening them. A journey north of the old border 
would be even more dangerous. They begged His Majesty to be allowed to stay on 
their estates for how would they else be able to pay their taxes? None of them had any 
property north of the old border and would not know how to maintain themselves and 
their families. Meanwhile their homes and lands would be wrecked and ruined in the 
war. They had always been faithful to His Majesty and the realm so why should they 
be punished?  
Rosencrantz saw the decision to deport the Scanian nobility as ”against both the rights 
of all peoples and the laws of Christianity”1225 and one could only blame the 
authorities for this. What they would have to face in Sweden was ”misery, shame and 
ridicule”.1226 In this case Rosencrantz’s comment is interesting because he was one of 
them, one of the little group of noblemen from the surroundings of Ystad (Ysted) that 
was headed by his best friend Krabbe, and his view might be assumed to reflect the 
way they reacted at the news of their imminent ”deportation.”  It was ”against both 
the rights of all peoples and the laws of Christiani y.” 1227 The only comparison that 
Rosencrantz could think of was the expulsion of the moors from Granada: but the 
moors were ”unchristian Barbarian people” who had committed treason and serious 
                                               
1224 GG 1677-78, SRA: Sperling had not felt that he could deny them this since he was unsure of the 
precise whereabouts of the king and was even less sure whether he would be able to find men enough 
to organise a convoy to and from Krogholm for 1st October. 
1225 p.73: ”...da det ald deris timelige Velfärd var ang aende at de icke imod alle Folckis Rät oc 
Christelige Maneer skulde tvingis til at väre huussflycktige aff deris egen Öffrighed til at forlade dris 
gaarder oc Gods i Fiendernis oc fremmedis Händer ja nd oc i Snaphanernis oc andre ubarmhiertige 
Röffveris som der allevegne grasserede...” 
1226 See p.72: ”Armod, Elendighed, Spot oc Forhaanelse.” 
1227See p.73.The cultural universe that Rosencrantz moved in was the one we would call Western.  The 
classical world and then Europe as it grew from its ashes, with something one might define as 
”Christendom” in between. And naturally The Two Realms were as central as France and the 
Netherlands. He considered the Danes a prominent ”nation” that held their own among ”the European 
countries” (quote p.66). 
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misdeeds.1228  The Swedes had no peers in the Christian world so one had to go to the 
Turks or even total heathens to be able to make a comparison.  The authorities wanted 
to leave the noble estates in the hands of ”snaphaner and other merciless thugs that 
had swamped the land”.1229 
 
On 30th September Holger Thott tried to stall the departure by writing a desperate 
letter to Krabbe. He declared himself prepared to pay any price in the world in order 
to be able to stay on until his wife had recovered f om the birth of the youngest child. 
He could not preserve his dignity and nobleman’s honour if he was sent as a prisoner 
to Sweden.1230 The news about Krabbe’s arrest had obviously not reached 
Marsvinsholm yet. 
In a letter to the king Sperling now declared that e was so short of troops that he was 
not sure whether he would manage to escort the nobility to old Sweden in time. He 
could not get any men from Kristianstad (in this source: Christianstadh) and the 
garrison at Glimminge had been disbanded. Nevertheless, Sperling guaranteed that 
”one way or another Your Royal Majesty’s most gracious order will be executed.” 
Especially so since he had ordered the officer who as ”convoying the cannons” to 
Krageholm (Krogholm) to let them know ”if not in a kind way, well then in a serious 
way” that they had better please Your Majesty’s gracious will.1231 Finally, he added 
that in any case Krabbe would have to remain in town until the whole business with 
Basch could be explained. In a postscript from the day after Sperling added in his own 
handwriting that the Danes had sent out 400 riders on a foray from Landskrona to 
Ystad (in this source:Ystadh) and that they were being assisted by the snaphaner in 
their attacks on the occupied mansions in the area. For that reason he would send even 
more men with the convoy to Krageholm (Krogholm). It transpires from this letter 
that the governor general was sending over artillery to Krageholm (Krogholm) with 
                                               
1228 Rosencrantz, (1679), p.27: ”Anseendis det aldrig tilforn udi nogen Christelig och vel constituered 
Regiering hafde været hørt...Vel læsis der de transmigratione Maurorum Granatensium...” 
1229 See p.73: ”... i Snaphanernis oc andre ubarmhiertige Röffveris som der allevegne grasserede...” 
1230  “Monsieur mon très honoré Frère, I am sending you a letter for Sperling, in which I beg him that I 
may be allowed to go to Malmö with my poor wife, and not to Sweden with this party, if not for a 
longer time then until she has recovered from childbirth. See to it yourself or through others for the
sake of Jesus Christ, that this will be granted us so that I will not become so unfortunate as having to 
see my wife dead at my feet; I will spend anything that could be asked in the world. Help, help for the 
death of Jesus.  Marsvinsholm d 30 sept. 1677”, quoted by M.Weibull. http://www.ra.se//lla/dokument/ 
1231 ”en wägh som annan Ed.K.Mtz. nådigste förordning effterlefuas skall, som Jag och i medler tijdh 
har gifwit Officeraren som styckene till Kroghollm convoyerar ordre at tillhålla dhem, huar icke medh 
godho doch medh alfuar at fullgiöra Ed. K.Mtz nådigste willie heruthinnan,” 
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the convoy.  Krageholm (Krogholm) was already occupied by this time.1232 It was 
used as headquarters for the troops that had been sent out from Malmö (Malmøe) to 
wage war on the “snaphaner”. The commander was called Simon Bengtsson and he 
and his men left Malmö (Malmøe)  some time during the first part of September.  At 
the same time Häckeberga, Svaneholm, Näsbyholm, Glimingehus, Tunbyholm and 
Sövdeborg were occupied as well.   
 
It was decided that Krabbe would have to face the Royal Commissarial Court that had 
been instituted in Malmö only a short time before. It did not have to take heed of 
normal Swedish or Scanian law-procedure. The ”president” or supreme judge was 
Jöran Sperling. According to Olluf Rosencrantz the jury consisted of a selection of 
”army officials, professors, magistrates, customs officers and court bailiffs” whose 
main scope was to enrich themselves.1233  Two hundred years later Martin Weibull 
promptly described the commissarial court as a ”politica  blood tribunal” and 
illustrated its methods through a series of documents that proved that Sperling’s 
special court dealt with traitors and disloyal subjects at breakneck speed. It was 
enough to pass on Danish orders or even to have a Danish official call oneself ”old 
friend” to be hurled into a dungeon for years.1234 At approximately the same time 
professor Casper Weiser from Lund University was indicted. He had written a poem 
in honour of the Danish king in which he derided the Swedish Majesty and claimed 
that ”the righteous owner is coming back to claim hs property”.1235 From the very 
beginning Sperling had no doubts as to whether Weiser was guilty or not. Though in 
the end Weiser was pardoned and only his poem was burnt y the executioner.1236  
Jöran Sperling was convinced that the case was so seriou  that it could no longer be 
regarded as a private quarrel between Basch and the baron but concerned ”His 
Majesty’s highest interests.”1237 At this point Sperling got the militie fiscal or military 
prosecutor in on the case. The major task of the militie f scal was to act as prosecutor 
                                               
1232 Röndahl (1996), p.250. 
1233 Rosencrantz (1679), p.3. The members of the commission were: chairman  Jöran Sperling, 
Reinhold Modée, Canutus Liljehöök, Johan Buschovius, Sigismund Aschenborn, Lars Törnschiär, 
Tobias Nauman, Per Tolesten and Jöns Andersson (See: Cronholm, p.202). 
1234 Martin Weibull, Skånska samlingar, II Till Skånes hi toria under övergångstiden 1658-1710, 
Skånska kriget och snapphanefejden 1676-1679: 4. http://www.ra.se//lla/dokument/v_1871/II_1_4.html 
1235 Röndahl (1996), p.259: ”Saa kommer Ejermanden god,vist snart til sit at tage!” 
1236 Sperling to the king, 7th October, 1677. Weiser’s criminal poem contained the following lines: Spes 
jacentis terrae/ Perge Triumphator riliquas submittere erras; Sic redit ad Dominum, quod fuit ante, 
suum;” (Röndahl, 1981, p.277.) His verdict was eventually changed into exile. 
1237 Fiskalens förste Indleg, 5th October 1677, in Aletophilus, p.35. 
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in law-suits between officers and private soldiers and in all other ”military cases.” 1238 
The mere fact that the militie fiscal was involved implied that the court should be 
considered as some kind of court martial. In this ca e the commissarial court had 
handed over the written declarations of Krabbe, Klingspor and Basch to the “fiscal” 
Michel Philip Breuer for closer examination. The baron was allowed to be present 
when the witnesses swore their oaths in the courtroom but not afterwards and so he 
was never informed of what they said. The main witnesses for the prosecution were 
Basch, the physician and two company quartermasters who had come over from 
Copenhagen. Basch left in the middle of the proceedings.1239 He had been the original 
plaintiff but at a certain stage this role was taken over by the “Militiä Fischal”. From 
then on Basch’s role became that of crown witness which Rosencrantz contested was 
contrary to the law since one could not both be plaintiff and witness in the same court 
case. At the beginning of the trial Krabbe was asked to compile a list of persons that 
he would like to come and testify (presumably in his favour), which he did. However, 
no one was allowed to witness in Krabbe’s defence. 
 
Conclusions  
It is probably hard for us today to understand just how humiliating the Scanian 
noblemen thought it would be to be deported to Sweden. Time and again we come 
across concepts like “dignity and nobleman’s honour”  in the violent protestations and 
tearful pleas that can be read in the archives today. Apart from the insecurity of being 
sent off to an uncertain destination and leaving one’s home and belongings in a war 
stricken land, it was the shame of it all, the tarnish on their noblemen’s honour that 
they used as an obvious argumentation against being s t away and that they 
obviously hoped the Swedish administrators would sympathise with. Not only did 
they hope that men like King Charles or von Fersen would be able to understand 
(from own experience) what a nobleman’s honour was, but they also pleaded to them 
as Christians. Later the Scanian nobleman Olluf Rosencrantz declared that no 
Christian would ever had been able to think of such a measure, the only comparable 
event on European ground was the expulsion of the Moors and they had at least not 
been Christians.   
                                               
1238 See Erlandsson, pp.98-99, foot-note 32. The generalguvernementsfiskal had a ”rättsövervakande 
funktion.” It was also his task to see to it that schools and hospitals only employed native Swedes. Alf 
Erlandsson, p.65. 
1239 See p.44. 
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Krabbe had only just been put under house arrest when the governor general sent over 
a convoy with artillery to Krabbe’s home so that it could be transformed into a 
stronghold in the battle against the “snaphaner”. Only a few days later the definitive 
deportation (“emigration”) order was read out to the representatives of the nobility 
and gentry. These facts alone indicate that althoug Krabbe did not have any real 
power over his fellow noblemen, he was considered an effective obstacle to the policy 
that was thought to be the most efficient. It was consequently desirable, if not 
absolutely necessary, to get Krabbe out of the way and a perfect opportunity to do so 
within the bounds of legality offered itself when Klingspor and Basch were ransomed. 
Krabbe was always the first one to protest his loathing of snaphaner in public and the 
mere thought of him in connection with “snaphaner” constituted a blemish on his 
honour. In his later writings governor general Sperling revealed that Krabbe’s death 
and the deportation of the nobility had had the one a d same cause: the ”illicit love” 
for the Danish name that the Scanians were ”totally besotted with.”1240. 
    
The Court Statements and Instances 
  
Introduction  
This section contains an analysis of the various court statements that the prosecutors 
and Krabbe handed in during the court proceedings. Both sides are accordingly 
presented in detail as are the conclusions that were drawn by the different parties in 
the conflict and that can be drawn by an external re der today. The main themes will 
be analysed at the end of this subsection, including that of the snaphaner. 
 
Krabbe’s First Court Statement (5th October) 
On 5th October 1677 Krabbe was on the stand for the first time. Contrary to normal 
Swedish law Krabbe was not allowed to defend himself in court but only to hand in a 
written statement in which he declared his position in the following words: 
”Basch will never be able to prove that I have acted against His Majesty and the Crown in any manner 
for I have sworn an oath and as far as possible is for a human being I have done my duty towards His 
Royal Majesty just like his other loyal subjects...I have behaved like any other of His Majesty’s true 
                                               
1240 Sperling’s Deduction, p.3: ”wiisandes sigh ännu wara så aldeles betagne medh en oloffligh 
Kiärleck och inclination til dhet Danske Nanpnet..” 
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patriots: I have lived honourably in peace and quiet on my estate, I have not had any correspondence 
with the snaphanner but have always observed my duty and have inquired on my estate if any 
farmhands or the sons of my tenants have deserted o had correspondence or been in collusion with the 
Snaphanner...”1241  
 
He appealed to the values and honour codes of the traditional ”feudal” world that he 
had grown up in and expected the tribunal to respect a gentleman’s word. From the 
beginning of the trial Krabbe announced to the judge and the jury that he was a 
nobleman who lived by the traditional noble codes and that his king was Charles XI 
of Sweden: he  claimed that  ”the LORD had blessed our gracious King with a 
felicitous Victory and chased the Enemy off the land”.1242 According to Krabbe it was 
a known fact that the snaphaner and the Danes despised h m. They had told him ”in 
public” that he deserved to be shot at his own dinner-table because he had let the King 
of Denmark down. They also would not let him leave his estate, plundered his 
storages and beat his tenant farmers black and blue. In the same manner he claimed 
that the Danes had been harder on him than on any other nobleman. Everyone knew 
that the Danes despised his ”Swedish stomach” and that the Danish king had had him 
arrested.1243 Krabbe insisted on his being a Swedish patriot and emphasised the fact 
that he had left his king and fatherland for the sake of the Swedish king and 
Sweden.1244  
 
Krabbe insisted that he had never harboured any grudge against Basch.1245 Basch had 
behaved rudely when his regiment was billeted at Krgeholm (Krogholm) and he had 
                                               
1241 Jorgen Krabbe’s first letter of defence to the Royal Commissarial Court (14 pages) Krabbe’s first 
inlägg. Höy oc Velbaarne Hr. Baron Jörgen Krabbes för te Svar oc Indläg imod Baschens angifvelse, 
der hand först for Retten comparerede den 5.October.   Krabbe’s first court statement (inläg), 5th 
October 1677, in Aletophilus: ”da skal Baschen mig aldrig kunde ofverbevise at jeg hafver handlet 
imod Hans Konglige Mayt. oc Cronen i ringeste maade t j g jo hafver taget min Aed oc Skyldighed 
saa meget mig aff Menniskelige Magt oc yderste Efne mu ligt väret hafver dend jeg Hans Konglige 
Mayt. med andre troe Undersaattere skyldig ere...at jeg som en anden Hans Konglige Mayt. troe Patriot 
hafver mig forholdet – lefvet ärligen oc stille paa mit Gods, icke haft nogen Correspondenss eller ladet 
correspondere enten med Snaphanner eller nogen andemens altid hafver jeg som min Skyldighed oc 
Pligt udkräfvede ladet strengeligen inqvirere paa mit Gods om nogen Bonde Dreng eller nogen aff 
mine Bönders Sönner skulle hafve sig absondret eller haft nogen ringe Correspondenss eller 
Madschapie med Snaphannerne...” 
1242 Krabbe’s first court statement (inläg), 5th October 1677, in Aletophilus, p.12. 
1243 In Scanian, much as in English “to have a stomach for something” i.e. “att ha mave for noed” 
means to have a predilection or intense liking for something. This is not so obvious in modern Swedish. 
Krabbe’s first court statement (inläg), 5th October 1677, in Aletophilus, pp.12-13. 
1244 Krabbe, in Aletophilus, p.143, p.151 and First Response to the Prosecutor, p.49. 
1245 Basch himself would point this weakness out to the court some days later: Basch’s court statement , 
8th October 1677, in Aletophilus, p.20. 
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put the whole estate under pressure and he had thrashed Krabbe’s vice-bailiff Mons 
Peerssön. Nevertheless the baron had made an effort to be civil and “treat the man 
well”. Basch also seems to have known people everywhere in the surroundings of 
Krageholm (Krogholm) and according to Krabbe he visited all his friends on his way 
there in July 1677 and told everyone that he was heding for “Kroegholm” and 
Tosterup (Taastrop). Everyone had known where he was he ding for so it could not 
have been difficult for the snaphaner to find out.1246 Christopher had warned Basch 
that the snaphaner might be after him since he had c osen to ride through Färs (Fers). 
He added that Basch had been so drunk at the time that he might not be able 
remember what he had been told.1247  Krabbe had only found out that Basch was taken 
prisoner around noon the day after and no one had mentioned that any of his 
employees had been involved.1248 He had offered the snaphaner money in exchange 
for Basch’s life and they accepted it.1249 Later, when Krabbe met Basch in Malmö 
(Malmøe), Basch had threatened Mogens Peerssön and Kr bbe had begged him to 
forgive Peerssön for what he had said.1250  Furthermore Krabbe insisted that he would 
not have had to ransom the lives of Basch and Klingspor if he had been in collusion 
with the snaphaner.1251 
 
Krabbe asked that six questions be put to Basch: 1. Could Basch deny that the baron 
had always behaved like a gentleman towards him and that Basch himself had been 
rude on several occasions? 2. Was there any way Basch could prove that the 
snaphaner had been in the hundreds of Herrestad and Ingelstad (Herrested and 
Ingelsted) before they came for Basch and Klingspor? 3.Could Basch prove that the 
snaphaner had come to the baron at Krageholm (Krogholm) before they rode to 
Tosterup (Taastrup) to catch Basch or that the snaphaner had been in touch with the 
baron and his men before meeting the bailiff (Hindrich Peerssön) three quarters of a 
mile from Krageholm (Krogholm)? 4. Was there any manner in which Basch could 
                                               
1246 Krabbe’s first court statement (inläg), 5th October 1677, in Aletophilus, pp.9-10. 
1247 Krabbe’s first court statement (inläg), 5th October 1677, in Aletophilus, p.11 and Krabbe’s second 
Indleg, 11th October 1677, in Aletophilus, p.29. 
1248 Krabbe’s first court statement (inläg), 5th October 1677, in Aletophilus, (p.7) page not numbered: 
”...ey heller viste at hand fangen var, förend anden Dangen efter ved Middags Tide, da der efter 
Snaphannerne om efter middagen förde hannem til Kroegh lm formedelst de hafde kundskab om 
Klingsporen som sagt var om Dagen tilforne var kommen til Ystæd...” 
1249 Krabbe’s first court statement (inläg), 5th October 1677, in Aletophilus, p.12. 
1250 Krabbe’s first court statement (inläg), 5th October 1677, in Aletophilus. 
1251 Krabbe’s first court statement (inläg), 5th October 1677, in Aletophilus, pp.11-12. 
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prove that the baron had colluded with the snaphaner or that he had sent for them 
when Basch came to Krageholm (Krogholm)? 5. Could Basch deny that the baron had 
asked him however he had dared to travel on his own through Färs (Fers) that was 
infested with snaphaner? 6. Could Basch deny that Kr bbe’s bailiff had warned him 
of the snaphaner at Christen Nielsen’s?1252  
 
 Krabbe claimed that the ”frivolous Snaphaner” had never come to the hundreds of 
Herrestad and Ingelstad (Herrested and Ingelsted) until the day they came  there to 
look for Basch.1253 It is rather strange that Krabbe insisted that there ad not been any 
snaphaner in Ingelstad or Herrestad (Ingelsted or Her ested) before July 1677. On 10th 
June that same year the Danish king had issued an order that said that any snaphane 
that was caught in the hundreds of Ingelstad, Herrestad and Ljunit (Ingelstad, 
Herrestad and Lynits) would be executed. The background to this decision can be 
seen in the numerous complaints against the snaphaner on the side of the local 
population.  Was it possible that the leading nobleman of the area could remain totally 
ignorant of the harassments that his tenants and the neighbours of his tenants were 
exposed to? 1254  
 
By this date Krabbe’s bailiff Christopher was already in custody (Cronens hectelse) in 
Malmö (Malmø). As soon as heard of the trouble the baron was in he left Krageholm 
(Krogholm) and rode along the beach to Malmö (Malmø) to give himself in to the 
authorities.1255 He had had to be very careful not to get caught by the snaphaner on the 
way.1256   
 
On the very same day (5th October) the prosecutor presented the results of his research 
in the form of an 8-page-long court statement. Michel Philip Breuer immediately 
declared that the baron had pronounced words that were ”utterly criminal.”1257 Having 
said that the king did not deserve tax payments was not a private quarrel between 
                                               
1252 Krabbe’s first court statement (inläg), 5th October 1677, in Aletophilus, pp.10-11. 
1253 Krabbe’s first court statement (inläg), 5th October 1677, in Aletophilus, p.10. 
1254  Röndahl 1996, p.238. A similar decision was taken in the regards of the Kristianstad 
(Christianstad) area, but nowhere else.   
1255 Krabbe’s first court statement (inläg), 5th October 1677, in Aletophilus, p.14. 
1256 Krabbe’s response to the Prosecutor, 9th October 1677, in Aletophilus, p.47. 
1257 Fiskalens förste Indleg, 5th October 1677, The Prosecutor’s first court statement. Fiskalens förste 
Indleg Imod Höy-Edle oc Velbaarne Her Baron Her Jörgen Krabbe. Insinueret i Rätten den. 5 Octobr. 
1677.in Aletophilus, p.34. 
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Basch and the baron but concerned ”His Majesty’s highest interests.”1258 Apart from 
attacking His Majesty’s royal person verbally the baron had encouraged his already 
”disobedient” tenants to break their oath of allegiance and duty towards the king. The 
prosecution nowl claimed that these tenants had welcomed the enemy with open arms 
and that they were always eager to help them in deeds and words and everyone knew 
that. According to the prosecution Krabbe was guilty of ”tergiversatio” and of having 
delayed Basch’s return so much that the snaphaner got a chance to kidnap him. 1259 
Krabbe was accused of having offended the royal person, of tergiversation, 
conspiracy and of having collaborated with snaphaner. B sides, Breuer wondered if 
Krabbe believed him to be a man of such poor wits as not to notice the inconsistencies 
of his account. The case was serious and Breuer recommended that the court call as 
many witnesses as possible.1260  
 
In the introduction of the statement of the fiscal we are told that Klingspor too had 
contributed with writings to the court. Unfortunately no traces of them are to be found 
today.    At this point it transpired that Krabbe had offered all that he owned in bail (at 
cavere) for his bailiff who ”was as innocent as a child”. He had done so in a letter to 
His Excellency about the innocence of his bailiff.1261 The prosecutor was ”pleased” 
with the baron’s offer and accepted it as pro rato. But he warned Krabbe that if 
Christopher was found guilty it would be worse for Krabbe himself. Hindrich and 
Mogens Peerssön were both guilty of having led the snaphaner that kidnapped Basch 
and of having abused Basch verbally. At this point the question of the snaphaner 
present at the kidnapping of Klingspor came up. According to the prosecution one of 
them had been Krabbe’s garden boy. Krabbe insisted that it was only a little boy that 
had guarded the fruit in his garden and that the boy had run away some time earlier. 
Yet another of the snaphaner had been what the proscution called Krabbe’s hunter 
and what Krabbe called a little boy of 10 or 12 years. The prosecutor did not believe 
Krabbe’s version. He also accused him of having left Klingspor in the hands of the 
snaphaner in stead of trying to fight them. Breuer concluded that Krabbe was guilty of 
having offended the royal person, of tergiversation, conspiracy and of having 
                                               
1258 Fiskalens förste Indleg, 5th October 1677, in Aletophilus, p.35. 
1259 Fiskalens förste Indleg, 5th October 1677, in Aletophilus, p.36. 
1260 Fiskalens förste Indleg, 5th October 1677, in Aletophilus, p.40. 
1261 Krabbe’s response to the Prosecutor, 9th October 1677 in Aletophilus, p.47. 
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collaborated with snaphaner. The case was serious and Breuer recommended that the 
court call as many witnesses as possible.1262  
 
On 7th October Sperling assured the king that he would learn to recognise the 
requirements of his true duty and that with the help of God, he would see to it that the 
Krabbe case would be dealt with on the one hand so that His Royal Majesty’s rights 
and interests would not be violated, but on the othr so that Krabbe would not be able 
to accuse Sperling of having wronged him unjustly.1263 Sperling then assured the king 
that he had been busy with this problem ”all these days” and that prosecutor was 
acting against Krabbe ”in a serious way”; they had brought all the witnesses from 
Ystad to Malmö (Ysted to Malmøe) and interrogated them. Hopefully the case would 
be over within the next few weeks. In the same lettr Sperling communicated that he 
had had invited professor Weiser to explain himself. Weiser had written a poem in 
honour of the Danish king in which he derided the Swedish Majesty. Sperling had no 
doubts as to whether Weiser was guilty or not. That same day Sperling also sent an 
eleven-page-long account of the situation in the Scanian provinces to the king. His 
first and most important point was that the war hadbrought the infidelity of the 
Danish and Scanian officials to the fore: not few of them had declared an “inclination 
towards the enemies of the realm” and that they wished for “the ruin and total 
extinction of the Swedish Nation”. Sperling advised his king not to allow Danes or 
Scanians to occupy positions in the army or administrat on from then on. His second 
point was that the clergy was dangerous: “their affection (for Denmark) has far too 
deep roots in their hearts”. Sperling reported thatey were trying to keep their 
positions through “secret arts” and he knew that they nurtured “illicit desires” in their 
hearts. They all clung to Danish church rituals andthat was not good for His 
Majesty’s safety. Corruption was widespread in the towns that were ruled by the town 
councils. All burghers did as the town councils did.1264 
                                               
1262 Fiskalens förste Indleg, 5th October 1677, in Aletophilus, p.40. 
1263 In reply to a royal missive of 1st October 1677, GG 1677-78, SRA. This letter has been published 
in part by Cronholm, p.202. 
1264 Underdånigst Memorial uppå några ährander, hwilka t l befodring aff Eders Kongl: May:ts nyttige 
tienst, och denne Provinciens upkombst och wähltrefnadt, allenast rettade är, och fördenskuld Eders 
Kongl: May:ts allernådigtste godtfinnande uti diupaste underdånigheet hemskiutes, affbijdandes der 
uppå een nådig Resolution, Sperling to His Majesty 7th October 1677, SRA. (Svenske Nations 
fördeerff och total utrotande). 
 370 
 
Basch’s Reply (8 th October) 
 
On 8th October 1677 Lorenss Basch’s reply to Krabbe was re d aloud in court. 
Basch’s tone was harsh, if not derisive and he called the baron’s statement ”a pack of 
lies.” Basch called Krabbe’s defence ”nonsense” and demanded that the baron be 
requested to use a more polite tone.1265  Basch claimed that stante pede in court he 
had answered the baron who demanded an answer that he d received the money 
from the baron’s servants so that the whole busines would be swept under the carpet. 
From this passage it seems as if Krabbe had actually appeared in court and that he had 
been allowed to interrogate his adversary.1266  Basch also claimed that the Baron had 
said ”you do not have a charge to come with there” in front of the Royal Commission 
the Friday before.1267 
 
Basch openly accused the baron of procuring a base and a cover for snaphaner: ”the 
baron’s servants that caught me stayed on in the baron’s service as long as they could 
keep their roguery hidden but as soon as an inkling of their sympathies was revealed 
they were gone, no doubt to the snaphanner.” Earlier in this passage Basch made clear 
that Krabbe knew about their sympathies from the beginning so it was not him they 
were running from. Basch did not comment on the baron’s manners but claimed that 
he nurtured secret hatred towards Basch in his heart. To Basch it was obvious that 
Krabbe was lying since he claimed not to have anythi g against Basch at the same 
time as said that Basch was insolent and did not fulfil his duties to the king.1268  The 
only one who had complained about the Swedish exactions was the baron. The 
peasants had told Basch that the baron’s bailiff ”who as now with the Danes” had 
put them under even harder pressure than Basch. Krabbe owed Basch money from 
when Basch’s regiment had spent the winter at Krageholm (Krogholm) and Basch 
                                               
1265 Basch’s court statement , 8th October 1677, in Aletophilus, p.15. sammanspinnen 
1266 Basch’s court statement , 8th October 1677, in Aletophilus, p.16. 
1267 Basch’s court statement, 8th October 1677, in Aletophilus, p.17:”...mens Her Baonen saghde i 
Fredags for Kongl. Commiss. til mig dher var ingen Anklågerre...”  
1268 Basch’s 9th October/10 statement, in Aletophilus, p.20. 
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saw this as the main reason for his being kidnapped. 1269   According to Basch it was a 
fact that the snaphaner had been a familiar sight in the hundred of Ingelstad (in this 
source: Ingildsteed) and around Sövdeborg (in this source: Söfvedegaard) and he 
called Major Gyllenpistol as a witness, because the major had had his horses stolen by 
the snaphaner in that area.1270 He denied having been drunk when he and Christopher 
had had dinner at Glimminge. Basch had been completely sober and nobody had 
warned him of the snaphaner. Basch knew nothing of any warnings. He only knew 
that three groups of snaphaner had surprised him and his men in three different places 
at the same time  . Christopher had been present when Basch divided his men into 
three parties. According to Basch no one else could have known where they were 
heading for. Basch commented Krabbe’s attitude in the following terms: ”qvi tacet 
consentire videtur.”1271 Basch only knew that snaphaner had known that he had told 
the baron that the Danish infantry at Lands Crone cried like pigs and that the 
snaphaner who captured him were commanded by two of Krabbe’s bailiffs.1272  
According to Basch’s logic the Danish ”party” was strenghtened in this way and His 
Royal Majesty damaged. Krabbe still owed Basch money from when Basch’s 
regiment had spent the winter at (Krogholm) and Basch saw this as the main reason 
for his being kidnapped. With these words Basch accused the baron of having plotted 
the kidnapping. 1273 Basch continued this line by informing the Commissarial court 
that Krabbe’s two ex-bailiffs Hindrich and Mogens Peersøn were both busy doing 
roguery in the service of the Danes: ”Henrich Peerssön and Mons Peerssön who have 
been the Baron’s faithful servants are in His Majesty of Denmark’s service and all the 
grace that they enjoyed under our most gracious king and lord’s protection do they 
now return with roguery and daring tricks and they are the fiercest persecutors of the 
Swedish nation.”1274   
                                               
1269 Basch’s court statement , 8th October 1677, in Aletophilus, pp.18-19: ”...for Hr. Baronen er migh 
ennu en Post-Penningar før førflutne Winterqvarteer skyldigh, på Regimentens Weigne, for hwilcke 
Penningar jagh meehrendeels bleff fangen...” 
1270 Was that the same Carll Gyllenpistol who had stolen the nobleman Arild Svab’s (Swawe’s) ten best 
horses in April that year? See: Letter from Arild Swawe to Governor General Fabian von Fersen, in M. 
Weibull, II Till Skånes historia under öfvergångstiden 1658-1710, 1:5:1, 
http://www.ra.se//lla/dokument/v_1871/II_1_5.html. Basch’s 9th October/10 statement, in Aletophilus, 
pp.20-21. 
1271 Basch’s court statement , 8th October 1677, in Aletophilus, pp.17-18. 
1272 Basch’s 9th-10th October statement, in Aletophilus, p.15 and p.21. 
1273 Basch’s court statement , 8th October 1677, in Aletophilus, pp.18-19. 
1274 Basch’s court statement , 8th October 1677, in Aletophilus, pp.16-17. som hafver väret Her 
Baronens troegne Tiennare ähr udi Hans Majest. Tienest  aff Danmarck och all den Naadhe dhe under 
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At this point Basch declared that he would rather respond to Krabbe’s accusations in 
the courtroom. The Royal Commission denied him this, owever, and we have a 
document that contains Basch’s answers to Krabbe’s ” interrogatoria” that can be 
dated to sometime between 8th and 11th October. 
Krabbe’s Replique (9th October) 
On 9th October 1677, Krabbe sent what was called a Replique to the prosecutor.1275 At 
this point it had become clear to the baron that he was in serious trouble:  it now 
seemed to him that not only his honour was at stake but also his worldly well-
being.1276 Krabbe’s tone had become very different compared to his letters to Basch. 
Not half as condescending but more learned: he kept referring to the ”Lawbook” and 
quoting passages in Latin from it. Krabbe’s main argument was that the Commissarial 
Court had no evidence against him; all they had was Basch’s word against his: 
”allegare & dicere rem hoc vel illo modo sese habere nil juvat nisi probetur.”1277 
Then Krabbe continued: ”Actore non probante reus etsi nihil probaverit vel 
praestiterit sit solvendus, item how it is prescribed in the Roman and other honorable 
Laws that in such serious Criminal and other Actions, no one be condemned unless 
there are clear and evident reasons for this...”1278 Furthermore Krabbe declared that 
”every true Patriot” could testify that he had always served his ”Master and King” to 
the utmost of his forces and this service had included generous loans and monthly 
contributions. And Krabbe had always done this with a ”sincere heart.”1279 
 
In this statement Krabbe went back on his earlier caim that no one had ever heard of 
the presence of snaphaner in his hundred before. In stead he declared that he had 
meant that those “misguided fools” the snaphaner never had come to Ingelsted “in 
groups” before. 1280 He also claimed that Scanian noblemen had the right to punish 
snaphaner among their peasants themselves, and that this privilege had been granted 
                                                                                                                            
vor aldranådigste Konningh oc Herres Beskydh niudet hafve det vedergelle dhe med Skielm och vofve 
Stöcker och er den Svenske Nations störste forfölliera.” 
1275 Krabbe’s Responsee to the Prosecutor (Fischal), 9th Oc ober 1677, p.46. 
1276 Krabbe’s Response to the Prosecutor, 9th October 1677, p.52: ”...een Erlig Mand skulle saa strengt 
paa Hæder oc Ære samt timelig Velfærd (hvor paa det siunis mig angaae)...kunde anklagis.”   
1277 Krabbe’s Response to the Prosecutor, 9th October 1677, p.43. 
1278 Krabbe’s Response to the Prosecutor, 9th October 1677, p.44. 
1279 Krabbe’s Response to the Prosecutor, 9th October 1677, p.43. 
1280 Krabbe’s Response to the Prosecutor, 9th October 1677, p.46. ”de ilde forhollende Skielmer.” 
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them by the king. The “fiscal” had claimed the contrary.1281 The baron insisted that 
Basch had misinterpreted his words when he came to Krageholm (Krogholm) to 
collect taxes. Krabbe had only said that it was impossible for him to pay contributions 
to both Swedes and Danes during the same month. Basch h d not had any written 
orders to show. Nor had he demanded a written statement from Krabbe. 1282     
Krabbe then asked that he be allowed to face the witnesses in court and that Basch be 
kept in custody.1283 Both pleas were ignored. However, Krabbe was allowed to write 
down a series of questions to the witnesses. His Interrogatoria were handed in to the 
court the same day as his Replique to the prosecutor. The Interrogatoria contained 
fourteen questions, most of them to the point that t e witnesses should tell the court 
what they had heard about the baron from the snaphaner. Eleven of these questions 
expressly mentioned the snaphaner, so it must be suppo ed that Krabbe knew that the 
witnesses had been in touch with them. 
 
Krabbe was never allowed to face the witnesses in court. He was not even told the 
identity of all of them1284  Krabbe mentioned some of them as “the peasants ....that are 
supposed to have transported things for the snaphanner from Bollerup to 
Krogeholm.”1285 One of the witnesses was Jens Hals who leased the Glimminge 
estate.  Krabbe asked Hals to reveal what he and Mogens Peersøn had been saying 
about Basch when the baron last dined with him. In the same way he asked Hals to 
tell the court if Mogens ever had asked him to do ”things” for him.1286 He also 
explained that he only recently had found out about the way Basch had been insulted 
by Mogens: namely on a visit to Glimminge and Bollerup when he had talked to Jens 
Hals.1287 
 
                                               
1281 Krabbe’s Response to the Prosecutor, 9th October 1677, p.49. 
1282 Krabbe’s Response to the Prosecutor, 9th October 1677, in Aletophilus, pp.42-44. 
1283 Krabbe’s Response to the Prosecutor, 9th October 1677, pp.52-53. 
1284 Krabbe’s Response to the Prosecutor, 9th October 1677, pp.52-53. 
1285 Krabbe’s Interrogatoria, 9th October 1677, in Aletophilus, p.54.   
1286 Krabbe’s Interrogatoria, 9th October 1677, in Aletophilus, p.56: ”...hand at udsige hvad Tale det 
var hand oc Ladefougden paa Tostrup hafde sig emell anlangendis Basken saa vel oc om 
Ladefougden noget tilforn eller siden hannem ombedet hafver paa hans Vegne at forrette sig at 
forklare.”    
1287 A Georg Andreas Donner was sheriff (befallningsman) in the hundreds of Oxie, Skytt o Bara 1664-
1675. Then he became ”generalguvernementsfiskal”. Alf Erlandsson p.158. His son was first secretary 
(kanslist) at the chancellery of the government general (generalguvernementskansliet) 1688-1693. Then 
he became “stadsnotarie” and a member of the city coun il at Ystad.See: Alf Erlandsson, p.199. 
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In the same way the baron wanted to find out what te peasants and Basch had been 
chattering about the day before when ”he brought them to Henning Olsön’s and 
offered them vodka before going to the court house.” 1288 Olsen was the one and only 
burgher in Malmö (Malmø) who worked for the Swedes.  From these two passages it 
transpires that some of the witnesses were peasants from the Ystad (Ysted) area. 
Others were members of “higher” social categories like Jens Hals.  
 
 Apart from Christopher only two of the witnesses that were in custody in Malmö 
(Malmø) are mentioned: Eggert and Jens Hals. Krabbe’s coach boy Eggert had come 
with him to Malmö (Malmø) and became an important witness; especially as regarded 
those fatal September days when Krabbe, Klingspor and Basch all arrived in Malmö 
(Malmø). He admitted that he had tried to ”bribe” Klingspor.1289    
Basch’s Second Replique (9 th or 10 th October) 
 
In another harsh reply to Krabbe’s court statements Basch stressed that the baron was 
contradicting himself. Why had he claimed not to have nything against Basch when 
at the same time, he said that Basch was insolent and did not fulfil his duties to the 
king?   Perhaps he was even right in claiming that t e baron had nurtured ”secret 
hatred” against him in his heart.1290  
 
Basch pointed out that that the men who captured him at Bollerup had known that he 
had said that the Danish infantry at Lands Crone cried like pigs. Basch thought it 
rather strange that his private (?) conversation with Krabbe should have reached the 
ears of snaphaner so easily and so fast.  Basch claimed that Krabbe had been 
scheming in order to find out where he was heading for and that the Baron himself 
had had him kidnapped. 1291 From this passage on it became clear that Basch gave 
                                               
1288 Krabbe’s Interrogatoria, 9th October 1677, in Aletophilus, p.56: ”...hvad Tale Basken oc de hafde 
sig imellem forleden Dag her da hand haffde dennem i de til Henning Olsöns oc tracterede dennem 
med Brendeviin förend de gick for Rätten.”   
1289 Breuer’s Second Instance, 15th October, p.67. 
1290 Basch’s 9th-10th October statement, in Aletophilus, p.20. 
1291 Basch’s 9th-10th October  statement, in Aletophilus, p.21. (Men at hand var at uhtspanne huar jagh 
ville blifva) 
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Krabbe the whole responsibility for what had happened, and what was even more 
serious, he openly claimed that it had happened at Krabbe’s instigation.1292 
 
Finally Basch quoted Jesus: ”Abandon everything and come with me” and concluded 
that if only Krabbe had listened to the Swedish king in this way he would never have 
ended up in trouble. Krabbe’s servant-boy Eggert had told Basch that the baron had 
lost an ox to the snaphaner, but if Krabbe had loved his house and estate less then he 
would not have had to deal with the snaphaner at all. Krabbe had showed himself a 
traitor by the mere fact of not going to Sweden.1293  
 
 Krabbe’s Second Court Statement and Reply to Basch (11th October) 
Krabbe swore that he had sent a report to the Govern r General when he found out 
that his employees had been constrained to join the snaphaner. He also explained that 
he only recently had found out about way Basch had been insulted by Mogens 
Peerssön: namely on a visit to Glimminge and Bollerup when he had talked to the 
Jens Hals (“arrendatorn”) who had told him about it. Then he declared that Hindrich 
Peersön had left his position as a bailiff well befor  the Danish invasion; Peersön’s 
intent had been to go and live in the nearby town of Ystad (Ysted). Krabbe claimed 
not to have had the least idea of what Hindrich Peerssön was doing until the day when 
the latter came to visit him and showed him the authorisation from the Danish king to 
exact taxes and a list of peasants from which to do so.  Mogens Pedersön had not been 
in Krabbe’s service since April that same year when Krabbe had been made to cede 
the Högestad (Högested) estate to the Swedish FieldMarshal and Counsellor of the 
realm (rigsraad) Gustaf Banér. Mogens had stayed on in Baner’s service under 
Hauptmand Monsieur Donner.1294  
  
The second part of this court statement consists of Krabbe’s answers to the 
accusations that Basch had come up with in court (stante pede). It seems as if the 
                                               
1292 ”the high and mighty fight very often but dare less than nothing” (dhe Mechtige fechte offte och 
våge mindre än intet) pique from Basch to Krabbe as regarded the latter’s knowledge of the outcome of 
the battle of Landskrona (Landscrone). Basch’s  9th-10th October statement, in Aletophilus, p.22. 
1293 Basch’s 9th-10th  October statement, in Aletophilus, p.22. 
1294 A Georg Andreas Donner was sheriff of Oxie, Skytt o Bara 1664-1675.Then he became a 
“generalguvernementsfiskal”. See: Alf Erlandsson p.158  His son Carl Mattias Donner worked as a 
secretary in the chancellery of the governement general, then he became a notary and town councillor 
in Ystad. See: Alf Erlandsson , p. 199. 
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question of Basch’s behaviour during his time at Krageholm (Krogholm) had come 
up. Krabbe insisted that Basch had gone against the Royal decrees that stated that 
billeted regiments must not cause destruction. According to these decrees peasants 
should even receive some help from the regiment if they lacked oxen or seed but 
Basch had denied Krabbe’s tenants any kind of help. At the time Krabbe and a county 
bookkeeper (Lands boghollere) called Stiern had even started an inquiry that was 
supported by the king, but for obscure reasons nothi g ad come of it.1295 Basch 
accused Krabbe of complaining more than anybody else of the Swedish taxes. Krabbe 
now tried to prove the contrary: in two months’ time ore than 20 of Krabbe’s farms 
had been abandoned by their tenants, because of their ”poverty and utter misery.”1296 
Krabbe was made to pay up to 10 times more than he should for farmsteads like 
Ingelsted and Baldringe.1297  A telling example was that of the Ingildstrop farm that at 
no time had rendered more than a normal farm. The Swedes had classified 
Ingildstrop1298 as a ”Sädegaard” a mansion worth 12 normal farms and therefore 
Krabbe had to pay 12 times more contributions than it could render. At the time when 
Krabbe wrote this statement, Ingildstrop lay in total ruins because of the war. The 
second example was Tosterup (Taastrup) that had been put in the same class as 
Ingildstrop and was counted as the equivalent of 12 farms. Obviously Taastrup 
rendered more than Ingildstrop but not enough to substit te 12 farms. After much 
trouble and many petitions Krabbe had been granted a tax reduction for 
Ingildstrupgaard.1299 
 
Krabbe had written a Memorial that he handed in to the Royal Commissarial Court of 
Justice. Basch had read it although, according to Krabbe, it was none of his 
business.1300 Finally Krabbe declared that sooner or later he would make Basch pay 
and that in any case, Basch was only a visitor to Scania whereas Krabbe himself was a 
permanent resident. 
                                               
1295 Krabbe’s second Indleg, 11th October 1677, in Aletophilus, pp.24-28. 
1296 Krabbe’s response to Breuer’s second statement, Ale ophilus, pp.97-98. 
1297 These two farmsteads are probably indentical with modern-day Ingelsta and Baldringe. 
1298 This farmstead is probably identical with either a farm in the village of Ingelstorp or the 
Hedvigsdal estate. 
1299 Krabbe’s second Indleg, 11th October 1677, in Aletophilus, pp.28-29. 
1300 Krabbe’s second Indleg, 11th October 1677, in Aletophilus, p.31. 
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The Prosecutor’s Second Instance (15 th October) 
 
Around this point in time Basch disappeared from Malmö (Malmø) and played no 
further role in the court proceedings. His role hadbeen taken over by the public 
prosecutor Philip Michel Breuer who presented his second court statement on 15th 
October 1677. It consisted of 20 pages of accusations and 15 extracts from Krabbe’s 
personal letters, all of which were read aloud in the courtroom.1301 The attack on 
Krabbe was massive. Breuer and Sperling had managed to get hold of Krabbe’s 
papers, account books and part of his correspondence from the beginning of the war 
onwards. They had also procured themselves numerous testimonies. Krabbe was 
allowed three days to compile a written defence against their accusations. The text 
was read out aloud in Krabbe’s presence and then handed over to him so that he could 
reply to the accusations.1302 Breuer’s tone had changed. From civil but suspicious to 
next to insolent.  He started out by excusing himself to the honourable vice-governor 
general and the ”manly, learned and clever” members of the commission (assessores). 
He would rather not have bothered them again but he felt that it was necessary to get 
certain ideas out of the baron’s head. The baron had better not persist in believing that 
the prosecutor’s preceding instance was only slander based on suspicion. On the 
contrary, what the prosecutor had written in it was evidence ”clearer than the sun” and 
based upon reliable testimonies.1303 Breuer proudly declared: ”I have written these 
(remonstrations and evidence) in as few words as pos ible ad have not dollied them 
up with many Latin quotes and words and even less have I referred to foreign 
Leges.”1304   
 
Then Breuer went on to declare that when the word of the baron stood against that of 
Herr Basch the court would listen to the latter who was ”one of His Majesty’s honest 
officers.” This was wholly in line with Swedish law: ”when the prosecution has 
                                               
1301 Breuer’s second intercession  (15th October 1677)The prosecutor’s second court statement (20 
pages) (Prosecutorens anden Indleg Imod den höy-ädle oc Velbaarnde herre her Baron her Jörgen 
Krabbe, Opleest för Kongl. Retten den 15. Octob.1677.) It was only this report  that the prosecutor 
accused Krabbe of more things than Basch had. Rosencrantz (p.48.) insisted that that was contrary to 
Swedish court procedure. 
1302 Sperling to the king, 16th October,1677, GG, SRA. 
1303 Breuer’s second instance, 15th October, in Aletophilus, p.57. Klage Libell 
1304 Breuer’s second instance, 15th October, in Aletophilus, p.57: ”jagh dem (remonstrationer och 
probationer) medh möyeligest Kortheet författet ochmedh inga många Latin Sententier och Gloser 
förblommerat och än mindre främmende Leges allegeret hafvar.” 
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evidence, proof or comparison (liignelse) or even a single witness then that is worth 
more than a single ”no” from the defendant.” The on testimony necessary was 
Basch. And Breuer himself stood for the ”comparison” in that he concluded that since 
the baron admitted to having felt that it was too much to pay taxes to two kings in the 
same month that was the same as having said that he did not owe the Swedish king 
anything. Breuer wondered if Krabbe believed him to be a man of such poor wits as 
not to notice the inconsistencies of his account. 
 
It could easily be proved that on several occasions Krabbe had said: ”Let them take 
everything away so that there will be an end to it, when this is up there’s nothing more 
for them to take.”1305 Krabbe denied having spoken ill of the Swedish king, but not 
that he had said that he could not pay two armies at the same time. For Breuer that 
was more than enough. It was obvious that Krabbe always had been unwilling to pay 
his dues to the Swedes. When it was the matter of paying the Danes he had managed 
to come up with surprising sums but every time the Swedes wanted their taxes Krabbe 
started grumbling. As evidence of this Breuer showed up a series of letters from the 
baron that had been censured by the Swedish authorities. At this point extracts from 
the letters quoted by Breuer were read aloud in the courtroom. According to Breuer 
they proved that Krabbe was unwilling to pay taxes, ungrateful to the king and that he 
refused to obey orders. To Breuer correspondence with the If he had been a true 
patriot then he would have gone to Sweden with his family and servants like all other 
true patriots in Scania. That would have saved him fro  having to trouble his Danish 
relatives and friends with pleas for help. Pleas that in themselves were proof of 
treason since connivance with the enemy was not allwed. other side was ”totally 
suspect and neither suitable nor recommendable  for any true subject”. It was 
evidence of an inclination towards the enemy.  The baron was even more to be 
suspected of since he had been in touch with the Danish Commission in Kristianstad 
(here: Christianstadh).1306 Consequently it was not only the matter of private 
correspondence. Breuer thought that extracts 8 and 9 proved that Krabbe had been in 
touch with ”yet another person whose name he does nt mention.” To judge by the 
extract it seems as if Krabbe had written to the Danish king to try and recuperate his 
                                               
1305 Breuer’s second instance, 15th October, in Aletophilus, p.58. ”lad dennem tage alt sammen bort, 
saa er der Ende paa, naar det er oppe, saa kunde de int t meere tage..” Krabbe’s Second Statement, 
p.95. A figment of Basch’s imagination according to Krabbe. 
1306 Extract 8 
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sister’s property.1307 Furthermore Breuer thought it seemed as if Krabbe had tried to 
”appropriate himself of Swedish property” and that e ”rejoiced in the destruction of a 
true Swedish patriot”.   
 
Extract 10 contained a phrase that would become fatal to Krabbe: ”For if we become 
Swedish, it might do me harm….” (Thi om vi blifver svensk, så kand det giøre mig 
skade). Breuer concluded that this phrase proved that the baron considered himself 
Danish and that he had given his heart to the Danes d their king. 1308 The usage of 
the future form of the verb was evidence enough to conclude that Krabbe no longer 
considered himself as ”bound by oath and duty to the king of Sweden.”1309 Someone 
who wrote that he might become Swedish in the future could not possibly be so at the 
time of writing.   
Breuer declared that he was not charging the baron with having ordered his 
employees to join the snaphaner. It could not be proved that Krabbe had known where 
his men were at the time of Basch’s abduction but Breuer concluded that it was 
”worth to ponder upon the fact that four of the baron’s men had been with the 
snaphaner, at night, with their guns and in three diff rent places when Herr Basch and 
his followers were caught and the fifth came out and betrayed Captain Klingspor.”1310 
What Breuer thought to have enough evidence of was that Krabbe had found out what 
had happened at an early stage and omitted or delayed reporting it to the authorities. It 
also seemed obvious that Krabbe was not telling the truth when he claimed that his 
bailiffs had been forced to go along with the snaphaner. 
 
Another point on which Breuer had found that the baron was telling less than the truth 
was that of the two “boys” who had been present when Klingspor was captured. 
Krabbe had described one of them as a poor little boy of 15 or 16 whose task it was to 
pick fruit in the garden. Unfortunately the bailiff had found out that the boy was 
twenty and as tall as himself and that he carried a rapier and pistols. As for the 
                                               
1307 Fulltofta (Fulletofte) that had been confiscated by Niclas Jonsson.   
1308 Breuer’s second instance, 15th October, in Aletophilus, p.60. 
1309 Breuer’s second instance, 15th October, in Aletophilus, p.61. 
1310 These five were the bailiffs, the two ”boys” and Walter Schötte. Breuer’s second instance, 15th 
October, in Aletophilus, pp.62-63: ”ehuru wel dhet elt eftertänckligt er at fire aff Velb. Her Baronens 
Folck om Nattertijdhen medh Geweehr på tre åthskiellige Ortår och licka som uthi et Moment waro 
medh Snaphaannerne dher Her Basken och hans föllie blefva fast tagen och dhen femte kom än dher 
uth hofl. och gaff Anslag paa Ritmester Klingspor...” 
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gamekeeper’s lad Krabbe claimed that he was 10 or 12 but the bailiff had found out 
that he was 16 and carried a huge rifle with him everywhere. According to Krabbe the 
boys and Mogens Peerssön had been forced to go with the snaphaner. In a letter to 
Sperling, Krabbe had explained that the boys had said ”You rascals!” to the snaphaner 
when they met. Then the snaphaner said: ”We know very w ll that he is at Taastrup or 
Bullarp. Now you will have to come with us so that you will not warn him.” 
Whereupon they all rode to Tosterup (Taastrup) castle to look for Basch. They ate all 
his food and drank all his beer and then they said he would have to come with them 
too. Mogens Peersøn and the two boys begged that they might be left behind so that 
they would not end up in trouble but the snaphaner forced them to come along.1311  
 
Unfortunately for Krabbe, Christopher had confessed that the boys had joined the 
snaphaner ”of their own free will.” They were both riding with him on the way to 
Tosterup (Taastrup) when he met the snaphaner and then they had left Bollerup 
(Bullarp) in the company of the snaphaner during the night and came back early in the 
morning claiming that they had been on a ”raid”: ”they joined the snaphaner of their 
own free will  and  rode with  them… the bailiff (Christopher) admits that they left 
Bollerup (Bullarp) with the snaphaner at night and returned with them early in the 
morning and said that they had been on a party and  that they had helped arrest the 
Quarter master  and the physician and they were quit  merry and happy and stayed 
with them when the bailiff and vice-bailiff took their leave” .1312 Christopher had 
”confessed” all this. By what means this “confession” had been extracted was not 
mentioned.  Breuer felt that he had caught the baron in a blatant lie and that that lie 
had given the ”boys” time enough to disappear: ”since the baron himself pretends to 
be a true and steadfast Patriot and Subject then he should have had them (the boys) 
arrested and brought in here right from the start when the deed was recent and he had 
only just found out so that they could have been punished as they deserved...” Those 
                                               
1311 Breuer’s second instance, 15th October, Letter from Jørgen Krabbe to Jöran Sperling, Extract Nr. 
XVI, pp.83-84. 
1312 This passage is not very clear: ”dhe komma til Snaphannerne goedwilligen, och redha medh, dher 
Fougden medh dhem war begrepen på Veigen åth Taastrup, Ja Fougdhen bekiännar, at dhe om Natten 
droegge medh Snaphaannerne ifran Bollerup, aff igien, och komme om Morgennen biitijde medh 
dhennom igien, seyandis sigh at hafva warit medt på Partie, som dhe och warit medh, och hiulpet at 
fängßla Quarteermestern, och Feeldskiäraren, beteendis sigh i alt öfrigt lystige och glade, och 
blifvandhes än hoes dhem dher Fougdhen och Ladefougdhen togga Afffskeed...” Breuer’s Second 
instance, 15th October, pp.63-64. 
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of Krabbe’s people who were on his estates and felt that they were in danger had 
disappeared quickly. Mogens Peersøn had gone missing. So had the garden boy.1313    
 
According to the other witnesses Christopher was not treated like a prisoner at all by 
the snaphaner but rode about ”free and proud” with his rapier by his side.1314 He had 
used this rapier as deftly as any of the snaphaner nd all the witnesses agreed that he 
had eaten and drunk and been as merry as any of thesnaphaner after their ”feat.”1315 
The witnesses also claimed that it was Mogens Peerssön who had insisted that the 
prisoners be shot so that they would not cause any trouble in the future.1316 
   
Eggert the coach boy had also testified about the occurrences during those fatal 
September days when Krabbe, Klingspor and Basch all arrived in Malmö (Malmø). 
He had run to Klingspor with messages several times and of having given him money 
on account of the baron. He admitted that he had trie o  ”bribe” Klingspor.1317 
 
 Krabbe claimed that he only discovered that his employees had been involved in the 
business  after a ”strict interrogation” after the kidnapping of the Swedes and then 
they insisted that they had been constrained to join the snaphaner. This interrogation 
took place two or three days later.1318 Krabbe claimed that he immediately after this 
sent a report to governor general Fersen about what had happened. 1319 Fersen died 
soon afterwards. Unfortunately there was no trace of such a letter in the archives.1320 
As Breuer saw it Krabbe had simply tried “to sweep the whole business under the 
carpet”.1321 Breuer asked the baron to stop bragging about his great friendship with 
Klingspor and Basch because it seemed to be a rather one-sided friendship. Krabbe 
had claimed that his wife and the other women were crying because they were so sad 
that Basch and Klingspor had ended up in the hands of the rascals.1322 However, the 
Swedish captives had reported to the court that the women had been laughing and 
                                               
1313 Breuer’s second instance, 15th October, in Aletophilus, p.63. 
1314 Breuer’s Second instance, 15th October, p.62. 
1315 Breuer’s Second instance, 15th October, p.62. 
1316 Breuer’s second instance, 15th October, in Aletophilus, p.63. 
1317 Breuer’s Second Instance, 15th October, p.67. 
1318 Breuer’s Second instance, 15th October, in Aletophilus, p.64. 
1319 Krabbe’s second Indleg, 11th October 1677, in Aletophilus, pp.24-28. 
1320 Breuer’ Second Instance, 15th October, p.66. 
1321 Breuer’s second instance, 15th October, in Aletophilus, p.65. (”Sacken döllia och under Bencken 
stickia”) 
1322 Krabbe, in Aletophilus, p.130. 
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making fun of them from the window when they were bought into Krageholm 
(Krogholm) castle ”inspite of the fact that up until then Basch had always been treated 
with respect on the estate”.1323 It also seemed evident that Krabbe was not telling the 
truth when he claimed that Basch had been maltreating his peasants. The peasants 
who had been called to the stand had unanimously agreed that Basch had been very 
kind to them and that he had not even tried to colle t all the taxes he was entitled 
to.1324  When Basch met Krabbe in the Central Square in Malmö (Malmøe)  Krabbe 
had tried to sound him in order to find out which way he was leaning. On this 
occasion Krabbe had admitted that his bailiffs had c lled Basch a ”Schwedscher 
Hund” and maltreated him.1325 Basch then signed an accord that said that he and 
Mogens Peersøn were even.1326 Breuer declared he guarded the interest of His 
Majesty the King and did not care about personal squabbles like the one between 
Mogens Peersön and Lorentz Basch.1327 
To Breuer the cardo totius negotii was the following: ”Apart from this the Baron 
totally ignores what I have written towards the end of all my petitions, as if it did not 
regard him that he, knowingly and willingly, had employed people who were best 
friends with the snaphaner and both had given them an excuse to and had participated 
himself in tracking down, arresting, maltreating, plundering and shooting His 
Majesty’s servants and soldiers...” Breuer called this problem the ”nodus gordius” the 
Gordian knot of the whole business. Krabbe had not replied to these accusations at all 
and Breuer could not but take his silence as a confession.1328 Breuer then referred to 
the Royal decree on the snaphaner in which it was expressly stated that those who 
harboured or hid snaphaner would be treated as snapha er themselves by the Swedish 
authorities. Breuer claimed that Krabbe knew this decree all too well, and that he was 
aware of the fact that every hundred or village that harboured snaphaner would be laid 
                                               
1323 Breuer’s Second Instace, 15th October, p. 65: ”...dher dogh Basken uthi förstonne wel warit 
antaggen dher på Gårdhen...” 
1324 Breuer’s Second Instace, 15th October, p. 66. 
1325  Breuer’s second instance, 15th October, p.66: ”...och uthleetha hans Mienningh, hvar hän han 
inclinerede...” Krabbe himself denied this fiercely and said that he had never taken such words into hs 
mouth. 
1326 Breuer’s second instance, 15th October, p.67. 
1327 Breuer’s second instance, 15th October, p.67. 
1328 Breuer’s second instance, 15th October, p.67: ”Uthan alt dhetta gaar Velb. Her Baronen dhet som 
jagh uthi Slutningen aff minna Inlagge skriffver aldeelis forbi, liggesom dhet hannom intet anginge at 
nemlig Velb. Her Baronen weettandes , och williandhes ollit uthi sit Bröedt sådant Folck, huilcka 
hafva warit uthi Flock och Föllia medh Snaphaannerne, och giffvet dhem een deels Anleedning, een 
deels och sielff warit medt, til at opleeta, fängsla illa tractera, plöndra, och ihielskiutta Kongl. Majest. 
Betiendta och Kriigs-Folck...” 
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waste. And yet Krabbe had not reported the goings o in time, nor had he sent for 
help from Malmö (Malmø): ”Which the baron did not do, but kept quiet from 20th 
July until 7th September when he informed his Highness, General Lieutenant and 
Vice-Governor General thereof, since the Snaphaanner now had started (as he claims) 
to attack and maltreat his estate and peasants...”1329   
  
It was undeniable that Krabbe still had people in his service who had gone over to the 
enemy. Breuer and his men had made impressive efforts to bolster up the prosecution 
with this second main line of accusations. In order to prove that Krabbe had lived 
surrounded by ”enemies” Breuer divided the evidence i to eight groups. 
1.  Two of Krabbe’s bailiffs namely Hindrich Peersøn  at Krageholm (Krogholm) 
and Mogens Peersøn1330 at Högestad (Høgested), had both gone over to the 
enemy. Hindrich had left Krabbe’s service before th Danish invasion with the 
excuse that he was going to dedicate himself to busines  in the nearby town of 
Ysted. However, after the Danish invasion he had presented himself to the baron 
with a certificate that proved that he had become a Danish tax collector (crone 
foget). The baron had admitted all this to the court. Breuer claimed that he could 
prove that Hindrich had been working as a bailiff up until the beginning of June 
1677 (some weeks before the abduction of the Swedes). Christopher had only 
started his service around 6th or 7th July and before that the position had been 
empty for a month. Which meant that even if Hindrich had taken his leave 
officially before the summer of 1676, in reality he still occupied his post as a 
bailiff a year later. Breuer then pointed out that Krabbe had claimed that Hindrich 
had saved his peasants from the ravages of the Danish soldiers and that he had 
been lenient as regarded tax extraction etc. At the same time Breuer had found a 
passage in one of Krabbe’s letters in which he stated that he and his peasants had 
paid the Danes three times more than the Swedes. Basch on his side had declared 
that “Hindrich Pehrsson” had put the peasants under hard pressure and maltreated 
                                               
1329 Breuer’s Second Intercession, 15th October, p.67: ”Huilcket Velb. Her Baronen nu intat hafver 
giort, uthan teeget dher medh ifan den 20. Julii indtil den 7. Septembr. da han dhet först hans högVelb. 
Excell. Her General Lieutenanten och Vice-General Gouverneuren lät weetta, formedelst dhet 
Snaphaannerne nu och begyndta som wil forregifvas, h ns Goeds, och Böndher at angrippa och illa 
medhfarra, som tilförne ähr sagt...” 
1330 Also called Hindrich Pehrsson, Hendrich Peersson and Hendrich Pedersøn. In ”Blood Crying for 
Vengeance he is called Hendrik Persön.  Hindrich and Mogens were obviously not brothers because 
Breuer just called them ”good friends and comrades” ( Second Intercession, p.71). Also called Mons 
Peersson in the same text.  
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them terribly. In this paragraph Breuer concluded that Krabbe had already defined 
himself as a Dane once and he did so again now, albeit involuntarily.1331 
2. Krabbe had two girls in his service who were highly suspect. Anne Andersdaatter 
was not only the sister of a Danish tax-collector (crone-fogde) called Anders 
Dolmer1332  but also the fiancée of Hindrich Peerssön. Sperling defined Dolmer as 
a scoundrel and one of Krabbe’s best friends. Bengte Börgisdaatter was the 
fiancée of a vice-bailiff (ladufoged) called Rasmus who had run away. Breuer 
conceded that the two girls might be of good and honest character but their mere 
presence on Krabbe’s estate was a risk: ”Occasion mght be given for unnecessary 
and illegal correspondence with the servants and supporters of the Enemy, of 
which every honest and true subject who wishes to persist in his Fidelity ought to 
feel particular disgust, in order to prove his Fidelity in public, and to avoid 
righteous Suspicion...”1333 Breuer was convinced that the two girls attracted 
”vermin” (Skaddediure) like Hindrich Peerssön and Rasmus to the estate. 
According to one of the witnesses Hindrich used to come and visit on a regular 
basis. The last time had been eight days earlier (7th October or so) when he had 
ridden “from Lands Cronna to Krogholm and Marsvinsholm in the company of 50 
snaphaner” in order to ”speak to his fiancée and conspire a little.” Breuer kindly 
asked the court that the two girls should be ordered to betake themselves to 
Malmö (Malmøe)  and that the property of “Hendrich Peersson” and Rasmus that 
was to be found on Krabbe’s estate was to be confiscated.1334                          
3. On the same day as Basch was brought to Kragholm (Krogholm) as a prisoner a 
man called Simon arrived there on his (röed-blisset) russet horse. Simon was 
“Hendrich Peersson’s” groom (dreng) but the snaphaner wanted to confiscate his 
horse anyway. Fortunately Eggert and the groom (drengen) interfered and saved 
                                               
1331 Breuer’s Second Intercession, 15th October, pp.70-71. 
1332 Dolmer’s activity was intense during the war. Numerous orders from him directly to captains of the 
friskytter have been preserved in the National archives of Copenhagen and Stockholm. Sperling called 
him a ”persecutor of the Swedish nation” and claimed that Krabbe and he were quite ”thick.” See also 
M.Weibull, Skånska samlingar, II:1:4 (Åtskilliga danska påbud) where several of His Majesty’s Tax 
Collector Dolmer’s orders are printed. 
1333 Breuer’s Second Intercession, 15th October, pp.70-71.: ”Tilfälle kan gifvas til een undwiickelig 
och stadigh olofligh Correspondence meh Fiendes Betiendte och Anhängiarre, för huilcken liickwähl 
hwar reedeligh och troegen Undhersåtte som åstundher at staae fast i sin trooheet billigt böer dragga 
een synnerligh Affsky, så wähl til at offentligen wiissa sin Trooeheet som och at undwicka all 
rätmättigh Suspicion...” 
1334 From this passage we learn that Hindrich Peerssön who was a tax collector (Crone Foged) was also 
the leader of a troop of snaphaner. Hindrich seems to have taken his refuge to the Danish enclave 
around Landscrone by this time and he seems to have been working from there, making forays out into 
the countryside. Landscrone is situated some 12o kilometres from Krogholm.   
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the horse from being ”kidnapped.” Breuer declared that by doing so they defended 
the property of the enemy and ”betrayed all that was Swedish.” He asked the 
baron to explain what kind of business Simon had had at Krageholm (Krogholm) 
and why he had not been arrested and sent to Malmö (Malmøe).1335                                                                                         
4. Then Breuer came to the case of Krabbe’s parson Christopher Corvinius. Breuer 
declared that Corvinius had behaved like a ”hypocrite and servant of two masters” 
which in itself ”went against the word of our Saviour the Lord Jesus Christ.” 
Krabbe had always supported Corvinius and Breuer saw this as further evidence 
of how ”eager and willing the Baron has been to defend criminals and all others 
who had violated their oath.” 1336 Breuer concluded that Corvinius should be 
summoned to Malmö (Malmøe).                           
5. Krabbe and his father Iffuer had had a man called Hack Søfrensøn1337 in their 
service for a long time. Breuer designated Søfrensøn a  ”the baron’s old and 
faithful friend and servant and right-hand man with w om he always discussed all 
his business in order to have his approval.”  To Breuer Søfrensøn was an 
”unfaithful subject of the king” who had committed serious offences. 1338  When 
the Swedes were after him he had fled to Krageholm (Krogholm) where the baron 
had taken him under his wings. Some time later Søfrensøn died and Breuer 
claimed that he had left all his earthly belongings at Krageholm (Krogholm). 
Søfrensøn’s wife had admitted that her things were there during a visit to Malmö 
(Malmøe)  in June 1677.1339 On 22nd May the governor general had written to 
Krabbe asking about Søfrensøn’s belongings: according to what Krabbe had 
written in his last letter it seemed to Fersen thatSøfrensøn had left everything on 
his estate. On 24th May Krabbe replied in a rather offended tone. He declared that 
Søfrensøn had fallen ill shortly after his arrival at Krageholm (Krogholm) and that 
all he had brought with him were the clothes he wore and had been taken away by 
Søfrensøn’s  wife together with the corpse. Krabbe had two old horses (Hopper) 
that had once belonged to Søfrensøn but he had received them as a restitution of a 
                                               
1335 Breuer’s Second Intercession, 15th October, p. 72. Breuer had some kind of idea of a Swedish-ness 
that could be defined by actions and ways of thought 
1336 Breuer’s Second Intercession, 15th October, p.73. 
1337 Also written as Søfrensen (p.99), Söffrensson, Söffrinson and Sörensen. 
1338 ”Velb. Her Baronens gamle, oc troegne ven, och Tiennare, och liika som hans andra Hånd, medh 
hvilckan Her Baronen uthi alle sinne Anlägenhetter altdtied sigh rådtförda , och des gotfinnande 
indhemptede...””een sådan utroegen Konnungens Undersått e” 
1339 Breuer’s Second Intercession, 15th October, p.74. 
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debt.1340 However, Breuer had evidence to the contrary on his hands or so he 
thought at least. In a letter from Krabbe to Søfrensøn that had been intercepted by 
the Swedish authorities Krabbe had written as follows: ”My wife received your 
letter today. You are welcome to leave your belongings here on the estate.” 1341 
Another letter, from as early as 25th April 1675, proved that Krabbe had had 
business transactions with Søfrensøn.1342 Breuer insisted that further enquiries be 
made into the matter.  
6. Søfrensøn’s son Mogens Hacksen had been in the Krabbes’s service too but was 
now following ”his Father’s evil example in that heis trying to damage His 
Majesty’s interests with great zeal and to extort taxes and contributions from the 
subjects as if he were an enemy.”1343 In other words, he had gone into Danish 
service and worked as a sheriff in the hundred of Färs (Fers).1344  Mogens seems 
to have been an enemy indeed. In a letter that was used as evidence he declared 
that the Swedes that had maltreated the peasants in Färs (Fers) would get a 
“infernal” punishment and that he would make many a Swedish child weep.1345 
Breuer concluded that everyone who had been in service with the baron and had 
been in favour with him had then gone over to the Danes and were now the worst 
persecutors of the Swedish nation and tried to cause damage to ”His Majesty’s 
Subjects”.1346 And what was even worse, they were still friends with the baron.  
At this point Breuer reckoned that it was obvious that the baron was guilty on the 
following points: 1) of having spoken harsh words against the king, 2) of having been 
unwilling to pay contributions to the Swedes but not to the Danes, 3) of ”confessing 
                                               
1340 Letter from Krabbe to Fersen, Marsvinsholm 24th May 1677, Breuer’s Second Intercession, 15th 
October, p.89. 
1341 Letter from Krabbe to Hack Søfrensøn, Kroegholm 27th January,1676, Breuer’s Second 
Intercession, 15th October, p.90. This extract is wrongly referred to as No.29 in stead of 20 in the text. 
1342 Letter from Krabbe to Hack Søfrensøn, Kroegholm April 25, 1675, Breuer’s Second Intercession, 
15th October, p.90. 
1343 ”...och söckier efter sin Fadhers ondhe Exempel medh all Fliid, Kongl.Maiest. Interesse at 
förhindra, och som een Fiendhe Skat, och Contribution aff Undersaatterne at uthprässa.” Mogens/Mons 
Hacksøn/Hacksen and his brother Johan are mentioned several times in the chapter on the snaphaner 
and friskytter.  
1344 Röndahl (1996), p.438. 
1345 ”det skal blifve Anders Gramß, sampt de andre Svensk  (som nu sidst var i Feerßherred til at pjne, 
och plage Almuen,) een Helfvedes Straff, och mangen et Svensk Barn, i Sverrige skal græde...” Lit. 
XXIII, Feerßherred, 3rd August Anno 1677. From Mogens Hacksøn, addressee not known. Possibly it 
was Krabbe. 
1346 ”alle dhe som hos Velb. Her Baronen för uthi Tiennsta, och hans egne Creaturar warit, nu sedan 
dhe sich til Fienden begifvat, dhe wärreste, som dhen Suenske Nation förföllia, och Kongl. Majest. 
Undersaattere all tort och Skadhe tilföya, och alle dese haffva stadigt warit, och ännu ähro Velb. Her 
Baronens besta och förtrogneste Venner.” 
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himself to be completely Danish..”, 4) of ”persecuting a true Swedish Patriot and 
servant and trying to lay hands on his goods...”, 5) of  illegal correspondence with 
friends and family on the other side, 6) of letting his servants go into Danish service, 
7) of having protected  delinquents, 8) of having peo le in his service through whom 
connivance with the enemy and the snaphaner could be maintained, 9) of having had 
people in his service who collaborated with the snaphaner without reporting it to the 
authorities, 10) of having been ”on such good terms with the Snaphaner that he 
allowed them to have meetings on his estate.”1347 These ten charges were extremely 
serious and Breuer considered them as already proven. To Breuer Krabbe had broken 
the faith he had sworn His Majesty the King, and he had broken the (Swedish) law. 
Now it was for the commissarial court to pronounce its verdict.  
 
Krabbe was now ordered to depose his rapier in the courtroom and then he was 
brought to a cell in the fortress (without ”citation.”)  He was allowed to keep one 
servant with him but this man was sent away three o four times and was eventually 
substituted by a little boy from the countryside. Krabbe asked that he might be sent 
means and articles from Krageholm (Krogholm) but he was refused this and had to 
live ”on the charity of others.”1348 When he received the prosecutor’s second report he 
was told by the commander of the fortress that he had to hurry with his reply and so 
he did; it was his firm belief that he would receive a reply from the prosecutor and in 
his turn be given a better chance to defend himself but this was not the case. The 
prosecutor’s second report contained serious accusation  but did not refer to any 
paragraphs or clauses of the Swedish law which made it more difficult for the baron 
to defend himself. The prosecutor also mentioned several witnesses whose identity 
was kept from Krabbe. It was obvious that it was the matter of Krabbe’s own 
employees or tenants. The baron’s employees had all been arrested and taken from 
Krageholm (Krogholm) to Malmö (Malmøe)  where they were guarded by the High 
Guard (Hoffvet Vakt). According to Rosencrantz Krabbe was made to understand that 
the court had started elaborating his death sentence.  At this point the baron wrote to 
the High Court (konglige retten) and pleaded that he might appear in front of it in 
                                               
1347 For these accusations, see also: :Fabricius III, pp.128-129. Translations in this passage: p.75: 
”bekiännandes sigh fulkommeligen Dansk...”, p.76: ”warit med Snaphaannerne uthi sådant Förtroende, 
at han dhem tilstådt på hans gaard at holla dheras Tilsammenkompst...” 
1348 p.52: ” har hand icke maatte faa sit nödtorfftige Underhold fra sit Gods men maatte leffve aff 
andres Naade.” 
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person so that he might “deducere” himself. In thisletter he pleaded his case as well 
as he could and begged that his ”confession” might be given to the king but he 
received no reply whatsoever.1349    
 
 In a curious little letter from 16th October 1677, written in his own handwriting, 
Sperling told Charles XI that he was now convinced of Krabbe’s evil intentions or at 
least evil inclination and that the whole court agreed with him.1350 It was Krabbe’s 
censured letters that had persuaded them. Things had taken a serious turn and the 
court felt that Krabbe no longer should be allowed to carry his rapier or to remain in 
house arrest.   It was better to assure oneself of Krabbe’s person, Sperling added. 
Sperling then added a short extract from one of Krabbe’s letters to the ”frivolous 
rogue Hack Sörensen, who was Krabbe’s best and closest friend.” The extract in 
question was the passage in which Krabbe expressed hi  doubts as to whether they 
were to remain Swedish. To Sperling it was obvious that Krabbe had defined himself 
as Danish :“whereas he r ipsa was or at least, should have been, Swedish, but 
nevertheless considered it a futurum contingens, that he might become Swedish…then 
this fact alone is enough to convict him.1351  
 
The Danes knew what the Swedes were up to. The Danish War Commissary Jens 
Harboe reported the following to Copenhagen: “Mit Jørgen Krabbe gehet es Schlecht 
in Malmøe her. Sie wollen ihn endtlich den Kopf herunter haben. Er wird beschuldigt, 
daß er mit den Snaphanen gehalten…”1352 
 
At the beginning of October Holger Thott had come to Sperling on the verge of 
tears.1353 In his letter from the 16th of that month, Sperling expressed his doubts and 
fears as regarded Holger Thott. He was offering Sperling enormous sums of money in 
order to let him and his family stay in Scania or emigrate to Lübeck. Sperling did not 
trust Thott at all. He warned the king that there was something suspicious about him 
and that he had him followed everywhere. According to Sperling Thott was doing 
                                               
1349 pp.49-50. 
1350 An extract of this letter is to be found in Cronholm, p.203. 
1351 ”dher han dock reipsa då war eller åthminstone borde vara swensk, men hölt dhet lickwäll för ett 
futurum contingens, att han kunde blifwa swensk...så ähr doch dheta allene sufficient till att öfwertyga 
och convincera honom.” 
1352 Jens Harboe to Arensdorff, October 1677, Indkomne breve 1677, DRA. 
1353 Sperling to the King, GG, SRA. 
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what he did out of fear, especially so since Krabbe had been arrested. For exactly that 
reason Sperling felt tempted to accept the deal ”because it might just be that Your 
Royal Majesty could profit somewhat thereof, if Tott would be condemned of 
something that originated in infidelity.” More than ything Sperling was 
concentrating on the ”highly useful emigration of the nobility.” But he still felt that he 
had to inform the king that Thott’s ”offers” could be extremely useful in those hard 
times. 1354 It seems undeniable that the judge and the jury wee spurred on by the hope 
for material gains. As indeed they were in the whole business of the deportation of the 
nobility.   
     
Krabbe’s Reply to the Prosecutor’ s Second Statemen t   (23rd October) 
 
”I do not know whom except God the almighty in heaven, that  I could call to witness that I have never 
written or said anything illegal or insincere against my gracious king but only what was worthy of a 
righteous Patriot, as I can assure with the oath of my innermost soul” Krabbe to the Commissarial 
Court, 23rd October, 1677.1355 
 
The same themes pervade all of Krabbe’s writings. The key words of those themes are 
all present in the quote above, namely: ”God”, ”king”, ”patriot” ,”oath” and honour  
To Krabbe, a true patriot always pursued the interes s of his king. In the same manner, 
an untrue patriot ignored his oath of allegiance and duty towards his Lord and 
King.1356 At the core of everything was the oath of allegiance that Krabbe, like all 
other Scanians, had sworn to the Swedish sovereign some time after the conquest. 
In the court statement from 23rd October  Krabbe’s tone had become humbler but he 
still insisted that he had the law on his side. Some f his arguments were based on 
foreign law but exclusively when in accordance with Swedish law. He then added: ”I 
wish and presume in all humility  that Your Highness wellborn Excellency and the 
honourable Royal Commissarial Court will let me enjoy the Beneficia that the law 
                                               
1354 ”så drages och intales iagh om så myckit mehr, till at  antaga dhene handelen medh honom, ty 
kunde hända, att Eders Kongl. Mayt torde i något kunna profitera dheraf, om Totten något, som af 
otrooheett skulle saka, blefwa öfwertygat.” 
1355 Aletophilus, p.100 
1356 Krabbe, in Aletophilus, p.101. 
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entitles me to...”1357 Soon enough Krabbe let his bitterness transpire. He declared that 
it was better to ”save paper” and not fill it with ”unnecessary chatter” such as 
Breuer’s endless quibbles.1358 Krabbe then quoted several Swedish law treatises and 
excused himself for having to say that Breuer ”prostituted himself” when he permitted 
Basch to act both as plaintiff and witness.1359 He stressed that he had always 
”willingly paid his dues to His Majesty and the army of the realm as was suitable and 
fitting for a righteous Patriot.”1360 Krabbe owned the Swedish king his ”life, property 
and honour” for the honours that he had bestowed upon him, especially the baronetcy. 
Or at least, that was what Krabbe claimed at this po nt in time. He stressed this by 
assuring that ”the only thing one gets from all one’s pains and labour in this sinful 
world is an honest name.”1361 Krabbe promptly denied having spoken ill of the 
Swedish king but not having said that he could not pay two armies at the same 
time.1362 
Krabbe had to pay 90 daler in silver a month for Ingildstropgaard in war 
contributions. In the Land Register (Jordebog) it was registered as a farmstead with no 
more land than an average farmstead inhabited by peasants. Yet 90 daler was what 12 
farmsteads paid in contribution. In the same way Baldringe that had belonged to 
Krabbe’s maternal great-grandfather and was inhabited by two peasant families was 
taxed at  45 daler a month in war contributions. (Krabbe and his ancestors had never 
paid more than 40 daler, 1 mark in silver in Land tax (landgille) for it). Tosterup 
(Taastrup) was equalled to 18 farmsteads, “Kroegeholm” to 16 farmsteads and 
Högestad (Høgested) to 10. By these standards Krabbe had to pay more in war 
contributions a month than what he earned in four months. Krabbe had appealed to 
Fersen for help and Fersen told him to turn to Johan Gyllenstierna. In two months’ 
                                               
1357 P.94: ”Ønskendis jeg, och alligevel hørsommeligst vil formode, Eders Høy – Velb. Excell. och den 
høyloflige Kongl. Commissarial-Rætten lader mig de Beneficia som Louen i alle Maader tilegner til 
gode kommer...” 
1358 p.94: ”hvorfore, och at spare Papiret, och det ey m d saadanne unødvendig Snack opfylde, Jeg mig 
eenfoldig til min forrige Exception och Loufaste instantiam referere...” 
1359 p.95: ”prostituerendis sig Her Prosecutoren (med prmision at sige) intet lidet naar hand imod all 
formam Juris Actorem Principalem...her bruger til et Vidne...” 
1360 p.99: ”jeg med en goed Villie, mine Udlegger, altid, til Hans Kongl. Majest. och Rigens Armee 
contribueret hafver, det och een retskaffen Patriot vel eigned och anstoed...” 
1361 p.99: ”mand haffver intet meere for all sin Umage her i denne syndige Verden end et Erligt Nafn...” 
1362 Breuer’s second instance, 15th October, in Aletophilus, p.58. ”lad dennem tage alt sammen bort, 
saa er der Ende paa, naar det er oppe, saa kunde de int t meere tage..” Krabbe’s Second Statement, 
p.95. A figment of Basch’s imagination according to Krabbe. 
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time more than 20 of Krabbe’s farms had been abandoned by their tenants, because of 
their ”poverty and utter misery.”1363 
Against Breuer’s accusation that he had corresponded with the Royal (Danish) 
commissariat in Kristianstad (Christianstad) Krabbe admitted that this was the case, 
but only because the new (Danish) Lehnsmand was putting the peasants under far too 
heavy tax-pressure and there was no way to get in touch with the Swedish 
authorities.1364 
 As regards the phrase “if we become Swedish” that Breuer had given such great 
weight to, Krabbe responded that Breuer simply did not understand the nuances of the 
Scanian tongue. The verb “blifver” could mean either “become” or “remain” in 
Scanian, though it only had the first significance in Swedish. Krabbe had meant the 
phrase to mean “if we remain Swedish”.  This is the one and only passage in the court 
records where linguistical problems are well documented.1365 
As regards the garden boy and the game-keeper’s lad, Kr bbe’s only comments were 
that he found it hard to remember the precise age of young boys but if the “fiscal” saw 
them as men and not boys then they should answer for their own actions like men. 
And yes, he admitted that the gamekeeper’s lad was wont to take his rifle with him 
into the parlour. 1366 
 Hindrich Peersøn had resigned his job on 1st May which was the day when Krabbe’s 
bailiffs were wont to hand in their accounts of thepast year. Krabbe had allowed him 
to go on living at Krogholm for the time being. Some time after Hindrich Peersøn’s 
resignation Krabbe sent him to the Danish army camp to ask for a sauvegarde letter 
for Krabbe’s estates. Then one day when Krabbe was out walking in the garden 
Hindrich came back and said: ”There was no way I could btain a safeguard letter but 
I have decided to become a Danish tax collector and here is His Majesty of 
Denmark’s authorisation” At which Krabbe replied: ”Do you want to sell yourself to 
the devil? For you have to prepare yourself for becoming an exile and a fugitive and 
after this day you will have to look for somewhere lse to stay because you cannot 
come here to my estate anymore.” After that Hindrich went to the village of Bromma 
                                               
1363 Krabbe’s response to Breuer’s second statement, Ale ophilus, pp.97-98. 
1364 p.101: jeg hafde skrefvet Cörbiß, och den Kongl. Commissariat om den letfærdige Lehnsmands 
Actioner til...” 
1365 Krabbe, in Aletophilus, p.103: ”Thi enten jeg skreff, blifve Svensk det Skaanske Sprock falder, 
(blifve) I stedet som den Svenske Stiil falder/ (forblifver). Tyckis mig at de Ord, hafver een 
Meening...” 
1366 Krabbe, in Aletophilus, p.127 (107). 
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(Bromme) to stay with the Lehnsmand there and he only ever came to Krageholm 
(Krogholm) again to collect taxes for the Danes. As for Mogens Peersøn Krabbe did 
not think that he had ever been in the service of the Danes.1367   
Krabbe only had good things to say about the two girls that Breuer criticised him for 
keeping on in his service. Anne Andersdatter was ”hi  dearest’s chambermaid” and 
could be found with the baroness in Malmö (Malmøe) right then. She had been with 
them for ten years and was not engaged to be married to anyone; it might be that she 
was friends with Hindrich Peersøn but Krabbe did not know very much about that and 
saw no reason to send her away. As for the other girl, she had been in Krabbe’s 
service for seven years and could now be found at Kr geholm (Krogholm). She had 
always behaved well too and Krabbe had nothing to say about her and her supposed 
fiancé Rasmus. If Hindrich or Mogens Peersøn had left any belongings at Krageholm 
(Krogholm) well, then Krabbe was utterly ignorant thereof and pleaded Sperling and 
the jury to let war commissar Olluff Hermand and Crown Sheriff (Cronens fouged) 
Niels Skaaning  inquire into the case.1368 What Krabbe knew was that Hindrich still 
had quite a few important letters and documents that belonged to him that he would 
like to get back. As for “Mogens Pedersøn” Krabbe did not think that e had ever 
been in the service of the Danes. A  far as he knew he had been working for Field 
Marshal Banér until he went missing.1369 
Krabbe claimed to know absolutely nothing of the episode with the russet horse. He 
knew who the servant Simon was and that he was the on of a burgher in Malmö 
(Malmøe) that Hindrich Peersøn had taken into his service while he was still working 
for Krabbe. Obviously Hindrich had hoped that the baron would foot the bill for the 
                                               
1367 Krabbe, in Aletophilus, p.135: ”Salvaguarde Breff kunde jeg nu intet bekomme, mens jeg hafver 
antaget nu jeg var borte at være Danske Cronefouget och her hafver jeg Hans Kongl. Majest. aff 
Danmarckis Breff der paa, daa jeg hannem svarede, som jeg veed Gud i Himmelen hermed kand 
contestere...Vilt du nu Fanden i Vold, det du maa forsickre dig, och bereede dig til, at blifve 
Landflyctig, och en Rømnings-Mand, och efter denne Dag, skalt du see dig om een anden Ort, mens 
paa min Gaard hafver du intet meere at komme....” 
1368 Ingelstad och Järrestad were passed to the county f Kristianstad (Christianstad) in 1675. Nils 
Skåning was a sheriff (befallningsman). See: Alf Erandsson p.164. Under the Danes the county of 
Christianstad comprised eastern and western Göinge (Gynge/Gønge), Villand (Willanz), Gärds (Giers) 
o Albo. During that time there were three to four “fögderier). Under the Swedes there was first one, 
then two. See also: Krabbe, in Aletophilus, pp.136-7. (min Kierestis Kammer-Pige) 
1369 Mogens Pedersön had not been in Krabbe’s service sin April that same year when Krabbe had 
had to cede the Högested estate to the Swedish Field Marshal and Councillor of the realm (rigsraad) 
Gustaf Banér. Mogens had stayed on in Baner’s service under Hauptmand Monsieur Donner.See 
Erlandsson! En Georg Andreas Donner var befallningsman i Oxie, Skytt o Bara 1664-1675. Sedan 
generalguvernementsfiskal. Erlandsson p.158. Sonen Carl Mattias Donner kanslist i 
generalguvernementskansliet 1688-1693. Sedan stadsnot rie och rådman i Ystad. Erlandsson 199. 
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servant boy but that was not the case; Krabbe had promptly told him to let the boy 
(fougde dreng) stay somewhere else and so he did.  
Krabbe’s parish minister Christopher Corvinius had only read out the Danish 
proclamations in church because he had been forced to do so by Danish troops.  
As for Hack Søfrensøn, he had come to Krageholm (Krogholm) one evening in order 
to hand over some accounts to the baron; he was then supposed to go on to his sister 
and brother-in-law at Ystad (Ysted) the morning after but fell ill and had to stay at 
Krogholm. As soon as possible his wife joined him there and then his sister and 
brother-in-law too. Mester Bertel from Ystad (Ysted) came to try and help him with 
his medicines and the minister came too. But it wasall in vain; some days later 
Søfrensøn passed away and was buried at Høersby1370 where he had resided. Krabbe 
had had no second thoughts about letting Søfrensøn stay; as far as he knew then 
Søfrensøn had never committed any crimes or showed himself ”untrue.” During 
Søfrensøn’s illness Krabbe went to Malmö (Malmøe) to talk to the governor general 
who wanted some information about the Søfrensøn and his family. The governor 
general asked Krabbe if Mogens Hacksøn was in his service and if it was true that 
Krabbe had helped him to a position as a Danish Crown sheriff (Crone fouget)? 
Naturally, Krabbe denied all this. Krabbe then concluded that ”if he has been untrue 
then he is now in those places where he will have to take responsibility for his 
actions.”1371  
Krabbe admitted that he had told Søfrensøn’s wife that they could leave their things at 
Krageholm (Krogholm) if they liked; this did not mean that Krabbe had lied when he 
swore that he did not keep any of the Søfrensøns’ things at Krageholm (Krogholm) 
because in the end they had not accepted his offer.1372 As for their son Mogens, 
Krabbe promptly denied that he had ever been in his service.   
 
On 4th November 1677 Simon Bengtsson, the commander of the troops at Krageholm 
(Krogholm), reported to Sperling that Holger and Tage Thott and their family and 
servants had been ”collected” by Danish troops. It was the matter of a mixed force or 
regular soldiers and snaphaner under Colonel Bahl th t had set out from Landskrona 
(Landscrone). This was the second time Bengtsson communicated this but he wanted 
                                               
1370 Modern-day Hörby? 
1371 Krabbe, in Aletophilus, p.139: ”Mens hafver hand været utroe saa er hand nu paa de Stæder hvor 
hand det skal ansvare.” 
1372 Krabbe, in Aletophilus, p.140. 
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to make sure that the governor general had received these news. Moreover he had 
received further information to the point that a Swedish party had surprised the Danes 
near Getinge (Giddinge) and that the Danes had been aten and most of them killed. 
Unfortunately the Thott brothers had managed to escape on their horses but Mrs 
(Holger) Thott and the children and all their belongings had been captured by the 
Swedes. 1373 As it turned out, Bengtsson’s information was not c rrect because Mrs 
Thott and the children had actually managed to escape on horseback too. 
 
Sperling only waited two days to explain to the king that he thought it highly 
unsuitable that old Dorthe Rosencrantz should keep th  Sövde (Söfwede) estate. On 
the paper it belonged to her son Holger who was a traitor. And Dorthe’s mere 
presence there would constitute an excuse for conniva ce with the. Sperling proposed 
that Dorthe and her sister Mette (who was also the mother of Holger’s fiancée) either 
be sent ”across the border” or be brought to Malmö (Malmøe). The old ladies were 
”pretending” they did not wish to go to Denmark. In a y case the point of Sperling’s 
letter was that the Sövde (Söfwede) estate, including Ågarp, should be left in the 
hands of a competent person who had worked hard but lived under tight financial 
circumstances. That is poor Jöran Sperling himself.1374 His wish was granted him. 
Holger’s house in Malmö (Malmøe) was given to Buschovius who was Chief Military 
Prosecutor (general auditor) and a member of the Commissarial jury. Buschovius also 
received the estate of another fugitive: namely Hans Valkendorff’s Brönneslöv. 
Sperling’s deputy Hans Cock von Crimstein received Marsvinsholm.1375 Tage Thott’s 
estate Eriksholm went to general major von Buchwald. Field marshal Henrik Horn 
received Knud Thott’s Næs. Colonel Axel Wachtmeister received the entire property 
of Ove Rommel. That good patriot Niklas Jonsson wasallowed to keep Karen 
Krabbe’s Fulltofta (Fulletofte). 
Conclusions:   
During the first part of the court case it was Basch’  word against Krabbe’s. The word 
of one of his Majesty’s servants against that of a native Dane. Naturally Krabbe did 
                                               
1373 Holger Thott’s youngest child was born around the middle of September. See his letter to the 
Offuer Commissarius among Sperling’s letters from 30th October, 1677. GG, SRA. 
1374 Sperling to the King, 5th November, 1677, GG, SRA. 
1375 According to the local legends the Thotts and their snaphane friends  filled the impressive 
renaissance castle with cowdung before they left. Although the Swedish reports do not expressly 
mention cow dung they nevertheless made clear that the castle was in a frightful state: the war 
Prosecutor declared that it looked like “the destruction of Jerusalem”. (Fabricius III, s. 143).   
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not see it that way. His was a somewhat antiquated view of the world in which the 
squire still was the true lord of the land on his domains. He also believed that the 
word of a gentleman should be worth more than that of  ”commoner” like Basch and 
that the ”nationality” or occupational position of the adversaries was of less 
importance. Unfortunately for Krabbe the Swedish authorities seemed to share 
Basch’s standpoint. Just as in the case of Niklas Jon son they gave more credit to 
Basch because he was one of his Majesty’s servants and a true Swedish patriot. 
Krabbe lied to his king. But only because he felt that he had to protect ”his people.” 
He stood for values that were rapidly becoming outdate  in a world where absolutism 
and centralisation were becoming the rule and where there was no room left for 
squires and barons who lived for their own little worlds only.  
 
Basch described Krageholm (Krogholm) as an estate where the lord of the manor was 
keeping an eye closed to the fact that a not insignifica t part of his employees were 
participating in anti-Swedish activities. He also hypothesised that the lord of the 
manor had instigated his servants to kidnap a man he owed money. These employees 
seem to have occupied all sorts of ranks from bailiff to garden-boy. The anti-Swedish 
activities ranged from regular jobs in the Danish army to passive support of the 
Danes. The baron himself could be included in this latter category or possibly in an 
even worse one, if one is to trust Basch’s conclusions. What is also of interest is that 
he claimed that on Krabbe’s and his wife’s estates tho e of the employees who wanted 
to participate in “snaphaneri” did so with the lord’s good conscience as long as 
nobody (Swedish or Swedish minded) found out. At tha point, but not earlier, they 
had to leave and join the “real” snaphaner.  
 
To Basch being a true Swedish man meant being prepared to give up everything for 
the king. More than anything it meant not loving one’s lands and own little squiredom 
more than one’s duty to the sovereign. It meant obeying the king the way one obeyed 
one’s God. 
 
Philip Michel Breuer was considerably more careful than Basch but then he had no 
personal relationship to the baron and as a professi nal he was confident that the 
evidence was crushing. He did not need to insinuate that Krabbe was the mastermind 
behind the snaphaners’ operations because he could prove that Krabbe had found out 
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what had happened at an early stage and per se that fact was enough to condemn 
Krabbe for collusion with the enemy. Breuer stressed that Krabbe insisted on avoiding 
the “nodus gordius” of the whole affair, namely that Krabbe spent most of his time 
with snaphaner and other traitors or enemies and that he lied on behalf of them even 
in court, so that those who were at risk could get time to escape from the (Swedish) 
law. The list of suspect friends of Krabbe’s that the court presented was quite 
impressive and included famous names as Mogens Hacksen who by some were 
considered an arch-snaphane. Breuer also observed that in his personal 
correspondence Krabbe used quite another tone than in his public protestations and so 
was he obviously wont to do when he spoke in private because all the witnesses 
claimed that he had said disparaging things about the (Swedish) king.  
  
Krabbe never quite replied to most of Breuer’s affirmations. On the contrary he did go 
back on important points like the presence of snaphaner in the immediate 
surroundings. Instead he based his defence on the illegal ty of the Swedish court 
proceedings and that on the lacking transparency of it. A ter all he had a European 
degree in law and knew what his rights should have been according to international 
procedures. He explicitly accused Breuer of having prostituted himself and he also 
claimed that magistrates that were willing to do servic  in that kind of tribunal only 
did it for the money. It is obvious from Krabbe’s account too that there was a lot of 
social life in the area, across apparent class barriers and that several of the involved 
had been in the habit of dining together. But then social life made part of the court 
proceedings too, or almost, because Krabbe also reveal d that several of the peasants 
that had been taken to Malmö (Malmøe) to give evidence had also been to Henning 
Olsen’s for a dram in the company of Basch. Krabbe implied that these persons who 
were now apparently so friendly with the Swedish “party” knew a whole lot about the 
snaphaner. Eleven of the fourteen questions he put to them regarded the snaphaner. 
With the passing of time Krabbe’s tone became less professional and more openly 
bitter. He communicated to the court that he had been constrained to cede Högestad 
(Högested) to Gustaf Banér and that he and his sister had been constrained to cede the 
Fulletofte estate to Niklas Jonsson. He also provided the court with ample evidence of 
how his farms and estates had bee ruined because of th taxes that had been imposed 
on them. Taxes that were quite unrealistic and that had forced some of his tenants to 
abandon their homes. He also claimed that the Swedish billeted troops had 
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misbehaved grossly and in particular Basch who had also been violent. Nor did he 
deny having said that he was unable to pay taxes and co tributions to two armies and 






In this section I will analyse what took place after the verdict had fallen and how 
Krabbe’s reaction to it should be seen. Today it might seem implausible that someone 
should sincerely believe that turning to God instead of more practical means in that 
situation would be the best solution. But religion did occupy another place in society 
in those days and at least some people, like Krabbe, expected that communication 
with others (the Swedish authorities in this case) be facilitated by the common 
experience of trust in God and knowledge of the Bible.  
 
The Last Weeks 
On 6th November 1677 a verdict dated __ November was sent to the king. However, it 
was not pronounced officially until 21st or 22nd November.1376 In the verdict Krabbe 
was found guilty of six charges:  
1)  “Baron Krabbe has showed uttered such words that on the one hand prove 
very little respect for His Majesty and on the other a particular desire not to 
pay war-contributions.” 1377  
2) Krabbe had people in his service who might ”give cause for connivance with 
the enemy and the snaphaner” and he himself had corresponded with Danish 
ministers. 
3) Krabbe had ”not only lodged and entertained, protected and excused those of 
his people who had been associating with the snaphaner but he had even 
offered to pay bail for some of them.” A comment to he paragraphs of the 
verdict concluded: “…and so Summarum Summa all those who used to be in 
Milord the Baron’s Service and who have been his Creatures, now that they 
                                               
1376 SRA, Generalguvernementet över Skåne, Halland och Blekinge 1677-78. The date of the day is 
blank. 
1377 Verdict of 6th November, 1677, Sperling’s letters, GG, SRA. 
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have betaken themselves to the Enemy, they have become the worst of all 
those who persecute the Swedish Nation and cause His Royal Majesty’s 
Subjects wrong and damage, and all those have always been and still are 
Milord the Baron’s best and closest friends.” According to Swedish law those 
who associated with snaphaner were snaphaner themselves.   
4)  The servants at the house had cultivated a ”particular intimacy and 
friendship” with snaphaner and other enemies. 
5)  Krabbe was not only guilty of laxity towards his servants but also of 
connivance with them; a connivance that had led to the abduction of Klingspor 
and Basch, and the murder of two other men.  
6)  “In two letters from Kroghollm from 19th August 1676 and 28 dito (he had) 
more than all too clearly and obviously declared ansaid that he was a good 
Dane as if he already then were freed from all obligations to the Swedish 
Nation, and in that manner he ignored his oath and the duties that he owed his 
king; an oath that he had sworn together with all the estates of the realm…”    
The punishment for all these crimes was ”the loss of honour, life and property.” These 
points corresponded to the accusations that Breuer had drawn up on the basis of the 
evidence that he had collected: the one point that was missing in the verdict was that 
of having persecuted ”a true Swedish Patriot and trying to lay hands on his 
goods...”1378 The king wanted the execution to take place as soon as possible but 
Sperling could not get hold of the executioner who as busy in north-eastern Scania 
(!).  
 
It is unclear whether Krabbe was aware of how far things had gone. On 14th 
November he sent a petition to the Commissarial Court in which he pleaded that he 
might be allowed to appear in court before a final verdict was reached.1379 He 
reminded Sperling and the jury that he had left the king of Denmark and his 
fatherland in order to become a subject of the Swedish king and that he had always 
had felt true and sincere love for Sweden. He also reminded them that he had left a 
                                               
1378 p.75: ”bekiännandes sigh fulkommeligen Dansk...”, p 76 (”he had admitted to being completely 
Danish): ”warit med Snaphaannerne uthi sådant Förtroende, at han dhem tilstådt på hans gaard at holla 
dheras Tilsammenkompst...” (..he had been in such confidence with the snaphaner that he had allowed 
them to keep their meetings at his place...”) 
1379 14th November 1677. Petition from Krabbe to the Royal Commissarial Court. 
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good position in Denmark for vain hopes of a similar job in Sweden.1380 Why did they 
accuse him of trying to subtract the property of a true Swedish patriot? (i.e. Niklas 
Jonsson’s) Did they not know that he had saved the gardens of the Bjärsjöholm 
(Biersøeholm) estate for its owner Mortaigne who was Chancellor of the Realm?1381 
Then, Krabbe declared that he would confess his innoce ce to God both in public and 
to his confessor that same week. He wanted to explain th t if he had sinned, then it 
had been out of human frailty and not wickedness or a treacherous heart. Perhaps he 
owed God a death but that debt was an old one. He was and had always been a sincere 
Swedish man.1382 Krabbe humbly offered the King’s Court to swear his most solemn 
”Juramentum.”  Oaths were important at the time. One of the first accusations that 
were flung at a Scanian in Danish- or snaphane service was that he was an 
”edsbrytare” a ”breaker of oaths.” Official Swedish propaganda informed the 
Scanians that breakers of oaths all went to hell.  The Danish authorities took exactly 
the same view, but emphasised that any oaths that the Scanians had sworn to the 
Swedes had been annulled by the Swedes themselves sinc  they had not respected the 
Peace Treaty between the two countries.1383  
 
Krabbe ended his plea by assuring the Royal Court that he would live and die a true 
patriot, the same as he had been all since he came under the Swedish Crown and that 
he would remain his Majesty’s true and honest subject and servant for ever.1384 
 
On 18th November later Krabbe sent a petition to Sperling in which he declared that 
he had confessed his sins in public the preceding Friday and that his confessor Willum 
Laurenberg had accepted his confession. One of the things that hurt him most and that 
made him want to cry was that he was accused of collusi n with the snaphaner, which 
brought the greatest dishoneur and shame over his whole family, estate and ancestry. 
His only hope was that one day God would let the truth shine through. How many 
                                               
1380 Krabbe, in Aletophilus, p.143. (diurehafven), (Rigs-Canceller). 
1381 Krabbe, in Aletophilus, p.147. Krabbe speaks of a “dyre have” which would mean a zoo in modern 
Danish. 
1382 Krabbe, in Aletophilus, p.148: ”een oprictig Svensk Mand” 
1383 Fabricius (III, p. 31, footnote 3.) pointed out tha  the Danish decree of 1st July 1676 had been 
corrected by the king himself because the original version did not explain to the Scanians that they 
were free from obligation to the Swedes since the Sw des had annulled the loyalty oaths by their own 
misbehaviour. The Danish “pater patriae” as Christian V called himself, also added the piece about the 
happy days that Scania had enjoyed in the olden days under the kings of Denmark. 
1384 Krabbe, in Aletophilus, p.151. 
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times would he have to repeat that he had never ever tried to betray his King and 
Country. On the contrary, Krabbe had always loved his King and wished him well. He 
begged His Excellency the governor general to be so much of a Christian as to realise 
that Krabbe did not care so much about worldly things as to risk ending up in hell. 
Because if he had confessed anything but the truth hat was where he would end up. 
Then he asked Sperling to be allowed to defend himself in court. As a final touch he 
assured Sperling that he had always been assured that His Excellency had favoured 
him with his affection.1385. 
 
On 22nd November 1677, Sperling reported to the king that Kr bbe’s death sentence 
had been pronounced and that the executioner was back in town so that, God willing, 
the execution could take place the following Saturday or Monday.1386 The baron was 
trying to stall the execution by claiming that he wanted to be shot instead of 
decapitated and that in any case he had to order new funeral clothes and a coffin.  
When the final verdict had been read out aloud to Krabbe he declared that the thing 
that perhaps hurt him most and brought tears to his eye  was that he was accused of 
collusion with the snaphaner. That was the most humiliating part of it all for it 
brought the greatest dishoneur and shame over his whole family, (social) estate and 
ancestry.1387 Krabbe’s friend Olluf Rosencrantz proudly declared that people of 
quality did not value anything higher than their honour; in fact it was almost dearer to 
them than their lives.1388 
 
Meanwhile Krabbe’s friends and family tried to pull all strings they could think of. 
Jytte Thott appealed to Sperling ”with sorrow and tears” but there was no way she 
could appease his  ”hatred and bitterness.” To her supplications Sperling promptly 
replied: ”Even if he had had 100 lives he would hadlost them.”1389 On 25th November 
Sperling wrote to the king that Krabbe’s wife had come to him but she had left town 
almost immediately again: “no doubt in order to bother Your Royal Majesty although 
                                               
1385 18th November 1677  
Krabbe’s Petition to Sperling (Skriffvelse Lit K) Krabbe, in Aletophilus, p.154: ”Och saa som Eders 
Excell. altid hafver været mig med all Affection bevaagen...” 
1386 SRA, Generalguvernementet över Skåne, Halland och Blekinge 1677-78. 
1387 Krabbe, in Aletophilus, p.154: ”Och saa som Eders Excell. altid hafver været mig med all Affection 
bevaagen...” 
1388 Rosencrantz (1679), p.38. 
1389 ”...lod sig plußeligen forstaa paa adskilllige städer at om hand haffde 100 Liff skulde hand miste 
dem.” p, 14. 
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I told her frankly that her journey would be in vain.”1390 Then Krabbe composed an 
appeal to the king that was handed over by his wife. In spite of Jytte’s ”sad sighs and 
sorrow” the king made her understand that she was ”locked out from the royal grace 
and favour that she had hoped for.”1391 It seemed as if the Swedes had their minds set 
on a bloody outcome. Towards the end of November a Swedish politician by the 
name of Johan Paulin Olivekranz decided to intercede in Krabbe’s favour. He had 
been friends with Krabbe since his parliamentary days. Paulin Olivekranz felt that it 
was his duty as a Christian to do something.1392 Now Paulin was on his way to the 
Nimwegen conference to confront the Danish ambassador Just Høgh (who was 
Krabbe’s brother-in-law) and the rest of the Danish legation. Krabbe wrote a new 
petition to the king in which he begged that he might be allowed to plead his cause in 
person. Paulin handed over the petition to the kinga d added a letter in which he 
commented that it had never been heard of that an appeal was denied in a capital case. 
It would be the first time that a Swedish king denied such a plea. In case Krabbe was 
denied an appeal the Danish ambassador at the Nimwegen conference, Just Høgh 
(Krabbe’s brother-in-law) would be sorely upset and cause serious trouble for the 
whole Swedish legation. Denying Krabbe an appeal would be the same as “declaring 
him an atheist and blasphemer against God and his sacred sacraments”…and 
according to public opinion he is a good Christian.” The Swedish commentator also 
added that Professor Weitzer had been pardoned although he had openly gone over to 
the Danes. People might think that “His Royal Majesty was only harsh on those who 
owned big estates in the country.”1393The execution was postponed and the king 
declared that he would look the case over again.  
 
Danish spies reported that Krabbe’s and Christopher’s coffins were ready and that 
they should both have been executed a few days earlier but that during the night 
before the execution a messenger from the king had arrived with a reprieve. As gossip 
had it in Malmö (Malmøe) the baron and his bailiff would surely be pardoned or 
                                               
1390 Cronholm, p.205. 
1391 See p. 15: ”..med inderste hiertens Bedröfvelse fornam sig at väre udeluct fra den Kongl. gunst oc 
Naade som hun sig der haffde forventet.” 
1392 Johan Paulin Olivekranz to Hoff Rådh?, 29th November, 1677, Biographica: J.Krabbe, SRA. 
1393 Handlingar till Sweriges historia under K.Carl XI, quoted by Cronholm, p.204. Cronholm believed 
(but was not sure) that it was B.Oxenstjerna who had interceded in Krabbe’s favour.  
 402 
maybe exiled.1394  On 1st December it was reported to the Danish headquarters about 
Niklas Jonsson and Krabbe and of the following words being uttered: “...become 
Swedish? I hope you have not become Danish, give me my money.” Though it is not 
clear who said what or if it was simply gossip. In any case it shows that the quotations 
from Krabbe’s letters and especially the fact that he had said (or not said) “if we 
become Swedish” had become public knowledge. The same report states that a 
drummer had announced that the Thott brothers were summoned to court. If the 
brothers did not turn up their sister Jitter (Krabbe’s wife) would have to pay the 
consequences.1395 
Krabbe prayed that God might protect him against his persecutors: “for they have set 
their minds on ruining me without reason, and they ave prepared a grave for 
me…help me escape these lions’ jaws and let those feel ashamed of themselves who 
are injuring me without reason.”1396  
 
On Boxing Day Krabbe sent a long petition to King Charles but apart from that he 
turned to God in Heaven for salvation and asked if he could have a minister of the 
church help him prepare himself for death. 1397  He was obliged and Wilhelm 
Laurenberg who was a clergyman in Malmö (Malmøe) was sent to him. Krabbe then 
asked for permission to be allowed to go to the city centre to say good-bye to his wife 
who was ill in bed. According to Rosencrantz she was suffering from ”a broken heart 
and bodily weakness” and was so weak that she could not manage to visit her 
”master.” Jens Harboe reported to Copenhagen that ”e wife” was ”mortally ill.”1398 
Krabbe was not granted this favour so he sent Laurenberg in his place and with him 
his testament, addressed to his wife. From this point onwards the baron and the 
baroness started saying farewell through letters and messages. In January the king 
confirmed the death sentence but allowed the widow to inherit what was due to her. 
Krabbe was to be shot on 16th January 1678. According to some historians he was 
                                               
1394 Herman Hermansen’s  depositio  beginning of December 1677, Didrich Hafebundt’s depositio of 
10th December 1677, DRA. 
1395 Depositiones, 1st December 1677, DRA. 
1396 “A Confession  and prayer  that I wrote in my prison in  the castle of Malmøe, and  in  which I 
confessed my sins and  my innocence to God and my confessioner , in  the sad lawsuit  that has been  
brought upon me by  my persecutors,  written on 16th  December  1677”, Bönnebog,  KB. 
1397 p.16. 
1398 Harboe’s reports, January 1678, Indkomne breve, DRA. 
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offered pardon if he confessed that he had committed crimes against “the Swedish 
crown”.1399 
 
On the execution day Krabbe said farewell to the commander of the fortress and to 
Lillehög and Captain Piller and insisted once more on his innocence. He then went to 
mass (presumably in the chapel of the fortress) and kneeled in front of the altar and 
cried out his innocence in the presence of the whole c mmunity (meenigheden). He 
swore to God that he had never corresponded with snaphaner and in no other way 
caused Basch and Klingspor to be imprisoned by them and he had never ever had it in 
his mind or heart or thoughts to try to denigrate His Majesty or the Kingdom of 
Sweden. Then a psalm was sung and the minister preached on the basis of 2. Tim.4: I 
am being sacrificed already and it is time to part, in which Saint Paul complained of 
how everybody had abandoned him when he had to face court charges but that he 
forgave them all. Saint Paul in his turn alluded to Daniel in the lion’s den and of how 
Daniel’s king eventually realised that he was innocent. 
 
 Then it was time for communion and after that the baron greeted the whole 
community and went out of the church and into his carriage in the company of 
Laurenberg and a Swedish clergyman by the name of Nic laus Hambräus. The 
carriage stopped in the middle of the central square where the firing squad was 
waiting. Krabbe discovered that not only the four musketeers who were to shoot him 
had come, but also many of his friends and ”burghers of some standing” from all 
around Scania had come to express their sympathy and say good-bye. Krabbe gave 
them all his hand and said ”Good-night.”1400 He then told Colonel Lillehög to send his 
greetings to Sperling and to ask him to stop the bloodshed . He also wanted Sperling 
to know that he wished that the blood that was to be shed on the carpet (kläde) that 
had been spread out on the pavement must not cry vengeance on anybody.1401 Krabbe 
then went on repeating his innocence to all the people who were present and said that 
he ended his life as a ”good Swedish patriot.” He then read a prayer about going to 
heaven (om et saligt endeligt) that he had composed in prison and sang a psalm. After 
                                               
1399 Johnsson (pp.121-122) quotes Fryxell. 
1400 pp.17-18.   
1401 p, 18: ”...og ynskede at det Blod som hand nu skulde dgyde ey maatte komme länger end paa det 
Kläde som nu dertil var udbridt oc at det ey maatte raabe Heffn offver nogen som til deß Udgydelse 
vare Aarsage.” 
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that he asked the musketeers to shoot at a sign of his hand and so they did. Some days 
later he was buried in the little church at Tosterup (Taastrup) where his elegant silver 
coffin is still to be seen. 
 
After Krabbe’s Death  
Contrary to earlier decisions, Jytte Thott was allowed to keep her husband’s property. 
Unfortunately all their belongings had disappeared by then. Rosencrantz insisted that 
this had been done upon the orders of Sperling and his Swedish officers in spite of the 
fact that the Swedish king had promised the widow that she could keep it.1402 Dorthe 
Rosencrantz also had some of her things at Krageholm (Krogholm) and in a complaint 
to the authorities she claimed that Rutger von Aschenberg and his men had taken 
them.  When Simon Bengtsson arrived on 2nd July 1678 Krageholm (Krogholm) was 
already in a miserable state. He had hurried very much because he was so afraid the 
snaphaner would find out his intentions and ruin Krageholm (Krogholm) even more, 
but he was lucky. He found that “the floors and the ceilings and some tables and old 
chairs are still here, item the palisades, but many other things like the locks etc have 
been taken away from the doors. Nobody is to be seen on the grounds…I enclose a 
letter from Thott who brags about his virtues and I found it in one of the chambers 
here.”1403  
At the end of the war Krageholm (Krogholm) was little more than a burnt out shell. 
Eventually Jytte Thott had to sell out to a Swedish family.1404 Olluf Rosencrantz 
insisted that greed was one of the reasons behind Krabbe’s death and the deportation 
of the nobility. It is difficult not to believe that it did play a certain role. However, 
Högestad (Høgested), a huge country house somewhat to the north-east of Krageholm 
(Krogholm), was restituted to Jytte Thott after thewar and she lived there for several 
years. According to legend she had her room painted black and walled up the 
windows from where Krageholm (Krogholm) could be sen. At night she would go 
out and cry on the hills between the two estates.1405 The letters in the Swedish 
National Archives show that much of Jytte Thott’s time and energies must have gone 
                                               
1402 Aletophilus, p.79. 
1403 Letter from Bengtsson to the governor general, 1678, LA, Lund, quoted by Johnsson, p.160. 
1404 The Törnschiärs? 
1405 Stefan Isaksson. Skånska spöken. Gastar och gengångare i bondesamhällets folktro, (Scanian 
Ghosts. Spirits and Apparitions in the Popular Beliefs of the Agrarian Society.), Kristianstad 2007. See 
p.241 and p.243. 
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to lawsuits because she was in constant conflict with the Swedish authorities over the 
next twenty years. Eventually she lost almost everything she had and spent her last 
days on the farm Baldringe. Krabbe’s prayer-book was h nded over to Jytte Thott 
after his death.  
Jytte’s three brothers were executed in effigy together with a couple of other Scanian 
noblemen who had gone over to the Danes. Their property was confiscated by the 
Swedish authorities and distributed among more faithful subjects. Knud Thott burnt 
his bridges and accepted a position as district governor of Landskrona (Landscrone) 
for the duration of the war. The Danish king had offered him the career opportunities 
that he was excluded from in Sweden. Knud declared that it was the Swedish king 
who had broken the pact between subject and ruler in his case. After the end of the 
war Knud started a long and glorious career that would take him to the pinnacles of 
Danish politics: eventually he was nominated Chancellor of the Realm. Knud’s fight 
for his possessions in Scania was less successful. He was still trying to get the harbour 
of Barsebäck (Barsebæk) back at the beginning of the 18th century.  Throughout his 
career Knud Thott continued to work for the Scanian c use. He was reported to be in 
close touch with Johan Patkul who led the Baltic rebellion against Swedish rule and 
Patkul came to meet him in Copenhagen.1406 Tage Thott was eventually pardoned. In 




 Once the verdict had been given, Krabbe turned to God rather than to the earthly 
powers and he spent his time composing prayers and religious reflections that he 
wrote down in his little prayer book. Even when he once more appealed to the 
Swedish authorities for grace or at least to be allowed to see the king, he appealed to 
them on the basis of his religious worldview. Having confessed his sins both in public 
(in church) and in private he felt that the Swedes should be more ready to accept his 
sincerity and maybe even his excuses. Sperling and Breuer did not appreciate 
Krabbe’s appeal to common religious values and theyought it ridiculous to call God 
to witness all the time as Krabbe did. A Swede who used the same strategy as Krabbe 
was Johan Paulin Olivekranz who tried to intervene in Krabbe’s favour, claiming that 
                                               
1406 Patkul was later crushed on the wheel by the Swedes. 
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it would be a sin not to respect Krabbe’s confessions and excuses. Paulin Olivekranz 
was a sincere Christian himself and on a par with Krabbe he concluded that the jury 
(and implicitly the king) could not be so if they refused to show mercy. Both Krabbe’s 
confession and his execution were very much public ceremonies that should be 
interpreted as the transformation of the main actor of these rituals into a redeemed 
sinner who could go straight to heaven. This was also the case when criminals were 
accompanied by a clergyman to the scaffolds and their ex cution was considered a 
sort of public purification of their souls. In Krabbe’s case he confessed his sins and so 
to speak, tried to take charge of the ritual. By presenting himself at the execution as 
someone who had already cleared his conscience (in public) and felt sincerely contrite 
of his sins, he also transformed into a victim. Like Daniel in the lion’s den and Saint 
Paul in the Roman dungeons he felt that his own purity of spirit, achieved by sincere 
contrition and penance, blackened the actions of his persecutors. Or rather, they did 
that themselves by not opening their souls to compassion and mercy.     
 
Booklets and Pamphlets Regarding the Krabbe Case 
Sperling and His Deduction 
Sperling was on leave when Krabbe was executed. He was Governor General from 1st 
August 1677 until December 1678. Contrary to many other Governor Generals and 
high officials he did not delegate his work to his inferiors and spend his time on his 
estates. Apart from a brief period all documents in the chancellery (kansli) were 
signed by Sperling himself during these years; it was only in January 1678 that 
general major Hans Christoffer Kock von Crimstein took Sperling’s place for a while. 
As Alf Erlandsson stresses, this was exactly the period during which Krabbe was 
executed.1407 Alf Erlandsson does not agree with Fabricius that e ”Krabbe case” 
made Sperling so unpopular in Scania that the king had to send him to another part of 
the reign in stead. However, Sperling did complain to the king about the nasty 
rumours that were spreading about him because of the ”Krabbe case.” According to 
Alf Erlandsson the Swedish king wanted someone a bit more ”experienced and 
powerful” than Sperling to reconstruct the Scanian provinces after the war and so he 
chose Johan Gyllenstierna and gave the region (generalguvernement) of Western 
                                               
1407 Erlandsson, p.103. 
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Norrland to Sperling as a compensation.1408 Almost two years had passed since 
Krabbe was executed by the time Sperling was substit ted by Gyllenstierna who was 
not particularly popular either. The war had been wo  and Scania had to be 
reconstructed by a competent person. That does not mean that the unpopularity that 
Sperling had won himself because of Krabbe did not further diminish his chances of 
being allowed to stay on in the province.  
 
Shortly after Krabbe’s death Sperling issued a “black list”, the decree that included a 
list of the clergymen, public officials and burghers that were to be charged with high 
treason by the special tribunal that had condemned Krabbe, included the clergymen 
Jakob Ernstsen Baden from Herslev, Christen Gjersing from Dalköbing, Niels 
Pedersen Hundorph from Asmundstrup, the sheriffs Peter Klein, Iver Ravn, Mogens 
Haksen, Henrik Persen, Jörgen Hansen Horst and Knudsen Rönnov plus 82 
Helsinborg burghers including mayor Pil/Pihlcrona, Herman Schlyter, Sofie the 
widow of the previous mayor Eggerts, Jeppe and Svend Pil, Herman Schlyter and 
some twenty burghers from other towns.1409  
 
The Swedish king ordered Sperling to write a public explanation of the reasons for 
which Krabbe had to lose his life.1410 Immediately after the execution Sperling wrote 
a so called Deduction of about 30 pages in which he justified his (and indirectly, the 
king’s) actions. Sperling felt so pleased with his little pamphlet that he thought his 
detractors would have to ”eat their own puke” after its publication.1411 But the 
Deduction had only just been published when the king banned it. According to Sthen 
Jacobsen, who was Knud Thott’s dean (at Kågeröd/Kogered) and a Danish spy, the 
pamphlet was banned because ”those who were clear-sighted realised that it would 
give Krabbe’s friends an opportunity to reply and prove his innocence.”1412 Fabricius 
hypothesised that the court records disappeared at the same time as Sperling’s defence 
                                               
1408 Erlandsson, p.104. 
1409 Fabricius, III, pp.145-146.  
1410 In a letter to the king from 14th March 1679 (SRA) Sperling expressly says that he had written on 
the king’s orders. 
1411 Sperling’s Deduction, ”måste dhe sedhan upätha dheras Spyor och således medh Skam och 
Blygzell taga sitt uthkastadhe Gifft till sigh igen.” 
1412 Jacobsen, p.154. About Jacobsen’s activities as a spy, see: Bengt Nordahl, “Kyrkoherden Sthen 
Jacobsen i Kågeröd”, (Reverend Sthen Jacobsen at Kågeröd), in Släkt och Bygd 1997:1, 
http://home.swipnet.se/w-32106/sloff/sobb/97-1/sthen. tm.    
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pamphlet was withdrawn from circulation.1413 Someone had realised that many people 
might interpret what had happened in a very different light. But by then “some copies 
(of the book)…have already been smuggled out from here with extraordinary 
artifice”.1414 
 
In vain had the king tried to win the love and loyalt  of the Scanians for himself and 
the fatherland.1415 They would persist in having a ”loving mind and incl ation, 
obeisance and predilection” for anything Danish. This kind of behaviour spelt treason 
to Sperling. According to him it was not only the nobility but the other estates as well 
who suffered from this illicit love. I think we should respect that statement as long as 
we keep in mind that whatever the gamekeeper’s lad thought ”being a Dane” meant, it 
had different connotations from what a young “roligan” (football fan of the nice kind) 
would think “being a Dane” means today, or at least in part so. Sperling believed that, 
deep down the whole nobility had the same kind of hearts as Krabbe. And his was a 
”completely Danish heart” that had grown ”cold and embittered” towards Sweden. 
Sperling also believed that their true colours had shone through when they refused to 
come to Malmö (Malmøe) three times in a row. That meant that their hearts were 
Danish and that they needed to be protected from the selves in safer surroundings, if 
nothing else for the safety of the realm.  The nobility would be much safer in Sweden 
and the Swedes in Scania would not have to worry about their potential 
unfaithfulness. 1416 Sperling accused the Scanian nobility of endangerin the security 
of the realm.  The Swedish and Danish nations were conceived of as diametrically 
opposed to each other.  This was so because of the ”natural hatred and suspicion” that 
reigned between them. So far both my Danish and Swedish sources agree.1417    
 The gulf between the two ”nations” was experienced as equally great by Sperling 
who claimed that it was impossible to combine the caracteristics of each nation in 
the same person. At least in times of war. Krabbe did not seem to realise that he was 
letting Swedish and Danish characteristics compete inside of him. One just could not 
                                               
1413 See Fabricius III: p.122. The Swedish authorities w re very conscientious at the time (as they still 
are) and it was not common that documents disappeared. 
1414 Letter to the king, 14 March 1679, SRA. 
1415 Sperling’s Deduction, p.8. 
1416 Sperling’s Deduction, p.22: ”att guarantera sigh sielff för wijdare despect och dher aff flytande 
desaventage och Skadha som en sådan continuerligh olydna i längden effter sigh draga kunde...” 
1417 Rosencrantz, (1679), p.36: ”at lide Nød oc tvang hos et Folck hos hvilcket hand for den 
allmindelige begge disse Nationer imellemværende naturlige had oc mißtancke.” 
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do that. An example of the impossibility of combining ”the characteristics of both 
nations” was the way Krabbe had managed to save the Fulltofta (Fulletofte) estate 
from (Danish) confiscation. Krabbe claimed he had done it because he was a ”sincere 
and honest Swede ”who wanted to help another patriot. But the only reason for his 
being able to stop the army from taking it over was that he counted as a Dane and 
therefore Fulltofta (Fulletofte) passed as ”Danish goods.” He had tried to act both like 
good Swede and a native Dane and that combination did ot work, according to 
Sperling.1418 In any case Krabbe had revealed which one was his nation by calling the 
Swedes ”our men” in his letters to Swedes but not i his letters to Danes.1419 The 
Fulltofta (Fulletofte) case illustrates how blurred distinctions between what was 
Swedish and Danish had become. It is clear that no precise guide-lines for what one 
was to call property Swedish or Danish existed. Andit seems as if that was the case 
for people as well. There were general guide-lines, but their validity was not generally 
accepted. 
Sperling claimed that the king had tried to win thelove and loyalty of the Scanians 
both for himself and the Fatherland, but they had all acted like their ”antesignanus” 
Krabbe.1420 Krabbe was besotted with Denmark and had proved himself a ”complete 
Dane.” And his example was inviting others to follow him. If the Scanians were busy 
doing their bit of play-acting so that they would not be suspected by the ”Swedish 
nation” then they had certainly been encouraged by the fact that Krabbe had been 
playing a role all the time.1421   Later Sperling would admit that that Krabbe’s bitter 
end was supposed to constitute a deterrent to the ”evil and disloyal rabble” so that 
terror would force their evil hearts to remember the oaths they had sworn. And on the 
contrary, all just and faithful subjects would be encouraged in their good intentions by 
the punishment of criminals like Krabbe.1422   And they must have experienced it as if 
                                               
1418 Sperling’s Deduction, p.11: ”at bägge Nationerne Swenske och Danske nu för Tijdhen ähre twenne 
sådanne contraria , och som hwar andra è diametro ähre opponerade, och för dhen skuldh bägges 
egenskaper widh dhenne Tijdhernes beskaffenheet ick så lät uthi ett Subjecto kunna concurrera?” For 
Rosencrantz’s comments on the Fulltofta (Fulletofte) case see Aletophilus, p.76. 
1419 In one of his letters he had even written that  his peasants who had been to the Swedish camp 
reported that ”the Swedes are leaving and the way things are going in their camp they will collapse 
from illness.” Letter from Krabbe, addressee unknow, in Sperling’s Deduction, p.30: ”de Svenske vil 
gaa bort oc som de gaa udi Leyeren saa styrte de aff Sygdom.” 
1420 Sperling’s Deduction, p.8. 
1421 Sperling’s Deduction, p.5: ”att han ifrån dhetta bedröfwelige Kriigets begynnelse alt bårth åth har 
burit Kappen på bådhe Axlerne...och ändtligh bådhe ut i Ordh och Gierningar declarerat sigh för 
fullkombligh Dansk.” 
1422 Sperling’s Deduction, p.27: ”dhe som dhenne senare onde och Otrogne Hopn tillhängia af sådhan 
Alfwarsam procedur kunde taga sigh en genomträngande Skräck och dheraf flytande warningh..” 
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Krabbe was the most important obstacle to the plans for the ”highly useful emigration 
of the nobility.”1423 Sperling was not the kind of man who would miss a ch nce if he 
was offered one. And being able to incriminate the leader of the nobility with 
collusion at the precise moment when a leaderless and s pped nobility was most 
needed must have seemed like a gift from heaven.   
A year later, Sperling complained to king that he had been “given the blame and 
declared an unjust, bloodthirsty and money-grabbing man to the four corners of the 
world” when really he had only been following orders all along.1424 He felt that 
Krabbe, the Thotts, Magister Weißer, ans Professor Schwartz and some others were 
unfaithful criminals, delinquents and criminals that d had to be punished. Now Dr 
Schwartz had written a “shameless scriptum” in which he defended Krabbes “illegal 
acts and disloyal procedures”, and the “scriptum” had not only been published at 
home but also abroad! Sperling feared that people in foreign countries might take him 
for the “most unjust, ferocious and sinful man on earth”.1425 
Rosencrantz’s Counter-Pamphlet 
But Professor Schwartz was not the first to try to defend Krabbe. Almost immediately 
after the publication of the Deduction Olluf Rosencrantz wrote a scathing critique of it 
that was published under the title of A truthful REPLIQUE against the false 
Deduction that has been made up in order to cover th  Murderous and Tragic 
Process through which General and Vice-governour Baron Jörgen Sperling 
condemned the Noble and Honourable Baron Jörgen Krabbe on the 16th January 
1678. 1426  
The Replique contained both Sperling’s Deduction and Rosencrantz’s own critique 
and all the most important court records. Rosencrantz had very firm views. He 
accused Sperling of imposing a terror regime and of being a latter-day Caligula. He 
did not bother to try to hide that the Swedish king was behind Sperling’s deeds. He 
also made very clear distinctions between the Danish and Swedish nations that both 
had their innate characteristics. When Scania was taken back in 1676 the Danish king, 
according to the habit of the ”Danish nation”, treaed the Scanian noblemen well from 
                                               
1423 Sperling to the king, GG, SRA. October ?, 1677. 
1424 Sperling to the king, GG, SRA, 14th March 1679. 
1425 Sperling to the king, 14th March 1679, GG, SRA. 
1426 Copenhagen 1678 
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the very first moment.1427 The Danish nation was generous and courteous and treated 
subjugated peoples with rationality and delicacy, especially if they were of noble 
extraction: ”Since all realms and governments ought to be based more upon the good 
will and affection of its subjects than upon constriction and force on the side of the 
authorities.1428  Rosencrantz went on to explain that the Swedes were no different 
from all other nations that had conquered new lands: they did not trust the loyalty of 
the inhabitants.1429 They differed from all other nations in that this ”suspicion and 
mistrust” had become so exaggerated that they decided to send the whole Scanian 
nobility into ”arrest” in Sweden. Instead of trying to reconcile the two nations and 
construct a peaceful future men like Sperling were raising their children to become 
full of venom and hatred of Danes. The Danes on the contrary, raised their children in 
the fear of God and educated them to love of their others, including Swedes.1430 
Rosencrantz was convinced that the Swedes nurtured “National Hatred” against the 
Scanians and that it did not matter what one did, it was enough to be of Danish 
extraction to be condemned as a traitor. The way Olluf Rosencrantz saw it lands and 
provinces were sometimes lost because of the sins of the monarch or the nation and 
that was what had happened to Denmark. The Swedes were committing much worse 
sins than the Danes in that they had not contented themselves with the Lands and 
Kingdoms that God had ascribed to them. Instead of listening to God they had taken 
what rightly belonged to others.1431   
Rosencrantz was fairly open about his critique of the Swedish king. He gave Charles 
XI the whole blame for Krabbe’s untimely death. Sperling was a latter-day Caligula, a 
cruel tyrant who had committed tyrannical murder1432 and ruled through terror and 
persecution; but Sperling was the king’s responsibility. He derided Charles XI by 
                                               
1427 p.68: ”Bärer hand dermed oc först Vidnissbyrd om Hans Kong. Mayss af Danmarck store Naade 
Fromhed oc Mildhed som saa uforskyldt i Naade optog den lange Ophold de aff bestandig Troskab 
imod deris egen Herre oc Konge haffde giort imod den udgangne Kongl. Befalning at indstille sig for 
Hans Kongl.Mayst. Dernest den Danske Nations sädvanlige store Generositet oc Höflighed med 
Fornufft och fiinlighed at begegne undertvungne fremmede Folck som befindis at väre aff Fornemme 
Stand oc Condition. 
1428 Rosencrantz quotes Cicero: Nam pessimus est custos diuturnitatis metus. Cicero.” p.74: 
”Undersaatternis troskab som ellers hos alle Genereus  Nationer med lemfeldighed bör at sögis...”   
1429 See p.7: ”…formedelst den Suspicion oc Defiance som de Svenske lige saa vel som alle andre 
Nationer almindelig bäre om Undersaatternis bestandige Troskab i de Lande som de sig nyligen hafver 
ervorben oc undertungen.”  
1430 See: p.9. Rosencrantz hoped that the ”young Sperlings would not be able to fly so high on their 
poisoned wings that the Danes would not be able to shorten them.” 
1431 See: p.36. 
1432 Rosencrantz (p.11 and p.80) also compared Sperling to Sulla and called him a cruel tyrant who had 
committed tyrannical murder.   
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speaking of his ”fugacious absence or invisible presence” when the Danes 
reconquered Scania.1433 The Swedish monarch of had failed his new subjects. It was  
”the duty of every Christian Potentate in the world who needs good advice and 
viceroys” to ”choose good, pious and righteous men who feared God, loved the truth 
and hated greed...”1434Rosencrantz claimed that the Commissarial Court had been 
instituted at direct orders of the king and that both the king and several councillors of 
the realm had signed the death sentence. When the king signed that document he had 
not only made little of Swedish law but also forgotten his duty towards his 
subjects.1435 Monarchs that rule with harshness and unrighteousness tend to die at an 
early age!1436. I have stressed Rosencrantz’s view on the subject in order to illustrate 
the currents of thoughts that pervaded the circles Krabbe was moving in on the Danish 
side.  
Olluf Rosencrantz also claimed that all Swedish civil servants were suspicious of 
Scanians. Consequently, Krabbe had not been allowed to mbark upon a public 
career. In the case of Krabbe the Swedes had faked ”sincere friendship” and that they 
preferred him to all other Scanian noblemen. But it had all been the matter of 
”dissimulation”. Deep down they loathed Krabbe as much as all other Scanians. The 
simple reason for this hatred was that Krabbe was of Danish origins and that his 
family had been sworn enemies of the Swedish Kingdom. Naturally the outbreak of 
the war in 1675 exacerbated the situation. Native Danes were excluded from service 
during the Scanian war (according to Rosencrantz). It was the Swedes themselves 
who pushed noblemen like the Thotts and Krabbe towards the Danish camp. They had 
had all the best intentions in the world but had found themselves frozen out. Tage 
Thott had first applied to the Royal Lifeguards without luck, and then he volunteered 
to fight in Pomerania but decided not to go in the end (because the pirates blocked the 
sea between Scania and Pomerania). Then he joined the Swedish king and his court in 
Malmöe (Malmøe) but was left behind when they fled to Sweden. Young Tage then 
                                               
1433 Aletophilus, p.71: ”fluctige Undvigelse eller usiunlig Närvärelse”  
1434 Rosencrantz, p.80.  This critique became even clearer in the booklet that he (presumably) wrote in 
defense of the Thott brothers: ”God has given the Authority the sword in order to punish the Evil and to 
defend the innocent; wherefore they in due time will pay their dues to God”, En kort och sandfærdig 
RELATION Imod Den figurerede Executions dom/ som den Svenske General-Leut. Baron Jørgen 
Sperling/ Vice-General Gouverneur udi Malmøe/ Ved en uloflig Commissarial Rettis uretfærdige 
Proces haffver anrettet udi Mallmøe Anno 1678. offver De Vel-ædle oc Velbaarne Knud, Holger, Tage 
Totter. forfattet Til Sagsens opliußning/ oc deris Retfærdige/ Hæderlige Naffns oc Ryctis beskiermelse. 
Alle U-partiske oc sandheds elskende til underretning. Lybeck; Anno 1679, p.3. 
1435 See pp.53-56. 
1436 See p.60. 
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offered his services to governor general Fersen but was told that they were not needed 
because ”ich werde alle Unnützige innerhalb zwey stunde von der Stadt abjagen.” It 
had not escaped Tage’s notice that Fersen was only too willing to accept the services 
of the numerous ”native Swedes” that were flooding into Malmöe during those days. 
1437  It is obvious that these ”native Swedes” feared that he Danes would persecute 
them rather than their Scanian neighbours who stayed in their homes. Fersen’s line of 
thought seems to have been that native Swedes were a whole lot more reliable than 
sworn-in Swedes of Danish origins. In this situation it was one’s birth and not one’s 
oath that mattered. And I believe that this line of thinking was prevalent during the 
Scanian war.1438 
Rosencrantz explained that ”some Swedish high officials who never before had 
trusted the Scanian nation very much were driven to show their true faces during the 
Scanian war and they were looking for an opportunity to reveal and give vent to the 
hatred of the Scanian nobility and all other estate  that they had been hiding in their 
hearts. They started out with the Baron...who was the leader of the Scanians, both the 
nobility and the other estates.”1439 The Swedish officials were persecuting anyone of 
Danish family and extraction and they were burning to ”exterminate and expel the 
whole Scanian nobility from the country.” Sperling was said to thirst for the blood of 
Danes and this thirst was the one and only true reason for Krabbe’s death.1440 
Rosencrantz compared Sperling to Caligula and maintained that his hatred was 
unquenchable and his cruelty towards the ”remaining Scanians of Danish extraction” 
so great that he would have liked to do away with them all in one blow.1441 The 
                                               
1437 Rosencrantz (1679), p.44. ”I will chase all useless people out of this town within two hours.” 
1438 Rosencrantz (p.28) also claimed that native Swedes of different social backgrounds had been called 
to the Danish camp to pay homage to the king just like Krabbe and the Thotts but that none of them had 
ever been accused of treason for this. Only native Danes ended up in trouble for having submitted to 
the will of the Danish king. 
1439 See p.8: ”Anseendis at en deel aff de Svenske Höye beti nter som aldrig tilforen haffde hafft nogen 
ret fortroelighed til de Skaanske nation ved de tidrs oc tilstands conjunctures begyndte at aabne 
maschen oc sögte Leylighed til Aabenbarligen at udgyde sit hadske Sind oc gemytte som de tilforn 
altid hemmelig i Hiertet hafde forborgen imod det Skaanske Ridderskab oc andre Ständer: Oc giorde 
sin förste begyndelse paa den Sl. Baronen som iblant dem alle for sin Alder oc rang blef holdet oc aktet 
den Eldste oc Fornemste oc som general. Leut: Sperling ham i den der om forfattede Apologiske 
Deduction lader Naffngiffve en Antesignanus for alle andre Skaanske Adel oc Indbyggere.” 
1440 See p.12 and p.25: ”det naturlige Had oc Blodgierihed imod alle Danske Affkomst oc Extraction, 
hvilcket alleeniste er den rette Aarsag som dem til saadan et Mord oc Tyrranniske Medfart haffver 
operret.” 
1441 See p.32: ”den Sl.Barons Efftertractere aff et umettelig Had oc Grumhed til de fleeste aff de 
offverbleffne Skaanske Indbyggere aff Danske Biurd oc Extraction gierne skulle ville effterfölge 
Caligulae Exempel, oc intet heller see oc ynske end at de allesammen haffde ickun et Hoffvet oc en 
Halß at de tillige paa engang med en Haand oc med et Hug kunde mordis oc affhuggis.” 
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Swedes were not only after the nobility but sent memb rs of all estates off to 
humiliating executions in their persecution of all native Danes.1442 It was a case of 
what was then called ”national hatred”. It was national hatred that cost Krabbe his life. 
It was also the origin of the terror regime that forced the Scanians to live in daily fear. 
Ultimately it was this innate hatred of Danes that lay behind the deportation of the 
nobility.1443 
Blood Calling for Revenge 
At about the same time Holger Thott wrote another pam hlet in Krabbe’s defence: 
”Blood Calling for Revenge” for the false trial that led to the capital punishment of 
the noble and well-born Baron Jørgen Krabbe.” Fabricius concluded that the author of 
this pamphlet was unknown but that it could not be Olluf Rosencrantz : it diverged 
from Aletophilus on two major points: that of Krabbe’s relations with admiral Tromp 
and that of the lawsuit between Krabbe and Jonsson. C sequently it cannot be 
ascribed to Olluf Rosencrantz. 1444 It actually differs from Aletophilus on many other 
points. The language is less elegant, more influenced by Scanian dialect and the 
rhetoric and terminology more openly pro-Danish. An example of this latter tendency 
is that the author of ”Blood Calling for Revenge” used the term friskytter and not 
snaphaner like Rosencrantz.  It was not Olluf Rosencrantz who wrote “Blood Calling 
for Revenge” but it must have been someone who was very close to Krabbe...at one 
point the author wrote ”we, his brothers-in-law, family and friends” and from that 
passage I believe that one might conclude that it is rather likely that the pamphlet 
might be ascribed to a member of the first mentioned category. Would anyone but a 
brother-in-law mention that category as a separate one from family and friends? 
Possibly, but not likely. A further piece of evidenc  in the same direction is that 
”Blood Calling for Revenge” is to be found in a stack of documents that used to 
belong to Knud Thott, in the Rostgaard collection. I would ascribe this pamphlet to 
one of the Thott brothers. Knud was in Danish custody n Funen during the time of 
                                               
1442 See p.32. 
1443 See p.55 and p.74: ”Undersaatternis troskab som ellers hos alle Genereuse Nationer med 
lemfeldighed bör at sögis...”   
1444 Fabricius III: p.123. 
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Krabbe’s incarceration. Holger and Tage were ”abducted” by the Danes and the 
friskytter towards the end of October.1445   
  
 “Blood Calling for Revenge” was written from an deeply religious point of view: a 
righteous Old Testament God would punish all sinners, whereas Krabbe himself had 
advocated a more lenient New Testament God that did not want innocent blood to be 
avenged. He had already punished the Scanians with the Swedish yoke. But he also 
would punish the Swedish monarch and nation that were responsible of the spilling of 
innocent blood like that of Baron Krabbe unless they repented themselves 
immediately...On this point I believe that Fabricius’s conclusion that the author of 
”Blood Calling for Revenge” was clever enough to presume that the Swedish king 
was innocent should be contestant. Just like Rosencrantz the author accused the 
Swedish monarch in a less than subtle way.  Rosencrantz kept repeating that sooner or 
later someone would have to pay for the evil that had been unleashed on Scania and a 
monarch is always responsible for the sins of his subjects. The difference was that 
Rosencrantz toned down the religious background and s w it more in the light of 
international law and rights. It was would-be tyrannicides rather than the Old 
Testament God that threatened the Swedes and their king. “Blood Calling for 
Revenge” was probably never published.  
Thott’s views agreed almost totally with Rosencrantz’s although he was more 
radically pro-Danish. He had more sympathy for the snaphaner whom he respected 
enough to call friskytter. He had less respect for he Swedes who were worse than 
Turks and heathens. Krabbe had been a “highly privileged Swedish baron under 
Scanian law” who ought to have been entitled to a proper trial according to the law he 
lived under.1446 According to Thott, Krabbe was well aware of the fact that Sperling 
hated everyone who was of Danish extraction. Krabbe had also found out that 
Sperling’s friends in the court circles were threatening those who tried to speak in 
Krabbe’s defence to the king that they would be accused of criminal actions 
themselves. Thott was convinced that Sperling had done everything to prevent Krabbe 
                                               
1445 Sperling mentions a pamphlet by Knud Thott. Maybe Knud was the author then? The notebook in 
which “Blood Calling for Revenge” is written is to be found among Knud Thott’s papers in 
Copenhagen. There are also papers and documents that had belonged to Krabbe, Jytte Thott and other 
relatives. But then the handwriting is very similar to that of Holger Thott… 
1446 See p.59: ”Icke heller maatte hand som en høyprivilegerede svenske Baron effter Skonske Low paa 
caution eller paroll komme ud”... 
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from gaining an audience with the king. He concluded that greed made certain people 
turn into bloodhounds who destroyed honest people’s honour and lives.1447 
According to both Thott and Rosencrantz the Scanians were involuntary Swedish 
subjects who had all the rights in the world to rise against their evil overlords. 
Through war and bloodshed the Swedes had put a humiliating yoke on the shoulders 
of the Scanians. Rosencrantz wished that the Swedes had listened to their conscience 
and returned Scania to Denmark so that further warscould have been avoided.1448 
Krabbe and the people on his lands ”were Swedish since they had been subjected to 
Swedish domination by force of violence.” But the mrcenaries that arrived after the 
Danish invasion considered themselves entitled to loot the estate: ”the soldiers were 
Danish and were there on the lookout for Swedish people and goods.” 1449 Krabbe’s 
ex (?) bailiff Hindrich Peersøn who was now in the service of the Danish king saved 
Krabbe and his people from the German mercenaries that considered them enemies. 
Peersøn had persuaded the mercenaries that non-volutary Swedes were not Swedes 
at all.1450  
 
The author of “Blood Calling for Revenge” felt that Sperling had framed Krabbe for 
two reasons: his hatred of anyone of Danish descent, and greed.1451 Thott kept 
stressing that his brother-in-law Krabbe had been a true Swedish patriot and a 
Swedish baron, but that at the same time he was hated by some because he came from 
a Danish family.  The idea existed that a “Swede” or “Dane” was something that 
depended on who the sovereign was, but so did the idea that one was born a “Dane” 
or “Swede” and that   there was no way one could change that.      
                                               
1447See pp.65-67, quote p.66: ”her vidste oc den Sl.Baron vell att Guberneuren Sperling var ett hadsk 
menniske imod dem som var aff danske famili.e...” 
1448 See p.36 
1449 See p. 55: ”Byerne vare svenske, landsotterne, efftersom de med gevalt var hverffvett og lagtt 
under svensk dominio tillige med Krabben var svensk, dett Mönsterske folck var danske, alt kommen 
att söge svenske folck og godtz som deris  fiender, de vare svenske folck oc godtz mectig.” Technically 
most of the soldiers in the feared Münster regiment were Germans but it seems as if a mercenary 
soldier in the service of a foreign country could be said to be of that nationality,  in the sense of being 
on that side. One of my points is that very often ”being Danish or Swedish” was used in the sense of 
”siding with the Danes or Swedes.” 
1450 The regiment that was posted in the Krogholm area was the so called ”Mönsterske” (from Münster) 
that was widely feared for the ruthlessness of its soldiers. When this regiment were consigned winter 
quarters in Zealand in 1678 the local population was desperate. On one occasion three peasants had 
been shot simply because they tried to oppose the mercenaries of the ”Mönsterske.” And those were 
peasants who could by no means in the world be considered enemies. (Report from a spy in 
Copenhagen, 3rd October, 1678, Sperling’s letters, GG, SRA.) 
1451 “Blood Crying for Vengeance”, pp. 65-66. 
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Krabbe, Rosencrantz and Thott all appealed to common Christian, European and 
universal morals and values.1452 They also appealed to Swedish and Scanian law. The 
way they saw it they clearly belonged to the same moral community as the Swedes 
and the general community of Swedes was part of Christendom and Europe. Breuer 
and Sperling took quite a different view. They did not appeal to common Christian 
values, nor did they want to get mixed up in legal niceties in Swedish and Scanian 
lawbooks, since Krabbe was facing some sort of court-martial, although it was never 
explained to him and his friends exactly what procedur s and criteria that court would 
follow. From the day when Krabbe was ordered not to leave Malmö (Malmøe)  he 
was excluded from the group, or community, that Sperling belonged to; a group that 
had officially included Krabbe for about fifteen years. Krabbe had long felt that he 
was not totally accepted as an in-group member becaus  some people would not 
accept noblemen of Danish descent into their group, b t that was not the dominant 
way of thinking during the inter-war period. But now he was treated as a member of 
an out-group.1453 
 
Among the letters that the snaphaner intercepted from the Swedes there is one from 
May 1678 that a member of the commissarial court called Lars Törnschiär sent to the 
French resident “Ms Le Commissaire Jean Stridbeck a Stockholm”.1454 In it he 
reported that some of the Scanian noblemen had behaved outrageously of late: 
 “Herr Jøren Krabbe betrayed the love that he used to have, in order to save himself, his estate and his 
servants, and for that reason he proved himself somewhat lame in proving the loyalty that he had sworn 
to our most gracious king and that he owed him.  Consequently he had to accept his punishment last 
winter and he was shot in the square here in Malmøe and so he died with the confession that he was an 
honest Swedish man who never had wanted to damage His Royal Majesty.”1455  
 
                                               
1452 One of Thott’s most frequent arguments was that the Swedes acted in a way that would have been 
unthinkable not only to Turks but even to heathens! 
1453 Marcella Ravenna, Carnefici e vittime. Le radici psicologiche della Shoah e delle atrocità sociali,  
Il Mulino, Bologna 2004, pp.12-16, for an overview of the  concepts of in-group and  out-groups. 
1454 Opsnappede breve, Danish National Archives, 28th May 1678. The letter was written by a Dane 
who transcribed Swedish as best as he could. He wrote Törnschiär’s name as Tørneschiør which is 
approximately what it sounds like to a Scanian or Danish ear today too. 
1455 “huadh wår skånske adellsmen wedkommer, så är dät intet uthan, at dhe till en deel hafver 
skammelig illa førsedd sig, H Jøren Krabbe har bedragit dän kärleck han har hafft till att conservera sig 
siælf, sitt godtz och tiænstfålck, och før dän skuldh wist sig något lam uthi dän troohet than har swurit 
wår allernådigste konung och war skylldig præstera. Huorfør han och uthi førleden winter har fådt sitt 
straff, och här på Malmøes tårg är blefwen arcubuseret, män døde därpå och med dän bekännellsen att 
han war en ährlig swensk Man som alldrig har ment ha s Kgl. Mt ille.” 
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Törnschiär also reported that the Thott brothers, Ove Rommell and Hans Walkendorff 
had all behaved “frivolously” and were now to be found in Denmark. For that reason 
they had all been executed in effigy. Two heads had been placed on poles on the 
“Søndre port” (southern entrance to Malmøe) and three on the “Østre port” (the 
eastern entrance). Rommell’s whole body had been impaled across the eastern 
entrance too since he had taken office in the enemy administration and had “done 
them all sorts of favours”. Rommel’s right hand had been quartered in four parts that 
were stuck onto the city wall. Another nobleman, Otte Lindenow, had ended up in the 
hands of the Commissarial Court because he had written a letter to his Danish brother-
in-law, admiral Juel, that “these are such evil times that nobody who is a Jute, sc. born 
Danish, can find an excuse in innocence…they are all judged by the same standards 
so that it is better to be a Danish prisoner than to stay here, if only it could be done by 
legal means…” Lindenow’s letter was intercepted by the Swedes and Lindenow 
himself was arrested. It was for the king to decide what his fate would be.  
 
The Prayer-book 
En Confession og Skriftebön, hwilcken jeg udi mit fengsel paa Malmøe Slot haver sammenskrevit og 
der udi bekient foer Gud og min Skriftefader mine synder og uskyldighed, udi min nu ulyckelige 
paaförde sag, af mine foerfölgere forfattet  
 d 16 Decemb: Ao 16771456 
 
In his prison cell Krabbe composed a little prayer-book in which he wrote down his 
thoughts and reflections. He also wrote prayers and psalms in honour of friends and 
foes. Krabbe thanked the Lord for all the blessings that had been bestowed upon him: 
he had grown up in a noble and strictly religious family. He had been allowed to study 
various subjects in prestigious schools and at foreign universities. He had travelled all 
over Europe and had finally married a virtuous young woman. The subject of the 
annexation of Scania and the change of “nationality” was touched upon by Krabbe in 
his prayer-book. He wrote that he had served His Majesty the king of Denmark in his 
youth and that he had been beloved and honoured by the king and that he always 
would be grateful for that. The king had been gracious enough to give him a good 
position in the Royal Chancellery where he had worked hard for the fatherland until 
the Lord decided that Scania should come under Swedish rule.   Krabbe then declared 
that it had pleased the Lord that Scania should be ced d to the crown of Sweden and 
                                               
1456 Jörgen Krabbe’s prayer-book. 
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he himself become a subject of the King of Sweden. He was grateful for the blessings 
he had obtained   ”here in Sweden” and not the least for the fact that the Swedish king 
had been gracious to a foreigner like him.1457 He had worked hard for ”our country 
and estate” and he stressed that it would be easy for the prosecution to prove this 
through some archival work. It was ridiculous that the Swedes should accuse him of 
treason when he had been ”suspected of and then under arrest under his Royal 
Majesty of Denmark. ” 1458  However, Krabbe never wrote a harsh word against the 
Danish sovereigns. On the contrary, he stressed that he had been offered important 
positions in the Danish administration and his consta t emphasis on this point must 
have grated a little on the ears of the Swedish sovereign.  Now, Krabbe had always 
served the king and the fatherland although God had seen to it that the objects of his 
service had changed. First the fatherland had been D nmark then it was Sweden. 
Krabbe did not comment upon the transition from Denmark to Sweden in a personal 
manner. It had pleased Almighty God that Scania should be ceded to the crown of 
Sweden and he himself become a subject of the King of Sweden. It had all been the 
will of God. Now, Krabbe was convinced that God wanted to punish him for his sins. 
He admitted that he owed God a life but not when or why that had come about. He 
also admitted that he had committed innumerable sins during his travels abroad. If 
God let him out of prison he would fast and remain a virtuous man for the rest of his 
life.   
 
In his prayer-book Krabbe thanked God for the blessings he had obtained ”here in 
Sweden” and not the least for the fact that the Swedish king had been gracious to a 
foreigner like him.1459  After fifteen years, Krabbe still considered himself a foreigner 
in Sweden. He also took it for granted that others saw him as one. Not even the 
nobility of two neighbouring countries like Sweden a d Denmark were so united as 
                                               
1457 ”...saa kand jeg i ligemaade aldrig nocksom fuldtacke min gode Gud og herre for ald sin 
velsignelse og godhed, som hand imod mig her udi Suerrig hafver...bewiist, og synderlig ladet mig faa , 
saa som en fremmed mand udi Suaerrig, störste yndest og Naade for hans Kongl: Mayts, saa og saa for 
hendes Mayts enkedronningens öyne.” 
1458  ”...jeg hafver derhos aldtid hos min allernaadigste herre og konge, og dets höye betiente, taldt wel 
for dette Land og des Indbyggere, og wed alle Rigsda er, Kongl: holdne commissioner og Landdager 
her udi Landet, altid sagt woris Lands og Stands interesse beste og forkofring, som wed Kongl: 
skriftlige resolutioner kand erfaris...” 
1459 ”...saa kand jeg i ligemaade aldrig nocksom fuldtacke min gode Gud og herre for ald sin 
velsignelse og godhed, som hand imod mig her udi Suerrig hafver...bewiist, og synderlig ladet mig faa , 
saa som en fremmed mand udi Suaerrig, störste yndest og Naade for hans Kongl: Mayts, saa og saa for 
hendes Mayts enkedronningens öyne.” 
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not to treat foreigners in a special way. A fact that indicates the difference between 
noblemen from the two countries was that in the 1680s the Swedish nobility was 
much annoyed with the members of the Scanian élite who insisted on following the 
Danish fashion and using Danish manners in Stockholm.1460 So we have seen that 
Krabbe hinted that one had to be grateful for the littl  signs of favour that one 
received; for after all, one was only a foreigner. He knew very well that many of the 
Swedish potentates were of foreign origins. Perhaps e also noted that on a lower 
level, the Swedish authorities employed all kinds of nationalities in the 
administration. Native Swedes had precedence but plen y of Germans, Dutchmen, 
Poles and other countrymen found good positions. Not Danes though.   
  
A frequent theme of the prayer-book was the snaphaner, regarding which Krabbe 
expressed his position in the following terms: 
 ” I have not had anything to do with those false rascals the snaphaner during this war, on the contrary 
have I suffered great damage and offence by them and I have had to live in greatest danger under their 
continuous threats, which you dear God and the whole neighbourhood know...”1461   
 
Krabbe was at great pains to make the Swedish authorities understand that the 
snaphaner considered him an enemy. Unfortunately he could not deny having had 
employees who had ”been with the snaphaner”, but he insisted on having reported all 
that he knew to the Swedish authorities.  Krabbe had to admit that he had known that 
some of his men had been present on the scene of thkidnapping but that they had 
told him that they had been forced to come along. I any case he would not have 
dared take his men into custody because of the ”continuous presence and evil doings 
of the snaphaner on my lands.” No other nobleman had been dealt with so harshly by 
the snaphaner.  
 
Krabbe knew (and hoped?) that chances were that the Swedish authorities would read 
the Prayer-book. He was writing it in a prison cell in a town under Swedish rule. 
Everything that left the prison could only be expected to be subjected to censure.  No 
one can tell what his prayers would have sounded like if he had written them in 
                                               
1460 Fabricius, I, p.69. 
1461 This passage comes from the prayer-book but might just as well be taken from Krabbe’s court 
insertions. (no pagination)”...”...ej heller hafver jeg haft noget at bestille udi denn  Kriigstiid med disse 
skelmske snaphaniske Parthier, mens liid störste for raed og viderverdighed af dennem, og levet udi 
störste fare for deris continuerlige trussler, hwilcket du gode Gud of heele Landet omkring hos mig er 
bewist..” 
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Denmark. It is obvious that Krabbe was more cautious in the Prayer-book than in his 
letters. Krabbe’s letters were not written with an eye to the Swedish authorities. It is 
worth noting, though, that Krabbe wrote the Prayer-book in Danish whereas he 
always addressed Swedes in his best Swedish. In hisletters he wrote in Danish to 
Danes and in Swedish to Swedes. 
 
Krabbe and the King 
Krabbe denied having spoken ill of the Swedish king but not having said that he could 
not pay two armies at the same time. On several occasions Krabbe had been 
overheard saying: ”Let them take everything away so that there will be an end to it, 
when this is up there’s nothing more for them to take.”1462 And of course, he had 
written to his friend Hack Søfrensen that he did not care about the baronetcy at all.1463 
To the commissarial court and eventually to the king himself this was enough to 
constitute the first and foremost charge against Krabbe, namely that of having showed 
”very little respect for His Majesty” and of a ”desire not to pay his war-
contributions.”1464 Naturally Krabbe insisted that he owed the Swedish k ng his ”life, 
property and honour” for the honours that he had bestowed upon him, especially the 
baronetcy. 1465   
 
And yet it is hard not to interpret his words as those of a man who had lost faith. He 
seemed frustrated and he seemed to have thought that the Swedish king should have 
tried to put up a fight. Which was almost the same as saying that the king’s courage 
was not all in the right place. A man who implied that the King was a coward must 
have been desperate indeed. Nevertheless it was an ide  that circulated at the time. 
Olluf Rosencrantz derided the king by speaking of his ”fugacious absence or invisible 
presence” when the Danes reconquered Scania.1466 He was accusing the Swedish 
monarch of having failed his new subjects and of cowardice. The difference was that 
                                               
1462 Breuer’s second instance, 15th October, in Aletophilus, p.58. ”lad dennem tage alt sammen bort, 
saa er der Ende paa, naar det er oppe, saa kunde de int t meere tage..” Krabbe’s Second Statement, 
p.95. A figment of Basch’s imagination according to Krabbe. 
1463 Krabbe to Søffrensøn, January 27, 1676: ”I came back from the king some days ago, I received a 
gracious reply to all that I wanted....against my will I had to accept the title of baron and other great 
Royal promises...” 
1464 Verdict of November 6, 1677, Sperling’s letters, GG, SRA. 
1465 p.99: ”mand haffver intet meere for all sin Umage her i denne syndige Verden end et Erligt Nafn...” 
1466 Aletophilus, p.71: ”fluctige Undvigelse eller usiunlig Närvärelse”  
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Krabbe just might have said something in the heat of the moment whereas 
Rosencrantz was philosophising in safety on the othr side of the Sound.  
Rosencrantz was fairly open about his critique of the Swedish king. He claimed that it 
was ”the duty of every Christian Potentate in the world who needs good advice and 
viceroys” to ”choose good, pious and righteous men who feared God, loved the truth 
and hated greed...”1467  By that time Rosencrantz had already accused Sperling of 
greed, lies and blasphemy so what he was really saying was that the king of Sweden 
was not doing his duty. 1468 The accusations became even more overt when 
Rosencrantz claimed that the Commissarial Court had been instituted at direct orders 
of the king and that both the king and several counillors of the realm (rigs raad) had 
signed the death sentence. When the king signed that ocument he had not only made 
little of Swedish law but also forgotten his duty towards his subjects.1469 Rosencrantz 
then concluded that monarchs that rule with harshnes and unrighteousness tend to die 
at an early age.1470 To me it is obvious that Rosencrantz gave Charles XI the whole 
blame for Krabbe’s untimely death. He saw Sperling as a latter-day Caligula1471 who 
only knew how to rule through terror and persecution; but Sperling was the king’s 
responsibility.  
 
I doubt whether it will ever become possible to understand what Krabbe really 
thought of  Charles XI. I have stressed Rosencrantz’s view on the subject in order to 
illustrate the currents of thoughts that pervaded the circles Krabbe was moving (in on 
the Danish side). However, there can be no doubts as to whether Krabbe was 
frustrated or not. It is enough to take a look at his petitions to the king and the 
riksdrots from the inter war years to realise that he felt that the Swedish king had not 
fulfilled his promises. In 1673 he complained that e was now over forty and had 
wasted away twelve years in the countryside without an ”employe.”   Perhaps the 
                                               
1467 See p.80. 
1468 This critique became even clearer in the booklet tha  he (presumably) wrote in defence of the Thott 
brothers: ”God has given the Authority the sword in order to punish the Evil and to defend the 
innocent; wherefore they in due time will pay their dues to God”, En kort och sandfærdig RELATION 
Imod Den figurerede Executions dom/ som den Svenske Gen ral-Leut. Baron Jørgen Sperling/ Vice-
General Gouverneur udi Malmøe/ Ved en uloflig Commissarial Rettis uretfærdige Proces haffver 
anrettet udi Mallmøe Anno 1678. offver De Vel-ædle oc Velbaarne Knud, Holger, Tage Totter. forfattet 
Til Sagsens opliußning/ oc deris Retfærdige/ Hæderlige Naffns oc Ryctis beskiermelse. Alle U-partiske 
oc sandheds elskende til underretning. Lybeck; Anno 1679, p.3. 
1469 See pp.53-56. 
1470 See p.60. 
1471 Rosencrantz (p.11 and p.80) also compared Sperling to Sulla and called him a cruel tyrant who had 
committed tyrannical murder.   
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baron felt that foreigners did not quite have the same chances as native Swedes. After 
all, that was the way things worked in Denmark too.1472  In his prayer-book he 
thanked God for the blessings he had obtained ”here in Sweden” and not the least for 
the fact that the Swedish king had been gracious to a foreigner like him.1473  Krabbe 
seems to have considered himself as a foreigner in Sweden and that that was the way 
he was seen by others. Naturally Krabbe was writing about Parliamentary circles and 
the court; which implies that not even the nobility of two neighbouring countries like 
Sweden and Denmark was so united as not to treat foreigners in a special way. A fact 
that indicates the difference between noblemen from the two countries was that in the 
1680s the Swedish nobility was much annoyed with the members of the Scanian élite 
who insisted on following the Danish fashion and using Danish manners in 
Stockholm.1474 So we have seen that Krabbe hinted that one had to be grateful for the 
little signs of favour that one received; for after all, one was only a foreigner. He 
knew very well that many of the Swedish potentates w re actually of foreign origins. 
Perhaps he also noted that on a lower level, the Swedish authorities employed all 
kinds of nationalities in the administration. Native Swedes had precedence but plenty 
of Germans, Dutchmen, Poles and other countrymen fou d good positions. Not Danes 
though. According to Olluf Rosencrantz this was also the reason why Krabbe had not 
been able to embark upon a public career in Sweden; he claimed that all Swedish civil 
servants were suspicious of Scanians. It had all been the matter of ”dissimulation”. 
Deep down they loathed Krabbe as much as they hated all other Scanians. The simple 
reason for this hatred was that Krabbe was of Danish origins and that his family had 
been sworn enemies of the Swedish Kingdom. Naturally the outbreak of the war in 
1675 exacerbated the situation. 
 
Conclusion of Part II: Was Krabbe guilty?  
Was Krabbe guilty then?  Were the Swedes right in executing him? Had he 
“collaborated with the Danes a little” as the present day lord of the manor put it the 
last time I went on a guided tour of modern day Krageholm? Those are questions that 
                                               
1472 Lind, pp.98-100. The normal order of preference was: n tive noblemen, other natives, foreign 
noblemen, other foreigners. 
1473 ”...saa kand jeg i ligemaade aldrig nocksom fuldtacke min gode Gud og herre for ald sin 
velsignelse og godhed, som hand imod mig her udi Suerrig hafver...bewiist, og synderlig ladet mig faa , 
saa som en fremmed mand udi Suaerrig, störste yndest og Naade for hans Kongl: Mayts, saa og saa for 
hendes Mayts enkedronningens öyne.” 
1474 Fabricius, I, p.69. 
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have been asked over and over again all since Krabbe’s own day. There are no simple 
answers. Asking if Krabbe was guilty is like asking whether the Swedes were right in 
taking Scania from Denmark. Both Thott and Rosencrantz saw the Scanians as 
involuntary Swedish subjects who had all the rights in the world to rise against their 
evil overlords. Krabbe and the other Scanians ”were Sw dish since they had been 
subjected to Swedish domination by force of violence.” Through war and bloodshed 
the Swedes had put a humiliating yoke on the shoulders of the Scanians. The Swedes 
had sinned against God even if worldly laws maintained that conquerors could keep 
their prey. Rosencrantz wished that the Swedes had listened to their conscience and 
returned Scania to Denmark so that further wars could have been avoided.1475 The 
Scanians had pledged loyalty to the Swedish king because they had to, but an oath 
always implied a mutual agreement.  When the Swedish sovereign failed them 
through his “fugacious absence” in 1676, they were fre from any kind of obligations 
to Sweden.1476  Knud Thott wrote to Sperling that both the laws of G d and of nature 
entitled a ”subject” to liberate himself of his oath and duty if his lord and liege had 
declared him an enemy.1477 According to this line of thinking the Swedes did not have 
anything to do in Scania and Krabbe was not guilty because you cannot commit 
treason against a sovereign or nation that has dissolved its pact with you. It could also 
be questioned whether a pact that had been imposed “by force of violence” had ever 
had any validity at all. Maybe in the eyes of European power politics but not in the 
eyes of God. Krabbe still declared himself a Swedish patriot when he was about to be 
executed. In the same manner, Tage Thott called himself a Swedish patriot in May 
1678 when he had already been executed in effigy.1478 The accusations against the 
Swedish king (and nation?) are implicit in these statements. Krabbe and Tage Thott 
had both done everything they could to stay true to the oath they had sworn. They had 
not stopped being Swedish patriots. The Swedes had precluded them from that 
category. From a Danish point of view Krabbe was not guilty, although the six points 
of the final verdict spoke the truth. 
                                               
1475 p.36 
1476 Knud Thott declared so in a letter to the Swedish King, See:Aletophilus’s pamphlet in defense of 
the Thotts. 
1477 Knud Tott to Sperling, 19th May, 1678, in Rosencrantz (1678), p.21. 
1478 Tage Tott to Sperling, 19th May, 1678, in Rosencrantz (1679), p.60. Knud Thott on he contrary, 
considered himself free from all bonds to the Swedish king and crown from the day his execution (in 
effigy) was confirmed. 
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Nevertheless, the Swedes could claim that Krabbe was guilty. It was a claim that was 
contestant and doubted of, not the least at the Nimwegen conference, but it was 
acceptable. Krabbe could have taken his escape to Sweden like the neighbouring 
estate owners of Swedish origins. Nobody forced him to stay in Scania to try to save 
his lands and his tenant-farmers. Officially the Swedish king had not betrayed his 
Scanian subjects by leaving the whole country prey to the Danes. In the official 
version there was no “fugacious absence”. Consequently, the Swedish king had not 
broken the pact first. Or at least, that was what he wanted the world to believe. The 
version that was offered the public was that Sweden had retrieved its lost Scanian 
provinces and that the evil-minded inhabitants of th se provinces had risen against 
their righteous lord and king. 
Harboe’s report to Meijer makes quite clear that Krabbe had chosen Denmark. At that 
moment in time there were two options for the nobility from the Ystad (Ysted) area: 
either they went to Sweden where most of them would be interned in a camp at 
Vimmerby just across the border, or they could try to escape to the other side. Both 
options were highly insecure. They had nothing in Sweden. As most of them would 
find out, conditions in the camp were not all too favourable and not all of them would 
get out from there.1479 Massive troops were needed to be “abducted” from Swedish 
territory. An outright escape meant that chances of being pardoned became 
infinitesimal. But the Danish king promised them that those who lost their lands in 
Scania would be compensated (in case of a Danish defeat). He also offered excellent 
positions to Scanian noblemen who were willing to take the full step and declare 
themselves pro-Danish. The Thotts and the Krabbes were anti-absolutists but they had 
always revered the bond between sovereign and subject. They had always been highly 
estimated by the Danish kings. Forced exile meant dishonour and shame. Denmark 
meant physical safety and, perhaps, the professional opportunities that they had 
always dreamt of. In that particular situation Krabbe had chosen to side with the 
Danes. If possible, he would like to keep it a secret from the Swedes because it would 
increase his chances of gaining amnesty after the war and it would save his relatives 
in Scania from trouble. It was very much the matter of practical considerations, just 
like when Iffuer Krabbe divided his lands between the wo sides of the Sound after 
                                               
1479 See:II Till Skånes historia under öfvergångstiden 1658-1710, Skånska kriget och snapphanefejden 
5, 1-2, https://www.ra.se/lla/dokument/ 
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the cession of the Scanian provinces. “What are our chances of survival?” is the 
ultimate question that one is likely to ask in a situation of chaos and war.  
Politically, it was important to break the backbone of the Scanian resistance. Charles 
XI wanted to get rid of the baron who was looked up to by so many people. In his 
reports to the king from September 1677 Sperling seemed overjoyed that they might 
be able to bring charges against Krabbe.1480 The king and Sperling knew they had to 
build up a case and that they were risking their ”image” among the people. Most of 
Sperling’s reports from late September until Christmas 1677 express a desire to get 
the ”business” over and done with as soon as possible. In 1677 the snaphaner 
constituted a major problem in the Scanian provinces. The estates were considered 
“snaphane-nests”. If their inhabitants were sent off into exile or died the mansions and 
castles could be used as army bases from where the snaphaner could be fought on 
their own ground. So why was it so important to get Krabbe’s neck? The Swedes 
wanted to use Krageholm (Krogholm) as a fortress but Häckeberga, Svaneholm, 
Näsbyholm, Glimmingehus, Tunbyholm and Sövdeborg were occupied at the same 
time and their proprietors did not have to die. The Swedes could appropriate 
themselves of  Danish property without trouble anywa . I believe that part of the 
answer lay in the fact that Krabbe was considered th  ”antesignanus” not only of the 
nobility, but of all Scanians. It was commonly held that important personages like 
Krabbe and Countess Parsberg influenced ordinary people’s views. This attitude also 
regarded officials and clergymen who were seen as carriers of evil influence. Good 
Swedes were needed for such important posts. In times of peace one could try to drive 
people of the sort into exile. In times of war, one might have to statute examples.  
The strongest argument in Rosencrantz’s and Thott’s writings is that all Scanians 
were involuntary Swedish subjects. The Swedes had imposed a humiliating yoke (an 
image that appear again and again in Danish rhetoric fr m way back then) on their 
shoulders and they had all the rights in the world to free themselves of that yoke. 
Rosencrantz wished that the Swedes had listened to their conscience enough to return 
Scania to Denmark: so much violence could have beenavoided in that manner and the 
Swedes would have saved their sinful souls.1481 Krabbe would never have ended up in 
trouble if the Swedes had feared God. The Danish hitorian Hanne Sanders who 
                                               
1480 Naturally it might have been a question of personal a tagonism. Sperling and Krabbe went a long 
way back. They had worked together in the Swedish diet in the 1660s. It is not unlikely that some kind 
of ill will could be traced back to those days, butthe king was pressing on too. 
1481 En sandfærdig replique, p.36. 
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works in Lund has commented that God (and his relation to humanity) was 
fundamental to one’s “national” identity at the time.1482 To traditional nationalists it is 
the relation to the nation that is fundamental to one’s identity. The last words that 
Krabbe uttered before he died was not that he was a Swedish patriot. It was “Lord 
Jesus receive my soul”.1483 It was the heavenly and not the worldly powers that e 
baron called out to. 
  
Conclusion of This Thesis 
“War does not occur in a vacuum”  
   Joanna Bourke1484 
 
During a war people enter a normality that is far from normal. What has until then 
been unthinkable or horrifying becomes the order of the day. Military agents take on 
an exceptional role and so do sometimes people who,in a different situation, would 
be called criminals. After a war it is difficult toleave that state of absurd 
normality.1485 On a practical level the war torn country has to be rebuilt and 
restructured because both buildings and social structures do get razed to the ground in 
a war. Time has been interrupted and when it is never asy to get it going again. The 
more profound the rift between before and after, the harder it becomes. Once time has 
begun again shattered structures take on new forms and people have to try create 
something like a “normal normality” again. The inherent difficulty in recreating a 
world that has been lost is what can make a comparatively short war so consequential. 
The period of “absurd normality” remains an interruption of time, a black hole that 
influences the conception of whatever takes place afterwards and consequently 
influences the restructuring of a new “normal” world. That is why a long inter-war or 
post-war period might seem of minor importance compared to a comparatively short 
war.    
                                               
 1482 Hanne Sanders, “Religiøst eller nationalt verdensbillede? Skåne efter overgangen til Sverige i 
1658” (A Religious or a national view of the world?Scania after the transition to Sweden in 1658), 
s.231-252 in Mellem Gud og djævelen. Religiøse og magiske verdensbilleder i Norden 1500-1800, ed. 
Hanne Sanders , 2001. See pp. 251-252. 
1483 Fabricius III, p.135. When Krabbe had already been shot and had fallen halfway off the chair he 
exlaimed: ”Herre Jesu anname min ånd.” 
1484 Joanna Bourke, ”Barbarisation vs Civilisation in Time of War”, pp.19-28 in The Barbarisation of 
Warfare, George Kassimeris (ed.), New York University Press 2006. Quote p.24. 
1485 The background to these conclusion is Håkan Gunneriusson’s presentation of his research at the 
Swedish Military Academy Försvarshögskolan on warfare at the Swedish national historians’ 
conference at Lund University, 25th April 2008.    
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In the modern world war zones are often pacified according to strategies that could 
very well be applied to the Scanian war. In a situation of chaos like that in Scania or 
in Bosnia in more recent times it is usually a question of monopolising, or trying to 
monopolise, violence. At one end of the spectre there is a group of people who do 
politics through parliamentarian methods. At the other end we find the people who do 
politics with guns. Violence is and always has been an efficient way of doing politics 
and when the structures of the “normal” state start crumbling, much more space is left 
for violent politics. In a war zone, where politics are done with bombs and guns, any 
kind of pacifying force should focus on the primary military actors, but what is most 
important is to interrupt or redirect the war time structures and any informal 
economies that might have arisen during the war.1486 The aim of the “pacifying” force 
is usually to make the objects of their efforts choose second best. It should be noted 
that a “pacifying force” in this context might mean  international force that is sent 
in order to try to create peace between two or more warring parties, but it might also 
mean one of two warring parties. The aim is to try to make the enemy abstain from its 
ultimate goal. Most enemies are not particularly keen on renouncing on what they 
have dreamed of and fought for, but the “pacifying force” should then try to change 
the structure of the social field so that what was second best becomes the best option, 
and the objects of the pacifying mission/the enemy should be persuaded that that is 
the case. A war-time social field changes rapidly, the parameters of power, prestige 
and know-how are in constant flux and it is the task of the intelligence service of the 
“pacifying force” to identify the social field, which is much the same as identifying 
the main actors in it. Identification and control of the social field allows the pacifying 
force to take the situation in its hand and to get into a position to offer “carrots” in the 
form of second best options. Logically enough, “carrots” can only be assumed to 
interest enemies with a political agenda. In any war zone there will always be groups 
that have no other goal than smuggling, plundering or other shady pursuits that lead to 
personal gratification but nothing else. Some groups create legitimacy for plundering 
through claims of doing so for queen and country or some other idealistic cause. It is 
the aim of the “pacifying force” to destroy these groups. Physically so if necessary. 
Groups have a political agenda but will not let thems lves be persuaded to a second 
                                               
1486 Gunneriussons’s analyses are based on Pierre Bordieu’s theories. 
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best option are, according to Bordieu’s and Gunnerius’s theories, to be blocked out 
from the field, whatever that means. During the Scanian War the land was plunged 
into a situation where the state no longer existed except in a few barricaded enclaves. 
The social field was dominated by warring parties of dubitable authority. Be they 
Danish or Swedish regular soldiers, Danish irregular troops (friskytter), snaphaner of 
various kinds, or Swedish snaphane catchers and carpetb ggers, it was far from 
obvious who the righteous lord of the land was and who had the right to claim the 
power of authority.  The Swedish policy in Scania followed the categories that 
Gunnerius have analysed. The main aim of the Swedish “pacifying” troops was to 
make the enemy abstain from violence without having attained their ultimate goal 
(Danish supremacy). Through identification of the actors on the local social field the 
snaphaner/friskytter were singled out and tamed with promises of acceptable second 
bests (amnesty, a safe future in this life and paradise in the next).Those who were 
deemed to have been acting for personal gratification were destroyed. However, the 
weaknesses in this system also become evident in the case of the Swedish policy 
during and just after the Scanian War. It is next to impossible to judge who is sincere 
in their wishes to fight for queen and country or the fatherland. It is but too easy to 
impute that someone is not sincere in these wishes, or that all those who are born in a 
certain area cannot be sincere in these wishes since they have not realised who their 
true queen/king and country are and that consequently all pretences of patriotic 
fighting is only an excuse for crime. The Swedes systematically classified groups that 
were not primarily fighting for personal gratification as criminals, in order to free the 
field from their presence and to deter others from support of once primary goals. 
 
Richard Clutterbuck points out that invasions and subjugations of one people by 
another belong to the order of the day of history. And very often guerrilla resistance 
against the foreign invaders could (at least with the passing of time) just as well be 
seen as resistance against indigenous government: th  English came to regard Scottish 
and Welsh guerrilla warriors as rebellious subjects, while the English (or the Saxons 
as the Welsh still call them) were certainly still seen as foreign invaders by the Scots 
and Welsh. 1487 In the same manner the Swedes felt they had a right to consider the 
snaphaner as rebellious subjects, traitors and criminals but those who were branded as 
                                               
1487 Clutterbuck, p.24. 
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“snaphaner” by the Swedes and actually participated in some kind of resistance felt 
that they were fighting a foreign invader, and they were supported in this belief by the 
Danish authorities. Far from being a particular case, the snaphaner were in this sense 
quite typical and so was the Swedish crackdown on them: guerrilla movements almost 
invariably get deemed illegitimate by the government they are opposing and all those 
who support the guerrillas tend to get treated as criminals. Throughout history this has 
been the case innumerable times.1488 Another classical aspect of guerrilla warfare that
can easily be applied to the situation in Scania 1676-79 is the fact that guerrilla 
movements normally incorporate an element of “terrorism.” Exactly because it is so 
extremely dangerous to support guerrillas, these usually see themselves constrained to 
resort to terror in order to survive, even in cases where popular support is widespread. 
If the local population is not in fear of them it tends to get too difficult to find hiding 
places and provisions, and more people are not afraid of supporting the government. 
1489 To be able to function, guerrilla movements need to act in areas where public 
opinion is at least not hostile and where they can be sure that those who give them 
refuge and/or food will not be reported to the authori ies. Terror will often be needed 
in order to deter government supporters from reporting those who give shelter to 
guerrillas.1490    
 
Another parallel to the Scanian War could be drawn through a study of  the initial 
phases of the American War of Independence 1775-1783 when the British under 
General Sir Henry Clinton followed what Richard Clutterbuck has characterised as 
“an enlightened policy to attract people to the willing support of ‘law and order’ with 
considerable success; he encouraged rebel soldiers to defect by a generous system of 
granting parole on an undertaking that they would not take up arms against the 
British”. Sir Henry’s strategy was so successful that t e rebellion in the southern 
states was practically at an end and he handed over responsibility to Lord Cornwallis 
and moved the headquarters to New York. Cornwallis chose not to continue Clinton’s 
“soft” policy. Guerrilla movements grew and so did popular support for them. 
                                               
1488 Clutterbuck, p.20. 
1489 See: Clutterbuck, p.20: ”Thus, whatever the true sympathies of the majority of the population, the 
proportion prepared to take the risk of supporting he guerrillas will usually only be a small minority 
so, to survive at all, the guerrillas will have to put the population at large in sufficient fear to induce an 
adequate proportion to support them and to deter the emainder from supporting the government – in 
other words, to impose an element of terror.” 
1490 Clutterbuck, p.26. 
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Guerrilla actions provoked reprisals, which in its turn, increased support among the 
local inhabitants. By 1781 the situation was completely changed and Cornwallis was 
besieged and defeated at Yorktown by a combination of regular American troops and 
guerrillas.1491 In that war, repression made resistance explode. Th  local population 
was outraged and support for the rebels multiplied, whereas Clinton’s parole system 
had managed to disarm large numbers of rebels and to maintain people’s trust in ‘the 
law’. The same game of  alternating ‘carrots’ with the whip was played by the Swedes 
in Scania during their attempts at making the Scanians submit to Swedish law and 
order, with equally varying results. At the time of the conflict, Sthen Jacobsen 
identified the increasingly harsh reprisals around the end of 1677 and the beginning of 
1678 as the spark that lit the spark that caused th fiercer part of the snaphane 
rebellion.1492 Fealty pledging campaigns and general parole offers had the opposite 
effect. As did the rest of the “gentler” approach that won out in the long run. 1493  
 
It should be remembered that in most wars the majority f the population have no 
desire whatsoever to get involved in a war. When faced by a gun most people 
conform to the dictates of any kind of regime. Richard Clutterbuck assesses the 
average of people who are prepared to risk their lives for either guerrillas or the 
government in most conflicts to approximately one per cent, whereas another ten per 
cent or so might be persuaded by activists on either sid  to participate. The vast 
majority or around 80% try to stay clear of the conflict and do so as long as 
possible.1494 In this sense the Scanian War and the Snaphane Feud were no exceptions 
to the rule. Nor was it so when it came to the importance of maintaining or reducing 
popular support, depending on which side you were on. According to Clutterbuck a 
pattern can be traced in the way guerrilla warfare has been countered by governments 
throughout the ages: up until the Enlightenment might was the only means of 
punishing insurgents, and as often as not punishment ant not only death but also 
torture. From the Enlightenment onwards a more lenient attitude towards rebels took 
                                               
1491 Clutterbuck, p.27. 
1492 Jacobsen, p. 89. 
1493 Cf. Jens Christian Vesterskov Johansen’s recent article on the Swedification (Vesterskov Johansen 
2008, pp.39-42) in which he claims that the Swedish aut orities eventually managed to persuade the 
Scanians that the new regime was preferable to the ld one through the lenient introduction of the new 
legal system and law. In his presentation of the article at the meeting of the Historical Association of 
the Diocese of Lund on 25th April 2008 Vesterskov Johansen declared “the carrot” as the ultimately 
winning weapon in the Swedification process. 
1494 Clutterbuck, p.25. 
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the upper hand as governments began to realise that “the most important battle in 
guerrilla warfare was the battle for the support of the people”.1495 The Swedish 
military historian Gunnar Åselius stresses much the same point in his claim that 
“guerrilla wars are won through the conquest of the trust of the people”.1496 It is 
important for the government to manage to transmit the message that they (the 
government) stand for law and order. In a situation like the one during the Scanian 
War when two governments were transmitting the same claim the question of trust 
became even more complicated. It should also be pointed out that Clutterbuck’s 
timeline is not quite correct. The authorities were well aware how important to win 
over the population to their side during the Scanian War and that was before the 
Enlightenment. The authorities today tend to crack down on popular insurgents quite 
violently. The situation in Iraq and the treatment of prisoners in the Abu Ghraib 
prison is an example of very traditional treatment of guerrillas.1497 Maybe the 
alternation between gentle persuasion and sheer might should be seen as parallel 
traditions that can be resorted to in different situations instead of as a linear 
development.  
 
Consequently, the snaphaner/friskytter were far from as unique or as exclusively 
Scandinavian as most Swedish historians would like to think. The European 
dimension is essential. I believe that the snaphane movement developed out of the 
troops that were raised in every parish, in part because Scandinavian peasants had 
always defended their homes with arms, in part as a re ult of the defensio patriae 
movement. In their turn, the friskytter were a professionalised version of the 
snaphaner and the peasant troops. “Professionalised” because they were very much 
the works of the Army Board and constituted its maybe most important tool during 
the Scanian War.  Naturally the men that conducted th  Scanian War did not get the 
idea of turning their snaphaner and peasant troops into Friskytte troops from out of the 
blue. It was part of the general trend that rendere th  massive Absolutist armies 
dependent on swift irregular contingents. In the 20th century startling progress in 
arms and communications technologies undoubtedly changed the face of guerrilla 
                                               
1495 Clutterbuck, p.25. Clutterbuck also informs us of Mao Tse-Tung’s wise saying that the guerrilla is 
the fish and the people are the sea. 
1496 Quote from a presentation on “War, Culture and Economy 1700-2000” at the Swedish national 
historians’ conference at Lund University, 25th April 2008.  
1497 Once again I refer to Åselius.  
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warfare. Nevertheless, modern guerrillas and their early modern predecessors have 
surprisingly much in common. The US Army manual “Guerrilla Warfare and Special 
Forces Operations” from 1961 might just as well have described the friskytter as 
modern day guerrillas: 
 “Guerrilla warfare is the responsibility of the United States Army…Guerrilla warfare is characterised 
by offensive action. Guerrillas rely upon mobility, elusiveness, and surprise. In addition to these 
traits, there are other characteristics that should be mentioned: civilian support, outside sponsorship, 
political aspects, legal aspects, tactics and developmental aspects.”1498 
 
 In order to be able to come to terms with the idea that somebody is opposing us and 
(as it might seem to us) our whole style of life, that somebody is threatening our 
families, our religion and our country, it is all but too easy to consider that someone a 
thug. Well, actually someone capable of as much could not possibly be human. Putin 
wisely concludes that the cruelty of the rebels proves them to be wild beasts. Just like 
the Swedish judge who made a Danish rebel admit that he had indeed been living like 
a wild beast while he was with the “snaphaner”. I certainly do not know for sure if the 
Chechnyans are all scoundrels and wild beasts, but I do not think so. I do think, 
however, that sometimes it becomes all too easy to demonise and/or denigrate those 
whom we feel constitute a menace to our own big or small world. Sometimes human 
beings need to think of their opponents as animals in order to be able to crush them all 
the easier. It is far easier to dismember a pig than a fellow Christian. Joanna Bourke 
sustains that the difference between a bandit and a non-mercenary soldier is that the 
former kill for money whereas the latter kill for a sense of duty, but they still trade in 
violence and may indeed, share many aspects of their lives with each other. 1499 The 
difference between bandits and mercenaries (“contracto s”) is primarily that bandits 
work for themselves and are not condoned by a statewhereas mercenaries tend to 
function as representatives of a state although the soldiers themselves have no 
personal connection to that state whatsoever. But still, they all trade in violence. It is 
their job to kill other people in order to obtain something.   
 
Eric J. Hobsbawm argues that popular movements of defence against foreign invaders 
in the early modern era were spurred by social and religious ideologies, but not 
                                               
1498 Grenkevich, p.21. Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations, FM 31-21, Washington, DC, 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1961, p.3 and p.8. 
1499 Joanna Bourke, ”Barbarisation vs Civilisation in Time of War”, pp.19-28 in The Barbarisation of 
Warfare, George Kassimeris (ed.), New York University Press 2006.   
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national ones.1500 In accordance with Hobsbawm’s beliefs I do not think that national 
ideologies existed then in the sense of nationalism or nationalist ideology. But if 
”national” is understood in the sense of ”for one’s nation” or ”against another nation” 
then I disagree with Hobsbawm. Nor can I find that t e Danish snaphaner/friskytter 
had much in common with the peasants in Hobsbawm’s examples: 
”Peasants appear to have argued that they had been betrayed by the nobles whose duty as bellatores 
should have been to defend them against the Turks. Perhaps they had a secret agreement with the 
invaders? It was thus left to the common people to defend the true faith against paganism means of a 
crusade.”1501   
 
Perhaps Krabbe’s bailiffs and the snaphaner were out to ”accomplish the will of God, 
to make the truth prevail, or to advance the interests of a dynasty, or perhaps simply to 
defend their own against aggression.” I am quoting Elie Kedourie’s definition of the 
kind of patriotism that might have existed in early modern Europe because I believe it 
fully possible that he described the situation of the snaphaner/friskytter with these 
words. I am convinced that most snaphaner felt that they fought for their own families 
and their future. They definitely fought for the truth.  Perhaps they accomplished the 
will of God. If they believed the official Danish propaganda well then yes, they were 
indeed fighting for God too. If they believed the Swedish propaganda then they were 
preparing themselves to roast in the life after this. Many snaphaner/friskytter were 
deeply religious and risked their lives in order to go to church. Scanians in general 
were also critical of the Swedification of the whole liturgy and language in the 
churches, although on a spiritual level there is little or no difference between the 
Danish and Swedish church. The snaphaner/friskytter did not have to change religion 
but they might have been annoyed by the formal differences between the two state 
churches and that might have provided them with yet another reason for rebellion. 
Furthermore it is clearly fastidious to be threatened with the flames of hell and of 
doing the Devil’s business if you are a Christian. Religion was continuously used as 
propaganda during the Snaphane war. It wouldn’t have been so if people in general 
and snaphaner/friskytter in particular, had not been xpected to believe in it.  
But I do not believe religion was particularly important to the snaphaner as a 
motivating force for what they were doing. They were out killing Swedes in order to 
                                               
1500 Hobsbawm (1990), p.75. In a somewhat ambiguous manner he then declares that such movements 
could become ”the basis of a broader popular nationl patriotism.” 
1501 Hobsbawm (1990), p.75. In a somewhat ambiguous manner he then declares that such movements 
could become ”the basis of a broader popular nationl patriotism.” However, there is strong evidence 
that the Danes felt betrayed by the nobles in 1658-60 when the Scanian provinces where lost. 
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chase them off the land, not primarily because theyfelt that their religion was being 
threatened.  They fought for the Danish king and defended Danes. Which in a way 
corresponded to advancing a dynasty, but only in a way. They were definitely not out 
to manifest the genius of a particular nation as Kedourie felt that latter-day freedom 
fighters did.1502 
 
The fact that so many Scanians of all social classes went against their loyalty oaths 
indicates that either oaths were regarded of littleimportance or that the Scanians 
thought that the Swedes had broken their part of the pact first.  Loyalty to the king 
might have been the most important issue but I believ  that the sources that have been 
analysed here show that national/ethnic dividing lies mattered too. There is ample 
evidence of the frequency with which ethnicity and names connected to ethnicity were 
used as arguments in the conflict between Sweden and De mark. The Dannebrog was 
a symbol that meant something to peasants in the wilds of Blekinge. I believe that one 
should listen to how ordinary people explained their actions. Miller Anders from 
Kristianstad (Christianstad) did not say that he was fighting for his village or for his 
religion when he volunteered to help the Danish army in 1676: he did it because he 
had been waiting for them to come back for fifteen y ars and was sick and tired of the 
Swedes.1503 I am not saying that he might not have grown tired of the Swedes because 
his business was going down; but that he saw the Swedes as the root of his evils and 
did not consider himself one of them. The mere fact tha  Baron Krabbe’s employees 
did not try to stay neutral indicates that patron/client bonds were not always important 
in the conflict. The foot soldiers who fought the battle of Lund were actually 
encouraged to fight ”for king and fatherland” and if this kind of battle-cry was 
thought to be of use the it must have been because it was taken for granted that it 
would encounter some kind of emotional response.1504  My point is that among the 
loyalties and identities that mattered to many Scanians was also that of being Danes 
and perhaps Scanians. 
  
                                               
1502 Elie Kedourie, Nationalism, Hutchinson & Co LTD, London 1974, p.75. 
1503 Letter from Anders Möller’s widow to the King, 11th June 1677, Indkomne breve, DRA. She was 
writing because her husband had died of fright when t  Swedes came back. 
1504 Relation och Continuation Om dhet blodiga Slaget som emellan dhe Swenske och dhe Danske 
förelupen i Skåne widh Lund den 4. Decemb. 1676 til the Swenskes största Avantagie (An Account and 
a Continuation of the bloody battle that has taken place between the Swedes and the Danes in Scania 
near Lund the 4th December 1676 to the great Advantage of the Swedes), Lund 1676, p.3. 
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I see the snaphane-movement as the result of social discontent and as a form of 
protest against abuse and maltreatment.1505 Captain Keldsøn practically said so 
himself did he not? In Scandinavia both Fabricius and Alf Åberg supported this view. 
Nevertheless, the snaphane/friskytte movement was far from a case of typical social 
banditry. Contrary to Hobsbawm’s social bandits the friskytter/snaphaner were not 
restricted to peasant communities: the majority of them seem to have been of peasant 
origins but we also have cases of snaphaner/friskytter of extraction from all other 
social classes (including the gentry). How could they ave been against the rich? 
Hobsbawm believed that ”resistance to the rich, to foreign conquerors or oppressors, 
or to other forces destroying the traditional order of things” were the principal 
motivations of social bandits and that all these were blurred in their minds.1506 Now, I 
have not found any traces of a desire to fight the rich in my sources but very often I 
have found statements that seem to prove that the snaphaner/friskytter wanted to get 
rid of the foreign yoke and that they wanted things to be as they were in the good old 
Danish days.1507 The biblical image of “the foreign yoke” they were suffering under 
recurs in rhetoric from all strata of society, from the king to courtiers to servants, 
millers and farmhands and so do references to Babylonia and the Babylonians and 
suffering in a foreign land.  
 
Matias Skaanlund was the son of the bailiff of the Ellinge estate. He was sent to 
school at the prestigious Latin school (modern-day K tedralskolan) but dropped out 
because the teachers were Swedish and he could not suffer “the Swedish yoke” as he 
later declared in his memoirs. Instead his parents found a “nice Danish teacher” for 
him.1508 When Skaanlund had finished school he went into service with a Swedish 
nobleman (Herremand), but he quit his job since he could not stand “det svenske 
Væsen” i.e. the innermost nature, or character of the Swedes. Skaanlund then found a 
job in Copenhagen with Monsieur Georg Borch, in whose service he did not have to 
get into too close contact with Swedes. In fact, Skaanlund greatly enjoyed his job as a 
lackey and together with his master he visited Scania d stayed with the most famous 
(Danish-Scanian) noblemen such as the Thotts, Jørgen Krabbe and the Rantzaus, then 
                                               
1505 Or at least, of what people experienced as such.  
1506 Hobsbawm (2000), pp.21-22. 
1507 Hobsbawm (2000), p.24. 
1508 Fabricius II, p. 63. ”en smuk dansk Skolemester.” 
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they also went to see King Charles XI of Sweden during this sovereign’s visit to 
Malmö (Malmøe). 
 
Yet I believe that some of the snaphaner could be classified as social bandits. 
Hobsbawm characterises social bandits as ”peasants who refuse to submit, and in 
doing so stand out from their fellows...men who find themselves excluded from the 
usual career of their kind, and therefore forced into outlawry.”1509 Indeed, a number of 
snaphaner/friskytter were peasant boys who had run away from Swedish conscription 
or military service. Captain Severin had served 13 years in the Swedish army before 
he ran away and became a leading friskytte. He was an outlaw according to the 
Swedes, but certainly not according to the Danes with hom Severin identified. 
Although Hans Severin was a particular case in that he managed to betake himself 
from the other side of the Baltic to Copenhagen and then to Scania, he did not differ 
much from many other Scanian “deserters” from the Sw dish army in that he did not 
simply run away to become an outlaw but he went to the Danish army headquarters to 
offer them his services. Even after the Scanian Warmany Scanian boys ran away to 
do service in the Danish army. Many Scanians enrolled in the Danish army during the 
last decades of the 17th century. Danish recruiters had a special route betwe n the 
promontory of Kullen in north-western Scania and Zealand. Åberg cites a case from 
this late period when six farm boys from Bjäre were caught by the Swedes after 
having served a year in the Danish fleet. They were condemned to death but at the last 
moment they were deported to Pomerania.1510 From a Danish point of view this kind 
of young men were certainly not outlaws. But from a Swedish point of view they 
were. 
In the same manner friskytte captains like Nicolaus Hermansen, Hans Severin, 
Hendrik Frederik Dreyer, Captain Simon and Jakob Visseltoft might have been 
outlaws in Sweden but they were definitely not outcasts from Danish society. Some 
Danes admired the friskytter/snaphaner, some had patience with them, others loathed 
them, but they were outlaws neither to the law nor to the imagination of the people 
whose opinions we encounter in the sources. According to Hobsbawm the 
”programme” of social bandits is the ”defence or restoration of the traditional order of 
                                               
1509 Hobsbawm (2000), p.28. 
1510 Åberg 1958, p.117. In 1688 300 Scanians were conscripted for service in Pomerania but most of 
them deserted before the ship set off. In 1700 Charles XII finally allowed Scanians to apply for service 
as dragoons in the local regiments. 
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things”.1511 Which I believe applies perfectly to all kinds of snaphaner and friskytter 
except maybe those who were criminals, but then we know very little about that 
variety of snaphaner. From a Danish point of view we have no evidence at all that any 
of the friskytter should have been criminals and very vague evidence that any of the 
snaphaner should have been so. The Neapolitan bandits and peasants rose ”for the 
ideal of the ’good old’ society naturally symbolised by the ideal of the ’good old 
church and ’good old’ king.”1512 In the same manner the Scanian snaphaner and 
friskytter, and maybe the whole population, hankered for all that was symbolised by 
good old Denmark.1513 
 
I do not quite believe in the idea of a peaceful border area where Swedish and Danish 
farmers lived in a world of their own.1514 The local peace treaties that were concluded 
between villages on both side of the border have attracted much attention and they 
most certainly did exist and most certainly testified of a degree of trans-border 
community. Naturally it is very interesting that the villagers decided that they wanted 
to stand outside major conflicts and keep their good relations with their neighbours on 
the other side. No one could oppose the fact that vill gers and peasants in Småland 
and Göinge (Gønge) belonged to the same cultural are  nd that they had and have 
much in common. But I feel that the realities of the ”snaphane”-fights have been 
largely overseen by many scholars. There were localpe ce treaties but also local wars 
that were based on ethnic distinctions. The snaphaner from Göinge (Gønge) made 
incursions into Swedish villages, not just any village that might render booty.  There is 
very little evidence that indicates that the snaphaner/friskytter stood outside the 
peasant communities in any part of Scania or Blekinge (Bleging). In all legends, 
negative and positive alike, the snaphaner are eithr the owners or the sons of owners 
of farms. Very often still-existing and impressive farms like Simon Andersen’s in 
Tullsager/Tullsåker. The Swedish authorities certainly did not consider them as 
outsiders from the local communities. Nor did the Danish authorities. And in all 
sources the concepts of snaphaner/friskytter and peasants are mixed up with each 
                                               
1511 Hobsbawm (2000), p.29. 
1512 Hobsbawm (2000), p.31. 
1513 Both the Swedish king and the Governor General claimed that all Scanians had immediately chosen 
to side with the Danes and that they were enamoured by all things Danish. 
1514 Åberg 1958, p.79.  
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other in a way that tends to identify the first group with the second in many passages 
from both sides. 
 
By and large Fabricius analysed the friskytter and s aphaner correctly. But I believe 
there is ample evidence that it was not a “movement” tha  concerned the borderlands 
only, especially during the later parts of the Scanian War the border territories became 
too dangerous and the operations of the friskytter moved west and south.  In the case 
of the friskytter they were not even centred in the border area since the whole Göinge 
and Blekinge (Gønge and Bleging) area had been lost to the Swedes by the time the 
King’s Friskytter Corps was established. The King’s Friskytter made forays into that 
area but they were based in the Danish enclaves on the west coast and during winter-
time also on Zealand and Bornholm. Certainly, in geeral the friskytter and snaphaner 
preferred keeping to the woods, at least when they travelled. The friskytter that 
operated in the modern-day Ystad-Österlen area werebas d in Landskrona 
(Landscrone) and used the stripes of woodlands that cross the plains between 
Söderslätt and Österlen (back then it was called Östreslätt)1515 to travel safely from 
the headquarters to their area of action. The woodlands in the Sövdeborg area was one 
base along this track and it was reported to be “inf sted” with snaphaner. The Färs 
(Fers) area occupied much the same function. During the whole Snaphane War the 
sources mention snaphaner and friskytter in the whole of Scania and Blekinge 
(Bleging). I think it can therefore be firmly established that  what is generally called 
the snaphane movement and that includes the operations of the King’s Friskytter 
Corps concerned the whole of the area.1516 Somehow the snaphaner/friskytter outside 
the Gønge area have been ignored by later times. They turn up in legends in the south-
eastern area, but sometimes they are not called snapha er in these legends. It is a 
well-known legend that is being told to tourists in the Marsvinsholm area that the 
“men there” filled the castle with cow dung before surrendering it to the Swedes and 
that all the “men” in Mjölkelånga (Michelange) were lined up along the church wall, 
                                               
1515 Söderslätt and Österslätt simply means “the southern plains and the eastern plains”. Österslätt is 
known as Österlen, the road east, today. I do not believe that denomination existed in the 17th century. 
1516 I almost wrote Skånelandskapen, the Scanian provinces, but it would not be correct since I have 
found very little evidence of snaphaner/friskytter in the northwestern region of Halland during the 
1670’ies. They might very well have operated there too, but I have not got enough sources that allow 
me to say so. On the island of Bornholm that was safe in Danish hands from 1660 onwards there were 
plenty of snaphaner and friskytter but they used  it as a base and winter quarters since they did not need
to fight the Swedes there. 
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told to kneel and pray the Lord’s Prayer and then mrcilessly shot down.  Also, I had 
heard stories of the feats of the courageous Captain Bendix but had absolutely no idea 
that he was what the Swedes call a snaphane. In that sense a “snaphane” is a 
construction.  
 
One of Eric Hobsbawm’s most important points in Nations and Nationalism is that he 
stresses the multiplicity and compatibility of collective identities:  
”Men and women did not choose collective identification as they chose shoes, knowing that one could 
only put on one pair at a time. They had, and still have, several attachments and loyalties 
simultaneously, including nationality, and are simultaneously concerned with various aspects of life, 
any of which may at any one time be foremost in their minds, as occasion suggests.”1517  
 
In this case I think Hobsbawm has brought the essence of the ”machinery” of 
collective identities to the fore. I believe that he as characterised the way the diverse 
layers of identities and loyalties interplayed in early modern Europe, and still 
interplay today. Although the friskytter/snaphaner w re generally judged to be 
patriotic peasants and farmers in early modern Denmark and Scania, the nexus 
“pirates and snaphaner” was nevertheless frequent enough to appear in the 
“Dictionary of Old Danish”. And the Swedes contradicted themselves constantly 
during the Scanian war by boasting about the majors nd other officers of the 
friskytter they had met in combat. On the one hand the snaphaner were just a bunch of 
criminals, on the other hand their military ranks were recognised when one had 
vanquished them in combat. Grey zones, contrary opini ns and the like have always 
existed, even in the case of the fearsome snaphaner. A d I think it is important that we 
remember that.  
 
  
                                               





The feeling of community with the Danes runs deep in Scania. Det gamle land (the 
old country) is sometimes spoken of in the same terms as American immigrants speak 
of their or their ancestors’ country of origin.1518 Some time ago one of my older 
relatives asked me why I was still at university. I tried to explain that I was trying to 
write a dissertation and then my aunt wanted to know about what. I said that it was all 
about the guerrillas and the barons and counts of the Danish times. ”Well,” my aunt 
said ”If you’ve studied so much, maybe you could tel me why the hatred won’t go 
away” 
”The hatred?” 
”Yes. Deep down it’s always been there you know” she concluded. 
This little episode is as un-academic as can be. Thre is no way I could prove that 
every single generation since 1658 or 1679 has lived with hatred and bitterness. What 






                                               
1518 Cf. The lyrics of Danne Stråhed’s song “Vi bygger en bro” (We are building a bridge) from 2000. 
The refrain goes “we are building a bridge to the old country”. 
 442 
A Translation of Major Aage Harlof’s letter to the King, November 1679: 
 
“Great King, Most Gracious Lord! 
 
With the very deepest Humility I Major Aage Harlof now appeal to Your Majesty, on behalf of all my 
subordinates, and with the greatest Sigh, and with melancholy I have to communicate that we have 
appealed many Times to the Gentlemen of the Army Board in the humble Hope of obtaining Winter 
quarters and Retribution, all since we and our men came to this Land on the written Orders of the 
Gentlemen: 8 Companies, and at the time we were all fully equipped with Horses, Guns and all other 
accessories. But since we now, together with our Men, Horses and Grooms (Knechte)  have consumed 
all that we brought with us, and we left the best things we had with our People in Scania, and now we 
have been told that the Swedes have confiscated it all, in this manner we have become Freaks and 
Exiles because of our dutiful faithfulness to our lawful King and Master and to our dear Fatherland; 
nobody wants to take us in or restore us who have rud ly sneaked away from our Wives, Children, 
Families, Property and Patrimony, who of our own Fault re now living in great Poverty, yes some of 
them are being arrested and miserably executed in the Manner practised by tyrants only, all this have 
we suffered and lived through in the Hope that we might be saved from the Swedish Yoke and that, in 
times of Grace, we will be rewarded by our Most Gracious King. 
For these reasons we fall to Your Great Majesty’s gracious feet, begging for gracious Royal Merciful 
Mildness, that we poor exiled People, who have been ordered to come here in Your Royal Majesty’s 
Service, may obtain Payment and Lodgings just like the rest of the Cavalry and that we may stay with 
our own People, so that we in this cold Winter of Hunger and Frost might not perish. Your Royal 
Majesty and the whole rightful Royal House will be rewarded such Royal Grace upon the resurrection 
of the Righteous in front of God’s gracious tribunal. 
 
Your Royal Mightiest Majesty’s most subservient humble Servant 
 
Aage Harlof 
Major of the Friskytter 
 
Copenhagen 
18th Nov. 16791519 
                                               
1519 Incoming Mail (Indkomne Sager), 1679 No:413, DRA, published by Sörensson,  pp.59-60. 
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Contents of Aletophilus’ A Truthful Replique: 
1. The actual Replique that was written as a response to Sperling’s pamphlet against 
Krabbe. 
(80 pages) 
2. Petition from Lorenss Basck to Jöran Sperling, September? 1677 (3 pages). The 
letter that Basck wrote in order to denounce Krabbe. 
3. Jørgen Krabbe’s first letter of defence to the Royal Commissarial Court, October 5, 
1677, (14 pages). 
4. Lorenss Basch’s Reply to Krabbe, October 8, 1677, (8 pages). 
5. Jørgen Krabbe’s second court statement and replyto Basch, October 11, 1677, (10 
pages). 
6. The Prosecutor’s First Court Statement, October 5, 1677, (8 pages). 
7. Jørgen Krabbe’s Reply to the Prosecutor, October 9, 1677, (16 pages). 
8.The Prosecutor’s Second Court Statement, October 15, 1677, (20 pages). 
9. Extracts from Krabbe’s correspondence, read in court on October 15, 1677, (16 
pages). 
10. Jørgen Krabbe’s Reply to the Prosecutor’s Second Statement, October 23, 1677, 
(24 pages). 
11. Jørgen Krabbe’s Petition to the Commissars, November 14, 1677, (9 pages). 
12. Jørgen Krabbe’s Petition to Sperling, November 18, 1677, (3 pages). 
13. Jørgen Krabbe’s Petition to His Royal Majesty of Sweden, Boxing Day 1677, (24 
pages). 
14. Jöran Sperling’s Explanation of the reasons for pr secuting and executing Krabbe, 
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